A year into Russia’s full-scale invasion, the war has upended assumptions about Russian military prowess. Put simply, prewar assessments were skewed to Russia’s military strengths. Western intelligence agencies and defense analysts overvalued the size of the Russian armed forces and the numbers and types of Russian weapon systems. They undervalued the importance of command and control, logistical support, civil-military relations, and other nonmaterial factors.
In early February 2022, as Russian forces amassed on Ukraine’s borders, Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned a closed session of Congress that Kyiv could fall within 72 hours of a full-scale Russian invasion. He was not alone in offering such a dire prediction: U.S. and European officials and military analysts alike expected the Russian military to steamroll Ukraine’s forces. On paper, Russia appeared formidable, with its military not only much larger than that of Ukraine, but also better equipped with new and modern weapons after a decade of reform.
Nevertheless, the war has exposed the myth of Russian military prowess. Moscow’s initial plan to quickly capture Kyiv and topple the Ukrainian government ignored Russia’s own doctrine and ended in a humiliating failure; its subsequent “Plan B”— a series of attacks on the Donbas region — fared little better, setting the stage for Ukraine’s successful offensives in the fall. Moreover, Russia’s many failures are not the army’s alone — the navy has lost several ships, including its flagship cruiser the Moskva, and the air force has failed to establish air superiority over Ukraine. The Russian military is down, but not yet out.
Resources are important in assessing military power potential, but the generation of actual combat power also depends on the capacity of militaries to effectively leverage those resources — what analysts call “military effectiveness.” Put differently, it matters what militaries do with the resources available to them. Military effectiveness depends on a range of nonmaterial factors, such as regime type, civil-military relations, culture, and skilled-force employment. Prewar assessments of Russian military power tended to ignore these factors, even though they all pointed to Russian military ineffectiveness. Similarly, estimates of Ukrainian military power failed to capture Ukraine’s capacity for quick and effective decisionmaking, tactical learning, and, above all, its will to fight. The net result was that prewar assessments overestimated Russian military might while simultaneously underrating Ukrainian military capabilities.
This is not an isolated occurrence. Exaggerated assumptions about enemy military capabilities are a longstanding problem. Before the 1991 Gulf War, for example, senior military officials, the intelligence community, and analysts at think tanks grossly overestimated Iraqi military capabilities, predicting a protracted war and upwards of 45,000 U.S. casualties. Instead, in 1991, The United States was able to defeat Iraq in 43 days at the cost of 382 American lives (of which 147 were combat deaths) and 500 wounded. Today, government and think tank reports are blinking “red,” warning about China’s growing military power. Like prewar Russian power assessments, however, these estimates of Chinese military power tend to focus on numbers and technological sophistication and exclude nonmaterial factors.
Why have analysts not improved their forecasting models? It is harder to assess the quality of non-material factors, such as leadership, logistics, and troop morale, much less quantify them in models. That said, they are not unknowable factors. Before February 2022, for example, Russia experts had warned that Putin’s regime had devolved into a personalist autocracy, ruled by his whims, and the political science literature found the militaries of such regimes tend to perform worse in wars. Taken together, these findings pointed to endemic Russian weakness.
Testing Assumptions About the War in Ukraine, One Year Later
By Kelly A. Grieco • Evan Cooper • Aude Darnal • Christopher Preble • Emma Ashford • James Siebens
In Grand Strategy
One year ago, on February 24, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. At the time, many policymakers and commentators alike predicted a quick Russian victory, major energy disruptions, and Western political discord. When Ukraine demonstrated its unexpected resilience — and the West proved more cohesive than expected — observers instead made optimistic predictions: the West need not worry about the dangers of nuclear escalation; economic sanctions would cripple the Russian economy; the world would follow the West’s lead in punishing Russian aggression; and China, observing Russia’s military failure, would be less likely to take military action against Taiwan.
The events of the past year offer an opportunity to assess both sets of conventional wisdoms, as well as the assumptions underlying them. In this series of short essays, Stimson experts with the Reimagining US Grand Strategy program undertake this challenge. Their essays suggest three main takeaways for policymakers:
Assumption: The Russian military will quickly defeat Ukraine
Preliminary Conclusion
False.
Opinion Changed Since February 2022?
Yes. The Russian military has displayed endemic weakness and ineffectiveness at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, far worse than prewar estimates.
A year into Russia’s full-scale invasion, the war has upended assumptions about Russian military prowess. Put simply, prewar assessments were skewed to Russia’s military strengths. Western intelligence agencies and defense analysts overvalued the size of the Russian armed forces and the numbers and types of Russian weapon systems. They undervalued the importance of command and control, logistical support, civil-military relations, and other nonmaterial factors.
In early February 2022, as Russian forces amassed on Ukraine’s borders, Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned a closed session of Congress that Kyiv could fall within 72 hours of a full-scale Russian invasion. He was not alone in offering such a dire prediction: U.S. and European officials and military analysts alike expected the Russian military to steamroll Ukraine’s forces. On paper, Russia appeared formidable, with its military not only much larger than that of Ukraine, but also better equipped with new and modern weapons after a decade of reform.
Nevertheless, the war has exposed the myth of Russian military prowess. Moscow’s initial plan to quickly capture Kyiv and topple the Ukrainian government ignored Russia’s own doctrine and ended in a humiliating failure; its subsequent “Plan B”— a series of attacks on the Donbas region — fared little better, setting the stage for Ukraine’s successful offensives in the fall. Moreover, Russia’s many failures are not the army’s alone — the navy has lost several ships, including its flagship cruiser the Moskva, and the air force has failed to establish air superiority over Ukraine. The Russian military is down, but not yet out.
Resources are important in assessing military power potential, but the generation of actual combat power also depends on the capacity of militaries to effectively leverage those resources — what analysts call “military effectiveness.” Put differently, it matters what militaries do with the resources available to them. Military effectiveness depends on a range of nonmaterial factors, such as regime type, civil-military relations, culture, and skilled-force employment. Prewar assessments of Russian military power tended to ignore these factors, even though they all pointed to Russian military ineffectiveness. Similarly, estimates of Ukrainian military power failed to capture Ukraine’s capacity for quick and effective decisionmaking, tactical learning, and, above all, its will to fight. The net result was that prewar assessments overestimated Russian military might while simultaneously underrating Ukrainian military capabilities.
This is not an isolated occurrence. Exaggerated assumptions about enemy military capabilities are a longstanding problem. Before the 1991 Gulf War, for example, senior military officials, the intelligence community, and analysts at think tanks grossly overestimated Iraqi military capabilities, predicting a protracted war and upwards of 45,000 U.S. casualties. Instead, in 1991, The United States was able to defeat Iraq in 43 days at the cost of 382 American lives (of which 147 were combat deaths) and 500 wounded. Today, government and think tank reports are blinking “red,” warning about China’s growing military power. Like prewar Russian power assessments, however, these estimates of Chinese military power tend to focus on numbers and technological sophistication and exclude nonmaterial factors.
Why have analysts not improved their forecasting models? It is harder to assess the quality of non-material factors, such as leadership, logistics, and troop morale, much less quantify them in models. That said, they are not unknowable factors. Before February 2022, for example, Russia experts had warned that Putin’s regime had devolved into a personalist autocracy, ruled by his whims, and the political science literature found the militaries of such regimes tend to perform worse in wars. Taken together, these findings pointed to endemic Russian weakness.
Threat inflation prevails in Washington because those inside and outside government have an interest in overstating adversaries’ capabilities in order to secure additional funding and prestige.
Unfortunately, few in Washington even perceive a problem. The common refrain is that it is better to inflate an enemy’s capabilities than be taken by surprise and suffer catastrophic consequences. Yet this one-sided argument fails to recognize that threat inflation encourages policymakers to adopt more confrontational foreign and defense policies, creating a self-fulfilling prophesy of greater security competition and increasing the risk of war. Threat inflation prevails in Washington because those inside and outside government have an interest in overstating adversaries’ capabilities in order to secure additional funding and prestige.
Given the very real security challenges confronting the United States, the American public deserves better. Instead of continuing with the same biased threat assessments, Washington should learn from the Ukraine war and course-correct, developing more accurate, balanced estimates of adversaries’ military capabilities.
Assumption: The West will not stick together in supporting Ukraine
Preliminary Conclusion
False.
Opinion Changed Since February 2022?
Yes. Initially it appeared that policy differences among Western countries would be too difficult to manage, but policymakers and diplomats have so far been able to prevent large fractures from occurring.
At the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, various policymakers and commentators raised concerns that the United States and Europe would struggle to stick together in the face of Russian aggression. Many potential fault lines were identified: possible defections from the sanctions regime, disputes over the millions of refugees fleeing the war, and larger questions about the international system and the war’s potential to upend international norms surrounding sovereignty.
Such concerns were not entirely unfounded. Before the invasion commenced, some NATO allies had ignored U.S. intelligence warnings of an impending Russian invasion, undermining efforts to equip Ukraine to defend itself against an attack. Since February 24, however, Western states have largely stuck together, even if they have often disagreed on policies toward Russia and Ukraine. This sustained cohesion is in large part due to the shared view among Western states that Russia, even if militarily crippled, poses a threat to Europe and, more broadly, that its actions toward Ukraine, if left unchallenged, would further degrade the liberal order and its definition of sovereignty.
If Western unity is to be sustained, there will need to be a shared vision regarding the desired end state in Ukraine and how the lasting threat of Russia will be handled in the future.
Still, American and European leaders deserve a great deal of credit for building a policy consensus on economic sanctions. Although the threat of sanctions did not have the deterrent effect on Russia that some had hoped it would, the United States and its partners were able to quickly implement a sweeping post-invasion sanctions regime. Crucially, the groundwork done by Washington and Brussels to plan a large sanctions package in anticipation of the invasion, communicating and negotiating among participants about what assets and industries would be targeted, was itself a consensus building exercise that encouraged Western alignment. Securing participation by Western countries reliant on trade with Russia — Italy in particular — demonstrated a unified front. The sanctions regime continues to be a core pillar of the Western approach to Russia.
A more challenging issue within the West has been the question of what matériel to supply to Ukraine, but this has been limited to disagreement — rather than outright defection — among NATO members. Eastern European countries and the United Kingdom have repeatedly pushed for providing more weapons and systems, while the United States, Germany, and others take a more cautious tact. Early in the conflict, Poland submitted a proposal to provide its MiG-29 fighter jets to Ukraine by stationing them at a U.S. air force base in Germany and allowing Ukrainian pilots to fly them into Ukraine. The United States rejected this proposal, revealing a rift between Western countries over the extent to which the supply of systems capable of attacking deep into Russian territory risked dangerous escalation of the conflict. Nonetheless, the recent agreement between Germany and the United States to provide tanks to Ukraine showed that there is a viable middle ground between the two camps.
Continued pressure to provide aircraft and other long-range weapon systems to Ukraine, as well as concerns about the escalatory nature of these weapons, demonstrates that maintaining a unified policy toward Ukraine will be a persistent challenge for Western countries and their leaders to manage. If that unity is to be sustained, Western states will need a shared vision regarding the desired end state in Ukraine and how the lasting threat of Russia will be handled in the future. At present, European leaders see settlement prospects differently; these rifts are exacerbated by divisions among Western publics about whether the overarching goal of their country’s policy should be to push for peace or mete out justice.
Assumption: The world will follow Western leadership
Preliminary Conclusion
False.
Opinion Changed Since February 2022?
No. The war in Ukraine has highlighted brewing tensions between the West and the Global South that are beyond this specific conflict. The inability of Western leaders to anticipate and collaborate with Global South countries to overcome these challenges impacts the credibility and legitimacy of the West in much of the world.
During the opening months of the war in Ukraine, Western media emphasized how the world was uniting around Ukraine and its Western allies. However, this understanding of “the world” did not account for a wide section of the planet, particularly those countries in the Global South. It took the vote tallies from several U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions, plus statements by some of the most vocal leaders from the Global South before Western actors began to reckon with global divisions on the war. The U.S. approach was disconnected from reality, and — in expecting to turn the tide of the war through global pressure — it failed.
From March to November 2022, the UNGA passed five resolutions condemning Russia’s attack on its neighbor. During the three votes in March and October, between 26% and 27% of UNGA members — primarily from Africa and Asia — abstained, voted against the resolutions or were absent. These numbers rose to 52% during April and November votes, which called for the suspension of Russia from the UN Human Rights Council and for Russian reparations to Ukraine. The interests of Global South countries figured heavily in their leaders’ decisions. At the same time, the Global South is not a monolith: many leaders took a clear stand against Russia during these votes, but many others did not. Few, however, applied sanctions against the country.
The Global South’s reluctance to follow the West’s lead is not the same as approval of Russia’s war, however. Echoing statements made in March 2022 by South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, the country’s Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Naledi Pandor, stated during Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit in January 2023 that “we have continued and will continue to urge that there should be a diplomatic solution and process to this current conflict. Because we regard war as terrible, we regard war as negative for development and for world security.” Indeed, the Global South is bearing the brunt of the repercussions of the war in terms of energy, economic, food and human security; it cannot afford a prolonged war.
The U.S. approach was disconnected from reality, and, in expecting to turn the tide of the war through global pressure, it failed.
Western powers have been remarkably shortsighted in underestimating these countries’ desire to defend their policy independence, to advance their interests, and to protect their relations with the multiple partners involved in this crisis. These states refuse “to be the breeding ground of a new Cold War,” as Senegalese President Macky Sall stated. “In terms of our interaction with some of our partners in Europe and elsewhere, there has been a sense of patronizing bullying”, explained South Africa’s Naledi Pandor. The message to her country and others, she said, was “you choose this or else.”
Moreover, there has been a shared sense of frustration among several Global South countries about Western double standards and hypocrisy. The West reacted to the war in Ukraine with far more outcry than often seen in response to crises in the Global South. Others have questioned the role of NATO’s expansion eastward in the conflict. Brazilian President Lula Da Silva, whose diplomats condemned Russia at the UNGA, nonetheless said in a Time interview that “Putin shouldn’t have invaded Ukraine. But it’s not just Putin who is guilty. The U.S. and the [European Union] are also guilty.”
The failure to rally global public opinion against Russia is a missed opportunity. The situation could perhaps have been different had Western powers demonstrated more commitment to their partnerships with Global South countries in past decades and supported their efforts to be better integrated in global governance institutions. From Latin America to Africa and Asia, these nations’ leaders have pursued political, diplomatic, security, and economic partnerships among themselves and with new regional and global powers, showing Western states the shortcomings of their foreign policy toward the Global South. As Indian Minister of External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar stated in June 2022, “Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems.” The war in Ukraine raises an important question: Will the West change course or risk continuing to lose credibility from the perspective of Global South countries and its relevance as power dynamics continue to shift?
Assumption: Sanctions will cripple the Russian economy and compel Putin to sue for peace
Preliminary Conclusion
False.
Opinion Changed Since February 2022?
No. Sanctions rarely produce policy change, and Russia was uniquely capable of enduring additional economic coercion.
Economic sanctions have hurt — but not crippled — the Russian economy. Russia’s GDP in 2022 contracted by about 2.2%, and could actually grow by 0.3% in 2023 according to International Monetary Fund estimates, outperforming Britain and Germany. Inflation is bad (about 12 % ), but initial projections indicated it would be much worse. Although it may be useful to speculate on what might happen in the future, for now, economic pain has not diverted Putin from his single-minded mission to conquer some or all of Ukraine, even when combined with arms shipments and other assistance that has enabled the Ukrainians to inflict damage on invading Russian troops. From all appearances, Putin and other Russian elites are doing just fine.
Russia’s ability to endure economically is likely to persist. Moscow had accumulated considerable currency reserves that have insulated it from unusually severe measures, including the controversial seizure of Russian assets held abroad. Its energy and mineral exports have continued — another source of hard currency that few other countries can rely on so easily. Indeed, the economic isolation has hardly been airtight; many countries have continued to trade with Russia, despite widespread revulsion at Putin’s brutal war.
Before February 2022, some analysts fervently believed that the threat of severe economic pain would deter Putin from invading Ukraine. Despite what subsequently occurred, some still hope that further and wider economic sanctions will compel him to reverse course. The secondary and tertiary effects of sanctions are not being felt just in Russia, however; other countries are suffering from rising costs of food and fuel, mostly caused by the war, and these problems will continue so long as the economic restrictions remain in place. That accumulating hardship may be more strategically significant than whatever pain is imposed on Russia and Russians.
That sanctions have failed to alter the course of the war is hardly surprising. There are few instances in which economic pain has compelled countries to alter their behavior, and especially when they view the issues at stake as existential to their survival. Countries — and people, it turns out — are willing to endure considerable economic pain. Sanctions might even have a perverse unintended effect as targeted regimes can often blame economic hardships on external actors, deflecting attention away from their own corruption or incompetence. Putin has been able to portray the response to his invasion of Ukraine as a case of NATO waging economic war against Russia.
Russians have many reasons to believe there is no prospect of sanctions relief in exchange for ending the war in Ukraine.
Second, to be successful, sanctioning countries must be able to make a credible commitment that the economic coercion will cease if the targeted country complies with the demands placed on it. Nonetheless, Russians have many reasons to believe there is no prospect of sanctions relief in exchange for ending the war in Ukraine. It is hard to imagine any U.S. or Western leader normalizing economic relations with Russia so long as Putin is living and not in a jail cell at the Hague. Even if Putin were to die or otherwise be removed from power, pressure on Russia is likely to continue. The United States has left sanctions in place against Russia before, even after dramatic changes in Moscow. The Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 blocked the normalization of economic relations with the Soviet Union. And even though the Soviet Union ceased to exist in 1991, Jackson-Vanik remained in effect until 2012 and was immediately replaced by another set of economic sanctions under the Magnitsky Act. This history makes Moscow wary of U.S. promises. In this case, U.S. officials have not spelled out what steps Russia would have to take to get the sanctions lifted; they have only talked about what Russia will be expected to pay to rebuild Ukraine.
At a minimum, U.S. and European officials responsible for implementing this economic pressure campaign against Russia should be aware of the collateral harms and realistic about the prospects for success. A firm commitment to relax sanctions if Russia complies with clear demands could help, but the continuation of this war seems more likely.
Assumption: Putin will not escalate to the use of nuclear weapons
Preliminary Conclusion
True for now, but there is more to the story.
Opinion Changed Since February 2022?
No. The dangers of nuclear escalation are real and growing.
The incremental approach that has guided Washington’s military aid packages, of gradually providing Ukraine with more advanced weapons, has thus far deterred Russia from crossing the nuclear threshold. Such brinksmanship is inherently dangerous, however, and the risks of crossing a Russian redline continue to grow as the Biden administration continues to escalate America’s involvement in the war.
Ukraine’s most ardent supporters in the West have criticized the Biden administration’s stated desire to avoid nuclear escalation with Moscow. These critics insist fears of nuclear escalation are overblown and have even derisively given it a description —“self-deterrence.” “There is no indication right now that the nuclear threats so frequently mentioned by Russian propagandists, going back many years, are real,” asserts journalist and commentator Anne Applebaum. Echoing this view, Philip Breedlove, a retired four-star general in the U.S. Air Force who served as NATO’s supreme allied commander, warns that Western fears “about nuclear weapons and World III” have left it “fully deterred” and Moscow “completely undeterred” in Ukraine.
Certainly, there is no denying that Putin’s nuclear threats have deterred the United States from intervening directly in the conflict, but that’s not exactly surprising. Scholars have long observed that possessing nuclear weapons can make conventional war more likely because a nuclear-armed attacker can use the threat of catastrophic escalation to deter outside intervention. Indeed, political scientists even have a name for it: the stability-instability paradox. Those criticizing the White House’s caution seem shocked to learn that nuclear weapons impose limits on America’s willingness to use force. But this is hardly new. Fear of nuclear escalation factored into President Dwight Eisenhower’s decision not to respond to Moscow’s crackdown on Hungary in 1956, as well as President Lyndon Johnson’s reluctance to aid protesters in Prague, Czechoslovakia, in 1968. Of course, that’s precisely the point of nuclear deterrence. As the classic saying goes, “Don’t hate the player, hate the game.”
Some will see Putin’s caution as proof that escalation fears are grossly exaggerated; that would be a dangerous misreading of the situation.
These critics also seem to miss that the United States has used its own nuclear arsenal to deter Moscow in this war as well. For all Putin’s bluster, he has not escalated this war to attack a NATO country on Ukraine’s borders. Of course, some will see his caution as proof that the Biden administration’s escalation fears are grossly exaggerated; that would be a dangerous misreading of the situation.
Threading a tough policy needle, the White House has sought to support Ukraine with advanced weapons — weapons that will kill Russians — without having the conflict escalate into what the president called a nuclear “Armageddon.” To that end, the administration has played its own game of brinkmanship with the Russians. By gradually sending ever more advanced weapons to Ukraine, it has placed Moscow in the position of starting a nuclear war over Stinger missiles, or advanced guided-rocket systems, or Abrams tanks. None of these weapons announcements or military aid deliveries alone are enough for the Russians to invoke nuclear retaliation. The scholar Thomas Schelling referred to this approach as “salami tactics”; no one slice is ever enough to provoke confrontation. Put differently, the Biden administration’s incrementalism, so disparaged, is actually the high art of brinksmanship. Putin’s restraint is no accident, rather it is the result of Biden’s deliberate policy choices.
The most dangerous lesson Washington could possibly take away from the last year of the war is that it should fear nuclear weapons less. Indeed, the nuclear dangers remain and continue to rise, particularly if Putin grows more desperate. The administration’s incrementalism is not risk-free. There is still a chance — however small — that it will miscalculate and result in inadvertent nuclear escalation—the ultimate case of a low probability/high consequence event. Finding a way out of this terrible war, with its rising humanitarian toll, ought to be an urgent priority.
Assumption: Europe has the means to defend itself
Preliminary Conclusion
True.
Opinion Changed Since February 2022?
No. Europe has the means to defend itself; what it lacks is willpower and common purpose.
NATO — contrary to French President Emmanuel Macron’s infamous remarks — is not brain dead. The last year has shown that the alliance is alive and kicking, with Europe still dependent on the United States for its security.
Of course, that is not necessarily a good thing. The United States cannot be responsible for European security forever. There are more serious problems in Asia, and here at home. The United States is confronted with a classic means-ends gap.
Compared to the Cold War, America is relatively poorer and less powerful, while Europe is richer and more prosperous. The last year offered an opportunity for European states to step up and take ownership of their own security. They mostly failed to do so.
There were some significant rhetorical shifts from European leaders. There were even spending increases, or at least pledges to spend more. Germany, after all, pledged to spend an additional 100 billion Euros ($106 billion). Other states including Italy, Romania, and Norway have also promised to spend more. This is one part of the puzzle — and suggests that there is some willingness in Europe to confront defense shortfalls — but moderate increases in funding alone are not enough. The choice by Germany to backpedal on its most ambitious spending pledges mere months after making them also does not bode well.
Across the continent, U.S.-made arms dominate, and there is only minimal coordination among states on military and defense initiatives. NATO and the European Union continue to be somewhat at odds on defense policy; the European Union’s new Strategic Compass is a mishmash of competing ideas with few practicable components. Rather than investing in much-needed European defense-industrial capacity, recent spending decisions from governments in Germany and elsewhere have instead doubled-down on purchases of US-made arms, only deepening the continent’s dependence on the United States.
It is hard not to conclude that European divisions on strategy and security are simply too big to be reconciled. European states see threats differently: Central and Eastern European states are most wary of Russia, France has eyes on its former colonies, and southern European states like Greece and Italy look toward the Mediterranean and North Africa as a source of illicit migration and potential instability.
There are increasing divisions on the course of the war in Ukraine, too. Germany, Italy, and France are pushing for a settlement. Meanwhile, polling suggests that citizens of Eastern European countries like Poland are instead keen to punish Russia and to prolong the war as long as needed. The question of war aims is a growing bone of contention within Europe.
Amidst this division and dysfunction, the United States is still the glue that holds European defense together. Washington has provided most of the equipment to the Ukrainians and has expanded the presence of American troops on the continent to reassure nervous NATO allies in the East.In doing so, the United States eases concerns among smaller European states, not just of being conquered by Russia, but of having to rely on other European states like Germany and France, who may not share their foreign policy goals.
Europe’s ability to defend itself was not tested during the last year; European leaders are content to shelter behind the United States.
For this reason, we can largely conclude that Europe’s ability to defend itself simply was not tested during the last year, although the relative political unity in the immediate aftermath of Putin’s shocking invasion suggests that a high-enough level of threat might be enough to overcome even these deeply entrenched foreign policy divisions. European leaders have been content to shelter behind the United States because, in many ways, doing so is easier than attempting to reconcile their own disagreements; the Biden administration’s unwavering support for European defense in the last year has unfortunately done little to encourage European countries to move away from this hedging position.
This does not mean that European states should be freed from bearing the burden for their own security in the coming years, however. Indeed, they may eventually be compelled to overcome these disagreements. Republican policymakers and voters are signaling growing fatigue with footing the bill for Ukraine; beyond that, former President Donald Trump and many of his acolytes oppose paying too much for European security.
There is always the potential for trouble in Asia — whether in Taiwan or elsewhere — that could force the United States to pull back from Europe. The assumption that Europe cannot defend itself was not tested in 2022, but it is increasingly likely to be tested in coming decades.
Assumption: Russia’s disastrous experience in the Ukraine conflict will dissuade China from attacking Taiwan
Preliminary Conclusion
False.
Opinion Changed Since February 2022?
No. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may provide a cautionary example of the pitfalls of armed aggression, but China’s decision to attack or coerce Taiwan will continue to be based on clear political conditions rather than the attractiveness of different military options. Although China is surely learning from the conflict in Ukraine, its redlines around Taiwan are deeply embedded in domestic politics, and will be more sensitive to political conditions than to military conditions.
The example of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine offers very few lessons that might be fairly applied to Taiwan, especially given the differences between an overland invasion and an amphibious assault or naval blockade. However, at least two lessons are clear. The first is that moderate levels of U.S. military advice and assistance can be extremely beneficial to partner forces, enabling them to defend themselves against aggression. Prior to Russia’s 2022 invasion, President Joe Biden reportedly warned Putin that an attack on Ukraine would lead the United States to “respond decisively and impose swift and severe costs on Russia.” Indeed, Russia has suffered huge losses in the war, and Ukraine has been able to hold its own against a larger conventional force largely thanks to Western weapons and intelligence support. This dynamic has led some to believe that China will be so discouraged by Russia’s example that it will assiduously avoid war with Taiwan. However, even if China is persuaded of the potency of U.S. military assistance, this does not necessarily make a conflict over Taiwan less likely. In fact, the opposite may be true.
The second lesson from the Ukraine conflict is that close military cooperation and coordination with the United States can actually contribute to an adversary’s decision to attack. Because U.S. military assistance can alter the balance of power in a potential conflict, it has the potential to inspire a sense of desperation and urgency for other major powers that perceive themselves as losing relative advantage. Russia sometimes claims that it had to invade Ukraine to defend its allies from Kyiv’s forces, many thousands of which had been trained and equipped by the United States since 2014. Prior to the invasion, Russia also issued a laundry list of ambitious demands in an apparent effort to leverage the threat of invasion to blackmail the U.S. and the NATO alliance. Although it has become fashionable to dismiss or ignore the influence that perceived NATO encroachment had on Putin’s decision to attack Ukraine, the fact remains that Putin began his pre-invasion speech by complaining about NATO “moving its military infrastructure ever closer to the Russian border.” A key Russian objective in the war was evidently to prevent Ukraine’s military alliance with the United States and NATO. As Ukraine’s forces grew more capable due to Western training and weaponry, and more closely aligned with NATO, Ukraine’s government became less willing to yield to Russian diplomatic pressure. Consequently, Russia became more, not less, inclined to pursue a military solution.
Even if China is persuaded of the potency of U.S. military assistance, this does not necessarily make a conflict over Taiwan less likely. In fact, the opposite may be true.
When it comes to Taiwan, Chinese leaders have consistently expressed a preference for peaceful unification rather than military conquest. This preference is partly based on deterrence by outside forces. Indeed, as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl recently explained, “[China’s leaders] understand well that the United States continues to have pretty significant overmatch in a lot of critical domains, and that Xi Jinping would ― all else being equal ― like to resolve the Taiwan issue without having to resort to force.” The assumed involvement of U.S. and/or Japanese forces in a Taiwan conflict presumably makes the prospect extremely daunting to Beijing.
Yet, China’s leaders have also demonstrated sustained political commitment to reclaiming or incorporating Taiwan as a territory of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since the country’s founding. China’s pursuit of peaceful unification with Taiwan is explicitly contingent on several terms, repeatedly articulated in PRC public statements, officially sanctioned publications, and laws. These pertain to past U.S. commitments (or official representations) made in the U.S.-China Joint Communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982, as well as past agreements (and disagreements) between Taiwan and mainland China with respect to the “one-China principle.” Put simply, as U.S. military advice and assistance renders Taiwan less vulnerable to China’s threats, Taiwan may be unwilling to remain within the bounds that China can tolerate, much less to negotiate with China over unification. Consequently, China may consider military options more seriously.
Should Taiwan formally declare its independence, join a military pact with an outside power, or begin hosting foreign forces, China’s leaders will most likely feel compelled to escalate, regardless of the costs, in response to the perceived threat to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The United States should be careful not to overdraw lessons for Taiwan from the experience in Ukraine. Russia’s disastrous invasion might help persuade China to avoid the dangers of armed aggression, but Ukraine’s experience could also serve as a cautionary tale for the United States and Taiwan.
Recent & Related