Editor’s Note: Joe Macaron is an independent geopolitical analyst specializing in the Middle East. A former journalist, he has held fellowships at the Wilson Center and the Colin Powell Center for Policy Studies, managed International Monetary Fund public engagement in the Middle East and North Africa, and served in various capacities in the United Nations system. He holds a Ph.D. in Politics and International Studies from the University of Bath in the United Kingdom.

By: Middle East Program Team

As Lebanon and Israel hold their sixth round of talks this week amid the unraveling of the US-Iran ceasefire, the Security Annex attached to the June 26 Trilateral Framework Agreement is emerging as the main test of whether negotiations can produce an implementable security arrangement. Initially kept secret, the annex creates yet another mechanism that institutionalizes the withdrawal-disarmament deadlock without providing a viable pathway to resolve it. Combining elements of existing and potential mechanisms may instead offer the most effective path toward durable stability in South Lebanon.

The annex rests on four main pillars. First is a performance- and conditions-based withdrawal framework. Israel’s obligation to “redeploy” is contingent upon “successful completion” of a “verifiable disarmament and dismantlement process” without a timetable for withdrawal. In effect, Israeli withdrawal becomes conditional on Lebanese performance. This contrasts with a proposal advanced by Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, reportedly approved by Hezbollah, which called for simultaneous Israeli and Hezbollah withdrawal from south of the Litani River, followed by LAF deployment, with a vague commitment to integrate Hezbollah’s weapons “across all Lebanon” within the framework of the Lebanese state.

Second, the annex introduces pilot zones, designating two small areas before expanding the model across south Lebanon. At their core is a four-step sequence: clearing Hezbollah from the areas and dismantling its infrastructure, independent verification, simultaneous Israeli withdrawal and LAF deployment, and finally reconstruction. Because each step is contingent on the successful completion of the previous one, the absence of an objective and credible verification mechanism could prolong Israeli occupation indefinitely.

Third, the annex explicitly commits the Lebanese state to Hezbollah’s disarmament, without reference to previous international resolutions on south Lebanon or the 1949 Lebanon-Israel Armistice Agreement. Israel’s obligation, by contrast, is to withdraw only after successful and verifiable disarmament of Hezbollah throughout Lebanon. The annex therefore shifts the focus away from bilateral Lebanese Israeli issues and U.S. pressure on Israel to withdraw, toward an internal problem assigned to the Lebanese state.

Fourth, the annex establishes a verification mechanism under which a mutually agreed third party would certify compliance, while a new Military Coordination Group for Lebanon (MCG4L) would manage implementation through indirect military channels. Neither side can unilaterally determine whether Lebanese obligations have been met, while perceptions of U.S. bias toward Israel are likely to undermine confidence in the verification process.

Beyond these four pillars, the annex bypasses rather than resolves the weaknesses of the existing United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) mechanism. It does not clarify the link between Israeli withdrawal and Hezbollah disarmament, define what “disarmament” means, establish verification criteria, or specify how disputes over compliance would be resolved.

More importantly, the annex does not anticipate what happens if Hezbollah refuses to disarm or if Israel refuses to withdraw. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz on July 9 dismissed U.S. pressure to leave Lebanon, stating that “we didn’t ask for anyone’s approval to enter Lebanon, and we don’t need approval to stay in Lebanon.” Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s Secretary General Naim Qassem has called the agreement “surrender” and declared it “null and void.”

If Israel acknowledges that it cannot disarm Hezbollah by force while there are no indications that LAF would do so coercively, the result could be an indefinite Israeli occupation that further weakens the Lebanese government’s claim that negotiations with Israel offer the only viable path toward restoring sovereignty. The LAF, meanwhile, continues to struggle to expand its authority amid Israeli military operations and Hezbollah’s continued presence.

The gap is already apparent. Israel has delayed the first step of the pilot zones that include the Zawtar el-Gharbiyeh and Froun/Ghandourieh areas, which are not occupied by Israeli forces. This has generated competing interpretations, since the agreement ostensibly governs the transfer of occupied territories. Due to the annex’s ambiguity, Israel has reportedly conditioned the launch of the pilot zones on a LAF declaration of readiness and U.S. CENTCOM certification that the LAF is operationally prepared. At the same time, it reportedly rejects simultaneous Israeli withdrawal and LAF deployment, linking withdrawal to the LAF being “receptive” to the pilot zones – that is, actively disarming Hezbollah and dismantling its infrastructure. Pilot zones are therefore likely to become the first major test of the annex’s implementation.

Moreover, the annex leaves broad discretion to the MCG4L, giving Washington flexibility while preserving the principle of tying redeployment to verified security benchmarks. Its implementation, however, will remain heavily dependent on external dynamics, particularly U.S. relations with Israel and Iran.

Contrast with Other Mechanisms

The security annex has limited potential because it provides an operational framework for an incomplete diplomatic agreement. Nevertheless, until further notice, it remains the only process combining both political and operational dimensions and should therefore be assessed alongside other existing and potential mechanisms.

Despite its unaddressed flaws, the most viable mechanism theoretically remains the UNIFIL-led process that emerged from a November 2024 ceasefire and includes the U.S., France, Lebanon, and Israel. However, Washington and Tel Aviv are already preparing for a post-UNIFIL environment, with the body’s mandate set to end in December. Israel also seeks to exclude France from any future mechanism.

A second track is the de-confliction mechanism emerging from the Bürgenstock process and linked to the 60-day negotiations under the US-Iran Framework Agreement, which includes Lebanon, the U.S., Iran, Qatar, and Pakistan, but primarily focuses on the ceasefire. Beirut has backed away from naming a representative, while Israel rejects it outright. A third option involves French and Italian peacekeepers under a reinforced post-UNIFIL mandate. Lebanon is more receptive than Israel to this proposal, while an emerging French-German initiative aims to serve a similar purpose.

Each option has significant shortcomings. The Washington process has the political approval of the Lebanese and Israeli governments but still lacks a solid mandate, an implementable mechanism, and objective verification. The Bürgenstock process has Iranian and Hezbollah buy-in, but opposition from the Lebanese and Israeli governments, compounded by renewed U.S.-Iran tensions, deprives it of an operational mechanism and would leave verification contested. A European peacekeeping force could provide objective verification but would remain unworkable without Israeli approval, likely requiring sustained U.S. pressure. UNIFIL already offers an operational framework and verification capacity, but its mandate requires revision and faces both an uncertain future and continued Israeli opposition to its current configuration and operations.

The most effective path forward would combine elements of these four mechanisms rather than rely on any single one. The Washington process can be strengthened by linking to a reinforced ceasefire, a clear deadline for simultaneous withdrawal of Israeli forces and Hezbollah, together with the dismantlement of Hezbollah’s infrastructure south of the Litani River to facilitate disengagement, followed by a confidence-building roadmap addressing outstanding issues, including Hezbollah’s weapons, land border demarcation and prisoners.

The existing mechanism involving Lebanon, Israel, the U.S., and France could be preserved beyond UNIFIL’s mandate, with Italy replacing France if needed to secure Israeli consent. Ultimately, any mechanism will also require sufficient domestic political buy-in to be effective; if Lebanon’s official negotiating position adequately reflects the core concerns of the country’s principal political actors, the rationale for a separate Bürgenstock channel would likely diminish.

The central problem is that discussions about mechanisms in south Lebanon are increasingly shaped by Israeli and U.S. electoral calculations, as well as Lebanese domestic politics, rather than a policy process designed to achieve durable and sustainable stabilization. An outcome-oriented approach should focus less on creating new mechanisms and more on structuring reciprocal obligations in a verifiable and politically realistic manner capable of preventing another cycle of violence along the Lebanese-Israeli border.