Nuclear Annexation: A New Proliferation Concern?

Background: Nuclear Facilities in Ukraine

Ukraine has the seventh largest civilian nuclear power program in the world with fifteen reactors at four nuclear power plants that together generate approximately 50% of Ukraine’s electricity, or 13,107 MW in 2020.¹  Note: IAEA Annual Report 2020: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/reports/2020/gc65-5.pdf, p. 178.     All reactors are Russian VVER types. As of March 17, there were eight operating reactors, including two at the Zaporzhzhya nuclear power plant (NPP).²  Note: Update 24 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine, March 17, 2022: https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-24-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine.    Zaporzhzhya has been under control of Russian military forces since March 4³,  Note: Update 21 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine, March 14, 2022: https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-21-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine.     eight days after Russian forces took control of all facilities at the Chornobyl nuclear power plant.

Zaporzhzhya is Europe’s largest NPP, with six reactors generating a total output of 5,700 MW, almost 44% of the energy generated by all of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants.⁴  Note: Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant: everything you need to know, The Guardian, March 4, 2022: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/04/zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-everything-you-need-to-know.     Close to the Belarussian border, at Chornobyl, there are four inactive reactors, including the Nuclear Four reactor which exploded in 1986, releasing large amounts of radiation into the atmosphere in what would become the world’s worst nuclear disaster. Chornobyl is also the location of the world’s largest dry spent fuel storage facility, where 21,000 spent fuel assemblies from reactors 1, 2, and 3 will be stored.⁵  Note: “Historic milestone at Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant,” EBRD, Nov 18, 2020: https://www.ebrd.com/news/2020/historic-milestone-at-chernobyl-nuclear-power-plant.html.     It is also the site of the newly built Centralized Spent Fuel Storage Facility (CFSF), intended to store spent fuel from nine reactors at the Rivne, Khmennitsky, and South Ukraine plants. In January 2020, operators anticipated the CFSF would receive its first shipments in April.⁶  Note: “Ukrainian used fuel storage in commissioning,” World Nuclear News, January 31, 2022: https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Ukrainian-used-fuel-storage-in-commissioning#:~:text=The%20facility%20is%20located%20near,tested%20in%20July%20last%20year.     

Historically, Ukraine has received most of its nuclear services and fuel from Russia, but has been moving in recent years to increase its energy independence. Westinghouse first tested and refined its fuel assemblies for VVER reactors at South Ukraine in 2005. Under the 2008 contract between Westinghouse and Ukraine’s Energoatom, Ukraine could buy fuel for reloading three of the South Ukrainian reactors in 2011-2015,⁷  Note: Anton Khlopkov and Valeriya Chekina, Governing Uranium in Russia, DIIS Report No. 2014: 19, Danish Institute for Danish Studies (DIIS), p. 14: https://www.diis.dk/node/19036.     and in 2014 Ukraine signed fuel contracts with Westinghouse which were extended in 2018. By the beginning of 2022, nearly half of the fuel in Ukraine’s nuclear power plants was provided by Westinghouse.⁸  Note: Kamen Kraev, Ukraine: Zaporozhe 5 Becomes Second Unit to Use Only Westinghouse Fuel, NucNet, Dec 18, 2019: https://www.nucnet.org/news/zaporozhye-5-becomes-second-unit-to-use-only-westinghouse-fuel-12-3-2019.     

Ukraine also has three research reactors located at the Institute for Nuclear Research in Kiev, the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology in the city of Kharkiv, and the Sevastopol National University of Nuclear Energy and Industry. The latter has been under Russian control since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 (see below). The Kharkiv Institute was damaged on March 6 by shelling during the recent advance by Russian forces, destroying the substation and damaging the main building of the installation.⁹  Note: SNRIU, Shelling of a NSA “Neutron Source,” March 6, 2022, https://snriu.gov.ua/en/news/shelter-nsa-neutron-source.     The installation had been put into long-term shutdown by operating personnel on February 24, 2022. Before that, the neutron source was undergoing physical start up during which the core was loaded with fresh fuel.¹⁰  Note: SNRIU, Shelling of a NSA “Neutron Source,” March 6, 2022: https://snriu.gov.ua/en/news/shelter-nsa-neutron-source.     

In addition to the reactors, Ukraine also has four uranium mines located in the central Ukrainian ore province: Michurinske (3 km south of Kropyvnytskyy), Tcentralne (on the south-east end of Kropyvnytskyy), Vatutinske (near Smolino) and Novokostyantynivske (40 km west of Kropyvnytskyy).¹¹  Note:  OECD-NEA, 2020 Uranium Resources, Production and Demand, p. 400: https://www.oecd-nea.org/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-12/7555_uranium_-_resources_production_and_demand_2020__web.pdf.     As part of the arrangement with Russia, uranium from these mines is enriched in Russia and used to manufacture nuclear fuel for some of Ukraine’s NPPs. Of the 2,400 tU required to fuel Ukrainian NPPs annually, approximately one-third is supplied by Ukraine itself. (The rest comes from Russia and the United States).¹²  Note: Ukraine to step up efforts  https://bellona.org/news/nuclear-issues/2022-01-ukraine-to-step-up-efforts-to-produce-a-domestic-uranium-supply.     Together the four mines produced 800 tU in 2019 and 744 tU in 2020. In December 2021, the government committed 9.1 bn hryvnia ($335m) over the next five years to increase uranium production to meet the fueling needs of the country’s NPPs.¹³  Note: Ukraine aims to produce enough uranium for nuclear energy needs, Reuters, Dec 29, 2021: https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/ukraine-aims-produce-enough-uranium-nuclear-energy-needs-2021-12-29/.     

The Immediate Concern: Safety and Security

An immediate concern of the Russian invasion is the safety and security of the nuclear facilities in Ukraine and of the staff operating them.  As highlighted by IAEA Director General Grossi, the situation is “truly unprecedented,” representing the first time the world is witnessing “an armed conflict, in such a vast geographical area, with nuclear facilities of so many types.”¹⁴   Note: IAEA director: Kyiv fears nuclear plan agreement ‘recognises Russian control,’ EURACTIV, March 15, 2022: https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/iaea-director-kyiv-fears-nuclear-plant-agreement-recognises-russian-control/.     Shelling at nuclear facilities, power outages, and the situation facing personnel at Chornobyl in particular underscore safety concerns. At the time of writing (March 22, 2022), the radiation levels at all of Ukraine’s NPPs are reportedly in normal range.¹⁵  Note: Update 29 – IAEA Director General Statement on the Situation in Ukraine, March 15, 2022:  https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-29-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine.           

Throughout the crisis, Ukraine’s nuclear regulator, the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU), and the IAEA have been in continuous contact and have posted information publicly as the situation has evolved.¹⁶  Note: https://snriu.gov.ua/en/timeline?&type=posts.     DG Grossi met with Ukrainian and Russian foreign ministers in Turkey on March 10 to discuss his proposal to allow the IAEA to deliver technical and other assistance for the safe and secure operation of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities.¹⁷  Note: Update 20 – IAEA Director General Statement on the Situation in Ukraine, March 13, 2022: https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-20-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine.     The proposal is grounded in seven indispensable principles and requires a commitment by both Ukraine and Russia before the Agency can enter the country.  Consultations are ongoing.¹⁸  Note: Updated 24 – IAEA Director General Statement on the Situation in Ukraine, March 17, 2020: https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-24-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine.     

On March 15, the IAEA acknowledged that SNRIU had stated that information received regarding Zaporizhzhya and Chornobyl was being controlled by Russian military forces and they were therefore unable to provide detailed information to the IAEA or answer all IAEA questions. This hampers safety and security at the facilities, as well the implementation of safeguards. Since March 13,¹⁹  Note: Update 20 – IAEA Director General Statement on the Situation in Ukraine, March 13, 2022: https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-20-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine.     DG Grossi’s statements have included a section on safeguards, noting that the Agency was no longer receiving remote data transmissions from its monitoring systems at the Chornobyl NPP, but “that such data was being transferred to IAEA headquarters from other NPPs in Ukraine.²⁰”  Note: Update 20 – IAEA Director General Statement on the Situation in Ukraine, March 13, 2022: https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-20-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine.     The situation remains the same today.²¹  Note: Update 29 – IAEA Director General Statement on the Situation in Ukraine, March 15, 2022:  https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-29-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine.      

The impact of conflict on nuclear safeguards

Ukraine has both a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) and an additional protocol (AP) to that agreement in force.  In 2010, the IAEA reached the initial “broader conclusion” for Ukraine based on the Agency’s finding that there are no indications of diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indications of undeclared nuclear material or activities in Ukraine. Reaching this “broader conclusion” allowed the IAEA to customize and streamline safeguards implementation in Ukraine, integrating measures under the CSA and AP.  ²²Note: INFCIRC/550, in force since January 1998: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1998/infcirc550.pdf.     The process for drawing safeguards conclusions relies, in part, on analysis of information provided by the State as well as analysis of verification activities undertaken by the IAEA in the State during the year under review.

The ongoing invasion is, of course, not the first time Russian invasion has affected nuclear facilities in Ukraine. On March 16, 2014, Russia announced it had command of nuclear facilities in Crimea ²³ Note: Dmytro Chumak, The Implications of the Ukraine Conflict for National Nuclear Security Policy, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, Non-Proliferation Papers, No. 53, November 2016, p. 3: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Implications-Ukraine-conflict-national-nuclear-security-policy.pdf     after its invasion and annexation of the territory. Ten days later, SNRIU informed the IAEA that it no longer had control over nuclear material located in Crimea that was subject to Ukraine’s safeguards agreement.  ²⁴Note: Chumak, p. 4.    The IAEA (foot)noted in the Safeguards Implementation Report for 2014 (issued in 2015) that it was not able to conduct a planned inspection at the IR-100 research reactor and subcritical uranium-water assembly at Sevastopol but still drew a broader conclusion given the Agency “did not find any indications of proliferation concern.”²⁵  Note: See footnote 28, IAEA, The Safeguards Implementation Report for 2014: Report by the Director General: https://armscontrollaw.files.wordpress.com/2015/07/sir-2014.pdf      The Agency continued to issue the same note for Ukraine until 2020, when it was dropped from the list of countries that received a “broader conclusion“ that year.²⁶  Note: See footnote 25 in the Safeguards Statement for 2020, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/21/06/statement-sir-2020.pdf.      This was only the second time the Agency had withdrawn a broader conclusion. The first was for Libya the year before.²⁷  Note: Safeguards Implementation Report for 2019: Report by the Director General, https://armscontrollaw.files.wordpress.com/2020/05/sir-2019.pdf. See also, Otto T et al. (2021) Reimaging the Broader Conclusion, Proceedings of the INMM & ESARDA Joint Virtual Annual Meeting, August 23–26 and August 30–1 September 2021.   

In neither case did the IAEA issue a public statement explaining the reasons for withdrawing the broader conclusion. Libya’s downgrading was accorded a footnote in the 2019 Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) which explained that the inability of the IAEA to verify information on the status of nuclear material at a location in Libya had “eroded the Agency’s ability to implement safeguards effectively” and “therefore, affected its ability to draw the broader conclusion for Libya for 2019.”²⁸  Note: See Footnote 41 of the Safeguards Implementation Report for 2019: Report by the Director General, https://armscontrollaw.files.wordpress.com/2020/05/sir-2019.pdf.     There was no disclaimer that the inability to verify information was because of reduced access to sites and information (by both the IAEA and Libya’s national regulator) as a result of ongoing civil war. Similarly for Ukraine, the inability for the Agency to access facilities in Crimea is likely why the Agency could not issue the broader conclusion for Ukraine in 2020; but without a public statement on the decision, we are left to guess at the Agency’s reasoning.

Although different situations, the cases of Ukraine and Libya raise an uncomfortable question of how the Agency can implement safeguards in contested areas and/or areas experiencing active conflict. In 2015, Russia publicly stated that it wanted the IAEA to recognize Russian control of Crimean nuclear facilities, proposing they fall under Russia’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA.²⁹  Note: Russia wants IAEA to recognize Crimea’s legal status, World Nuclear News, June 10, 2015: https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-Russia-wants-IAEA-to-recognise-Crimeas-legal-status-10061501.html.     The proposal is a non-starter as Russia’s annexation is not recognized by the United Nations and therefore cannot be recognized by the Agency; Ukraine’s safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol remain in place. In November 2014, Ukraine told the UN General Assembly that it retains jurisdiction over all nuclear facilities and materials, including at Sevastopol, “which are the property of Ukraine and presently are located on the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territory.”³⁰  Note: Statement by the Ukrainian Delegation on Agenda Item 87 of the 69th session of the United Nations General Assembly, ‘Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency’, 3 Nov. 2014.      

Lessons for Communicating About Safeguards Conclusions

The status of Ukraine’s nuclear program and materials have also been the subject of Russian disinformation. Just a few days before his forces advanced into the country, Russian President Vladimir Putin began to claim that Ukraine intended to develop nuclear weapons.³¹  Note: Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 21 February 2022: https://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67828. Accessed 9 March 2022.     On March 16, Russia’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharaova escalated those claims, stating that Ukraine would use nuclear or biological weapons against Russia. The Russian Foreign Ministry tweeted that Zakharova said that Russia had taken control of Chornobyl and Zaporizhzhia NPPs “exclusively to prevent any attempts to stage nuclear provocations, which is a risk that obviously exists.”³²  Note: MFA Russia Twitter account posting on March 16, 2022: https://twitter.com/mfa_russia/status/1501507764178272257. Accessed March 16, 2022.    This experience provides good reason for the IAEA to provide additional context and clarity on its reasoning for changes in safeguards conclusions. Effective communication with Member States and the public can help mitigate such disinformation campaigns.

The debate on communicating safeguards conclusions is an old one. Every year, the IAEA provides a confidential Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) to the Board of Governors and issues a public Safeguards Statement summarizing the findings. Unfortunately, neither is reader friendly. The SIR has been called “impenetrable,” and how the Agency communicates about safeguards verification is often “data rich and information poor.”³³  Note: Trevor Findlay, Nuclear Law: The Global Debate, International Atomic Energy Agency (ed), Asser Press, p. 233.    Indeed, deciphering the text is often an exercise in sleuthing footnotes.

To be clear: the withdrawal of the broader conclusion for Ukraine in 2020 was not because it was considered non-compliant with its safeguards agreement pursuant to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The Agency still determined in 2020 that all declared nuclear material in Ukraine was being used for peaceful purposes, but it needs to be more open about why the broader conclusion could not be drawn, particularly given its use of term “proliferation concern” in the SIR. The IAEA should not let its process be taken advantage of by bad faith actors.

The cases of Libya and Ukraine demonstrate that a loss of information and access can be caused by a variety of factors, including active conflict in a country. These factors are not the fault of the IAEA or the national regulator and are unprecedented, leaving many questions about how the Agency is able to maintain its continuity of safeguards knowledge in countries experiencing turmoil and sweeping political change.

Russia has controlled Ukrainian nuclear facilities in Crimea since 2014 and is adding more to its control as their armed forces move through Ukraine. The world needs first a framework for safety and security that allows the IAEA to ensure the safe operation of nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Secondly, it needs to clarify what the situation in Ukraine means for safeguards implementation. Under the current circumstances, the IAEA clearly is unable to conduct normal verification activities at some facilities in Ukraine. This is obviously a concern. The question for the IAEA is whether it constitutes a true proliferation concern as well.

Notes

• 1
    Note: IAEA Annual Report 2020: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/reports/2020/gc65-5.pdf, p. 178.  
• 2
    Note: Update 24 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine, March 17, 2022: https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-24-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine.  
• 3
  ,  Note: Update 21 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine, March 14, 2022: https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-21-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine.   
• 4
    Note: Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant: everything you need to know, The Guardian, March 4, 2022: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/04/zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-everything-you-need-to-know.   
• 5
    Note: “Historic milestone at Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant,” EBRD, Nov 18, 2020: https://www.ebrd.com/news/2020/historic-milestone-at-chernobyl-nuclear-power-plant.html.   
• 6
    Note: “Ukrainian used fuel storage in commissioning,” World Nuclear News, January 31, 2022: https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Ukrainian-used-fuel-storage-in-commissioning#:~:text=The%20facility%20is%20located%20near,tested%20in%20July%20last%20year.
• 7
    Note: Anton Khlopkov and Valeriya Chekina, Governing Uranium in Russia, DIIS Report No. 2014: 19, Danish Institute for Danish Studies (DIIS), p. 14: https://www.diis.dk/node/19036.   
• 8
    Note: Kamen Kraev, Ukraine: Zaporozhe 5 Becomes Second Unit to Use Only Westinghouse Fuel, NucNet, Dec 18, 2019: https://www.nucnet.org/news/zaporozhye-5-becomes-second-unit-to-use-only-westinghouse-fuel-12-3-2019.  
• 9
    Note: SNRIU, Shelling of a NSA “Neutron Source,” March 6, 2022, https://snriu.gov.ua/en/news/shelter-nsa-neutron-source.   
• 10
    Note: SNRIU, Shelling of a NSA “Neutron Source,” March 6, 2022: https://snriu.gov.ua/en/news/shelter-nsa-neutron-source.  
• 11
    Note:  OECD-NEA, 2020 Uranium Resources, Production and Demand, p. 400: https://www.oecd-nea.org/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-12/7555_uranium_-_resources_production_and_demand_2020__web.pdf.   
• 12
    Note: Ukraine to step up efforts  https://bellona.org/news/nuclear-issues/2022-01-ukraine-to-step-up-efforts-to-produce-a-domestic-uranium-supply.   
• 13
    Note: Ukraine aims to produce enough uranium for nuclear energy needs, Reuters, Dec 29, 2021: https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/ukraine-aims-produce-enough-uranium-nuclear-energy-needs-2021-12-29/.  
• 14
    Note: IAEA director: Kyiv fears nuclear plan agreement ‘recognises Russian control,’ EURACTIV, March 15, 2022: https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/iaea-director-kyiv-fears-nuclear-plant-agreement-recognises-russian-control/.   
• 15
    Note: Update 29 – IAEA Director General Statement on the Situation in Ukraine, March 15, 2022:  https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-29-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine. 
• 16
    Note: https://snriu.gov.ua/en/timeline?&type=posts. 
• 17
    Note: Update 20 – IAEA Director General Statement on the Situation in Ukraine, March 13, 2022: https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-20-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine.   
• 18
    Note: Updated 24 – IAEA Director General Statement on the Situation in Ukraine, March 17, 2020: https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-24-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine.     
• 19
    Note: Update 20 – IAEA Director General Statement on the Situation in Ukraine, March 13, 2022: https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-20-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine.   
• 20
  ”  Note: Update 20 – IAEA Director General Statement on the Situation in Ukraine, March 13, 2022: https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-20-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine.   
• 21
    Note: Update 29 – IAEA Director General Statement on the Situation in Ukraine, March 15, 2022:  https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-29-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine. 
• 22
  Note: INFCIRC/550, in force since January 1998: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1998/infcirc550.pdf.   
• 23
  Note: Dmytro Chumak, The Implications of the Ukraine Conflict for National Nuclear Security Policy, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, Non-Proliferation Papers, No. 53, November 2016, p. 3: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Implications-Ukraine-conflict-national-nuclear-security-policy.pdf   
• 24
  Note: Chumak, p. 4.  
• 25
    Note: See footnote 28, IAEA, The Safeguards Implementation Report for 2014: Report by the Director General: https://armscontrollaw.files.wordpress.com/2015/07/sir-2014.pdf    
• 26
    Note: See footnote 25 in the Safeguards Statement for 2020, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/21/06/statement-sir-2020.pdf.    
• 27
    Note: Safeguards Implementation Report for 2019: Report by the Director General, https://armscontrollaw.files.wordpress.com/2020/05/sir-2019.pdf. See also, Otto T et al. (2021) Reimaging the Broader Conclusion, Proceedings of the INMM & ESARDA Joint Virtual Annual Meeting, August 23–26 and August 30–1 September 2021.   
• 28
    Note: See Footnote 41 of the Safeguards Implementation Report for 2019: Report by the Director General, https://armscontrollaw.files.wordpress.com/2020/05/sir-2019.pdf.   
• 29
    Note: Russia wants IAEA to recognize Crimea’s legal status, World Nuclear News, June 10, 2015: https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-Russia-wants-IAEA-to-recognise-Crimeas-legal-status-10061501.html.   
• 30
    Note: Statement by the Ukrainian Delegation on Agenda Item 87 of the 69th session of the United Nations General Assembly, ‘Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency’, 3 Nov. 2014.   
• 31
    Note: Address by the President of the Russian Federation, 21 February 2022: https://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67828. Accessed 9 March 2022.   
• 32
    Note: MFA Russia Twitter account posting on March 16, 2022: https://twitter.com/mfa_russia/status/1501507764178272257. Accessed March 16, 2022.  
• 33
    Note: Trevor Findlay, Nuclear Law: The Global Debate, International Atomic Energy Agency (ed), Asser Press, p. 233.