Editor’s Note: Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco is a PhD candidate in Institutions and Politics at the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart of Milan, Italy. His research interests revolve around the Gulf region and maritime security.

By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project

Iranian efforts to translate wartime leverage over the Strait of Hormuz into a lasting political and legal role in governing the Persian Gulf’s only gateway are threatening to collapse a fragile agreement with the U.S. not even a month after it was signed.

Furious at continued Iranian strikes at vessels that had not coordinated their routes with an Iranian “Persian Gulf Strait Authority” and new attacks on U.S. bases in Kuwait and Bahrain, U.S. President Donald Trump on July 7 announced that the U.S. was revoking waivers that allowed Iran to freely sell oil and ordered the U.S. military to mount severe retaliatory strikes on Iranian coastal military installations. On July 8, Trump suggested that the memorandum of understanding signed by the U.S. and Iran on June 17 might itself be over, calling Iranians “scum” and “sick people.”

Early efforts to restore freedom of navigation in the Strait have clearly failed.

On June 23, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) launched a temporary shipping corridor meant to relieve the crisis facing roughly 11,000 seafarers stranded in the Persian Gulf since the U.S. and Israel attacked Iran in late February. The initiative was ostensibly backed by Iran as well as Oman, the other Persian Gulf littoral countries, the United States, and the shipping industry.

The plan established a process to reduce vessel congestion while avoiding mines planted during the war by Iran. Merchant vessels were first directed to designated waiting areas, then allowed to choose either a northern route through Iranian waters or a southern route through Omani waters, with each state responsible for safety within its corridor.

Hundreds of large vessels could not be released into narrow waterways without unacceptable risks of collision and navigational errors. Sequencing movements required significant coordination between seafarers and coastal authorities, but initial implementation suggested the concept was workable.

The experiment, however, unraveled quickly. On June 25, the Singapore-flagged container ship Ever Lovely was struck by an Iranian drone while transiting the southern corridor. The same day, the IMO suspended the evacuation process. In four days, the mechanism had facilitated the departure of 136 vessels and roughly 2,900 seafarers.

However, the pause did not stop maritime traffic. Vessels continued using both routes, accepting higher risks, confirmed on June 27 when the Panama-flagged tanker Kiku was also hit by an Iranian drone in the southern corridor.

These attacks triggered a calibrated U.S. military response, with Central Command striking Iranian drone and missile storage sites, coastal radar, and mine-laying capabilities, reinforcing the cycle of confrontation the IMO initiative had sought to interrupt.

After a short lull, Iran launched a new offensive on commercial shipping on July 6, striking three merchant vessels, including the Qatar-owned liquefied natural gas carrier Al Rekayyat and the Saudi Arabia-flagged tanker Wedyan, transiting the southern corridor. As in previous escalation cycles, the U.S. responded, hitting 80 Iranian military targets, while the Trump administration simultaneously revoked the sanctions waiver that had temporarily allowed unfettered Iranian oil exports.

Iran’s Dual Strategy

Iran is pursuing parallel bargaining tactics, alternating technical negotiations with calibrated confrontation.

On the same day the IMO inaugurated the corridor mechanism, Oman and Iran convened their first ministerial meeting to negotiate the future administration of Hormuz. The talks, envisaged under Article 5 of the US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding, focused on developing a framework for maritime services, navigational assistance, and related costs.

Led by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the Iranian delegation met Omani Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr Albusaidi in Muscat. Both sides reaffirmed commitment to freedom of navigation while agreeing to consult other Gulf states and relevant stakeholders on Hormuz governance.

Diplomacy, however, unfolded alongside coercion. On June 25, as Araghchi and Albusaidi held a follow-up call praising their “productive consultations,” Iran targeted the Ever Lovely.

From an Iranian perspective, rather than derailing negotiations, the attack complemented them, reminding Oman and the broader shipping community that any future arrangement for Hormuz ultimately depends on Tehran’s acquiescence. This dual approach allows Iran to keep negotiations running while simultaneously demonstrating its capacity to disrupt maritime traffic.

On June 29, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi and Omani ambassador-at-large Sheik Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah Al-Hinai met in Muscat to discuss Hormuz’s administration. The continuation of technical talks suggests neither side is willing to abandon negotiations, even as security conditions remain volatile.

Redefining Hormuz’s Status

Although international attention regarding the waterway was minimal before the war, Iran has long viewed Hormuz as a flexible instrument of statecraft, modulating pressure on maritime traffic according to its confrontations with the U.S. and its Persian Gulf Arab neighbors.

Until 2026, this leverage remained below the threshold of outright interdiction, relying on vessel seizures, sabotage, and ship harassments. Operation Epic Fury, however, fundamentally altered Tehran’s calculus, degrading Iran’s military infrastructure and exposing its vulnerability to conventional force.

Faced with a widening military imbalance, Iran turned to Hormuz as one of the few domains where it could impose costs on its adversaries. Rather than seeking naval parity, Iran has sought strategic leverage by retaining the ability to selectively disrupt navigation. Still, Tehran’s ambitions seem to have extended beyond coercion as it is attempts to reshape the legal and political framework governing the Strait.

Since the MoU was signed, Iranian officials have made it clear they do not intend to restore the pre-war status quo of unrestricted transit, instead seeking a mechanism with Oman to impose “service charges” on transiting vessels.

During the conflict, Iran reportedly tested such a system, setting up a Persian Gulf Strait Authority and charging up to $2 million per passage. For Tehran, the ceasefire has become an opportunity to transform a wartime experiment into an enduring precedent.

Iran’s objective, however, runs against the legal framework governing international straits. Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, coastal states cannot charge vessels simply for exercising the right of passage. Fees are permissible only for specific services such as pilotage, towage, or channel maintenance.

Iran, nevertheless, continues to press for a charging mechanism, with officials portraying cost-free navigation as a temporary concession tied to the ceasefire rather than a permanent principle.

Oman’s Predicament

Oman now faces its most difficult diplomatic challenge since the crisis began, trying to reconcile Iran’s push to control Hormuz with regional and international resistance to altering its legal status.

For Arab countries on the Persian Gulf, the issue extends beyond transit fees. A formally recognized Iranian role in regulating navigation would institutionalize Tehran’s leverage over the only maritime outlet for most of these nations. Even Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, despite alternative routes, remain heavily dependent on Persian Gulf shipping.

Arab governments are equally concerned that revenues from a compulsory charging mechanism could finance the very missile and drone arsenal that threatens their security. Accepting Iranian demands, in their view, would set a dangerous precedent unlikely to remain confined to maritime administration.

Washington and its European partners — which will discuss the issue at the NATO summit this week in Turkey — share similar concerns, driven less by the cost of transit fees than by the implications of legitimizing Iranian control over an international chokepoint. Tehran’s opposition to French-Omani proposals to clear sea mines reinforces concerns that Iran seeks exclusive authority over both the governance and security of Hormuz.

The shipping industry approaches the issue differently. Its overriding interest is predictability, which underpins freight rates, insurance premiums, and crew safety. While many operators reject compulsory charges as incompatible with international law, others view a negotiated fee-for-services arrangement as preferable to recurring military escalation.

Recognizing these interests, Oman has reportedly floated a compromise centered on fees for services rather than charges for the right of passage, a distinction that may prove politically useful, but not necessarily sufficient to bridge the widening gap with Tehran.

Outlook is Murky

Returning to the pre-conflict status quo appears increasingly unlikely. The real question is not whether Hormuz’s governance will change, but how far different stakeholders are prepared to accommodate Iranian demands without legitimizing a precedent that could reshape the Strait for years to come. Any sustainable arrangement would require all sides to abandon maximalist positions and settle for a narrower compromise.

Iran is deliberately testing those limits, gauging how much pressure Oman, its other neighbors, and the shipping industry are willing to absorb.

The collapse of the IMO-backed evacuation mechanism illustrates its own limits. The corridor failed not because of operational shortcomings, but because maritime safety proved inseparable from strategic competition.

Iran may succeed in extracting concessions at the negotiating table, but each attack on commercial shipping erodes trust, narrows the space for compromise, and increases the risk of miscalculation. In doing so, Tehran’s brinkmanship may secure tactical leverage, but it also makes a durable settlement over Hormuz harder to achieve.