Report

Protecting Civilians & Human Security Program

Prioritization and Sequencing of Security Council Mandates: The Case of MINUSCA

Evaluating the mandate and political strategy for the UN peacekeeping mission in Central African Republic ahead of the November 2022 mandate renewal.

In Peacekeeping

November 4, 2022

On October 11, 2022, the International Peace Institute (IPI), the Stimson Center, and Security Council Report organized a workshop to discuss the mandate and political strategy of the United Nations Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). This discussion was part of a series of workshops that examine how the activities included in peace operations’ mandates can be better prioritized, sequenced, and grounded in a political strategy. This was the sixth consecutive year in which these partners convened discussions in support of the mandate negotiations on MINUSCA. The meeting note was drafted collaboratively by IPI, the Stimson Center, and Security Council Report. The meeting note summarizes the main points raised in the discussion under the Chatham House rule of non-attribution and does not necessarily represent the views of all participants. The project is funded with the support of the German Federal Foreign Office and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.

Introduction

The UN Security Council is expected to renew the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) in November 2022. The upcoming negotiations among Council members will unfold against the backdrop of renewed momentum for implementation of the country’s peace agreement. And while security dynamics in the Central African Republic (CAR) are somewhat more stable compared to the period leading up to last year’s mandate renewal, human rights and protection threats to civilians persist alongside underlying challenges of limited service provision, poor socio-economic development, and significant humanitarian needs.

In this context, the International Peace Institute (IPI), Security Council Report, and the Stimson Center co-hosted a roundtable discussion on October 11, 2022, to discuss the MINUSCA mandate renewal. This roundtable offered a platform for member states, UN officials, civil society stakeholders, and independent experts to share their assessments of the situation in the CAR in a frank and collaborative manner. The discussion was intended to help the Security Council make more informed decisions with respect to the prioritization and sequencing of MINUSCA’s mandate and the mission’s strategic orientation and actions on the ground.¹

Participants agreed that MINUSCA’s strategic vision and priority tasks are still relevant to the UN’s overall engagement in the country. Participants also emphasized that the current mandate provides the mission with appropriate guidance to implement the Security Council’s direction, while also giving the mission enough flexibility to pivot as new priorities or crises emerge. Participants emphasized that the points in the blue box below should all feature in the upcoming mandate and should be reinforced with unified political support from the Security Council and the country’s bilateral and regional partners.

Key considerations for MINUSCA’s mandate renewal

Supporting the government’s implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation (the APPR) and the Luanda Joint Roadmap²;
Encouraging widespread civic engagement with and inclusion into the formal political process;
Coordinating political support from the CAR’s regional and international partners;
Strengthening its capabilities for proactive, robust and mobile protection efforts across the country;
Safeguarding its human rights monitoring and investigation responsibilities;
Maintaining a constructive dialogue with the Central African authorities to ensure its freedom of movement and the effectiveness of its operations;
Laying the groundwork for accelerated delivery of humanitarian aid and long-term, locally driven development programming.

Conflict Analysis

Recent political developments suggest renewed momentum and consensus for the implementation of the peace process in CAR among national, regional, and international partners. However, participants were concerned that the government’s increased ownership for the peace process was not accompanied by substantive engagement with civil society and marginalized communities, including women’s organizations. Recent political concerns sparked by the attempted Constitutional revisions and the increasing restrictions on civic space could jeopardize progress on the implementation of the peace process. The security situation in the CAR has somewhat improved in recent months with MINUSCA’s efforts to enhance its robust posture to reduce the activities of armed groups and its joint patrols with the FACA to protect civilians. However, human rights and protection threats to civilians persist alongside underlying challenges of limited service provision, poor socio-economic development, and significant humanitarian needs.

Political Dynamics

Over the past year, the CAR Government has taken some steps to renew its support to the peace process and to mobilize momentum for its implementation. In a landmark meeting facilitated by the government in June 2022, key national and regional partners worked to renew momentum for implementing the 2021 Luanda Joint Roadmap.³ The meeting resulted in the creation of a permanent platform to monitor both progress and challenges of the Joint Roadmap and Political Agreement quarterly.⁴

Participants of the workshop highlighted the convergence of views between the Government of the CAR, partners in the sub-region and strategic partners regarding the APPR, and as a sign of renewed national ownership in the political process. President Touadera assigned his Prime Minister to lead the relaunch of the peace process, who has already held four coordination meetings at the Ministerial level, and different Ministries are actively working on the implementation of the Joint Roadmap. As part of this process, the CAR government met with signatory armed groups to the APPR in September 2022 to discuss implementation of the joint roadmap.⁵ However, a key challenge now will be to bring back the six-armed groups that left the peace process. Some participants warned that some of the non-signatory armed groups may increase their operations as the rainy season concludes.⁶

Participants highlighted a disconnect between the political emphasis placed on the APPR and the limited involvement of the broader population in the renewed peace agreement efforts. Some speakers felt that this disconnect came from the lack of strategic communication and outreach by the CAR government to civil society with regards to the Joint Road Map and recent developments, arguing that few communities knew these processes were underway. They also felt that civil society remained on the margin of these initiatives and that previous efforts to incorporate marginalized communities had not been sustained.

Political debates emerging after the conclusion of the Republican Dialogue held earlier in 2022 have received significant attention. Recommendations from the Republican Dialogue were submitted to the Government and broadly reflect outcomes of the Bangui Forum and the APPR.⁷ However, the Coalition de l’opposition démocratique 2020 (COD-2020) boycotted the dialogue because it excluded some armed groups from the process, among other concerns.⁸ President Faustin-Archange Touadéra’s efforts to revise the Constitution sparked significant outcries and protests.⁹ In September 2022, the CAR Constitutional Court has declared the current initiatives to amend the constitution invalid.¹⁰

Civil society organizations have been closely following the government’s attempts to draft a new Constitution, which could – inter alia- remove the two-term limit for the presidency. Multiple speakers acknowledged that these developments had “sucked the air” out of conversations around the peace agreement. Another speaker mentioned that the attempted revisions were undertaken alongside increased restrictions on civic space, including through rising hate speech, misinformation, and curtailed civil liberties. They also argued that the priorities pursued in the APPR are increasingly disconnected from the concerns facing civil society in CAR today. Some participants warned that deteriorating public trust in the government could jeopardize progress on the peace process.

Armed Conflict Dynamics

The security landscape in CAR continues to evolve following the armed rebellion in 2020-21, the government’s declaration of a unilateral ceasefire late 2021, and the government’s more proactive approach to countering the non-signatory armed groups. Following the government’s declaration of a unilateral ceasefire in October 2021, the national security forces (FACA) made territorial gains in provinces previously occupied by the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC).¹¹ Armed group have since regained control of some mining sites by attacking areas where national forces were less present, taking advantage of their diminished mobility due to the fuel crisis.¹²

Violations of the APPR persist, and both state and non-state forces pose direct threats to civilians throughout the country, in part due to “forced displacement, serious human rights violations, and deterioration of the humanitarian situation.”¹³ Between June and October 2022, 431 security violations of the APPR took place, a fifteen percent increase compared to earlier in the year, with most violations targeting civilians. This trend speaks to the changing tactics of conflict actors: on one hand the government engages in more proactive operations against armed groups and more partnerships with bilateral forces, and on the other, armed groups compensate for their diminished abilities to capture and hold territories by targeting less protected communities and prioritizing the illegal trafficking of natural resources.¹⁴

MINUSCA is attempting to manage these changing security conditions and persistent levels of human rights abuses through the adoption of proactive and preventive measures.¹⁵ These efforts aimed to improve the mission’s abilities to respond rapidly and deploy flexibly to mitigate identified hot-spots and prevent armed groups from reasserting territorial control, especially in the country’s center and eastern regions.¹⁶

Conflict dynamics also make it challenging for international partners to effectively deliver humanitarian aid, and impact MINUSCA’s abilities to conduct operations and protect its personnel. The UN reported 68 incidents affecting humanitarian workers.¹⁷ Speakers brought attention to the death of three Bangladeshi peacekeepers following a roadside bomb explosion near the border with Cameroon on 5 October 2022.¹⁸ This incident, against the backdrop of 272 security incidents involving UN personnel between June-October 2022, underscores the challenges that MINUSCA confronts.

Human Rights, Justice, and the Restoration of State Authority

Human rights conditions in CAR remain deeply concerning, with a notable increase in human rights violations since early 2022 and continued incidents of sexual and gender-based violence.¹⁹ MINUSCA reported 625 human rights violations and abuses of international humanitarian law during its most recent reporting period, most of which were committed by state security forces (45 percent) and signatory armed groups (44 percent).²⁰ Participants welcomed progress made on human rights issues but were concerned about the rising share of the violations committed by the country’s defense forces and their allies²¹. Following her four-day visit to CAR in early October 2022, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights Ilze Brands Kehris emphasized that monitoring and reporting on human rights violations remain essential tools in the fight against impunity, especially as armed groups and militias adapt their tactics to the evolving security context.²²

Human rights issues also intersected with discussions about accountability and the restoration of state authority, including in the field of justice. Participants welcomed ongoing efforts by the government to fight impunity, highlighting, for example, the investigations into and start of trials for war crimes and crimes against humanity by the Special Criminal Court and the recent establishment of the Truth, Justice, Reparation and Reconciliation Commission.²³ They emphasized, however, that these mechanisms remain in need of political support and funding from the government, with assistance from the international community.

Progress was also noted on the disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants under the APPR.²⁴ In recent months, CAR authorities have facilitated workshops aimed at improving the oversight of parliamentarians over the security sector.²⁵ In July, the strategic committee on demobilization, disarmament, reintegration and repatriation, security sector reform and national reconciliation, chaired by President Touadera, endorsed the new National Security Policy and the draft National Security Sector Reform Strategy, “both of which emphasized governance, accountability and coordination of actors in the security sector”.²⁶

Economic and Humanitarian Conditions

The deteriorating economic situation continues to exacerbate conflict dynamics in CAR and to prevent long-term sustainable peace and development. Global pressures on food and commodity prices have worsened the economic crisis in the country and forced the government to reduce its 2022 national budget by $122 million compared with the 2021 budget.²⁷ The worsening economic and fiscal situation negatively impacts the Government’s ability to ensure the delivery of basic services to the population in line with the National Recovery and Peace Consolidation Plan, as urged by the SRSG in a briefing to the Council.²⁸ The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund warned that the Government’s adoption of a volatile cryptocurrency as legal tender would further undermine domestic policy objectives and raise financial, transparency and legal issues.²⁹

In 2022, 63 percent of the population, or 3.1 million Central Africans, required humanitarian assistance. From April to August 2022, 2.2 million people, nearly 50 percent of the population, experienced high levels of acute food insecurity, including 638,000 who were in an emergency situation.”³⁰ The living conditions of internally displaced people (IDPs) particularly deteriorated over the last year. As of October 1, 2022, there remained a funding gap of $132 million in the 2022 humanitarian response plan for CAR, which aimed at providing life-saving assistance for 2 million people.³¹

Armed groups’ activities are increasingly directed towards the control of the country’s elicit economic networks, putting civilians at further risk of exploitation and insecurity. The most recent SG report identified multiple instances where armed groups were intentionally targeting locations around mining sites and natural resource deposits, committing abuses against civilians and imposing illegal taxation.³² Participants agreed that more efforts must be made to undercut armed groups’ control of the extractive sector and trafficking routes, which sustain their operations, notably towards the Sudanese border. In the context of deteriorating socio-economic conditions, the financing abilities of armed groups also enhance the appeal of the militia economy for CAR’s youth.³³

Prioritizing and Sequencing MINUSCA’s Mandate

Participants agreed that the strategic vision and priorities reflected in MINUSCA’s current mandate are still relevant and encompass the critical issues to guide the UN’s engagement in the CAR. Although UN peacekeeping operations are not meant to be long-term presences, the mandate’s emphasis on UN support to a long-term and durable peace in the country remains an effective anchor for its strategic vision.³⁴

Participants acknowledged that the country’s political and security contexts have changed considerably in between each of the previous Security Council mandate cycles, and that the current mandated priorities afford MINUSCA consistent guidance and enough flexibility to respond to emerging crises. Participants noted that MINUSCA continues to conduct critical protection work, especially through its human rights component. A few participants acknowledged that there may be opportunities to “fine tune” MINUSCA’s mandate to highlight the mandate’s essential elements while also making it easier for the mission to engage with the Central African population on all aspects of its work.

Most of the discussions focused on ways in which MINUSCA could adjust its current efforts to either improve its effectiveness or reprioritize aspects of its mandate implementation. They recommended that the Security Council support MINUSCA’s good offices role and that the mission helps localize the renewed political process with communities across the country. They also encouraged Security Council members, troop, and financial contributing countries to continue supporting the mission’s efforts to improve its rapid response and flexible deployment capabilities. They stressed the imperative of unified political support from the Security Council and the CAR’s international partners at this critical juncture in the political process. They also encouraged that the Security Council reinforces the mission’s work on human rights monitoring and its support to the country’s justice institutions.

Unified Support to an Inclusive Political Process

Supporting the Central African authorities sustain momentum for the mutualized political process is critical for the country’s progress. Participants acknowledged that the upcoming mandate would need to reflect recent political developments and the government’s consolidation of different political tracks following the June 4, 2022, strategic review meeting. Adapting the mandate’s already strong language on the APPR, the joint road map, and the ceasefire to reflect this unified political pathway will be helpful to guide the mission’s work. The mandate should establish clear expectations with regards to the identified implementation priorities, while recognizing progress made and reaffirming its support to the CAR government.

Some speakers encouraged MINUSCA to act as a bridge builder between the ‘Track 1’ political efforts and the rest of the Central African population. During earlier phases of its support to the CAR, MINUSCA played a critical role in facilitating local mediation efforts and linking these efforts to the formal peace process. Participants emphasized that public engagement on the mutualized political process was limited at best, or completely overtaken by the government’s efforts to amend the country’s constitution. The presence of MINUSCA’s Civil Affairs officers throughout much of the country could be invaluable for not only raising awareness of these recent political developments, but also to channel the perspectives, priorities, and concerns of Central Africans into these conversations. The remobilization of grassroot organizations from the provinces, including women and youth organizations, should focus on aligning the implementation of the joint roadmap with other community-based activities like community violence reduction (CVR) projects.

Consolidating MINUSCA’s support to the Central African authorities in organizing the upcoming local elections was also considered as an important contribution. A few participants noted that the government had not yet promulgated a new election date after it postponed the local elections that were scheduled to take place in September 2022 due to insufficient funding. Another participant suggested that it was important for the government to sustain its political momentum in support of the local elections even if they do not get rescheduled immediately, especially considering that the country’s last local elections took place in 1988. While some speakers suggested that MINUSCA’s current mandate provides the mission with enough guidance and flexibility to support the elections, others noted that additional international political and financial support would be critical for the coming months.

The sustainability of the on-going political process would depend in part on unified political support from the CAR’s international partners. Participants welcomed MINUSCA’s efforts to align critical regional partners such as the AU, ECCAS, ICGLR, Rwanda, and Angola around a coherent strategy to support this efforts (including to help shape the Central African government’s strategy for dialogue with CPC-affiliated armed groups).³⁵ The Security Council was also seen to be a critical vehicle for this international political support, and that consistent attention and unified support for MINUSCA was foundational to the mission’s overall strategy. One participant acknowledged that persistent divisions among the Security Council’s permanent members had strained previous discussions on the CAR. Despite these tensions, they noted that this new phase of the country’s political process offered a tangible avenue for Council members to reach common ground on support to the CAR.

Protecting Civilians and Reinforcing MINUSCA’s Force Effectiveness

Participants affirmed that MINUSCA’s efforts to protect civilians are among its essential contributions to the current country context. There was consensus that the protection of civilians should remain the highest priorities among the list of MINUSCA’s mandated tasks, based on the overarching strategic direction provided by the Security Council, on what Central Africans themselves expect of the mission and the UN, and the ways in which MINUSCA allocates its resources and operationalizes its mandate.

The interlinkages between the mission’s political and protection efforts were a prominent focus of these discussions. Because of the changing interests and capabilities of the country’s non-signatory armed groups and militias, MINUSCA’s efforts to eliminate all threats to civilians depended not only on its protection approaches, but also on the extent it could bring these groups into the political process. One speaker emphasized that MINUSCA’s political and security roles are intertwined, and that the use of force can be a valuable tool if it is underpinned by clear political objectives and in line with the mission’s mandate. For this purpose, MINUSCA should help the CAR government approach rebels through DDR programmes that provide a path for those who were disenfranchised by the 2019 peace process.³⁶

Participants also acknowledged the mission has not only progressed in implementing a “comprehensive and integrated approach” to protecting civilians, but also that the arrival of the new SRSG has also sparked the mission into rolling-out a more robust and proactive posture. In practice, this meant that MINUSCA prioritized more frequent reviews of identified and potential conflict hotspots, that it relied on more mobile operations, active patrolling, and temporary operations in hard-to-reach parts of the country. This approach falls in line with some of the additional requests on mission effectiveness that the Security Council provided to MINUSCA in its 2021 mandate.³⁷ Although there were no specific recommendations to changes to the mission’s mandated tasks on the protection of civilians, some participants acknowledged that the Security Council could more explicitly affirm the benefits of this new force posture. One participant emphasized that the sustainability of this approach depended on troop- and financial contributing countries providing MINUSCA with sufficient capabilities to sustain this resource intensive approach in the long run.

Additional suggestions focused on supplementing the missions’ comprehensive approaches to the protection of civilians. For example, some participants raised the emerging dangers that improvised explosive devices have on both the Central African population and UN peacekeepers; they encouraged the mission and UN member states to reinforce MINUSCA with the necessary technology and capabilities to reduce this threat.

Safeguarding Human Rights and Accountability

Several speakers reiterated that the renewed mandate should maintain existing language on the promotion and protection of human rights. At the same time, they also encouraged council members to reinforce the mission’s role in promoting accountability for human rights violations, including through its mandated tasks on human rights monitoring.

In addition to maintaining existing operational language on human rights reporting, the Security Council could also use the mandate to provide MINUSCA with stronger political support so that it is better positioned to hold difficult conversations with the Central African government when its armed forces or those of its partners are accused of committing violations of international human rights law. Participants agreed that in the context of the Wagner Group’s presence in the country, MINUSCA’s mandate should emphasize compliance with the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy to avert the risk of complicity in these violations.

The relationship between MINUSCA and the host government has improved over the past several months. Beyond continued monitoring and reporting on human rights conditions, multiple participants emphasized the need for MINUSCA to sustain its constructive relationship with Central African authorities on accountability-related issues. MINUSCA’s current SRSG has prioritized enhancing the relationship between the mission and the government, in part to create space to address these challenging issues. The coordination structures established in April 2022 by CAR’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to bring together security partners such as MINUSCA, the AU, the EU, and the heads of the armed forces have provided new opportunities to address the implementation of the status-of-forces agreement (SOFA).³⁸

Multiple participants affirmed that the number of reported SOFA violations declined over the past few months.³⁹ Nonetheless, some participants highlighted potential areas of concern in this space: MINUSCA continues to be limited by the government’s operational restrictions on mission flights at night, which inhibit MINUSCA’s abilities to project its presence across the country and presents security risks for its peacekeepers.

MINUSCA’s mandate should continue to prioritize accountability for violations of international human rights and humanitarian law while clearly reaffirming the government’s responsibility to deliver justice. Impunity for serious human rights violations and other crimes is at the heart of the violence in CAR, highlighting the need to build social cohesion around a common memory, identify victims, and provide them with reparations. The mission should continue assisting justice institutions in CAR and, in particular, call for more consistent funding for the Special Criminal Court and the Truth, Justice, Reparation and Reconciliation Commission.⁴⁰ Recognizing that legal processes take time, participants urged patience, transparency, and expectation management. They also suggested that MINUSCA create opportunities to share, and communicate on, the outcome of internal investigations into attacks on civilians with the populations directly concerned.

Strategic Communications

Several speakers urged MINUSCA to continue prioritizing strategic communications in all aspects of its mandate implementation. The current mandate makes only two references to strategic communications (both related to the implementation of the mission’s protection of civilians’ mandate).⁴¹ Nonetheless, participants pointed to multiple issues related to misunderstandings among the civilian population about MINUSCA’s mandate, including unresolved expectation gaps about what the mission could or could not achieve and the pervasive impacts of both mis- and disinformation on the local perceptions of MINUSCA. Multiple participants emphasized that MINUSCA should deepen its work with community-based organizations, including journalists and media companies, to continuously explain all aspects of the mission’s mandate, and to engage in a meaningful dialogue about what the mission has the mandate and capabilities to achieve.

Conclusion

Recent political developments suggest that CAR may be slowly emerging from the most damaging and volatile consequences of the 2020–2021 armed rebellion. Nonetheless, the deep-seated structural drivers of violence that fuel repeated cycles of armed conflict persist and continue to make CAR among the most challenging operational contexts for UN peacekeeping. While MINUSCA is only one stakeholder in the broader constellation of national and international partners supporting the country, its political engagement throughout the country, the widespread physical protection it provides, and its support to critical administrative and governance efforts remain invaluable.

Workshop participants agreed that MINUSCA’s strategic vision and mandated priorities continue to steer UN engagement in the right direction. Participants suggested slight revisions to the mandate language and MINUSCA’s strategies to strengthen the mission’s contributions in the coming months:

Support the government’s comprehensive implementation of the Luanda Roadmap and the 2019 APPR;
Expand civic engagement in the formal political process and make the process more inclusive;
Coordinate political support from the CAR’s regional and international partners;
Strengthen its capabilities to conduct proactive, robust, and mobile protection efforts across the country;
Safeguard its human rights monitoring and investigation responsibilities;
Maintain a constructive dialogue with Central African authorities to ensure the mission’s freedom of movement and the effectiveness of its operations; and
Lay the groundwork for accelerated and timely delivery of humanitarian aid and long term, locally driven development programming

Header photo: Deputy SRSG Visits Voting Centres During Second Round of Legislative Elections in Central African Republic.

Notes

1
Note: UN Security Council Resolution 2605 (November 12, 2021), UN Doc. S/RES/2605.
2
Note: International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, “Final Communiqué: Mini-Summit of ICGLR on the Political and Security Situation in Central African Republic,” September 16, 2021.
3
Note: Ibid
4
Note: UN Doc. S/2022/762, para. 13.
5
Note: UN Doc. S/2022/762, para. 14.
6
Note: International Crisis Group, “CrisisWatch: October Alerts and September Trends,” October 2022.
7
Note: S/2022/762, Para. 3
8
Note: UN Security Council, Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc S/2022/491, Para. 5, June 16, 2022.
9
Note: OHCHR Press Release, Central African Republic: The drafting of a new Constitution must not undermine peace and reconciliation say UN experts, 29 August 2022
10
Note: S/2022/762, Para. 8
11
Note: UN Security Council, Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc S/2022/491, Para. 40, 92 June 16, 2022
12
Note: UN Doc. S/2022/762, para. 23.
13
Note: UN Security Council, Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc S/2022/762, Para. 47, October 16, 2022
14
Note: UN Doc. S/2022/762, para. 24
15
Note: UN Doc. S/2022/762, paras. 48, 49, and 108.
16
Note: UN Doc. S/2022/762, Para. 23-24
17
Note: S/2022/762, Para. 44
18
Note: UN News, Guterres says Central African Republic must ‘spare no effort’ to help bring killers of UN peacekeepers to justice, 5 October 2022
19
Note: From 2 June to 1 October, MINUSCA documented 47 conflict- related sexual violence incidents representing 51 violations and 70 victims (28 women and 42 girls, aged from 2 to 17), mostly rape against 55 survivors (21 women and 34 girls). See: S/2022/762, Para. 69
20
Note: S/2022/762, Para. 64-65
21
Note: The Government adopted a law against trafficking in persons and the abolition of death penalty and appointed two Minister Counsellors to lead work on human rights, good governance, and efforts against sexual violence in conflict. See: OHCHR Press Release, Central African Republic: Top UN human rights official welcomes improvements, urges continued efforts, 12 October 2022
22
Note: Ibid
23
Note: The Special Criminal Court started its deliberations in August after having completed the hearings of its first trial. OHCHR, “Central African Republic: Top UN Human Rights Official.”
24
Note: S/2022/762, Paras. 3, 105
25
Note: UN Security Council, Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc S/2022/491, Para. 45, June 16, 2022.
26
Note: S/2022/762, Paras. 52-54
27
Note: UN Doc. S/2022/762, Para. 11
28
Note: MINUSCA, La MINUSCA étend sa posture robuste et proactive à Sam-Ouandja pour protéger la population, indique la représentante spéciale. 17 August 2022.
29
Note: Loni Prinsloo, “Bitcoin Adoption by Central African Republic a Concern, IMF Says,” May 4, 2022.
30
Note: UN Doc. S/2022/762, paras. 40–41
31
Note: UN Doc. S/2022/762, paras. 45.
32
Note: UN Doc. S/2022/762, paras. 23, 26, 28, 31.
33
Note: International Crisis Group, “Avoiding the Worst in Central African Republic,” September 28, 2017.
34
Note: UN Doc. S/RES/2605, para. 31.
35
Note: SG Report October 2022 Para. 14
36
Note: UN Doc. S/2022/762, para. 97
37
Note: UN Doc. S/RES/2605 (2021)
38
Note: Security Council Report, “What’s in Blue: Central African Republic Briefing and Consultations,” June 2022; UN Doc. S/2022/491, para. 79
39
Note: UN Doc. S/2022/762, para. 80
40
Note: OHCHR, “Human Rights Council: High Commissioner Expresses Concern over Increasing Incidents Involving Serious Human Rights Violations and Abuses in the Central African Republic,” press release, March 30, 2022.
41
Note: UN Doc. S/RES/2605 (2021)

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Introduction

Key considerations for MINUSCA’s mandate renewal