Issue Brief

Recognizing Reality: A Case for Nationalizing the US Arms Industry

Outlining the perverse incentives for policymakers to prioritize corporate interests over strategic considerations — and how to change the politics of national security policymaking

By Julia Gledhill Author • Emma Ashford Editor • Nevada Joan Lee Editor

Grand Strategy

September 15, 2025

This essay is part of the New Visions for Grand Strategy Project. You can find the entire collection of essays on the project page and listen to Julia Gledhill discuss her essay with Stimson Senior Fellow Emma Ashford on The Grand Strategy Sessions podcast

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

Full New Visions Report (PDF)

Editor’s Note: The New Visions for Grand Strategy Project brought scholars from across the political and ideological spectrum to discuss what the future has in store for the United States in the world. The editors of this series sought to foster a lively debate about America’s global role and strategic futures. Each author in this collection speaks for himself or herself alone, and their views do not reflect the official positions of the Henry L. Stimson Center, or of their own employers.

By Emma Ashford, Senior Fellow, Reimagining U.S. Grand Strategy Program

Introduction

Strategic thinking often falls victim to politics. For example, lawmakers refuse to make difficult decisions about what weapons the U.S. military really needs and what it can practically acquire over the long term. Instead, lawmakers adopt a “yes, and” approach to Pentagon spending and weapons acquisition. This approach is a natural outgrowth of the U.S. obsession with global military dominance.

However, superfluous spending and weapons acquisition would not necessarily cease with the publication of a narrowly focused National Security Strategy — or a major cut to the Pentagon’s budget. Military contractors would continue to influence policymakers through lobbying and political contributions to congressional campaigns. Members of Congress and their family members may still own and trade stocks in the arms industry. The military services would still fight to advance their own perspectives on how to win wars, competing for budgets, bodies, and valor. Politics would persist — and as American political scientist Harold Lasswell put it, politics is about who gets what, when, and how.¹

Politics helps to shape policymakers’ choices about Pentagon spending and weapons acquisition, and the strategic rationales follow. This paper explains why the financial interests of military contractors so often take precedence over rigorous strategic analysis and U.S. public interest in avoiding war and Pentagon waste. Ultimately, it argues that, regardless of strategy, the U.S. arms industry requires fundamental reform. It is highly consolidated, specialized, and dependent on the U.S. government — rendering the largest military contractors public firms in everything but name. Policymakers should consider assuming some degree of public ownership over the arms industry to regain control over Pentagon budgeting and weapons acquisition, and to ensure that it corresponds with a coherent grand strategy.

Strategy and Pentagon Budgeting

Policymakers have long struggled to connect Pentagon budgeting and acquisition decisions with strategy. Consider the case of the nuclear triad. Its establishment was not a strategic decision, but a product of interservice rivalry. The services fought to advance their respective theories of nuclear use in an effort to win funding for systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons.² Ultimately, there was no single winner of this budget competition. The triad was born when the United States established nuclear delivery systems for potential launch from the land, the sea, and the air.

Today, the biggest winner of the triad is Northrop Grumman — one of the “big five” U.S. military contractors. The company produces the B-21 bomber and the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), as well as critical components of the Columbia and Virginia-class submarines. As antitrust reformers at the American Economic Liberties Project put it, America’s triad would not have any legs without Northrop Grumman.³ In turn, the company is a loud voice in the nuclear weapons lobby, which works to expand the U.S. nuclear arsenal through modernization programs that are estimated to cost nearly $2 trillion over the next 30 years.⁴

During the next decade, the United States is projected to spend $946 billion on nuclear modernization — a 25% increase over the previous estimate for 2023-2032.⁵ The Sentinel ICBM program is the main culprit for such inflated nuclear spending, exceeding its initial budget estimate by over 80%.⁶ The Sentinel’s shocking sticker price is reason enough to scrutinize the program, but its strategic value is also questionable. In the event of a nuclear attack, the United States does not need ICBMs to launch a retaliatory nuclear strike — thus the Sentinel is unnecessary to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent.⁷

Unfortunately, however, a procurement approach grounded in parochial interests and pork barrel politics makes it extremely difficult to limit weapons acquisition to systems that align with a focused strategy. Perverse incentives to pad the profits of military contractors constrain policymakers from making the decisions necessary to better align budgets with strategy. Yet the biggest arms producers depend almost entirely on government contracts and face virtually no competition. U.S. military contracting is far from a free market.

The largest military contractors are public entities in all but name. According to the Department of Defense (DOD), tactical missile suppliers dwindled from 13 prime contractors in 1990 to three in 2020. Fixed-wing aircraft suppliers decreased from eight to three, while surface ship suppliers declined from eight to two.⁸ From 2020 to 2024, private weapons manufacturers took home about 54% of the Pentagon’s annual discretionary budget — $2.4 trillion.⁹ The Costs of War project at Brown University reports that the big five firms — Lockheed Martin, RTX (formerly Raytheon), Boeing, General Dynamics, and Northrop Grumman — accounted for $771 billion of that funding. These five companies have dominated the arms industry for decades.

Lockheed Martin reigns supreme. According to the company, it derived 73% of its $71 billion in net sales from the U.S. government in 2024.¹⁰ However, when accounting for foreign military sales — government-to-government arms transfers — Lockheed Martin generated 92% of its total net sales through the U.S. government. The remaining 8% derived primarily from direct commercial sales, in which contractors transfer weapons directly to foreign buyers with the approval of the State Department. Congress provides foreign governments with financing to purchase U.S. weapons from military contractors, thus 92% is probably an underestimate of the sales facilitated by the U.S. government.

Silicon Valley firms work hard to distinguish themselves from traditional military contractors like Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman. Palantir Technologies, for example, prides itself on its commercial enterprises, which accounted for 45% of its $2.9 billion in revenue in 2024.¹¹ Nonetheless, like Lockheed Martin, much of the company’s commercial work evolved from its government work. One of the company’s primary commercial offerings is the Foundry software program, which was developed with seed funding from In-Q-Tel, the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA’s) venture capital arm. Since Palantir went public in 2020, it has generated over half of its revenue from government contracts.¹²

Military technology firms like Space X and Anduril also work closely with the government. However, the details of their work are less transparent because they are private companies — not to mention the fact that much of their government work is also classified. Nevertheless, military technology firms are publicly deepening their relationships with the government. In December 2024, Anduril and Palantir announced a new consortium of defense technology companies to “disrupt the country’s oligopoly of ‘prime’ contractors,” hinting at Space X’s involvement, along with several other firms. The consortium would allow firms to jointly bid on Pentagon contracts, undermining competition.¹³ In this sense, military technology firms might find themselves following in the footsteps of the prime contractors they vociferously criticize.

Indeed, technology executives are cozying up to the federal government. In June, the army commissioned Palantir Chief Technology Officer Shyam Sankar and three other technology executives as lieutenant colonels — at Sankar’s request. In their army roles, the executives will guide the service on how to better integrate and scale “tech solutions to complex problems.”¹⁴ And although it is not unprecedented for the military to commission private sector civilians, it is unusual — and there are scant details about what the executives’ innovation unit will actually do. Nevertheless, according to Sankar, more technology executives are interested in joining the unit.

Despite their differences, traditional military contractors and Silicon Valley firms share an interest in socializing their costs and privatizing financial rewards. They likewise chafe at regulation and oversight. For example, Lockheed Martin and Palantir have expressed support for policymakers’ efforts to overhaul the Pentagon’s budgeting and acquisition system. Sankar has advocated for “substantive reforms” to “create a bias toward speed and decisive action.”¹⁵ Lockheed Martin CEO John Taiclet has claimed that red tape is “one of the biggest issues, where there’s limitations on the speed at which digital technology and even the most advanced physical technologies can be introduced into the national defense enterprise.”¹⁶

Budgeting and Acquisition Reform

As political scientist Thomas McNaugher writes in New Weapons, Old Politics, “The key issue is not how speedily the nation rushes new devices to the field, but rather the validity of choices about which technologies to push and at what rate.” Existing acquisition reform proposals may expedite weapons development, but they are unlikely to improve policymakers’ ability to determine which technologies the military needs over the long term and why.

The “Fostering Reform and Government Efficiency in Defense” (FoRGED) Act and the “Streamlining Procurement for Effective Execution and Delivery” (SPEED) Act are incredibly expansive, well over 100 pages — many of which are filled with provisions to simply strike vast portions of existing regulations for military contractors. The architects of these bills aim to speed up the acquisition process by “cutting red tape” — a refrain that emanated from the Clinton administration in the 1990s.¹⁷

The problem is that deregulation did not improve the efficiency of the process, and it discouraged policymakers from making strategic trade-offs. The Sentinel ICBM and Columbia-class submarine programs are years behind schedule and way over budget, but the Pentagon is forging ahead with both programs. If strategic considerations prevailed, the department could cut its losses on the Sentinel and instead focus on nuclear-capable submarines.

The picture is similarly grim for other acquisition programs. During the next five years, annual weapons procurement spending will be about 9% higher, in real terms, than the average from 2001 to 2024.¹⁸ The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that “despite reforms, [the Department of Defense] remains plagued by escalating costs, prolonged development cycles, and structural inefficiencies that impede its ability to acquire and deploy innovative technologies with speed.”¹⁹

The SPEED and FoRGED Acts threaten to allow more wasteful spending by the Pentagon. Both bills would exempt contractors from contract cost principles and procedures, enabling companies to charge the government for virtually any of their costs — even if they are unrelated to government work.²⁰ The reforms outlined in these proposals would also significantly impede the Pentagon’s ability to negotiate fair prices on military contracts, increasing the risk that contractors will overcharge the government, and ultimately, taxpayers.²¹ Perniciously, these reforms would limit the tools available for policymakers to conduct cost-benefit analyses on the military’s weapons acquisition programs — undermining their ability to make trade-offs that take relative costs and benefits into account.

Meanwhile, little, if any, evidence suggests that regulations like basic accounting principles or cost information requirements slow down the acquisition process. Contractors know what they are paying their suppliers and how to claim reimbursements from the government — which, in many cases, subsidizes contractors’ research and development (R&D) as well as their capital investments. Industry opposes contract cost procedures and the like because they help the government perform oversight, which threatens profit margins. Accordingly, military contractors exercise incredible political influence to shape policymakers’ decisions on Pentagon budgeting and weapons acquisition.

Open Secrets, an organization dedicated to tracking money in politics, reports that the arms industry spent nearly $43 million on political contributions during the 2024 election cycle. The top two recipients were former Vice President Kamala Harris and President Donald Trump, closely followed by the respective chairs of the House Defense Appropriations Committee and both the Senate and House Armed Services Committees (SASC and HASC).²² In fact, Representative Mike Rogers and Senator Roger Wicker — HASC and SASC chairs, respectively — were among the top ten biggest recipients of industry funds in 2024.²³ HASC Ranking Member Adam Smith came in at number eleven.

In terms of lobbying, military contractors spent nearly $150 million in 2024, sending 950 industry representatives to Capitol Hill — 62% of whom were former government employees.²⁴ The revolving door is a critical feature of the national security establishment, promising former government officials lucrative careers in the arms industry after public service. From June 2018 to July 2023, over 80% of four-star generals and admirals who retired from the Pentagon transitioned to the arms industry.²⁵

Elected officials do not necessarily have to leave the government to cash in on the arms industry. According to one analysis, at least 37 members of Congress and their families traded up to $113 million worth of military contractor stocks in 2024.²⁶ Some of the biggest defense stock traders were members of congressional committees focused on national security issues, including the foreign affairs and armed services committees. In 2023, at least 50 members of Congress or members of their households held defense stocks valued at up to $10.9 million.²⁷

It is not unique for lawmakers to invest in industries that they regulate, but it is particularly nefarious for members of Congress to financially benefit from war and the threat of war. After all, lawmakers have the constitutional authority not only to declare war, but to provide aid to parties at war through its powers of the purse. Therefore, members of Congress might have financial incentives to pursue policy options that favor the arms industry.”²⁸

Military contractors sway foreign policy analysts, too. In a recent study conducted at the Paris Center for International Studies, scholars found that researchers focusing on nuclear weapons policy often self-censor rather than experience outright censorship from their funders — which often include military contractors.²⁹ Private funding does not necessarily limit intellectual freedom, but scholars have good reason to stick to the status quo — which is the preservation and expansion of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

National security policymakers, in short, have incentives to act in the financial interest of corporate military contractors, whether these align with strategic and public interests or not. Implementing good governance reforms to slow the revolving door between industry and government could help curb undue industry influence on Pentagon budgeting and acquisition decisions. Some of these are broad: Campaign finance reform, for example, could embolden lawmakers to prioritize their constituents’ interests over those of private industry. A congressional stock-trading ban could help deter them from abusing public office for personal financial gain.

In the arms industry, specifically, contracting reforms could help to drive competition. Instead of gutting the acquisition process, for example, lawmakers could instead reinstate contracting regulations to prevent legalized price gouging of the military.³⁰ The Pentagon’s industrial policy office could even create plans to convert military industrial capacity for civilian use, offering contractors alternative modes of business during peacetime. This responsibility would encourage policymakers to contemplate the conditions for demobilization, not just how the United States would prepare for a potential conflict. Such plans would be critical to protect workers’ livelihoods in the event of a significant cut to the Pentagon budget, which could occur with a drastic strategic shift in U.S. foreign policy.

These reforms would vastly improve Pentagon budgeting and acquisition by incentivizing policymakers to grapple with big strategic questions, like, for example, the costs and benefits of maintaining a nuclear triad. Policymakers might pair these reforms with a whole-of-government effort to facilitate investment in areas of national need that are as important to the lives and livelihoods of Americans as traditional military capabilities. These areas include clean energy, pandemic prevention, and economic development to improve U.S. resiliency and adaptability in the event of global crises — whether they be pandemic outbreaks, climate catastrophes, or wars.

Reinventing the National Security State

Policymakers can also raise their ambitions for national security reform without giving up on civilian-driven industrial policy or good governance measures. Indeed, policymakers should consider every tool to better align national resources with Washington’s strategic goals. This is a considerable challenge no matter the strategy — and major challenges require big solutions.

The reality is that military contractors are creatures of the state, and they should operate accordingly. This was true over 50 years ago, when the economist John Kenneth Galbraith argued for nationalization of the U.S. arms industry in the pages of the New York Times. As he rightly pointed out, the largest U.S. military contractors lack the most basic features of private enterprises: competition and privately owned capital.³¹ Taxpayers foot the bill for capital investments in machinery and equipment while reimbursing contractors for significant portions of their R&D costs. As noted above, the U.S. arms industry is notoriously consolidated, with a handful of prime contractors winning most Pentagon contracts.

The U.S. government could assume public ownership of military contractors by fully nationalizing them. In that case, the government might buy out shareholders’ stocks, replacing them with Treasury bonds and establishing defense firms as public, nonprofit corporations. In so doing, the government would sever the relationship between private profit and weapons production. Arms producers would be judged based on criteria more consistent with the public interest rather than quarterly earnings targets.³² These criteria might include the strategic value, reliability, and cost-effectiveness of the weapons and equipment that a military contractor produces.

Partial nationalization, on the other hand, can be achieved through the purchase of some — or even most — shares in a company. As a major shareholder, the government would have considerable leverage to encourage contractors to prioritize investment over shareholder dividends or executive compensation. Through partial nationalization, the government could shape how arms manufacturers operate their businesses without taking on a firm’s assets and debts. Policymakers might consider partially or fully nationalizing a military contractor based on how reliant it is on government business over several years.

Either way, there is a strong argument for the government to assume some level of ownership over military firms — providing for the common defense is one of the most basic functions of government, and national defense is itself a public good. Partial nationalization is probably the most viable option in the United States, and it has worked well in other countries. In France, for example, the state does not fully control its arms industry, but Paris maintains significant ownership stakes in military contractors like Naval Group, KNDS France, and the Thales Group. Even partial nationalization of military firms would afford policymakers greater freedom to consider Pentagon budgets and weapons programs on their merits — including the extent to which they serve a grand strategy centered on the public interest.

In the international realm, eradicating or eliminating the private profit motive could transform the global arms trade. In the event of military budget cuts or changing defense needs, publicly owned arms manufacturers would not be as motivated as private firms to recoup lost revenues by selling arms abroad. Lawmakers would probably face less political backlash for refusing arms sales to regimes that abuse human rights, and they would be subject to a fraction of the lobbying in support of those transfers.

Even under a nationalized system, those with bureaucratic interests would still be intent on shaping spending and acquisition decisions in their favor. Government officials are no less susceptible to the allure of political power than military contractors: government employees have salaries, too. Meanwhile, the military services would continue to vie for the biggest budget. In short, there is no guarantee that government will always act in the public interest.

But the largest military contractors are practically public firms already, by virtue of their dependence upon the federal government for their revenue. Making it official might prove less drastic in practice than it is in theory. Most important, however, repeated attempts to reform the DOD and its budgeting and acquisition system — both to improve efficiency and to better align budgets with strategy — have all failed. It’s time for policymakers to consider a different approach.

Through nationalization, the U.S. government would have greater leverage to ensure that arms manufacturers rigorously test the performance and reliability of weapon systems. Presently, the arms industry consistently attacks the independence of the Pentagon’s Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. It threatens industry profits by revealing information that could fuel efforts to try to terminate acquisition programs like the F-35 fighter jet — the most expensive weapon program in U.S. history, in large part due to its persistent design flaws. By nationalizing the biggest military contractors, the government could focus its efforts on R&D to iron out design flaws before spending precious national resources on weapons that do not work as intended.

Arms manufacturers would develop essentially finished prototypes for the government to operationally test weapons for effectiveness and mission suitability. Developing multiple weapons to fill one capability gap is more expensive up front, but doing so would allow the government to test both performance and reliability before advancing weapon systems into full-rate production. Policymakers would have more testing data to inform their decisions on weapons acquisition. Over the long-term, the Pentagon would likely see a decrease in maintenance costs, which currently account for about 70% of a weapon system’s life-cycle cost on average.³³ Part of the reason for this is the rush to production. Contractors compete to win Pentagon contracts, principally through marketing gimmicks and lofty promises, rather than demonstrable capability or reliability.

Military contractors tend to low-ball the government when competing for contracts, but they have little reason to minimize costs during the production stage. “Extended competition,” as McNaugher describes it, would “encourage innovation in production processes,” not just the early development stage.³⁴ Although he does not argue for nationalization, it is difficult to imagine policymakers extending competition into the development and prototyping phase without eliminating or curbing private profit motive. Legislative efforts to stoke competition in military contracting face considerable opposition from the arms industry, and few lawmakers are willing to expend their political capital to promote wonky, politically challenging contracting reforms. Through full or partial nationalization of multiple military contractors, the government could instead exercise its ownership stakes to facilitate extended competition among firms. They would be evaluated primarily by how well they meet the military’s needs rather than how much value they deliver to shareholders.

Public ownership of military contractors would also make more explicit the tradeoffs between military and civilian economic stimulus. Historically, the United States has implemented industrial policies to create market opportunities for military contractors rather than socially beneficial job opportunities for workers. Indeed, the Pentagon is essentially a giant Works Progress Administration — the public works program instituted by President Roosevelt during the Great Depression.³⁵ Yet military spending is a poor jobs generator relative to other industries, and it diverts from civilian investment. In an era of stagnation, policymakers need to decide between stimulating the economy through military or civilian spending.³⁶

Despite complaints that military spending as a portion of gross domestic product (GDP) is low by historical standards, the military budget’s role in the U.S. economy is still considerable if one views it as a capital fund.³⁷ From 1970 to 2023, Pentagon spending equaled 19% of gross fixed capital formation — a measure of tangible investments in the nation’s productive capacity. These investments include public infrastructure like roads, bridges, and railways — assets that bolster quality of life in the United States, as well as national wealth. Military spending competes with such investments. Nationalization would help the United States shift its focus to civilian priorities, which would improve the lives of Americans while expanding the productive capacity of the economy.

Conclusion

An increasingly dynamic geopolitical environment demands that policymakers draw clearer connections between U.S. foreign policy and the economic well-being of Americans.³⁸ Under nationalization, U.S. policymakers would be largely freed of the political constraints that disincentivize them from opposing nuclear expansion or trillion-dollar-plus Pentagon budgets; they would be able, therefore, to focus on other urgent priorities. Policymakers would be more accountable to the U.S. public — which deserves elected officials who ground national security policy in rigorous strategic analysis of the threats at hand, not what is most lucrative for private corporations. Nationalization would push policymakers to distinguish between military spending and economic development activities, assessing the nation’s assets and investments and reevaluating the portion dedicated to superfluous military activities. In the process, the U.S. government would bolster its capacity to formulate a coherent and affirmative strategic vision for its foreign policy — one that serves the interests of the American people, above all.

Notes

1
Gordon Adams and Cindy Williams, “The Politics of National Security Budgeting,” in Buying National Security: How America Plans and Pays for Its Global Role and Safety at Home, (New York and London: Routledge, 2010), 221.
2
Geoff Wilson, Christopher Preble, and Lucas Ruiz, “Gambling on Armageddon: How US Nuclear Policies Are Undercutting Deterrence and Lowering the Threshold for Nuclear War,” (Stimson Center, 2025), https://www.stimson.org/2025/gambling-on-armageddon-nuclear-deterrence-threshold-for-nuclear-war/.
3
Elle Ekman, “The Stakes Of A Nuclear Missile Monopoly,” American Conservative, October 12, 2021, accessed August 4, 2025,
https://www.economicliberties.us/our-work/the-american-conservative-the-stakes-of-a-nuclear-missile-monopoly/.
4
Lucas Ruiz and Geoff Wilson, “What Trump got right about nuclear weapons—and how to step back from the brink,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, February 24, 2025, accessed August 4, 2025, https://thebulletin.org/2025/02/what-trump-got-right-about-nuclear-weapons-and-how-to-step-back-from-the-brink/.
5
U.S. Government, Congressional Budget Office, “Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2025 to 2034,” (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 2025), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/61362.
6
U.S. Government, Department of Defense, “DOD Press Briefing Announcing Sentinel ICBM Nunn-McCurdy Decision” (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, July 8, 2024), https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3830251/dod-press-briefing-announcing-sentinel-icbm-nunn-mccurdy-decision/.
7
Matt Korda, “Alternatives to the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent,” (Washington, DC, Federation of American Scientists, 2021) 25, https://uploads.fas.org/2021/02/Alternatives-to-the-GBSD-Feb.-2021.pdf.
8
U.S.
Government, Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Report: State of Competition within the Defense Industrial Base,” (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2022), 5, https://media.defense.gov/2022/feb/15/2002939087/-1/-1/1/state-of-competition-within-the-defense-industrial-base.pdf#page=7.
9
Bill D. Hartung and Stephen N. Semler “Profits of War: Top Beneficiaries of Pentagon Spending, 2020-2024,” (Providence, RI: Brown University, Watson School of International and Public Affairs, Cost of War project, 2025), 1. https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2025/Profits%20of%20War_Hartung%20and%20Semler_Costs%20of%20War%3AQuincy%20FINAL.pdf.
10
Lockheed Martin Corporation, Form 10-K for fiscal year 2024, January 28, 2025, available from https://investors.lockheedmartin.com/static-files/b5548c6b-71f9-4b58-b171-20accb1e8713#page=10.
11
Palantir Technologies Inc., Form 10-K for fiscal year 2024, February 18, 2025, available from https://investors.palantir.com/files/2024%20FY%20PLTR%2010-K.pdf#page=6.
12
Ross Wilkers, “Palantir details new phase of federal strategy,” Washington Technology, February 16, 2021, accessed July 14, 2025, https://washingtontechnology.com/2021/02/palantir-details-new-phase-of-federal-strategy/355117/; Roberto J. Gonzalez, “How Big Tech and Silicon Valley are Transforming the Military-Industrial Complex,” (Cost of War project, 2024), 15, https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2023/2024/Silicon%20Valley%20MIC.pdf#page=15.
13
Tabby Kinder and George Hammond, “Palantir and Anduril join forces with tech groups to bid for Pentagon contracts,” Financial Times, December 22, 2024, accessed August 5, 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/6cfdfe2b-6872-4963-bde8-dc6c43be5093.
14
Kesley Baker, “Tech execs are joining the Army — no grueling boot camp required,” Business Insider, June 17, 2025, https://www.businessinsider.com/tech-execs-just-joined-the-army-boot-camp-not-required-2025-6#:~:text=The%20execs%20%E2%80%94%20Shyam%20Sankar%2C%20the,Leroy%20Council/US%20Army.
15
U.S. Government, Senate Armed Services Committee, Shyam Sankar, “Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee: To receive testimony on defense innovation and acquisitions reform,” (Washington, DC: U.S. Senate, 2025), 2, https://www.armed -services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/sankar_opening_statement.pdf.
16
Ross Wilkers, “Lockheed’s CEO reacts to Trump’s acquisition overhaul orders,” Washington Technology, April 22, 2025, accessed July 13, 2025, https://www.washingtontechnology.com/companies/2025/04/lockheeds-ceo-reacts-trumps-acquisition-overhaul-orders/404739/.
17
Julia Gledhill, “Acquisition Reform, At a Crossroads: Examining recent executive and legislative efforts to reform the defense acquisition system,” (Stimson Center, 2025), https://www.stimson.org/2025/acquisition-reform-at-a-crossroads/.
18
U.S. Government, Congressional Budget Office, “Long-Term Implications of the 2025 Future Years Defense Program,” (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 2025), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/61017#_idTextAnchor014.
19
U.S. Government, Government Accountability Office, “Defense Acquisition Reform: Persistent Challenges Require New Iterative Approaches to Delivering Capability with Speed,” (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2025), 3, https://www.gao.gov/assets/880/879068.pdf.
20
Julia Gledhill, “Don’t let ‘efficiency’ result in looser standards for defense contractors,” Breaking Defense, March 13, 2025, accessed August 5, 2025, https://breakingdefense.com/2025/03/dont-let-efficiency-result-in-looser-standards-for-defense-contractors/.
21
Julia Gledhill, “Acquisition Reform, At a Crossroads: Examining recent executive and legislative efforts to reform the defense acquisition system,” (Stimson Center, 2025), https://www.stimson.org/2025/acquisition-reform-at-a-crossroads/.
22
“Defense recipients,” Open Secrets, last modified February 6, 2025, accessed July 16, 2025, https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/recips?cycle=2024&ind=D.
23
Ibid.
24
“Sector Profile: Defense,” Open Secrets, last modified May 24, 2025, accessed July 16, 2025, https://www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying/sectors/summary?cycle=2024&id=D.
25
Bill Hartung, “March of the Four–Stars: The Role of Retired Generals and Admirals in the Arms Industry,” (Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, 2023), https://quincyinst.org/research/march-of-the-four-stars-the-role-of-retired-generals-and-admirals-in-the-arms-industry/#executive-summary.
26
Nick Cleveland-Stout, “Top defense stock traders in Congress in 2024,” Responsible Statecraft, December 25, 2024, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/congress-defense-stocks/.
27
David Moore, “Here Are the Members of Congress Invested in War,” Sludge, September 12, 2024, https://readsludge.com/2024/09/12/here-are-the-members-of-congress-invested-in-war/.
28
Kate Kelly, Adam Playford, and Alicia Parlapiano, “Stock Trades Reported by Nearly a Fifth of Congress Show Possible Conflicts,” New York Times, September 13, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/09/13/us/politics/congress-stock-trading-investigation.html.
29
Kjølv Egeland and Benoît Pelopidas, “No such thing as a free donation? Research funding and conflicts of interest in nuclear weapons policy analysis,” International Relations 00 (March 2023): 11-12, https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-04017574/document#page=12.
30
Julia Gledhill, “The White House is looking for savings in the wrong place,” Defense One, June 25, 2025, accessed July 15, 2025, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2025/06/white-house-looking-savings-wrong-place/406308/?oref=d1-author-river.
31
John Kenneth Galbraith, “The Big Defense Firms Are Really Public Firms and Should Be Nationalized,” New York Times, November 16, 1969, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1969/11/16/110095191.pdf?pdf_redirect=true&ip=0.
32
Charlie Cray and Lee Drutman, “Corporations and the Public Purpose: Restoring the Balance,” Seattle Journal for Social Justice 4, no. 1, (November 2005): 336, accessed July 16, 2025, https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1574&context=sjsj#page=.
33
U.S. Government, Government Accountability Office, “Weapon System Sustainment: DOD Identified Operating and Support Cost Growth but Needs to Improve the Consistency and Completeness of Information to Congress,” (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2024), 1, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107378#:~:text=Fast%20Facts,a%20weapon%20system’s%20total%20cost.
34
Thomas McNaugher, New Weapons, Old Politics: America’s Military Procurement Muddle, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1989), 183.
35
Peter-Christian Aigner and Michael Brenes, “Shrinking the Military-Industrial Complex by Putting It to Work at Home,” The Nation, February 26, 2019, https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/military-industrial-complex-green-new-deal/.
36
Ann Markusen and Joel Yudken, Dismantling the Cold War Economy, (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 252.
37
Seymour Melman, Profits Over Production, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), 64.
38
Markusen and Yudken, Dismantling, 250.

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