Regional RADPOL for Preventing Nuclear Smuggling in Southern Asia

A contribution to the Nuclear Security Policy Menu series

Exploring policy solutions to prevent nuclear smuggling in South Asia and strengthen regional nuclear security

By  Sitakanta Mishra

Nuclear smuggling poses an international threat that requires cooperative solutions. In his contribution to the International Nuclear Security Forum’s Nuclear Security Policy Menu series, Sitakanta Mishra proposes a regional response to encourage law enforcement cooperation to address the cross-border challenges posed by nuclear materials out of regulatory control.

Editor’s Note: This policy memo is authored by an external contributor as part of the International Nuclear Security Forum’s Nuclear Security Policy Menu series. The views of this author do not reflect the views of the Stimson Center. The series solicits proposals that might appear politically risky or unrealistic today but could gain traction in the aftermath of a nuclear or radiological incident or accident. By compiling a wide range of international, regional, or local policy proposals, this menu provides policymakers with forward-leaning nuclear security regulation options to work towards today. Learn more or become a contributor.

Non-state actors or terrorists pose a serious threat to the safety-security of nuclear technology today. As the IAEA Nuclear Security System No. 6 reference manual, Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and other Radioactive Material, says: “The threat of criminal or unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material has grown significantly since the early 1990s.” Many still believe that terrorists’ direct access to nuclear weapons or material, or fabrication of a full-fledged nuclear bomb, may not be possible, given the stringent physical security arrangements in place and complicated nature of nuclear technology itself. However, smuggling of nuclear/radioactive materials and the existence of clandestine smuggling networks are often reported. According to the IAEA ITDB, trafficking or malicious use of highly enriched uranium, plutonium, and plutonium neutron sources are still taking place. The intended use of this illicit material remains difficult to determine. Especially in South Asia, many trafficking incidents are reported in nuclear-capable countries, China, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, who are also pursuing aggressive nuclear energy expansion plans.

Beside energy production, nuclear material and technology are increasingly used for peaceful applications in these countries. Therefore, the chances of their falling into the wrong hands cannot completely be overlooked; in a worst-case scenario, smuggled materials may land in terrorists’ hands. In addition, these countries suspect each other of promoting clandestine smuggling or proliferation networks. Given the adversarial relations among them, any disastrous incident in one country would be interpreted as intentional by the other, leading to unimaginable consequences.

Though some largely symbolic nuclear confidence-building measures (CBMs) are in operation between India and Pakistan, and a limited regional convention to suppress terrorism in general within the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) forum exists, there is no specific mechanism in the region to address concertedly the challenge of nuclear smuggling. Despite the hot-and-cold relationship between India and China, no bilateral nuclear CBMs are arranged between them yet. Moreover, Bangladesh is emerging as a new nuclear energy country, and Sri Lanka is also eyeing nuclear energy in its energy mix. Suffice it to say, Southern Asia is likely to become a nuclear energy hub soon and therefore needs special attention along with specific mechanisms to ensure nuclear safety-security and regional strategic stability.

The imperative of a regional mechanism to deal with the nuclear smuggling lies primarily in the magnitude of the problem. A rising number of incidents in the region is definitely a cause of concern when all members are pursuing ambitious nuclear programs. During 2013 to 2018, there were 66 monitored cases of missing, trafficked, or stolen radioactive materials in Asia as a whole. Especially in Northeast Asia such cases are alarming (43), while in West Asia (11) and South Asia cases (7) are increasing, indicating the vulnerability of the region. Smuggling of such materials takes place along both land and maritime routes. As the magnitude of the threat is alarming and incidents are on the rise, special attention and a cooperative solution must be explored.

Second, given the trust deficit among them, any misappropriation of nuclear material in one country and consequent occurrence of a radiological emergency leading to spread of radiation across the border would be misunderstood as deliberate by its adversary, which may lead to an action-reaction chain. Third, in case of any such emergency, all countries have to coordinate for disaster containment and post-disaster management. A regional mechanism for regional capacity building to deal with such emergency would be handy for coordination and management while reducing chances of mistrust among them.

Last, but not least, the nexus between smuggling and terrorism is well-known in Southern Asia. Strategists have long feared the possibility of slippage of nuclear technology to terrorists. Given the rapid proliferation of nuclear technology, it is assumed that terrorists might take interest in the terror potential of nuclear weapons as a means of advancing their cause. As nuclear energy programs rapidly expand in Southern Asia, chances of nuclear materials falling into terrorist hands through smuggling (deliberately or otherwise) cannot be ignored. This Carnegie Corporation of New York piece highlights that, “[t]he illicit proliferation network headed by A.Q. Khan of Pakistan supplied the nuclear programs of Iran, North Korea, and Libya.” Furthermore, “it is well known that terrorist groups have sought to acquire such material,” as noted in the IAEA’s Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and other Radioactive Material. An extremist organization (Taliban) with terrorism connection, adhered to non-democratic ideology, sustained by drug smuggling, and patronized by a nuclear weapons country (Pakistan) has returned to power in Afghanistan recently; nuclear weapons may not be far away from its possession if it desires to acquire.

To reduce the chances of nuclear materials getting out of control, high standards of regulatory, administrative, safety and engineering controls are needed. The IAEA prescribes guidelines and offers technical support for strengthening security measures as well as domestic legal provisions to enhance the capabilities of states to detect and respond to illegal possession and movement of such material. Most countries in Southern Asia, in compliance with multilateral conventions like CPPNM, have in place some domestic legal and physical security provisions. Radiation detection equipment is installed at vital entry-exit points. Frequent news of seizure of smuggled material in the region is probably the result of stringent measures taken by states, though off-late. The IAEA’s Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and other Radioactive Material notes, “although the authorities may be able to effectively handle some criminal or unauthorized acts, the transboundary movement of material can significantly hamper an effective response.” Borders in Southern Asia are largely porous and have generally been safe havens for smuggling/trafficking. A coordinated cross-border approach aided by an institutional mechanism is required to tackle this problem.

Today it may sound unrealistic or unachievable to imagine a regional cooperative border-management mechanism with ‘radiology-police’ (RADPOL) in South Asia. But the geopolitical tension and prevailing adversarial border conditions have created the perfect front for smugglers to exploit in carrying out their operations. A regional RADPOL can be established within the SAARC forum where China is also an observer, or by creating a new institutional arrangement by connecting member countries’ security establishments with a command centre and frontier divisions along the trafficking routes. All frontier divisions would be connected with the command centre with an enhanced hotline system and designated authorities in each country. With codified standard operating procedures, each member country would contribute to the operational part of the mechanism. Member states will report forth with to the nearest frontier division or the command centre about any trafficking/smuggling incident within their territory. In any case, member states are obliged to report to the ITDB of any such incident. The RADPOL wing in the concerned country will be activated to interdict and initiate an investigation in concurrence with the RADPOL of the neighboring country in the smuggling chain.

Such a mechanism or arrangement would be possible if one draws inferences from the 2007 India-Pakistan agreement to reduce the risk of nuclear accidents stemming from nuclear weapons. This CBM is far more substantive than symbolic, as it obliges both countries to inform each other forth with about a nuclear weapons accident if takes place in either side, so that there would be no misperception of the incident and to allow coordinated disaster management to be efficiently undertaken owing to the clarity about the incident. If India and Pakistan, entangled in protracted hostility, could reach such a landmark CBM, other countries in the region can be persuaded to come forward to devise a regional mechanism to arrest the menace of nuclear smuggling/trafficking which will be in their best interest. In any case, all countries already have their own specially trained police/security force deployed to deal with smuggling/trafficking of nuclear material. It is needed only to establish a coordinated regional network under the banner of RADPOL with a dedicated institutional mechanism.

Above all, a regional nuclear anti-smuggling mechanism and skilled RADPOL having knowledge of the topography will be an asset for the entire region, especially in the event of any radiological emergency. The first step towards devising a regional mechanism to arrest nuclear smuggling would be a regional nuclear security summit (R-NSS) or a track-2 dialogue involving the member countries to discuss this idea with support from the IAEA.

Dr Sitakanta Mishra is an Associate Professor at the School of Liberal Studies at Pandit Deendayal Energy University in Gujarat, India. Previously, he was a research fellow at the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi. He has authored three books: Defense Beyond Design: Nuclear Safety-Security in India; Parmanu Politics: Indian Political Parties and Nuclear Weapons; and Cruise Missiles; as well as one monograph, The Challenge of Nuclear Terror. He was also a recipient of one of the 2021 South Asian Voices-CRDF Global grants.

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