On June 3, 2026, Stimson hosted a public meeting to discuss The US–India Nuclear Accord, a new volume edited by Sumit Ganguly and Dinsha Mistree. The book includes chapters by Indian and American policy practitioners and analysts. It deftly assesses how that landmark deal was formulated and negotiated to a successful conclusion in 2008, as well as its implications for the nearly two decades of US-India strategic partnership thereafter. 

The book gets many things right; among them, readers will be reminded of what a stunning breakthrough the deal was at the time and how much creative diplomacy and sheer grit it demanded from both sides. The book is also a reminder of how the US-India relationship has changed. 

One change is especially relevant today. In the early 2000s, the principal impetus for improved strategic ties was “top down.” Simply put, the nuclear deal required bold and focused political leadership over more than four years. At the start of his presidency, George W. Bush and his national security team set a goal of transforming U.S. ties with India, but they faced deep skepticism from the U.S. national security bureaucracy, especially among policymakers and analysts involved in the effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In New Delhi, distrust of the United States was even more deeply entrenched, in part because India’s nuclear program had been a primary target of Washington’s nonproliferation policy for decades. To see the deal through to completion, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had to risk the fall of his government in a no confidence vote. 

The nuclear deal’s historical and political context was critically important: By choosing to launch an initiative on civil nuclear cooperation, the two sides cut to the heart of their thorniest bilateral dispute. It was a high-risk approach that nearly failed repeatedly and barely survived the downward pull of powerful bureaucratic, institutional, and political forces.

As successful as it was, the deal did not resolve all of the differences between the United States and India. It fell very short in one obvious way: It has yet to kickstart US-India civil nuclear cooperation. Nor, of course, did it quickly pave a way to the settlement of other disagreements over major issues like U.S. relations with Pakistan or India’s ties to Russia. 

Where the deal did succeed was in convincing many longtime critics of the bilateral relationship – within both governments, among influential political groups, and even wider segments of the public – that a bilateral strategic partnership was possible and desirable. It tangibly demonstrated that a far greater degree of trust had been built at the most senior levels of leadership. It was transformative. There was a US-India relationship before the civil nuclear deal and a fundamentally different relationship after it, if only because both sides put so much on the line to conclude it.

Perhaps this transformation is now more significant than ever, because the second term of the Trump administration has not been kind to US-India ties, at least not from the top down. The litany of the past year’s disputes is well known. Trade, immigration, Pakistan, Russia, and an apparent breakdown in the personal bonhomie between Trump and Modi all make the list. More recently, differences have flared over the war in Iran.

And yet many elements of the US-India strategic partnership persist. Where once the bureaucracies and democratic politics were drags, now they provide important ballast. A dense web of defense agreements inked after the nuclear deal and a full schedule of joint exercises and other engagements keep the U.S. and Indian militaries in active partnership. Existing economic and commercial ties, especially on civilian technology but also in important areas of defense industry, persist despite political headwinds. 

Compared to the early 2000s, this represents a reversal of the motive forces behind US-India ties: from top-down to bottom-up. The reversal also demonstrates the connective power of institutionalized relationships and organic market incentives. These have the potential to constitute the most sustainable foundations for long-term partnership – more so than any government agreement – and could be further bolstered once a long-awaited US-India trade agreement is finalized. 

However, even the bottom-up strengths in US-India ties face immediate challenges. Current U.S. immigration policies, especially visa restrictions, and rising anti-Indian sentiment on the extremes of the U.S. political spectrum threaten the Indian-American community, US-India business ties, and Indian champions of closer U.S. ties. 

A lost step in US-India ties could have grave consequences. Especially when viewed through the lens of a dynamic geopolitical competition with China, India and the United States need to race ahead together just to avoid falling behind. Past leaders in New Delhi and Washington appreciated this reality. 

During the first Trump administration and throughout the Biden administration, Washington was forthright about its desire to compete against China globally and especially across the Indo-Pacific region. Washington’s strategic clarity about China led U.S. officials to pursue ties with India as a top strategic priority, at times so ardently that it arguably came at the expense of other U.S. concerns.  

For its part, although India was understandably reluctant to stir trouble with China, it increasingly saw partnership with the United States as a core pillar of its strategy for national development and security, above all as a means to access cutting edge technologies without deepening dependence on China. In sum, the civil nuclear deal opened the door to deeper US-India partnership, but India’s concerns about China’s rising power and aggressive regional policies subsequently pushed it through that door and into Washington’s enthusiastic embrace. 

If the Trump administration is serious about regaining momentum in US-India ties, it should proceed quickly along three tracks. The first is well-underway: a breakthrough trade deal that unlocks major new opportunities for commerce and reignites enthusiasm among key interest groups on both sides. The sooner the deal is done, the easier it will be to clear the air of other lesser grievances and get to business.

Second, Washington should recommit to an Indo-Pacific strategy that once again clearly prioritizes U.S. economic and defense ties with India as part of a wider geopolitical competition with China. In recent years, the hard core of the US-India strategic partnership has been the defense sector. The more quickly New Delhi regains confidence about U.S. strategic intentions with respect to China, the more likely it will be to prioritize new defense deals, including co-production arrangements that benefit U.S. manufacturers while also improving India’s capacity to project power across the Indo-Pacific region. Simultaneously, by expanding US-India defense dialogues, tabletop exercises, and joint training, the two can better envision, plan, and coordinate a more ambitious range of cooperative military operations in the future.

Third, leaders on both sides should steal a page from the history of the civil nuclear deal and embark on a bold new cooperative venture, perhaps by returning to civilian nuclear or other energy technologies, or by shifting gears to other areas of critical and emerging technologies. The latter pathway was pursued during the Biden years under the “Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology” (iCET) framework, which evolved into “Transforming the Relationship Utilizing Strategic Technology” (TRUST) early last year.

As former U.S. ambassador to India Kenneth I. Juster observes in his chapter of The US-India Nuclear Accord, both iCET and TRUST resemble the precursor phases of the civil-nuclear deal, when Washington and New Delhi created a High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG). Juster also recalls that the bridge between the HTCG and the civil nuclear deal was the “Next Steps in Strategic Partnership” (NSSP) framework, which effectively sketched out a pathway for cooperation in several priority sectors and, more importantly, outlined a series of reciprocal steps that Washington and New Delhi would take to realize that cooperation. The NSSP offers an excellent model for prioritizing specific policy aims and making progress, stepwise, on sensitive issues. A similar approach would pay off now at a time when trust, once again, needs to be restored to the relationship.