On May 26, 2026, amid looming questions about the grouping’s continuation, strategic intent, and effectiveness, the 11^th Quad foreign ministers’ meeting was held in New Delhi, with Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar hosting Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong, Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi, and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio. The joint statement issued at its conclusion reiterated many of the grouping’s long-held ideals of defending the rule of law, sovereignty, and territorial integrity in the Indo-Pacific as well as ensuring peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. Given the situation in the Middle East, the leaders specifically asserted the importance of free and safe navigation as well as unimpeded flow of commerce in the Strait of Hormuz. The meeting delivered several new initiatives, such as on Indo-Pacific energy security and maritime surveillance collaboration, as well as expanded or continued older ones, through the intent to build a Common Operating Picture across the region, coordinating responses and shared logistics during regional disasters, and developing a critical minerals framework. And while overt mentions of Chinese strategic and economic coercion were missing from the Quad statement, as they always are, there were plenty of references to specific concerns on unilateral changes to the regional status quo by force, critical mineral export restrictions, and dangerous maneuvers by military aircraft and maritime militia vessels in the South China Sea, all pointing to Beijing. Indeed, the convening of the grouping invited sharp rebuke from China, which opposed “exclusive cliques or engaging in bloc confrontation.” While the gathering may have settled questions about the Quad’s existence, uncertainty remains about the grouping’s ability to deliver on expectations. Stimson experts reflect on the substance of this recent meeting, what it says about the priorities of each Quad member, and the future of the grouping.  

What had New Delhi hoped to achieve with this Quad meeting, and was it able to deliver?

Akriti Vasudeva Kalyankar
Fellow

It has become routine in Indian strategic circles to rue the lack of importance, efficacy, and impact of the Quad. But this particular argument became more pronounced over the past year, as President Donald Trump’s National Security Strategy prioritized the Western hemisphere over the Indo-Pacific. And particularly amid the downturn in US-India relations, which more than likely resulted in the 2025 Quad leaders’ summit in India fizzling out. Thus, New Delhi’s ability to convene this meeting of the Quad foreign ministers is telling in many ways.

For one, hosting this forum at a time of various ongoing international conflicts with implications for the Indo-Pacific sends a message of the Quad’s relevance and reinvigoration. Further, securing a vocal public commitment from the United States on the importance of the Quad as well as delivering what appear to be outcomes that drive the grouping forward are worthy wins. 

For those watching closely, New Delhi also sent an unmistakable signal about its commitment to ensuring transparency and assisting regional partners in understanding sources of unlawful maritime activities in the Indian Ocean Region. The Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) program finally being operationalized at India’s Information Fusion Center at Gurugram after years of delay is a sign that the Quad can help partners detect and respond to common maritime challenges. For those arguing that the Quad has no military orientation, one only has to look at the continuation of the Quad-at-Sea Ship Observer Mission, the next to be hosted by India, the sharing of real-time information to address a range of maritime threats through the Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Collaboration initiative, and the coordination of Standard Operating Procedures during disasters to be proven wrong.   

There was another critical outcome the convening in New Delhi delivered — a more streamlined and focused Quad. It’s clear that the Quad is becoming more limited both in scope and in its level of representation, as various commentators have pointed out. And that may not be a bad thing if it helps the forum focus on the one thing it has always struggled with — delivering tangible benefits for its members and others in the region. 

What indication did this meeting provide on the United States’ objectives in the Indo-Pacific?

Elizabeth Threlkeld
Senior Fellow and Director, South Asia Program

At a time when President Trump’s engagement with China and focus on the Middle East have raised questions among Indo-Pacific partners about the U.S. commitment to regional cooperation, the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting offered a timely temperature check on Washington’s approach. In both his bilateral visit to India and Quad participation, Secretary of State Marco Rubio sought to convey an air of normalcy in U.S. engagement in the region, projecting Washington’s Indo-Pacific goals as compatible with and complementary to the President’s America First agenda. That message was broadly reassuring, but whether Washington can sustain the attention the partnership demands amid competing priorities is far from certain.

Despite concerns about the lack of a leader-level Quad meeting during Trump’s second term, Rubio emphasized that Washington was “deeply committed” to the partnership and described it as a “linchpin and a cornerstone of our global strategy.” He cast the grouping as a vehicle for “real achievements and real accomplishments,” drawing a contrast with what he characterized as a more process-heavy previous approach despite progress under the Biden administration on issues including undersea cable infrastructure, maritime domain awareness, and global health. Prospects for a near-term leader-level Quad meeting remain unclear as the Joint Statement was silent on the timing of a potential summit – notable after last July’s statement had anticipated an India-hosted meeting in 2025 that never materialized. Rubio’s assertion that all sides were working toward a summit later this year suggests some hope amid continued uncertainty.

In outlining the Indo-Pacific’s importance more broadly, Rubio framed the region in economic and trade terms consistent with the administration’s broader priorities. He emphasized that 60% of global maritime trade transits the Indo-Pacific and pointed to the importance of maintaining the unimpeded flow of goods, drawing an implicit lesson from disruptions to the Strait of Hormuz and their cascading effects on global shipping. The meeting’s headline deliverables on maritime surveillance, energy and fuel security, port capacity, and critical minerals reinforced this framing, suggesting that Washington seeks to position the Indo-Pacific primarily as a theater for supply-chain resilience and economic competition.

The joint statement was circumspect on traditional security cooperation, but the economic and supply-chain framing carries its own security logic. Maritime surveillance and domain awareness, progress on regional logistics coordination, and tabletop exercises on a range of topics all have clear operational relevance, even if packaged as resilience or capacity-building measures. The statement also retained pointed language on the South and East China Seas, calling out coercive and destabilizing conduct without naming China directly.

Overall, the meeting signaled broad continuity in U.S. engagement, with the Quad retained as a central pillar of regional strategy but with a narrower and more targeted agenda than under the previous U.S. administration. Whether that continuity holds will depend in part on whether Washington can sustain the political attention the partnership requires, with competing priorities in the Middle East, continued uncertainty on China policy, and the absence of a confirmed summit date all leaving room for doubt.

How did the meeting’s outcomes look from Japan’s perspective, and what did it seek to emphasize?

Andrew Oros
Senior Fellow and Director, Japan Program

The latest gathering of the Quad foreign ministers offered another opportunity for Japanese political leadership to emphasize their renewed commitment to a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi emphasized to reporters at a joint press conference after the formal meeting how robust Quad cooperation forms an important component of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s efforts to invigorate the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” initiative that was a cornerstone of the diplomacy of her political mentor, the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Takaichi herself emphasized the importance of this initiative in a speech she delivered in Hanoi on May 2.

Takaichi as well as her foreign minister, defense minister, and other cabinet ministers traveled the globe earlier in May – during the so-called Golden Week series of holidays in Japan – to advocate for this alternative-to-China approach to international order. There was a notable focus in this year’s choice of regional states which all have expressed their own concerns about China – including Takaichi’s visits to Vietnam and Australia and her defense minister’s visits to the Philippines and Indonesia, all countries that are deepening defense cooperation with Japan while watching China’s expanding regional security role with concern.

The symbolism of regular meetings of Quad ministers builds on Japan’s substantial bilateral diplomacy with Quad members, including a meeting between Motegi and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on May 26 and a meeting between Takaichi and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese earlier this month. Much of Japan’s expanded military cooperation in the region overlaps with similar U.S. outreach to these states and is amplified through the deepening United States-Japan military alliance, a topic of the Trump-Takaichi meeting in Washington in March.

Much early reporting on this latest Quad foreign ministers’ meeting noted the lack of a Quad leaders’ summit in 2025 and concern that 2026 also may not see a leader’s summit. The first Quad leaders’ meeting was held in Tokyo in May 2022, with Japan continuing to seek an annual leaders’ summit – however, Japan is regularly meeting with the top political leadership of Quad states regardless.

By contrast, an oft-stated top-level objective of Trump administration foreign policy is action over words. This was evident in the fact sheet released by the U.S. State Department after the meeting, which emphasized new initiatives on coordinated critical minerals supply chains, maritime surveillance, and energy security as well as deepened cooperation in maritime domain awareness and resilience of undersea cable and radio access networks. Through multi-level diplomacy, including the Quad platform, Japan is achieving both its desired symbolism as a defender of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” as well as actionable items to make Japan more secure and prosperous.

How does Australia see this convening fitting with its vision for the Indo-Pacific?

Kelly Grieco
Senior Fellow

Ahead of this year’s Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting, Australian obituary writers sharpened their pens. Writing in the Lowy Institute’s Interpreter, the analyst Michael Shoebridge spoke for many when he pronounced the grouping “either dead or on life support.” Much of that pessimism reflected doubts about President Donald Trump’s commitment to the grouping.

The view from Canberra is not entirely wrong. The Trump administration has given the Quad limited attention — its National Security Strategy mentions it only in passing, and its National Defense Strategy omits it altogether. Trump also canceled his planned appearance at last year’s leaders’ summit amid tensions with New Delhi over tariffs and other disputes.

But the singular focus on Trump misses the broader strategic reality: The Quad’s limits are structural, rooted in divergent national interests, while its failure to deliver predates Trump’s return to office. Trump is not the source of the Quad’s problems, but he is also unlikely to fix them.

Consider the July 2024 Joint Foreign Ministers’ statement, issued at the height of President Joe’s Biden’s engagement with the grouping. It still could not name China directly, still bent to Indian preferences on the Ukraine war with carefully hedged language, and still read more like a to-do list than a record of outcomes. It is India’s insistence on strategic autonomy — not the occupant in the White House — that places hard limits on how far the Quad can move toward tighter political alignment. Japan and Australia have consistently pushed for a more security-focused grouping while India has consistently resisted. That tension long predates Trump and will long outlast him.

The result is a persistent gap between ambition and outcomes. The Quad’s most prominent Biden-era initiative — a commitment to distribute 1.2 billion vaccine doses across the Indo-Pacific by the end of 2022 — fell badly short, delivering fewer than 800 million in total. Analysts writing during Biden’s term were already warning that the Quad’s “expanding range of initiatives has yet to produce meaningful results, and their implementation lacks coordination and coherence.”

More recently, the critical minerals framework announced with fanfare in New Delhi this week was first launched at last July’s Washington meeting — the $20 billion mobilization target attached to it this week is just that, a target, not committed funding. The Quad has consistently been better at announcing initiatives than delivering results. That is a structural problem, not a Trump-specific one.

Australia, as a vocal champion of Quad ambition and one that has renewed its commitment to the Indo-Pacific in its recent 2026 National Defence Strategy, is best placed to push for accountability from within the grouping. Each ministerial meeting has added to the list of initiatives without reckoning with what the last one actually delivered. As the next host, Canberra should insist that future joint statements should include an explicit review of progress against prior commitments before announcing new ones. That single change would do more to enhance the Quad’s credibility than any number of new initiatives.

The Quad has real limits. It has always had them. But a grouping that is structurally constrained is not the same as one that is dying — and what matters now is whether Canberra and its partners can finally close the gap between ambition and execution.