Türkiye’s Geopolitical Conundrum
Türkiye often finds itself in a sort of purgatory. Its location as a crossroads between East and West is one of its greatest strengths, but many Turks want it to be seen as a “European Power.” Likewise, Türkiye doesn’t neatly fit into a “Middle East” or “Asia” category. Geographically, Türkiye can contribute to a more secure Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean region; the 1936 Montreux treaty gave much of the jurisdiction of the Dardanelles and Bosporus straits to Türkiye, allowing it to largely control access to the Black Sea. It has also acted as a mediator in disputes that transcend neat geographic lines.
Türkiye joined NATO in 1952 but has long had a complicated relationship within the alliance. Many of the people we spoke with pointed to the 1964 “Johnson Letter,” warning Ankara against using U.S. weapons in Cyprus, as a source of distrust. Tensions deepened after Türkiye’s 1974 intervention in Cyprus triggered a U.S. arms embargo. Similar restrictions over the years — including European export limits, and U.S. CAATSA sanctions imposed in late 2020, to punish Türkiye for its purchase of the S-400 air-defense system from Russia — reinforced perceptions of a conditional partnership.
Beyond weapons sales (or lack thereof), Turkish experts lamented what they viewed as the double standards embedded within US-Turkish relations. As one person said, “Strategic issues favor Türkiye, cultural or political ones favor those who are not friends of Türkiye: Armenia, Israel, and Greece.” Another persistent source of tension revolves around the Kurds. In other words, public opinion in the United States and elsewhere is influenced by diaspora groups that have long-standing disputes with Türkiye. As such, the United States is happy for Turkish support and a close relationship when it is strategically important but maintains its distance when that it is not. A recent case of this involves the Trump administration’s “Board of Peace” for Gaza, where the fact that Türkiye is a Muslim-majority, secular democracy has bolstered the board’s legitimacy.
The sense of double standards can also be traced to the War on Terror. Multiple interlocutors highlighted how U.S. political leaders and military officers were aggrieved when the Turkish Parliament voted in March 2003 to block the United States from using Turkish territory to prosecute the war in Iraq. This was followed in July that year by the “Hood event,” in which 11 Turkish soldiers were apprehended, hooded, and detained by U.S. troops. These incidents created something of a “split-screen” in which Türkiye was seen as a valuable ally in NATO (and to those in EUCOM) and a thorn in the side for those U.S. officials responsible for the Middle East (e.g. leaders in CENTCOM).
In short, Türkiye is seen (and often sees itself) as a “mediator,” at best, and “stuck in the middle” of geopolitical strife, at worst. While Türkiye is not always on the United States’ or Europe’s “side,” that is, in part, because it has not always been invited or allowed to be.
Türkiye’s Strategy
Unsurprisingly, this has contributed to many misunderstandings, especially regarding Ukraine, NATO, and Syria. Our interlocutors emphasized geography and history –including proximity to Russia and an awkward relationship with Europe – as drivers of a Turkish grand strategy characterized by autonomy, mediation, and flexibility.
This has led to an accusation that Türkiye is “playing both sides” with respect to the Ukraine war. It is true that Türkiye is not reflexively hawkish regarding Russia. Multiple experts told us that Turks do not want “the Black Sea to turn into a Russian lake,” but they also don’t seek to humiliate Russia or destroy the Russian economy. As one person said, “Türkiye is pro-Kyiv, but not overly anti-Moscow.” Another shared this sentiment: “An unstable Russia is the worst-case scenario.”
On the other hand, everyone that we spoke with expressed a desire to see a sovereign and independent Ukraine at the end of the war. They pointed to efforts like the Black Sea Grain Initiative as proof of Türkiye’s commitment to Ukraine’s survival. One expert said, “The Russians are not happy about what we are doing, and the Ukrainians are not happy with what we are doing, which means that it’s good.”
Türkiye’s pragmatic approach to the war aligns with that of the Trump administration but has put Ankara at odds with many of European NATO allies. That is only one of several points of contention, however; Türkiye’s ongoing disputes with Greece and Cyprus, and its hostility toward the Kurds, were also mentioned. Interlocutors complained to us that Greece, Cyprus, France, and countries with large Kurdish populations (including the Netherlands, Germany, and Sweden) block Türkiye from participating fully in European defense. And nearly everyone we talked to was concerned that the future of European security would be built around and through the EU — which pointedly does not include Türkiye.
Such fears are warranted. The EU has not allowed Türkiye to participate in its defense industrial packages — like Security Action for Europe (SAFE) or Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) — even though Brussels has opened the door to non-EU countries like Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. As a result, Türkiye is still reliant on NATO for security, even if, as one person explained to us, Turks do not “fully trust it.” (For more on Türkiye’s potential role in European security, see this report by Carnegie Senior Fellow Alper Coşkun.)
Syria was another topic of conversation. And, here again, U.S., European, and Turkish interests have not always aligned. Since the fall of former Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, however, the greater fear has been that Türkiye and Israel would come into conflict. For now, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, like U.S. President Donald Trump, is giving Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa a chance. Turkish experts explained that this is desirable for Türkiye because they see a stable, yet conservative, Syria as less of a threat than a Syria in chaos. Israel, on the other hand, is skeptical of Al-Sharaa’s jihadist background and appears to be trying to thwart his bid to unite Syria under Damascus’s rule for the first time in nearly 15 years.
This dispute puts the United States in a very awkward position. It has had close security ties with both Israel and Türkiye for decades. And while Türkiye is often strategically aligned with U.S. interests, that is not always reflected in U.S. leaders’ rhetoric. In fact, the Trump administration’s most recent National Defense strategy went so far as to call Israel a “model ally.” Türkiye is not mentioned.
We expected our conversations to fix on the bitter feud between Erdogan and Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu, but most experts held their fire. One expert, while expressing the view that Israel was on the wrong side of history regarding Syria, also admitted that “there can be disagreements among allies.”
Embargoes Have Paradoxically Strengthened Türkiye
In fact, Türkiye’s strategic culture has been built around the ability to cooperate with allies even amidst deep and longstanding disagreements. It also reflects Ankara’s resiliency and adaptability. Turkish experts we talked to were proud that Türkiye was a “weightlifting NATO member,” meaning one “that can contribute to NATO’s main missions — defense and deterrence — across the board in all domains.”
But Türkiye has only been able to become a “weightlifting” ally because of how it responded to U.S. and European pressure — and occasional alienation. For example, Türkiye began building its own defense industry during the embargos imposed in response to its military intervention into Northern Cyprus in 1974. More recently, following Türkiye’s military offensive against a Kurdish group in Northern Syria with close links to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Germany and other European states stopped selling weapons in October 2019. This, too, motivated the Turks to become more self-reliant.
And now Türkiye is reaping the rewards. The Bayraktar TB2 is a perfect example of this. The Turkish drone has played a key role in Ukraine’s defense. NATO members, including Poland, have now purchased them. And the TB2 is not Türkiye’s only defense export; Turkish defense company ASFAT has sold ships to Romania and Indonesia. As one expert boasted, “We build our own when we are not able to buy from others.”
And that is still the case today. As discussed above, the EU shut the Turks out of various funding mechanisms, such as SAFE. During the first Trump administration, the United States expelled Türkiye from the F-35 program, following Erdogan’s purchase of Russian S-400s. The experts we met with lamented Türkiye’s exclusion from these programs but noted Türkiye’s ability to find workarounds or otherwise replace American or European equipment. For example, Baykar, the maker of the TB2, created a joint venture with Italy’s Leonardo, which will allow joint production of drones potentially using SAFE funds. One interlocutor explained, “Right now we want F-35s, but in three, four, or five years, we might not need them anymore.” Another went even farther, saying that it was good that Türkiye could no longer obtain F-35s: “They are too expensive to buy, and their lifespan updates are too expensive as well.”
We came away from these discussions with a clearer sense of how Türkiye has managed to maintain, and even expand, its freedom of maneuver as it navigated disputes with the United States and Europe. And there’s a lesson here for other U.S. allies scrambling to develop their own defense industries in the face of pressure from Washington. Rather than trying to appease, the Turks built. And, as a result, they are now a stronger player — and a stronger ally.
