This presentation introduces a potential concept that would enable the US and Russia to exchange information on their respective stockpiles of warheads. Using secure information technologies, such as cryptography, the concept involves creating virtual tags to enable the sides to keep track of, and account for, individual warheads without requiring physical tags or intrusive, on-site inspections. Instead of using intrusive technologies to identify the content of the objects, the concept would track and account for the objects the same way as they are tracked by US and Russian inventory management systems – by using historical logistical and handling data. For warheads, the sides would not want to reveal a complete history of the transactions involved in an item’s life-cycle. To address that issue, this concept would only reveal enough historical data to validate the identification of the individual objects in a step-by step approach. Current operational data would remain protected. This tool does not provide a solution that replaces traditional verification measures, rather it is a concept that the sides might consider working on together to build confidence and support future agreements on warheads. US and Russian technical experts could work together on its development.
