Introduction
On February 1, 2023, the brutal military in Myanmar marked two years since its seizure of power from the civilian government in 2021. Since then, the country has been plagued by escalated civil war and political and economic turmoil. It is critical to end the military regime in Myanmar for all ethnic groups, especially the ethnic armed revolutionary groups taking the significant role of supporting and fighting alongside the resistance groups across the country. In return, the junta forces have launched brutal assaults on towns and villages in the center of the country as well as on key resistance points in ethnic minority areas, reducing them to rubble with heavy weapons and airpower.
One area of the country that has been relatively stable is Rakhine State, which borders Bangladesh on the west, especially after fighting that began in August 2022 between the Arakan Army (AA) and junta forces paused in late November 2022 to allow INGOs, NGOs, and local civil society to address the state’s humanitarian crisis of internally displaced people. In fact, since the February 2021 military coup, Rakhine State has differed from other states and regions, where massive peaceful protests erupted against the coup, civil services joined the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), and some peaceful protesters later grew into armed resistance groups.
Three months before the coup, in November 2020, Rakhine had agreed to an informal ceasefire after being at war for more than two years, starting in late 2018. More than 230,000 civilians were displaced, while nearly 1,000 were seriously injured or killed by artillery shelling, gunshots, and landmine explosions, including more than 170 children. The National League for Democracy (NLD) government also imposed what was then the world’s longest internet shutdown and disenfranchised three-fourths of Rakhine State’s eligible voters, ostensibly because of the conflict.
Soon after the coup, the military attempted to stabilize Rakhine State by providing favors, such as ending the 18-month-long internet shutdown and offering the leader of the Arakan National Party a seat on its administrative council on February 2, 2021. The regime also released Rakhine nationalist politician Dr. Aye Maung and Rakhine writer Wai Han Aung on February 13, 2021, in addition to the AA leader’s family members on June 9, 2021, to gain the favor of the group and the Rakhine people. In March 2021, the AA and its political wing, the United League of Arakan (ULA), were delisted from the “terrorist list,” though the junta has kept the group on the list of “unlawful associations.” But part of Rakhine State’s stability, including less involvement in CDM and street protests, is because two months after the coup, Maj. Gen. Twan Mrat Naing, Commander of the AA, said the group wanted to focus instead on a clear political objective.
The AA was established by Twan Mrat Naing and 25 comrades in April 2009 on the Myanmar-China border in Kachin State with support from the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). The group’s political goal is to create an “Arakan Nation” through the “way of Rakhita,” an ideology encapsulating “the struggle for national liberation and the restoration of Arakan sovereignty to the people of Arakan.”
The AA started engaging in war with the military in northern Rakhine State in 2015. A period of escalation by the AA began in late 2018 and ended the first week of November 2020, just three months before the military seizure of power. From 2018 to 2020, analysts described fighting between the AA and the Myanmar military as the fiercest Myanmar had seen in decades. This paper seeks to better understand the AA’s growth over the past decade, its involvement in nationwide resistance, and the resumption of conflict in western Myanmar.
Four Factors Forcing the Arakan Army to Grow
In the course of a decade, the AA has become one of the country’s most powerful and successful organizations despite being the newest of Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups. In a January 2022 interview with the Asia Times, Commander Maj. Gen. Twan Mrat Naing said that the AA has grown to 30,000 soldiers, mainly present in Rakhine, although at least 6,000 troops are stationed in areas controlled by AA allies, such as the country’s north and northeast. Four factors are behind the rapid rise of the AA.
First, the AA’s leadership is young, educated, and able to effectively grow the organization. Two of its top leaders, Maj. Gen. Twan Mrat Naing and Brig. Gen. Nyo Twan Awng, are educated Rakhine natives with deep networks and influence in southern and northern Rakhine. Twan Mrat Naing was born in Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine, and was previously a tour guide, with a strong network of foreign and national friends. Nyo Twan Awng, a medical doctor, was born and raised in Kyaukpyu Township, the key southern town in Rakhine and a symbol of foreign investment. Historically, most of Rakhine’s political leaders have been from the north, making it hard to influence the southern part of the state, but the AA leadership now covers this gap. Incorporating the experience of the older generations of the Rakhine revolutionary movement are Col. Kyaw Han and spokesperson Khaing Thu Kha, who serve as symbolic leaders. No previous Rakhine revolutionary group has had a similarly well-organized leadership circle.
Second, the leadership has utilized concepts such as “the Arakan Dream 2020” to strategically and politically mobilize the Rakhine people toward greater autonomy for the Rakhine State. The Arakan Dream, which the AA first promulgated in early 2017, promotes the establishment of a Rakhine People’s Authority to govern Rakhine State. In January 2019, the ULA/AA chief Twan Mrat Naing declared his commitment to achieving “confederation” status for the people of Rakhine, pointing to the Wa Self-Administered Division as an example. Later, during an April 2020 speech, he connected the Arakan Dream to the principle of the Way of Rakhita, which he described as “the struggle for national liberation and the restoration of Arakan’s sovereignty to the people of Arakan.” Such mottos and slogans characterize the new era of revolutionary movements for the people of Rakhine State.
A third factor contributing to the AA’s growth is the constrained political space for the people of Rakhine. Before the rise of the AA, the Rakhine community was mostly influenced by electoral political parties, such as through participation in the 2010 and 2015 national elections. Efforts to expand political roles and power for Rakhine people, including the AA, have been consistently blocked by the NLD. For example, although the Arakan National Party won a majority of seats in Rakhine State in the 2015 national election, the NLD refused to allow it to choose the state’s chief minister. In early 2018, the tension between the Rakhine people and the NLD government grew due after the government canceled a ceremony in Mrauk-U marking the anniversary of the fall of an Arakan kingdom to Burmese forces. Police opened fire on protesters following the cancellation, killing seven and injuring many others. This sharpened the Rakhine people to increase long standing bitterness toward the central government and to support the AA. Intensive fighting between the AA and Myanmar military from 2018 to 2021 also shifted to support for the AA among Rakhine people, especially at a time when the NLD had imposed the world’s longest internet blackout, labeled the AA a terrorist organization, and ordered the military to crush the AA. Furthermore, Aung San Suu Kyi, the state counselor and chair of the NLD, issued a statement in April 2020 expressing her gratitude to the soldiers who were fighting against the AA on the western front. Under these conditions, lacking an avenue for political action, more people turned towards the AA.
Alliance-building with other ethnic armed groups is a final factor in the rise of AA. In particular, the AA’s formation on the Myanmar-China border with support from the KIA, one of the country’s most powerful groups, helped pave the way for the growth of the ULA/AA. In 2011, the resumption of war between the Myanmar military and KIA gave the AA combat experience on the battlefield. But the exclusion of the AA from the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) organized by the Thein Sein government and military leadership in 2012 also pushed the group to build and cultivate alliances with sympathetic groups along the Chinese border, such as in the Kokang, Wa, and Kachin areas in the north and northeast.
This alliance building eventually led to AA’s membership in the Northern Alliance with three other armed groups, the KIA, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), in December 2016, an opportunity that arose because of the AA’s reported involvement with the MNDAA in the 2015 Kokang War between them and the Myanmar military. Finally, the AA also joined the Federal Political Negotiation and Coordination Committee, a political alliance led by the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the largest and strongest group in the country that likewise demands an “alternative path to the NCA.” This development was prompted by the continued exclusion of the AA as an equal to other ethnic armed organizations in the NCA process. The AA have reportedly received important assistance from the UWSA, including arms and equipment. With the support of its allies among the other ethnic armed groups, the AA has been able to maintain and expand its activities.
Tracking the Shift from War to Truce
The growth of the ULA/AA in recent years has allowed them to increase administration across Rakhine despite efforts by the junta to contain their expansion, including reinforcing its own troops in the area. This prevented a formal ceasefire even with the late 2020 halt in conflict. In February 2021, after the Myanmar military’s seizure of power, the ULA advanced steadily toward its objective of administrative control over many parts of Rakhine, while the AA avoided breaking the truce with the military that it had agreed to three months before the coup. Six months later, the group claimed it had control over two-thirds of Rakhine.
However, after weeks of tension, in February 2022 there was a small skirmish in northern Maungdaw that escalated into another fight. Military tensions intensified in the first week of June after the AA refused an invitation to take part in junta-brokered peace talks in the capital, Naypyidaw. Consequently, the military regime reinforced its troop presence across Rakhine State, began arresting dozens of people affiliated with the AA, and blocked the gates of towns such as Mrauk-U, Kyauktaw, and Sittwe. From June to September, at least 140 civilians were arrested, while at least 62 remain in detention. In response, the AA also arrested at least 20 junta personnel in the areas of Rakhine State under its control.
Unexpectedly, on July 4, 2022, the junta forces launched an airstrike against an AA base in territory controlled by the Karen National Union in Kayin State, killing at least six soldiers and injuring many others. Twelve days later, the AA responded with a retaliatory attack against junta forces in northern Rakhine’s Maungdaw Township, killing at least four, injuring many others, and capturing at least 14 alive.
From August to November, nearly 100 battles occurred between the AA and Myanmar military across at least nine of Rakhine’s 17 townships, according to the author’s observation based on local news and AA statements. These clashes were spread across Maungdaw Township (on the Myanmar-Bangladesh border) and southern Chin State’s Paletwa (on the Myanmar-India border). And at least 36 junta outposts and camps were destroyed, including at least 31 in northern Maungdaw.
Junta forces launched both airstrikes and heavy artillery attacks against the AA in a bid to take back their lost outposts and camps. From August to October, around 20 civilians were killed and 30 injured by artillery and airstrikes. Within 16 days in November, at least 36 people including children and elders were killed, and at least 72 were injured. During the fighting, nearly 300 residents were arrested by junta authorities claiming “to conduct investigations,” albeit without any judicial process. These residents ranged from schoolteachers, students, and doctors to social and charity organization leaders, businessmen, and staff of the General Administration Department.
The recent clashes in Rakhine have mostly occurred in its northern regions, especially along the border with Bangladesh and India, and around the upper Kaladan River that connects northern Rakhine with Chin State’s Paletwa Township. The ULA/AA apparently aimed to achieve full control over the border areas along Bangladesh and India in support of its political objective to establish “home rule” of Rakhine.
On November 26, both the AA and junta spokespersons unexpectedly confirmed that they had agreed to a truce to address the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine. Because of the state’s isolated location, humanitarian issues there easily become severe when access to food and goods from Yangon are cut off during periods of conflict. Thus, the truce was reached with several verbal agreements: first, reopening all roads and checkpoints and allow for humanitarian aid by INGOs and NGOs that were blocked by the junta across Rakhine, and second, ensuring that junta forces not interrupt the ULA/AA’s administrative and judiciary processes in Rakhine. Both sides nevertheless told the local media that the war could resume at any point, since there was no written agreement.
The AA’s Nationwide Resistance Movement
In the early months after the coup, the ULA/AA adopted a confounding approach to the nationwide resistance movement, perhaps because the AA had never clarified its involvement in that resistance. However, the group’s later approaches can be summarized by four actions: power competition with the junta in Rakhine, cooperation with other ethnic allied forces in the fight against the junta, assistance to resistance forces after the coup, and establishment of relations with the National Unity Government (NUG).
Since the 2021 coup, the ULA leadership has consistently put pressure on the junta in Rakhine and elsewhere, via both political and military means. Immediately after the coup, although the ULA/AA avoided breaking the truce that had been brokered with the military three months before the coup, the ULA steadily advanced toward its objective of administrative control over many parts of Rakhine. In an April speech, Maj. Gen. Twan Mrat Naing said that during the AA’s “early revolutionary period” it had “worked mainly on mobilization and war affairs for [its] political objectives,” and it was now “implementing a governance mechanism with strong institutions for public administrative affairs including administration, judiciary and public security.”
Throughout 2022, the ULA/AA demonstrated their competence in the sphere of local governance. In April, the ULA in Kyauktaw Township organized what may have been the largest “Songkran” (Water Festival) that year in the country, joined by around ten thousand people. The attendees celebrated openly with uniformed AA members, while other members provided security and healthcare at the festival. Following this major event, three months later, in July, it was obvious that compliance with the ULA government’s “stay at home” order in response to COVID-19 was high among Rakhine State residents. Brigadier-General Dr. Nyo Twan Awng, deputy leader of the ULA, claimed in August that the group had control over two-thirds of Rakhine and had trained hundreds of administrative personnel, who had resolved more than 550 of 1,400 complaints, disputes, and other legal matters over an 18 month period. The consistent administrative expansion of the ULA/AA toward the southern parts of the state was so effective that the junta authority’s concern heightened despite the ceasefire. Intensive fighting between the two groups resumed from August to November 2022.
Another characteristic of the ULA/AA’s post-coup approach is the AA’s cooperation with its allied forces in northern and northeast Myanmar in fighting against the junta. Just a month after the coup, the AA was fighting alongside its allies, including the KIA and co-members of the Brotherhood Alliance (the TNLA and MNDAA), in northern and northwest Myanmar. Further, in March 2021, the Brotherhood Alliance warned that if the Myanmar military did not immediately stop cracking down on peaceful protesters and address the political solutions demanded by the public, the alliance would “support and cooperate with our oppressed brethren and multi-ethnic people who are waging the Myanmar Spring Revolution in self-defense against the Myanmar Army.” Ten days after their statement, the alliance jointly attacked a police station in Shan State’s Lashio Township, killing several police officers. The attack came the day after junta forces fired live rounds and launched grenades at protesters in the central city of Bago, leaving at least 82 people dead.
The AA’s cooperation with its allies did not preclude trying to maintain the ceasefire with the junta, while the ULA/AA accelerated its administration across the Rakhine. Nevertheless, in January 2022, the AA leader told the Asian Times that at least 6,000 troops are based in allied areas such as northern Kachin, northern Shan, and Karen States. These troops are believed to be involved in various fights against the junta forces with other allied ethnic armed forces. More recently, a few days after the introduction of the current ceasefire, it was reported that AA soldiers, together with TNLA forces, were fighting against junta forces.
The AA’s support and training for the resistance forces including the People’s Defense Force are playing a significant role in the struggle against the junta. The AA publicly confirmed its support for the anti-coup resistance movements on its thirteenth anniversary in April 2022 by circulating dozens of congratulatory letters from ethnic armed organizations and anti-coup resistance groups, including the NUG, based in Sagaing, Magway, Chin, Ayeyarwady, and elsewhere. Among the letters, at least five resistance groups disclosed that they had received AA support through military assistance and technical advice. These groups generally included the Bamar People’s Liberation Army, led by the rights activist Maung Saungkha; the Student Armed Force, formed by the University Students’ Union (Yangon); the People’s Revolution Alliance (Magway) and Mara Defense Force; and the Chinland Defense Force (CDF). That same month, the Mindat Township branch of the CDF also released footage of recruits returning from training with the AA. In September 2022, an AA spokesperson said in an online press conference that the AA had also supported some health and social issues in undisclosed areas of Myanmar.
Finally, the ULA/AA now seem to have a good relationship with the NUG. Unlike other ethnic armed groups such as the Karen National Union and KIA, the ULA leadership approached the formation of the NUG at arm’s length because the NUG leadership circle is seen as occupied mostly by ex-NLD members who had been on the military’s side in the midst of ULA/AA fighting from 2018 to late 2020. In the early period after the coup, when many Rakhine netizens criticized the non-involvement of the ULA members in the formation of the NUG, the ULA/AA leader tweeted that the NUG had offered them inside positions but that they decided to decline, and urged observers not to blame the NUG.
Further supporting this rapprochement, a Zoom meeting of the leaders of the ULA/AA and the NUG in January 2022 was disclosed for the first time, with topics of discussion including ethnic political rights, anti-military junta movements, and future political aspirations of the country. Communication continued in May, with an NUG statement saying that they had met with “the Arakan People’s Government led by the ULA” and had discussed “the current political situation in Myanmar and exchanged their views.” The ULA/AA spokesperson said that the two leaders analyzed the current situation and exchanged opinions about mutual understanding. Further, the ULA/AA were ready to respond to what the military asserted militarily and politically. However, it is still difficult to ascertain to what extent the NUG leadership has been able to accommodate the ULA’s political demands.
Conclusion
Although the NUG sees 2023 as a critical year in fighting against regime forces, the AA seems to want to accelerate its administration across the Rakhine rather than openly engaging in clashes alongside resistance forces or its allies with junta forces. Nevertheless, the junta administration recently urged the residents of southern townships such as Kyaukpyu and Thandwe not to support the AA administration and reinforced its troops across the Rakhine. If the junta forces continue such actions in Rakhine, fighting could occur at any time.
Junta regime leader Senior General. Min Aung Hlaing has visited Rakhine State several times in the first two months of 2023, urging his troops to follow “command and obey” and describing his plan for a sham election in August. However, the AA does not appear to care about the junta’s election. At a February 27 press conference, AA spokesperson Khaing Thukha said that the election would not result in any changes or benefits for the Rakhine people, so he had no comment on it. Sham elections in Rakhine remain a possibility, since some Rakhine political parties have expressed their willingness to participate. The outcome depends on whether war resumes between the AA and junta in the coming months in Rakhine, and how well the ULA/AA can maintain its administration across the state.
Kyaw Hsan Hlaing is the author of dozens of articles on human rights, political transitions, and issues related to the civil war and the 2021 military coup in Myanmar. His work has appeared in leading publications including TIME, Foreign Policy, The Diplomat, And Nikkei Asian.
