Issue Brief

The Karen National Union in Post-Coup Myanmar

The ethnic armed group along the Thai border weighs unique political and military considerations as it seeks influence in charting the country’s future.

By Shona Loong

In China

April 7, 2022

The Karen National Union continues to pursue Karen self-determination amidst escalating conflict and crackdowns. Post-coup Myanmar presents it with new opportunities to do so. While historical legacies and ongoing violence have solidified the KNU’s rejection of negotiating with the Tatmadaw, its closeness to other anti-coup actors, especially the National Unity Government, will continue to be tested.

After the February 1, 2021 coup, armed violence escalated across Myanmar, including in areas claimed by the Karen National Union (KNU).¹ The KNU, in particular, has paid a heavy price for being the first ethnic armed organization (EAO) to oppose the coup.² Between March and May 2021, the Tatmadaw launched heavy air and ground offensives in KNU-controlled Mutraw³ after the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the KNU’s armed wing, captured a Tatmadaw base. These were the first airstrikes in KNU areas in 25 years.⁴ Then, fighting escalated in December 2021 and January 2022, when the Tatmadaw shelled the Lay Kay Kaw area, a refugee resettlement site south of Mutraw.⁵ In addition to stepping up its offensives against the Tatmadaw, the KNU has publicly decried the coup, sheltered protesters, and trained local anti-coup militias.⁶ This report explains the KNU’s responses to the coup by reflecting on its decisions and goals over the past decade. This was a pivotal period for the KNU, during which it signed two ceasefires and participated in peace negotiations with the Myanmar government and the Tatmadaw.

Formed in 1949, the KNU is Myanmar’s oldest EAO. After signing a bilateral ceasefire with the central government in 2012 to the surprise of many observers, the KNU became the most sizeable EAO to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in 2015.⁷ However, even before the coup, the legitimacy of these ceasefires wavered due to successive Tatmadaw incursions into KNU areas. The current conflict is, therefore, a reflection of the pre-existing fears of some KNU officials and other Karen actors about the Tatmadaw’s sincerity in peace negotiations. The KNU has not publicly annulled the NCA, but its overt anti-junta stance, backed by military action, indicates that the ceasefires are all but defunct. To appreciate what has been at stake for the KNU since the coup, it is necessary to understand the KNU and other Karen actors’ interpretations of the foregoing peace process.

A full analysis of the KNU’s responses to the coup must also see it as a governance actor—not just a military one. In the areas it claims, the KNU provides healthcare and education, among other social services, to local populations.⁸ These populations also receive services from Karen community-based organizations (CBOs) operating from across the Thai border that have granted access to ceasefire areas by the KNU. The KNU sees itself as a legitimate government; a sentiment shared by many constituents and CBOs.⁹ Indeed, some areas the KNU controls have never been governed by any Myanmar government.

The Tatmadaw has greater capacity (numbers of soldiers) and capability (ground, air, and naval) than the combined forces of the EAOs. However, some EAOs—like the KNU—are better embedded in communities and accustomed to fighting in mountainous battle theaters. Currently, the Tatmadaw has an estimated strength of between 100,000 to 400,000 troops,¹⁰ whereas the EAOs have 75,000 troops in total,¹¹ 5,000 of which belong to the KNU.¹² Even so, decades of conflict in Myanmar demonstrate that the military can win tactical battles yet lose wars strategically, as EAOs continually regroup, mobilize personnel and resources, and maintain their legitimacy among ethnic communities. Nationwide protests since the coup have made it clear that the Tatmadaw lacks the civilian population’s support, while strikes have shaken up the junta’s administrative systems.¹³ By contrast, resistance actors, encompassing EAOs and the National Unity Government (NUG), have positioned themselves as the de facto legitimate rulers of Myanmar, by providing social services that the population refuses from the military junta. This is a tactic that the KNU has exercised for decades. It has allowed the KNU to maintain its territory and authority despite its relative military weakness.

Finally, the coup provided an opportunity for longstanding Bamar-led democracy movements and armed struggles for federalism to converge.¹⁴ In this context, the KNU’s strategic choices are also shaping Myanmar’s new political environment. The KNU has been the keenest among the EAOs to openly engage with the NUG’s efforts to build a common federal future. This is evident in its participation in the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), a broad-based platform that will work towards drafting a new Myanmar constitution.¹⁵ The KNU is emboldened by nationwide uprisings against the coup regime, while also emphasizing that the KNU has fought the Tatmadaw for much longer. “I am happy to know that the people [who oppose the coup] are putting their faith in the KNU,” one KNU leader said, but “the military has been doing similar things in ethnic areas for many years.”¹⁶

The KNU’s Aims, Objectives, and Capabilities

The KNU began its armed struggle against the Myanmar government in 1949, a year after Myanmar’s independence,¹⁷ in its pursuit of autonomy within a federal state.¹⁸ The KNU had some military success in central Burma before it retreated towards the Thai border in the 1970s. In the 1990s, the Tatmadaw pushed further into KNU areas, instituting its infamous “Four Cuts” counterinsurgency campaign.¹⁹ This campaign displaced tens of thousands of Karen villagers into Thai refugee camps and further reduced the territory held by the KNU. Areas impacted by Four Cuts are largely under mixed control today with villagers navigating between the KNU, the Myanmar government, and other armed actors.²⁰ Many inhabitants of KNU areas have experienced or witnessed severe violence at the hands of the Tatmadaw, encompassing forced labor, torture, and extrajudicial killings.²¹ The Four Cuts caused Karen civilians and the KNU to mistrust the Tatmadaw long before the coup.

Today, the KNU has widespread influence across southeast Myanmar, encompassing the Myanmar government-designated Kayin State, and parts of Mon State, Tanintharyi Region, and Bago Region.²² Since the 2012 ceasefire, the KNU has governed about 800,000 people to varying degrees, of which at least 100,000 people are under its exclusive control.²³ The KNU administers this population through fourteen departments, through which it provides Karen-language education, regulates forests, issues land tenure certificates, and operates a police force and judiciary. The area controlled by the KNU is known as Kawthoolei and is divided into seven districts, which are further subdivided into townships and village tracts. The KNU has representatives at each administrative level.²⁴ The KNU sees its administrative system as proof that it is capable of enacting self-determination, even if it lacks recognition from the Myanmar government or the international community. In exclusively KNU-controlled areas, 91% of villagers want the KNU to govern their area.²⁵

The KNU sees its administrative system as proof that it is capable of enacting self-determination, even if it lacks recognition from the Myanmar government or the international community.

The KNU’s goal of self-determination, in contrast to the Tatmadaw’s aversion towards discussing federalism and civilian control over the military, makes the KNU unlikely to engage in dialogue with the post-coup junta. Between 2015 and 2021, peace negotiations between the EAOs and the Myanmar government stumbled over these fundamental disagreements. On one hand, the KNU saw peace negotiations as a means to “a genuine Federal Union… based on equality and self-determination.”²⁶ In contrast, they thought the Tatmadaw saw “federalism as a recipe for the break-up of the country, but reluctantly endorsed it in principle in the NCA.”²⁷ It therefore blocked ideas for federalism outlined by EAOs including the KNU. The Tatmadaw also insisted on retaining the 2008 Constitution, which enshrines the Tatmadaw’s autonomy and role in national politics, whereas EAOs sought to abolish the 2008 Constitution and bring the Tatmadaw under civilian control.²⁸ This also created tensions with the NLD, thereby creating a “split at the centre” that further undermined the success of these negotiations.²⁹

Hence in six years of negotiations, NCA signatories and the central government did not come close to a negotiated settlement. Although signatories’ ability to negotiate was hampered somewhat by intra- and inter-group tensions, negotiations were ultimately derailed by the Tatmadaw’s obstructionist behavior.³⁰ Thus at the time of the coup, KNU leaders were convinced that the Tatmadaw was an insincere dialogue participant unwilling to engage with EAOs except on its own terms.³¹ As the next section elaborates, these dynamics are compounded by internal tensions within the KNU over the extent to which the KNU should compromise with the central government. They also shape what KNU leaders will be watching out for in their engagements with the NUG.

The Peace Process from the KNU’s Point of View

The Karen ceasefires and subsequent peace process exposed four issues relevant to understanding the KNU’s responses to the 2021 Myanmar coup. First, the ceasefire uncovered a power struggle within the KNU between “pro-ceasefire” and “anti-ceasefire” factions. The decision to sign both ceasefires was driven by KNU officials associated with the KNU’s central districts, where the KNU had lost most territory during the Four Cuts counterinsurgency campaigns of the 1990s.³² This conciliatory faction of the KNU came to dominate the KNU leadership in 2012 and remains in power today. It is led by General Mutu Say Poe, the current KNU chairperson. However, the pro-ceasefire faction faces opposition from anti-ceasefire officials associated with the KNU’s northern districts, which faced fewer military losses.³³ These districts are largely under the KNU’s exclusive control, and their inhabitants have minimal contact with the Myanmar government.³⁴ Northern districts have also borne the brunt of armed violence since the ceasefires, with significant clashes causing internal displacement in 2016, 2018, and 2020.³⁵ Although the anti-ceasefire opposition was ousted from KNU leadership positions during the peace process, they have gained popularity over the past decade. Divides within the KNU also remind observers that “the Karen rebellion has always been a highly heterogeneous movement.”³⁶ The question is whether responses to the coup will bridge or exacerbate these divides.³⁷

Divides within the KNU also remind observers that “the Karen rebellion has always been a highly heterogeneous movement.” The question is whether responses to the coup will bridge or exacerbate these divides.

Second, the peace process made the KNU, Karen CBOs, and Karen civilians disenchanted with dialogue.³⁸ These actors’ frustrations were threefold. For one, lower-level KNU officials and civilians worried that pro-ceasefire officials could not be trusted to hold dialogues in the interests of Karen civilians. They saw Thailand-based pro-ceasefire officials using the ceasefires to grow their personal fortunes, while civilians bore the brunt of armed violence.³⁹ In addition, Karen actors saw the Tatmadaw as bellicose and underhanded for its insistence that EAOs disarm prior to political negotiations.⁴⁰ The KNU and most EAOs only accept disarmament after a political settlement is reached. Lastly, Karen actors perceived the National League for Democracy (NLD) government as weak dialogue partners at best and insincere ones at worst.

The NLD-KNU dynamic deserves unpacking because it shapes the KNU’s stance towards the NUG.⁴¹ While the NLD trumpeted peace in the run-up to the 2015 elections, once elected it did not invest sufficient human resources or political capital in the peace process. It was often accused of emphasizing “democracy” over “federalism”—the latter of which is central to various EAOs’ demands.⁴² Furthermore, the NLD was not able to reform the constitution, a key demand of the KNU and Karen CBOs.⁴³ Even though the NLD’s proposed constitutional amendments were ultimately undermined by the Tatmadaw, these proposals did not encompass provisions on federalism in the first place.⁴⁴ The tensions between the NLD and the KNU reflect protracted and entrenched divides between Myanmar’s democracy movement—helmed by Bamar-dominated groups like the NLD and its predecessors—and EAOs’ demands for federalism.⁴⁵ For this reason, the KNU’s open embrace of the NUG is historically significant, as is their collaboration in drafting a federal democracy charter—with “federal” first, and “democracy” second.⁴⁶

The tensions between the NLD and the KNU reflect protracted and entrenched divides between Myanmar’s democracy movement—helmed by Bamar-dominated groups like the NLD and its predecessors—and EAOs’ demands for federalism. For this reason, the KNU’s open embrace of the NUG is historically significant, as is their collaboration in drafting a federal democracy charter—with “federal” first, and “democracy” second.

Third, whereas the KNU saw itself as the legitimate government in Karen areas, some actors have regarded it only as an army. One stumbling block during the peace process was the status of EAOs’ social service departments. The NCA provides for “interim arrangements,” which refers to service delivery in conflict-affected areas in the period between ceasefires and a comprehensive political settlement.⁴⁷ This paved the way for the KNU Department of Health and Welfare (KDHW) to work with CBOs and the NLD’s Ministry of Health and Sports (MOHS). While these allowed for partnerships at the local level, they also made it clear that the NLD still had a centralized vision for healthcare provision in Myanmar. The NLD did not see the KNU and other EAOs as equal partners in social service delivery⁴⁸ and felt that there should only be one legitimate governing body in Myanmar.⁴⁹ Moving forward, the KNU faces the question of whether key actors in post-coup Myanmar recognize it as capable of governance and social service delivery. The KNU will only accept dialogue with the coup regime if the Tatmadaw recognizes it as a legitimate government in the areas it controls. Given the Tatmadaw’s track record, this seems unlikely.

Fourth, the peace process shone light on Karen CBOs’ concerns that infrastructure development and resource extraction in Karen areas since the ceasefires have had adverse effects on local communities.⁵⁰ Karen CBOs based on the Thai-Myanmar border and in the diaspora were vocal critics of the NCA⁵¹ and how it allowed for the encroachment of infrastructure and resource extraction projects into KNU areas. One flashpoint was a section of the Asian Highway funded by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Thai government in collaboration with the Myanmar government. Karen CBOs highlighted that affected villagers were not properly consulted prior to the highway’s construction.⁵² Another flashpoint was the planned Hatgyi Dam. There were several clashes at the proposed dam site between 2014 and 2018, as the Tatmadaw sought to assert full control over it.⁵³ Karen CBOs have released statements and organized protests in response.⁵⁴ These CBOs succeeded at lobbying the KNU: between late 2018 and early 2020, the KNU suspended its participation in the peace process, ostensibly in response to the growing frustrations of Karen CBOs, anti-ceasefire officials, and their constituents.⁵⁵ Therefore, through the peace process, Karen CBOs established themselves as key critics of the Karen ceasefires, whose voices could not be ignored by the KNU. In the past year, Karen CBOs have also firmly opposed any engagement with the post-coup junta, citing the failure of the peace process.⁵⁶ This is yet another reason why the KNU is unlikely to pursue formal dialogue with the Tatmadaw.

By 2021, relations between the KNU and the NLD, as well as between the KNU and the Tatmadaw, were on shaky ground. The KNU doubted that the NLD and Tatmadaw were sincere participants at the negotiating table, while Karen CBOs were even more vocal critics of the adverse effects of the ceasefires on Karen civilians.

The KNU’s Resistance to the Coup

Of Myanmar’s EAOs, the KNU has been one of the most outspoken critics of the coup.⁵⁷ It has backed its words with action, including military force against the Tatmadaw. First, the KNU publicly denounced the coup and was the first EAO to do so. In an official statement issued on 14 February 2021, the KNU announced its support for nonviolent protests against the coup regime.⁵⁸ On the same day, 85 Karen civil society organizations released a statement denouncing the coup and calling the KNU and other actors to resist the coup.⁵⁹

Second, the KNU continues to shelter protesters, striking civil servants, and ousted lawmakers. By late March 2021, the KNU reported that it was sheltering hundreds.⁶⁰ In December 2021, fighting broke out because Tatmadaw soldiers raided KNU-controlled Lay Kay Kaw town for opponents of the junta. Tatmadaw soldiers made thirty arrests, and subsequent fighting emptied out Lay Kay Kaw. Ironically, Lay Kay Kaw, a resettlement site for Karen refugees, was an emblem of the peace process.⁶¹

Third, the KNU is stepping up its military actions against the Tatmadaw, having seized at least three Tatmadaw bases since the coup, likely in response to the Tatmadaw’s armed quashing of nonviolent protests.⁶² After the KNLA captured a Tatmadaw base at the end of March 2021, the Tatmadaw retaliated with aerial attacks.⁶³ The Karen Peace Support Network, a coalition of Karen CBOs, recorded the use of 47 bombs and 575 mortar shells in KNU-controlled Mutraw district between 27 March and 7 May 2021, which displaced nearly 90% of its 80,000 population.⁶⁴ Besides this, there have been two other significant episodes of armed violence: the aforementioned December 2021 attacks in Lay Kay Kaw and ongoing attacks this year, which are also in Mutraw.⁶⁵ Small skirmishes are also commonplace, with at least 200 clashes reported between the KNLA and the Tatmadaw between February and March 2021.⁶⁶ Conflict between the KNU and the Tatmadaw has reached levels unprecedented for decades, with dire effects on civilian populations.

Fourth, the KNU has refused formal dialogue with the Tatmadaw. In February 2022, the junta invited EAOs, including groups that previously refused to sign the NCA, to preliminary peace talks. The KNU declined, stating that “the military is the main enemy and destroyer of peace, and thus we have nothing to discuss with them.”⁶⁷

Fifth, the KNU supports the local NUG-affiliated militias, the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs). The KNU provides military training to fleeing protesters, who subsequently join PDFs in other parts of Myanmar or the KNLA.⁶⁸ Since the December 2021 clashes in Lay Kay Kaw, the KNLA has also launched joint military operations with PDFs.⁶⁹

Finally, the KNU participates in structures affiliated with the NUG, primarily the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC).⁷⁰ Launched in November 2021, the NUCC is a broad-based platform for actors to come together to depose the junta and establish a roadmap for a federal democratic state. The platform is unprecedented for its diversity, given the involvement of EAOs—many of which were considered criminal organizations under the NLD government—political parties, and protest groups.⁷¹

One year since the coup, the KNU has adopted a clear anti-coup stance and backed this up with military action and open collaboration with other resistance actors. Despite initial hesitation and concerns about fragmentation within the organization, the KNU now appears united in its denunciation of the Tatmadaw.⁷² In addition, it appears to see participation in the NUCC as a viable means of pursuing its long-held aim of self-determination within a federal democratic state. The NUCC, which is a political alliance involving the NUG, protest leaders, political parties, and EAOs, seeks to pursue federal democracy in Myanmar, by drafting a Federal Democratic Charter. Although the “Bamar majority’s sensitivity to minority concerns are presently unprecedentedly high,” it remains to be seen if the NUCC can resolve the demands of the KNU and embattled Karen civilians, given the historically strained relationship between Bamar-led movements for democracy and ethnic-led movements for federalism and peace.⁷³

Legacies of the Peace Process in Post-Coup Karen Areas

The first “known unknown” relates to internal divides in the KNU. The KNU is due for a renewal of leadership in 2022, and the election of leaders associated with its anti-ceasefire faction may cause it to take a harsher stance towards the junta. The KNU elects its 11-member Central Executive Committee through quadrennial congresses. Its 17^th congress was scheduled for early 2020 but has been repeatedly postponed due to COVID-19, the coup, and escalating conflict.⁷⁴ The KNU has yet to release an official stance on the NCA since the coup, but its anti-ceasefire bloc has already declared the NCA “null and void.”⁷⁵ If elected, this stance could extend to the entire organization and may result in, for instance, the KNU encouraging the NUCC to denounce the NCA.

The NUCC should also be lauded for involving EAOs in drafting the Federal Democracy Charter. However, years of ceasefire collapses, stalled peace talks, and tensions between democracy and federalism may not be easily overcome.

Secondly, the KNU and other Karen actors will be watching to see if the NUCC offers a demonstrably different means of dialogue between EAOs and other actors than the foregoing peace process, which was unable to address the root causes of the Karen conflict.⁷⁶ The NUCC should also be lauded for involving EAOs in drafting the Federal Democracy Charter. However, years of ceasefire collapses, stalled peace talks, and tensions between democracy and federalism may not be easily overcome. For instance, in late 2021, NUCC dialogues stumbled slightly over the role of the NLD-dominated Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) and the NUG within the platform, when CRPH and NUG members removed the NUCC’s authority to direct the NUG and CRPH.⁷⁷

The third “known unknown” is the status of the KNU’s social systems and the role of Karen CBOs therein. There are two sub-issues at stake here. For one, the extent to which the NUG recognizes and supports the KNU’s administrative systems is currently unclear.⁷⁸ Another issue is the creation of humanitarian corridors through KNU territory. The KNU, together with the Chin National Front and the Karenni National Progressive Party, issued a call for establishing these “internationally negotiated” corridors in January 2022.⁷⁹

Finally, international actors may influence the course of the conflict.⁸⁰ The aforementioned humanitarian corridors will require the Thai government’s support. The KNU has also called for a no-fly zone over the Thai-Myanmar border,⁸¹ which is critical to this front of the conflict as the Tatmadaw increasingly relies on airpower to overpower EAOs and PDFs.⁸² Both these proposals require not just the support of the Thai government but also that other international actors recognize their legitimacy and provide funds for aid delivery.⁸³ While international involvement is not the ultimate arbiter of how Myanmar’s post-coup future will unfold, it is nonetheless significant to the resources and protective mechanisms available to the KNU. Due to its position on the Thai-Myanmar border, Thailand’s choices—such as to accept refugees or to enable the Tatmadaw’s supply lines—are critical to the KNU’s future.

Conclusion

The KNU’s attitude towards the coup is profoundly shaped by its experiences with the foregoing peace process, which increased mistrust between the Tatmadaw and the KNU. By the time of the coup, the peace process had not achieved a political settlement between these groups. Rather, the peace process cemented the KNU and Karen civilians’ views that the Tatmadaw was uncompromising in its opposition to a future federal system and civilian control over the military. It is thus unsurprising that the KNU is deeply opposed to political dialogue with the Tatmadaw. This impasse also heightened Karen CBOs and civilians’ perception that negotiations with the Tatmadaw would not deliver benefits to civilians. “Looking critically back at the past decade,” one commentator wrote after the coup, “the Tatmadaw never meant what it said about democracy and peace.”⁸⁴ Unless the Tatmadaw changes tack and sincerely recognizes the KNU’s aspirations for self-determination, the KNU will remain unwilling to meet them at the negotiating table.⁸⁵

Despite the KNU’s staunch anti-coup stance, it is important not to conflate it with other anti-coup actors. Successful alliances between the KNU and other anti-coup actors and platforms, like the NUG and NUCC respectively, depend on whether these actors can recognize three aspects of the KNU’s self-image. First, the KNU’s key objective is self-determination. It demands autonomy within a federal system, not just democracy, as an alternative to the coup regime. Second, the KNU represents Karen civilians who have not only experienced large-scale violence at the hands of the Tatmadaw but who have also not received many tangible benefits from Myanmar’s so-called “democratic transition.” And third, the KNU seeks to be recognized as a legitimate government in the areas it controls. Sustaining a successful alliance between anti-coup actors thus requires that these actors recognize the KNU’s social services and the role of Karen CBOs in checking its power. The KNU and Karen civilians will be watching whether the NUG can pursue parallel governance in practice, not just in name.

Ultimately, the peace process showed that dialogue with the Tatmadaw was not a productive means for the KNU to achieve its central aims of governance, self-determination, and autonomy within a federal union. The KNU has thus turned away from engagement with the Tatmadaw and towards engagement with the NUG, which claims to seek a “federal union that seeks to address decades of structural violence against all the people of Myanmar.”⁸⁶ Whether such a future will materialize in the KNU’s case hangs on whether the NUG can genuinely accommodate the organization’s history, aims, and visions for the future, amidst its efforts to collaborate with a wide range of anti-coup actors.

Notes

1
Note: “Myanmar’s Spring Revolution,” ACLED, July 22, 2021, https://acleddata.com/2021/07/22/myanmars-spring-revolution/.
2
Note: “Deciding the Future of the ‘Karen Revolution’” Frontier Myanmar, January 24, 2022.
3
Note: “Mutraw” is the name of a KNU district that is largely under exclusive KNU control. The area claimed by the KNU is divided into seven districts. This encompasses, and is significantly larger than, the Myanmar government-designated Kayin State.
4
Note: “Terror from the Skies: Coup Regime’s Escalated Offensives Cause Mass Displacement Across Mutraw,” Karen Peace Support Network, May 24, 2021.
5
Note: UNHCR, “Myanmar Emergency Update (as of 17 January 2022),” Relief Web, January 21, 2022, https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-emergency-update-17-january-2022
6
Note: Ibid.
7
Note: The term “nationwide” is a misnomer, as only eight EAOs out of at least twenty in Myanmar signed the NCA in 2015. Two more EAOs acceded to the NCA in 2018. David Brenner, Rebel Politics: A Political Sociology of Armed Struggle in Myanmar’s Borderlands (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019), 2.
8
Note: Ashley South, “‘Hybrid Governance’ and the Politics of Legitimacy in the Myanmar Peace Process,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 48, no. 1 (2018): 50-66.
9
Note: A 2019 survey conducted in 72 randomly selected villages in southeast Myanmar found that 45% of respondents wanted the KNU to govern their area, compared with 20% for the central government. Respondents’ preference for KNU governance was much stronger in KNU-controlled areas, as compared with areas where both the central government and KNU were present. Saferworld and Karen Peace Support Network, “Security, Justice, and Governance in South East Myanmar: A Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices Survey,” Saferworld, January, 2019, https://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/security-justice-and-governance-in-south-east-myanmar.pdf, 28.
10
Note: The Tatmadaw’s strength is often cited as between 350,000 to 400,000. Anthony Davis argues that these are gross overestimates and that the true strength of the Tatmadaw is likely to be less than 100,000, with a police force of a further 80,000. Anthony Davis, “Who’s More Likely to Win Myanmar’s Raging Civil War?,” Asia Times, December 25, 2021.
11
Note: Anthony Davis, cited in Poppy McPherson and Panu Wongcha-um, “As Ethnic Armies Unite Against Coup, War Returns To Myanmar’s Borderlands,” Reuters, March 30, 2021.
12
Note: “Karen National Union,” Myanmar Peace Monitor, 2019, https://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/1563/knu/
13
Note: On the coup’s anniversary, a silent strike emptied out cities across Myanmar. “Myanmar Marks Coup Anniversary with Protests and Unrest,” Reuters, February 1, 2022.
14
Note: Shona Loong, “Centre-periphery Relations in Myanmar: Leverage And Solidarity After the 1 February Coup,” Trends in Southeast Asia, 9/2021 (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2021)
15
Note: The KNU is one of eight EAOs involved in the NUCC, of which only three have disclosed their names: the KNU, the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), and the Chin National Front (CNF). Besides EAOs, the NUCC encompasses ethnic political parties, protest leaders, and ousted NLD lawmakers. Htet Myet Min Tun and Moe Thuzar, “Myanmar’s National Unity Consultative Council: A Vision of Myanmar’s Federal Future,” Fulcrum, January 5, 2022.
16
Note: Frontier, “‘People in Myanmar have been totally brainwashed’: KNU official welcomes new solidarity,” Frontier Myanmar, May 3, 2021.
17
Note: The KNU was formed in 1947, out of a few existing Karen organizations. Several factors led the KNU to armed struggle—an approach its leaders had not anticipated when the KNU was founded in 1947: the British did not respond to the KNU’s requests for autonomy; the Karen had been overlooked during secession negotiations with the Shan, Karenni, and Kachin; and communal violence between the Karen and Bamar reached unprecedented levels. Mikael Gravers, “Disorder as Order: The Ethno-Nationalist Struggle of The Karen in Burma/Myanmar — a Discussion of the Dynamics of an Ethnicized Civil War And Its Historical Roots,” Journal of Burma Studies 19, no. 1 (2015): 27-78.
18
Note: Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1999), 87.
19
Note: The “Four Cuts” are so named because the Tatmadaw sought to cut links between the KNU and their sources of food, funds, intelligence, and recruits.
20
Note: Other armed actors relevant to the KNU include the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA) and the Karen Peace Council (KPC). Both are splinter factions of the KNU.
21
Note: “Foundation of Fear: 25 Years of Villagers’ Voices from Southeast Myanmar,” Karen Human Rights Group, October 2017; Saferworld and Karen Peace Support Network, “Security, Justice, and Governance in South East Myanmar: A Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices Survey,” xv.
22
Note: Saferworld and Karen Peace Support Network, “Security, Justice, and Governance in South East Myanmar: A Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices Survey,” 3.
23
Note: Kim Jolliffe, “Ceasefires, Governance and Development: The Karen National Union in Times of Change,” Asia Foundation, December, 2015, 5.
24
Note: Ibid., 20-21.
25
Note: Responses are more mixed in mixed-controlled areas, where 41% want the KNU to govern the area, compared with 16% preferring the central government. Saferworld and Karen Peace Support Network, “Security, Justice, and Governance in South East Myanmar: A Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices Survey,” 48-49.
26
Note: “Background,” Karen National Union, https://knuhq.org/public/en/about/background.
27
Note: TRS6/21, 9; Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung and Saw Eh Htoo, “The Fractured Centre: ‘Two-headed Government’ And Threats to the Peace Process,” Modern Asian Studies, 2021, 21.
28
Note: Ibid., 21.
29
Note: Thawnghmung and Saw Eh Htoo, “The Fractured Centre,” 19.
30
Note: For an overview of factors leading to the stalemate in peace negotiations, see Gun San Awng, Mi Aye Khine, and Nyan Tun Aung, “The Deadlocking Factors in Myanmar’s Peace Process,” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/myanmar/15639.pdf. It is also worth noting that internal tensions around peace processes are not unique to the KNU. Other armed groups, within Myanmar and outside, also experience splintering, sometimes as a result of peace processes themselves. E.g. Allard Duursma and Feike Fliervoet, “Fueling Factionalism? The Impact of Peace Processes on Rebel Group Fragmentation in Civil Wars,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2020, 788-812.
31
Note: “KNU Scorns Junta Invitation to Peace Talks Following Karen State Military Onslaught,” Myanmar Now, February 8, 2022.
32
Note: Brenner, “Rebel Politics,” 48-51.
33
Note: These differences also have to do with the political economy of the KNU rebellion. KNLA brigades, each of which are associated with a district, are financially autonomous. Counterinsurgency campaigns severely disrupted financial inflows to the once-powerful central districts, which profited from the border gates they controlled along the Thai-Myanmar border. Ibid., 52-57.
34
Note: Ibid., 58-60.
35
Note: Karen Human Rights Group, “KHRG’s Statement on Shelling in Luthaw Township, Mutraw District,” Relief Web, March 19, 2020, https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/khrg-s-statement-shelling-luthaw-towhship-mutraw-district.
36
Note: Ibid., 49.
37
Note: Shona Loong, “Centre-periphery Relations in Myanmar: Leverage And Solidarity After the 1 February Coup,” Trends in Southeast Asia, 9/2021 (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2021).
38
Note: They saw a disjuncture between the international community’s celebration of the peace process and its failure to redress the concerns of conflict-affected people. The 2012 ceasefire was signed just one year after Thein Sein’s quasi-civilian government took power in Myanmar. Western governments thus interpreted the agreement as evidence that Myanmar was undergoing a genuine political transition. Brenner, “Rebel Politics,” 47.
39
Note: Ibid., 67.
40
Note: Bobby Anderson, “Myanmar’s Peace Process: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, Borderland Economies, Service Delivery, and other Post-Panglong Concerns (Part I),” Tea Circle, August 23, 2017.
41
Note: The NUG’s 26-member acting cabinet was appointed by the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) in April 2021. The CRPH comprises ousted NLD lawmakers, who drew on the NLD’s 2020 election win to position themselves as the legitimate leaders of the anti-coup movement. Moe Thuzar and Htet Myet Min Tun, “Myanmar’s National Unity Government: A Radical Arrangement to Counteract the Coup,” ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2022/8, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2022-8-myanmars-national-unity-government-a-radical-arrangement-to-counteract-the-coup-by-moe-thuzar-and-htet-myet-min-tun/.
42
Note: Kyaw Lynn, “The National League for Democracy: A Party for Democracy or Federalism?” Transnational Institute, October 2, 2020, https://www.tni.org/en/article/the-national-league-for-democracy-a-party-for-democracy-or-federalism.
43
Note: Karen Peace Support Network, “Burma’s Dead-End Peace Negotiation Process: A Case Study of the Land Sector,” Progressive Voice, July 5, 2018, https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/2018/07/05/burmas-dead-end-peace-negotiation-process-a-case-study-of-the-land-sector-2/.
44
Note: Nyi Nyi Kyaw, “Democracy First, Federalism Next? The Constitutional Reform Process in Myanmar,” ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2019/93, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2019_93.pdf.
45
Note: This mistrust can be traced even further back. After the 1988 crackdown, the KNU sheltered at least 5,000 student activists, who eventually formed a government-in-exile, the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB). However, the KNU was aggrieved when the government-in-exile failed to accommodate its demands. The NCGUB portended problematic aspects of NLD rule, including its unwillingness to question the Tatmadaw. Shona Loong, “Centre-Periphery Relations in Myanmar,” 25-27.
46
Note: This is not a stance shared by all EAOs; consider, for instance, the Arakan Army’s avowed stance.
47
Note: Ashley South, “‘Hybrid Governance’ and the Politics of Legitimacy in the Myanmar Peace Process,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 48, no. 1(2018), 50-66.
48
Note: Anne Décobert, “Health as a Bridge to Peace in Myanmar’s Kayin State: “Working Encounters” for Community Development,” Third World Quarterly, 42, no. 2(2021): 402-420.
49
Note: Thawnghmung and Saw Eh Htoo, “The Two-Headed Government,” 22.
50
Note: This is not unique to the Karen. For instance, plans for the Myitsone Dam in Kachin State were a key factor in the relapse of conflict between the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and the central government in 2011.
51
Note: 41 Karen Civil Society Organizations, “Karen Civil Society Has Lost Trust in the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) Negotiations as a Gateway to Political Dialogue,” Burma Partnership, October 4, 2015, https://www.burmapartnership.org/2015/10/karen-civil-society-has-lost-trust-in-the-nationwide-ceasefire-agreement-nca-negotiations-as-a-gateway-to-political-dialogue/.
52
Note: Karen Human Rights Group and Karen Environmental and Social Action Network, “Beautiful Words, Ugly Actions: The Asian Highway in Karen State,” Burma Link, https://www.burmalink.org/beautiful-words-ugly-actions-asian-highway-karen-state-burma/.
53
Note: Diana Suhardiman, Jeff Rutherford, and Saw John Bright, “Putting Violent Armed Conflict in the Center of the Salween Hydropower Debates,” Critical Asian Studies, 49, no. 3(2017): 349-364.
54
Note: Nyein Nyein, “Karen Villagers Protest Hatgyi Dam, Other Projects on Salween River,” The Irrawaddy, March 14, 2018.
55
Note: Swe Lei Mon, “What Does The Panglong Conference Mean For The Peace Process?” Frontier Myanmar, August 17, 2020; Ye Mon, “Karen National Union Suspends Participation in Peace Talks,” Frontier Myanmar, October 29, 2018.
56
Note: Karen Peace Support Network, “KPSN Strongly Condemns The Military Coup and Urgently Call For The New Approaches To Achieve Peace and Democracy in Burma,” Progressive Voice, February 4, 2021, https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/03022021_KPSN-Statement-on-BA-coup_Egnlish.pdf.
57
Note: Andrew Ong, “Ethnic Armed Organisations in Post-Coup Myanmar: New Conversations Needed,” ISEAS Perspectives, 79, 2021.
58
Note: Karen Information Center, “KNU Offer Anti-Coup Protestors’ its Protection – Karen Civil Society Alliance Calls for Ethnic Armed Groups to Unite and Foreign Embassies Denounce Military Coup,” Burma News International.
59
Note: Ibid.
60
Note: AFP, “Myanmar’s Rebel Areas Brace For Thousands Fleeing Unrest,” Frontier Myanmar, March 25, 2021.
61
Note: Linn Htin, “Military Arrests NLD Lawmaker in KNU Territory,” Myanmar Now, December 14, 2021; Nyein Swe, Linn Htin, and Maung Shwe Wah, “Thousands Displaced as Junta Troops Clash with KNLA in ‘Peace Town’,” Myanmar Now, December 17, 2021.
62
Note: “KNU Occupies Myanmar Military Base in Bago,” Myanmar Now, September 10, 2021.
63
Note: AFP, “Wounded Myanmar Refugees Tell of Airstrike Horror,” March 31, 2021.
64
Note: Karen Peace Support Network, “Terror From The Skies.”
65
Note: “Regime Airstrike Destroys Hospital in Lower Myanmar,” The Irrawaddy, January 12, 2022.
66
Note: “‘People in Myanmar Have Been Totally Brainwashed’: KNU Official Welcomes New Solidarity,” Frontier Myanmar, May 3, 2021.
67
Note: These peace talks did not include the NUG and CRPH, which the Tatmadaw has designated as “terrorist” organizations. “Myanmar Junta Invites Some Ethnic Armed Groups to Preliminary Peace Talks,” The Irrawaddy, February 7, 2022.
68
Note: Some trainees report being pressured to join the KNLA; others chose to join because the PDFs lack weapons and resources. “‘How Can We Fight Without Weapons?’,” Frontier Myanmar, January 6, 2022.
69
Note: “Myanmar Junta Forces See Heavy Casualties in Lay Kay Kaw Clashes,” The Irrawaddy, December 17, 2022.
70
Note: The KNU is one of eight EAOs participating in the NUCC. Three have disclosed their names. Besides the KNU, these are the Karenni National Progressive Party and the Chin National Front. Htet Myet Min Tun and Moe Thuzar, “Myanmar’s National Unity Consultative Council: A Vision of Myanmar’s Federal Future,” Fulcrum, January 5, 2022.
71
Note: Nyan Hlaing Lin, “NUCC Outlines Goals As It Seeks To Widen Membership,” Myanmar Now, November 21, 2021.
72
Note: In May 2021, KNU Chairman General Mutu Say Poe stated that the organization would uphold “resolving conflicts via dialogue” and honor the NCA. Another KNU official, associated with the KNLA Brigade 6, which encompasses the Lay Kay Kaw area, instructed his subordinates to turn PDF fighters away. These statements appear null at this point, given the KNU’s participation in joint attacks with PDF forces. “Deciding the Future of the ‘Karen Revolution,’” Frontier Myanmar.
73
Note: Su Mon Thazin Aung, “Myanmar’s Quest for a Federal and Democratic Future: Considerations, Constraints, and Compromises,” ISEAS Perspective, 2022/28, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2022-28-myanmars-quest-for-a-federal-and-democratic-future-considerations-constraints-and-compromises-by-su-mon-thazin-aung/.
74
Note: “Deciding the future of the ‘Karen revolution,” Frontier Myanmar.
75
Note: Anti-ceasefire officials formed the KNU Concerned Group in 2017 and sometimes speak under this banner. “Myanmar Ceasefire Agreement is Void: KNU Concerned Group,” The Irrawaddy, September 3, 2021.
76
Note: Klo Kwe Moo Kham, “An Already Failing Peace Process Betrayed in Myanmar,” Peace Research Institute of Oslo, March 10, 2021, https://blogs.prio.org/2021/03/an-already-failing-peace-process-betrayed-in-myanmar/.
77
Note: Aye Chan and Billy Ford, “A New Myanmar Forum Aims to Unite Democratic Forces,” United States Institute of Peace, November 3, 2021, https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/11/new-myanmar-forum-aims-unite-democratic-forces.
78
Note: The author understands that the NUG has recognized EAO administration systems; however, as of yet, it is unclear what this means in practice. The NUG is also piloting its own local administration systems.
79
Note: However, it is likely that these corridors will require the buy-in of the Tatmadaw to succeed. Karenni National Progressive Party, Karen National Union, and Chin National Front, “Statement in Response to the Proposal of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar,” Burma Library, January 19, 2022, https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/2022-01-19-Statement-in-response-to-the-Proposal-of-the-Special-Envoy-of-the-Secretary-General-on-Myanmar-tu-en.pdf.
80
Note: The extent to which international actors can influence the course of conflict is contested. ASEAN and the UN have yet to throw their full weight behind either the coup regime or the NUG. ASEAN—from whom both the U.S. and European actors are taking cues—has wavered somewhat. Its decision to invite only a “non-political” representative to the 2021 ASEAN Summit is significant, although it falls short of recognizing the NUG. As such, no state has recognized the NUG. Myanmar is also caught between China, which has important geo-economic interests in the country through the Belt and Road Initiative, and the U.S. Nonetheless, bilateral relations on a smaller scale, such as with Thailand, remain crucial to the conflict.
81
Note: “Myanmar Rebel Group Calls For No-Fly Zone To Protect Civilians,” Reuters, December 22, 2021.
82
Note: “Junta’s Reliance On Airpower Grows As Resistance Gain Ground,” Myanmar Now, January 29, 2022.
83
Note: At the time of writing, the U.S. government and Norway are purportedly discussing the creation of a humanitarian corridor with the Thai government. Both previously backed the peace process, which was grounded in the NCA. However, Thailand is concerned about antagonizing its neighbor. Gwen Robinson, “Yangon Calm Masks Myanmar’s Pain 1 Year After Military Takeover,” Nikkei Asia, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Asia-Insight/Yangon-calm-masks-Myanmar-s-pain-1-year-after-military-takeover.
84
Note: Klo Kwe Moo Kham, “An Already Failing Peace Process Betrayed in Myanmar.”
85
Note: “KNU Scorns Junta Invitation to Peace Talks Following Karen State Military Onslaught,” Myanmar Now.
86
Note: NUG Foreign Ministry, quoted in Moe Thuzar and Htet Myet Min Tun, “Myanmar’s National Unity Government: A Radical Arrangement to Counteract the Coup,” ISEAS Perspective, 2022/8, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2022-8-myanmars-national-unity-government-a-radical-arrangement-to-counteract-the-coup-by-moe-thuzar-and-htet-myet-min-tun/.

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