Throughout history, wars have frequently revolved around city sieges and defenses, with large open-field battles being comparatively less common. Multiple examples of past urban warfare prove that technological military superiority doesn’t necessarily ensure victory. Battles such as Hue in the Vietnam War and Fallujah in the Iraq War demonstrate that achieving victory in an urban conflict does not necessarily translate to success in the larger war.
Urban Warfare
Cities have long been at the heart of military campaigns. As far back as 1274 BC, the Hittites and Egyptians clashed near Kadesh in modern Syria. Ancient Athens resisted three Persian invasions and the Punic War concluded with Rome destroying Carthage. In 1453, the fall of Constantinople marked the end of the Byzantine Empire. 18th-century Prussian general and military strategist Carl von Clausewitz viewed war as a continuation of politics, a concept rooted in the Greek word “polis” meaning city—this same root gave rise to terms like “cosmopolitan” and “police.” Aristotle perceived politics as the affairs of the city.
During the Cold War, urban guerrillas escalated operations in various Latin American nations, meeting resistance from police and military forces. Anti-colonial uprisings compelled conventional forces to craft strategies for urban counterinsurgency. Significant confrontations took place in Hue in 1968 and Suez in 1973. The 1990s gave rise to the myth of conventional military superiority. However, events in Mogadishu, Somalia, and the Chechen capital of Grozny challenged this perspective. These episodes demonstrated that having advanced military technology doesn’t guarantee success against local armed groups in dense, unfamiliar urban environments. In fact, some older technologies may prove more effective. For instance, the older 7.62mm bullets can penetrate walls better than the more modern NATO standard 5.56mm rounds. Somalia also revealed the limitations of relying solely on superior firepower. The October 1993 defeat of Ranger troops at the hands of armed youths in Mogadishu served as a sobering lesson. Notably, civilians accounted for more than half of the casualties suffered by American forces.
Win the Urban Battle, Lose the Conflict
The 1968 Battle of Hue stands as a stark representation of how tactical maneuvers can have profound strategic implications in urban warfare. As Vietnam’s third-largest city, Hue witnessed 26 days of intense fighting among its 140,000 civilians against a combined force of roughly 7,500 from the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong. While the US Army eventually regained control, the extensive devastation—leaving about 80% of the city in ruins and uprooting an estimated 116,000 inhabitants—alongside substantial casualties, eroded South Vietnamese and American political support for the war. This demonstrates a critical challenge in urban warfare: one can win the battle but lose the broader conflict.
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, Fallujah emerged as a formidable challenge for Coalition forces. The city’s intricate network of streets, structures, defenses, and its civilian populace made for a challenging urban battlefield. Although the Coalition excelled in open-field combat, they faced increased difficulties in Fallujah’s urban confines. The Vietnam-era notion of “destroying the city to save it” was not a viable approach in this context. The deployment of troops without cultural knowledge of their area of operation contributed to the estrangement of the population.
Lessons from Russia’s Chechen Wars
During the First Chechen War that began in 1994, the Russian Federation sought to reclaim the breakaway Republic of Chechnya. The urban combat that unfolded in this conflict was intense, with both sides employing distinct strategies. Chechen fighters, usually grouped in squads of about 25 men, were predominantly equipped with handheld anti-tank weapons and precision firearms. They set up three defense lines in the city around fortified posts. Underground tunnels and basements played a pivotal role in their maneuvers, providing shelter from Russian artillery and air raids.
On the Russian side, the military initially approached Grozny with tactics more suited to conventional warfare. The first unit that ventured into the center of Grozny, the Maikop Brigade, suffered staggering losses within two days: 800 out of 1,000 men, 20 of its 26 tanks, and 102 of its 120 armored vehicles. Coupled with their inadequate training, subpar equipment, political meddling, and stringent timelines, the Russians found themselves at a significant disadvantage.
In 1999, the Russians returned to Grozny encircling the city, effectively cutting off Chechen reinforcements and supplies and opting for massive bombardments before sending in ground troops. Russian forces displayed enhanced flexibility in their operations. Forward air controllers and artillery observers were integrated into lower-level units, ensuring more accurate targeting. Moreover, they used electronic warfare units to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum, disrupting Chechen communications. The planning was more aligned with a focus on controlling strategic points like street intersections, avenues, and even underground areas to restrict Chechen mobility. However, this victory came at a heavy cost. Much of the city was left in ruins, and the civilian casualties were tragically high.
Looking Back Across History of Urban Warfare
Every city has its own unique identity shaped by factors such as urban layout, cultural traditions, religious practices, languages, ethnic backgrounds, building materials, climate, and governance. Current intelligence frameworks may struggle to gather sufficient data. Thus, operating in a city means venturing into relatively unknown terrain. Methods that succeed in one city might fail in another.
Additionally, the cities with their mix of planned and chaotic design along with the three-dimensional nature of urban warfare complicates information collection for the invading force. As a result, military mapping systems aren’t always apt for urban landscapes. While standard military operations might use maps scaled at 1:200,000 or 1:100,000, urban operations demand more detail, possibly 1:25,000 or even more precise.
In contrast, when it comes to mechanized warfare, appropriately adapted combat vehicles can significantly enhance infantry operations even in urban terrains with tall structures. For urban combat, Russian doctrine recommended a numerical superiority of 6 to 1. In Grozny, the Russians, despite having a 5 to 1 ratio, struggled due to an initial lack of concentrated combat power. They learned the importance of securing every building they captured, or else the Chechens would reclaim it, slowing the Russian advance.
Even with infantry support, a lone combat vehicle is at risk from concealed anti-tank units. In the Gaza Strip in 2006, the IDF identified vulnerabilities in their main battle tanks during urban operations, especially when operating with hatches battened down. Challenges such as limited visibility and hindered turret mobility in constricted streets led to considerable enhancements to the Merkava Mk.3.
A pivotal enhancement for increasing combat vehicle situational awareness in urban terrains is the introduction of a stabilized dual-axis panoramic sight for tank commanders. This sight is equipped with state-of-the-art FLIR (Forward-Looking Infrared) and closed-circuit TV, ensuring effective operations both day and night.
Gaza’s Distinctive Challenges
The Gaza Strip has unique characteristics. Boasting a dense population of approximately 2 million within a mere 141 square miles, the area’s demographic dynamics contrast sharply with places like Fallujah and Grozny before their devastating conflicts. In these locations, a direct assault led to massive civilian casualties and infrastructural damage. Given Gaza’s even greater population density, the repercussions of a direct assault could be far more catastrophic.
Beyond the immediate conflict, there’s the question of long-term governance and peacekeeping. The ‘Chechenization’ during the Second Chechen War offers an interesting strategy. Instead of a prolonged foreign military presence, the conflict shifted towards local governance with pro-government Chechen forces taking charge.
For Gaza, a similar transition could be beneficial. Once Hamas’s influence is weakened, a tripartite collaboration between Israel, the US, and Egypt could be envisioned. Given Egypt’s distrust of Hamas under President el-Sisi, due to Hamas’s relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, the United States could influence Egypt to play a pivotal role in assisting with the training and deployment of a local force in Gaza. This force would not only be adept at understanding the cultural and socio-political nuances but could also facilitate rebuilding trust among the residents. It’s a vision that’s ambitious, but in the aftermath of conflict, bold and innovative solutions often hold the key to sustainable peace.
Carlo J.V. Caro has an advanced degree in Islamic Studies from Columbia University and is a political and military analyst. He has published numerous articles in the US and Israel on foreign affairs and security.
Unpacking the History of Urban Warfare and its Challenges in Gaza
By Carlo J.V. Caro
Grand Strategy
Throughout history, wars have frequently revolved around city sieges and defenses, with large open-field battles being comparatively less common. Multiple examples of past urban warfare prove that technological military superiority doesn’t necessarily ensure victory. Battles such as Hue in the Vietnam War and Fallujah in the Iraq War demonstrate that achieving victory in an urban conflict does not necessarily translate to success in the larger war.
Urban Warfare
Cities have long been at the heart of military campaigns. As far back as 1274 BC, the Hittites and Egyptians clashed near Kadesh in modern Syria. Ancient Athens resisted three Persian invasions and the Punic War concluded with Rome destroying Carthage. In 1453, the fall of Constantinople marked the end of the Byzantine Empire. 18th-century Prussian general and military strategist Carl von Clausewitz viewed war as a continuation of politics, a concept rooted in the Greek word “polis” meaning city—this same root gave rise to terms like “cosmopolitan” and “police.” Aristotle perceived politics as the affairs of the city.
During the Cold War, urban guerrillas escalated operations in various Latin American nations, meeting resistance from police and military forces. Anti-colonial uprisings compelled conventional forces to craft strategies for urban counterinsurgency. Significant confrontations took place in Hue in 1968 and Suez in 1973. The 1990s gave rise to the myth of conventional military superiority. However, events in Mogadishu, Somalia, and the Chechen capital of Grozny challenged this perspective. These episodes demonstrated that having advanced military technology doesn’t guarantee success against local armed groups in dense, unfamiliar urban environments. In fact, some older technologies may prove more effective. For instance, the older 7.62mm bullets can penetrate walls better than the more modern NATO standard 5.56mm rounds. Somalia also revealed the limitations of relying solely on superior firepower. The October 1993 defeat of Ranger troops at the hands of armed youths in Mogadishu served as a sobering lesson. Notably, civilians accounted for more than half of the casualties suffered by American forces.
Win the Urban Battle, Lose the Conflict
The 1968 Battle of Hue stands as a stark representation of how tactical maneuvers can have profound strategic implications in urban warfare. As Vietnam’s third-largest city, Hue witnessed 26 days of intense fighting among its 140,000 civilians against a combined force of roughly 7,500 from the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong. While the US Army eventually regained control, the extensive devastation—leaving about 80% of the city in ruins and uprooting an estimated 116,000 inhabitants—alongside substantial casualties, eroded South Vietnamese and American political support for the war. This demonstrates a critical challenge in urban warfare: one can win the battle but lose the broader conflict.
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, Fallujah emerged as a formidable challenge for Coalition forces. The city’s intricate network of streets, structures, defenses, and its civilian populace made for a challenging urban battlefield. Although the Coalition excelled in open-field combat, they faced increased difficulties in Fallujah’s urban confines. The Vietnam-era notion of “destroying the city to save it” was not a viable approach in this context. The deployment of troops without cultural knowledge of their area of operation contributed to the estrangement of the population.
Lessons from Russia’s Chechen Wars
During the First Chechen War that began in 1994, the Russian Federation sought to reclaim the breakaway Republic of Chechnya. The urban combat that unfolded in this conflict was intense, with both sides employing distinct strategies. Chechen fighters, usually grouped in squads of about 25 men, were predominantly equipped with handheld anti-tank weapons and precision firearms. They set up three defense lines in the city around fortified posts. Underground tunnels and basements played a pivotal role in their maneuvers, providing shelter from Russian artillery and air raids.
On the Russian side, the military initially approached Grozny with tactics more suited to conventional warfare. The first unit that ventured into the center of Grozny, the Maikop Brigade, suffered staggering losses within two days: 800 out of 1,000 men, 20 of its 26 tanks, and 102 of its 120 armored vehicles. Coupled with their inadequate training, subpar equipment, political meddling, and stringent timelines, the Russians found themselves at a significant disadvantage.
In 1999, the Russians returned to Grozny encircling the city, effectively cutting off Chechen reinforcements and supplies and opting for massive bombardments before sending in ground troops. Russian forces displayed enhanced flexibility in their operations. Forward air controllers and artillery observers were integrated into lower-level units, ensuring more accurate targeting. Moreover, they used electronic warfare units to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum, disrupting Chechen communications. The planning was more aligned with a focus on controlling strategic points like street intersections, avenues, and even underground areas to restrict Chechen mobility. However, this victory came at a heavy cost. Much of the city was left in ruins, and the civilian casualties were tragically high.
Looking Back Across History of Urban Warfare
Every city has its own unique identity shaped by factors such as urban layout, cultural traditions, religious practices, languages, ethnic backgrounds, building materials, climate, and governance. Current intelligence frameworks may struggle to gather sufficient data. Thus, operating in a city means venturing into relatively unknown terrain. Methods that succeed in one city might fail in another.
Additionally, the cities with their mix of planned and chaotic design along with the three-dimensional nature of urban warfare complicates information collection for the invading force. As a result, military mapping systems aren’t always apt for urban landscapes. While standard military operations might use maps scaled at 1:200,000 or 1:100,000, urban operations demand more detail, possibly 1:25,000 or even more precise.
In contrast, when it comes to mechanized warfare, appropriately adapted combat vehicles can significantly enhance infantry operations even in urban terrains with tall structures. For urban combat, Russian doctrine recommended a numerical superiority of 6 to 1. In Grozny, the Russians, despite having a 5 to 1 ratio, struggled due to an initial lack of concentrated combat power. They learned the importance of securing every building they captured, or else the Chechens would reclaim it, slowing the Russian advance.
Even with infantry support, a lone combat vehicle is at risk from concealed anti-tank units. In the Gaza Strip in 2006, the IDF identified vulnerabilities in their main battle tanks during urban operations, especially when operating with hatches battened down. Challenges such as limited visibility and hindered turret mobility in constricted streets led to considerable enhancements to the Merkava Mk.3.
A pivotal enhancement for increasing combat vehicle situational awareness in urban terrains is the introduction of a stabilized dual-axis panoramic sight for tank commanders. This sight is equipped with state-of-the-art FLIR (Forward-Looking Infrared) and closed-circuit TV, ensuring effective operations both day and night.
Gaza’s Distinctive Challenges
The Gaza Strip has unique characteristics. Boasting a dense population of approximately 2 million within a mere 141 square miles, the area’s demographic dynamics contrast sharply with places like Fallujah and Grozny before their devastating conflicts. In these locations, a direct assault led to massive civilian casualties and infrastructural damage. Given Gaza’s even greater population density, the repercussions of a direct assault could be far more catastrophic.
Beyond the immediate conflict, there’s the question of long-term governance and peacekeeping. The ‘Chechenization’ during the Second Chechen War offers an interesting strategy. Instead of a prolonged foreign military presence, the conflict shifted towards local governance with pro-government Chechen forces taking charge.
For Gaza, a similar transition could be beneficial. Once Hamas’s influence is weakened, a tripartite collaboration between Israel, the US, and Egypt could be envisioned. Given Egypt’s distrust of Hamas under President el-Sisi, due to Hamas’s relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, the United States could influence Egypt to play a pivotal role in assisting with the training and deployment of a local force in Gaza. This force would not only be adept at understanding the cultural and socio-political nuances but could also facilitate rebuilding trust among the residents. It’s a vision that’s ambitious, but in the aftermath of conflict, bold and innovative solutions often hold the key to sustainable peace.
Carlo J.V. Caro has an advanced degree in Islamic Studies from Columbia University and is a political and military analyst. He has published numerous articles in the US and Israel on foreign affairs and security.
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