The U.S. military’s failure to extract unconditional surrender from Iran is one of the most easily predictable outcomes in military history.

First, the war is an (expensive) escapade for the United States, but existential for Iran – where the U.S. and Israeli militaries have killed more than three thousand civilians, including 120 schoolgirls. Iran poses little threat to the U.S. homeland, and waging a war against it does nothing to improve anyone’s security.

Second, the United States has waged its war with airpower alone. This strategy was doomed from the beginning, as every prior attempt the United States has made to bomb its way in and out of war has failed. Yet lawmakers continue to prioritize programs like the next-generation nuclear capable bomber and sixth generation fighter jet, at great cost to U.S. taxpayers. Now is the perfect time for Congress to fundamentally rethink the military’s aircraft needs.

In its fiscal year 2027 budget, the White House requested that Congress accelerate the development of the F-47 stealth fighter jet while increasing total F-35 purchases from 47 last year to 85 this year. The administration simultaneously requested over six billion for the B-21 Raider, the next generation bomber set to replace the B-2. But these programs aren’t necessary to protect the U.S. homeland from attack, the primary purpose of the military. Instead, the United States uses them to project force in parts of the world where it has no business conducting military operations, like Iran.

The United States and Israel began bombing Iran in late February, no doubt buoyed by the successful U.S. kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. President Trump’s stated goals were to eliminate Iran’s ballistic missiles, “annihilate” the Iranian navy, destroy the country’s ability to support proxy groups throughout the region, and ensure the country can never acquire a nuclear weapon. The president doubled down a few days later by calling for Iran’s “unconditional surrender.” In effect, the president declared all-out war on Iran, but it was unclear whether the war would include ground troops. As the weeks passed, however, a ground invasion became an increasingly dangerous prospect.

Airstrikes and missile launches had failed to produce the results that the United States sought, and the administration had few options left: put boots on the ground or end its senseless war on Iran. It is obvious now that the president believed he would be able to achieve massive operational and strategic goals solely through an airpower campaign. The blame for the order belongs to President Trump, though he was certainly goaded by analysts promising a war with Iran would be “sharp and short” with aviation alone. Even before the Iran war, history suggested otherwise.

The United States has conducted several costly experiments to test the theories of airpower advanced by thinkers like the Italian Giulio Douhet and the American Billy Mitchell: namely that strategic bombing can independently win wars without the Army or Navy. The Combined Bomber Offensive against Germany during World War II and the Desert Storm air campaign in 1991 are prime examples of the folly in their thinking. The rationale for both airpower campaigns was that air forces could independently win both of those wars, saving blood and treasure. D-Day and the 100-hour ground campaign against the Iraqi Army is all the proof anyone needs of their failure.

The impulse to escalate with ground troops when an air campaign predictably fails can be called the “airpower dilemma.” It is a danger created by people who sell the idea that wars can be won with airpower alone, and it should be avoided at all costs. The best way to avoid the airpower dilemma is, of course, to avoid war in the first place.

The outcome of the U.S. military strategy in Iran was foreseeable, but Trump’s reaction to it was not. He could have doubled down on the war by ordering a ground invasion and chasing after a political goal he originally did not deem worthy of such a sacrifice. Instead, he has so far sought to negotiate a ceasefire and eventual peace deal. He deserves some credit for this.

Like the president, lawmakers are easily influenced by the grandiose claims made by airpower advocates. Let the U.S. war on Iran be a lesson to them: Airpower alone does not win wars, and continuing to fund programs based on a disproved theory is a disservice to U.S. taxpayers. When it comes to defense, the public deserves an effective military that protects them at the lowest cost possible. A military strategy reliant on airpower alone is fundamentally at odds with the public interest, and lawmakers should abandon it.