A memorandum of understanding (MOU) to extend the ceasefire between the United States and Iran has been signed but the text has yet to be released.

Based on social media posts and comments by U.S. and Iranian officials, the two-page document includes an agreement on resuming toll-free navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, an immediate lifting of the U.S. naval blockade, and a ceasefire on all fronts including Lebanon. The MOU also calls for launching a 60-day period to negotiate a more comprehensive deal between the United States and Iran that will mostly focus on the nuclear file. It remains unclear, pending release of the text, whether other issues — such as Iran’s ballistic missile program and support of regional proxies — will be included in the agenda.

There are also mixed reports about what kind of financial relief Iran will receive upfront, including the release of frozen funds or sanctions relief, for reopening the Strait, and whether payments will be tied to tangible Iranian deliverables linked to a broader nuclear deal.

The negotiations were mediated by a multi-regional country team led by Pakistan and also including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey. This marks a new development in regional mediation. While the negotiations that led to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action were also multilateral — including France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the European Union, China, and Russia — the new mediation team brought regional capitals to the negotiating table and into the decision-making process.

The Arab countries facing Iran across the Persian Gulf, which were forced to live with the consequences of a war launched without consultation with them, will now have to figure out how to re-integrate Iran into their mix. Iranian attacks on their civilian infrastructure have left deep scars on their populations and upended any modicum of trust that had been building between leaderships prior to the war through sustained policies of rapprochement with Tehran. One major takeaway in regional capitals is that neither the U.S. nor Israel are reliable, predictable allies. American protection is now seen as conditional and partial.

Israel, meanwhile, is also regarded with mistrust and viewed  as being led by an unhinged, messianic group of politicians largely supported by a majority of a society unwilling to make the major compromises necessary to achieve peace with its neighborhood. The treaties and accords that bind some Arab countries with Israel are here to stay. But other Arab countries are unlikely to join the normalization trend anytime soon barring a dramatic shift in Israeli domestic dynamics. Going forward, we should expect Gulf states to strengthen independent air defense capabilities and  security partners.

Iran is also viewed as a threat to their security and, most importantly, to their way of life and economic future. They are still assessing what type of Iranian leadership they will be dealing with postwar — a pragmatic regime that will prioritize negotiations, diplomacy, and economic integration with neighbors; a hardline regime that will double down on regional meddling and support for non-state militias; or a weak and fragmented government consumed for the foreseeable future by domestic challenges but still a source of instability in the neighborhood. In the short term, the Arabs’ default mode will be to engage diplomatically with Tehran while awaiting the outcome of US-Iran negotiations.

Lebanon remains a particularly fraught issue. The MOU is said to call for a ceasefire in Lebanon without making it conditional on the withdrawal of Israeli forces who have penetrated deep into the country. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netayanhu has vowed that those forces will stay in Lebanon to maintain a security zone and U.S. officials assert that Israeli soldiers retain the right to self-defense and to respond to Hezbollah attacks on Israeli positions and towns. Hezbollah, meanwhile, welcomed the MOU  crediting Iranian resilience and steadfastness as well as support of regional resistance proxies. Hezbollah rejected Israeli official claims that the MOU permits continued Israeli freedom of movement in Lebanon.

The Lebanese government is now caught between an Israeli leadership that wants to maintain its occupation of a significant part of the country’s south — from which more than a million Lebanese have been displaced — and a Hezbollah-Iranian team that sees military resistance outside Lebanese state control as the only means to force Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. Direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, mediated by the U.S., were launched on for the purpose of reaching an agreement on ending the state of hostilities between the two countries, withdrawing Israeli forces, disarming Hezbollah and resolving border disputes.  A fifth round is scheduled for June 22-23. While both the Lebanese and U.S. governments insist on separating the Iran-U.S. and Lebanon-Israel negotiation tracks, the MOU appears to undermine the validity of the division. Iranian officials argue that the two tracks are linked and that the ceasefire in Lebanon and Israeli force withdrawal will be part of future rounds of negotiation with the U.S. Will Iran walk away from these negotiations if Israel were to resume attacks on the southern suburbs of Beirut? Will President Donald Trump use his leverage to prevent such attacks and avoid derailing future negotiations? The Israeli leadership will be incentivized to put both these questions to the test while Tehran stresses its resolve to safeguard its proxies’ interests and to continue to present itself as their protector. The MOU announcement did not halt the ongoing exchange of fire between Hezbollah and Israeli forces in occupied south Lebanon. Of all the stakeholders involved in this complex set of negotiations, the Lebanese government is the weakest. Lebanon was sidelined in the ceasefire negotiations between the U.S. and Iran and negotiations with Israel are unlikely to produce Israeli withdrawal in the short term.  Lebanon is mired in a long-standing economic crisis while facing an internal displacement crisis unlikely to be resolved any time soon. While the Lebanese government has embraced policies to regain control over a monopoly of force — including Hezbollah’s weapons — the state lacks the means to implement them. The U.S., Gulf countries, and the EU have conditioned aid to the Lebanese government on Hezbollah disarmament and economic reforms. Absent short-term deliverables on Israeli force withdrawal and a durable ceasefire, the government’s decision to engage in direct negotiations with Israel will face increasing domestic contestation. One argument being promoted by voices close to the Hezbollah camp holds that Iran delivered the ceasefire to Lebanon, and now is the time to test whether the Aoun government can secure an Israeli withdrawal through diplomacy — knowing full well that Israeli leadership is not about to oblige anytime soon.

Hezbollah is also about to face a major test. The million-plus displaced Lebanese are predominantly Shi’ite, a large portion of whom are Hezbollah supporters. Unlike in previous wars between Hezbollah and Israel when people returned home once a ceasefire was declared, this time Israeli forces are ensuring there are no homes to return to. Entire villages have been and continue to be razed. Hezbollah’s decision on March 2 to enter the war in support of the Iranian regime produced recrimination throughout Lebanon— including from the Shi’ite community — for dragging the country into yet another war in support of an outside party in the span of three years. As the conflict continued and the internal displacement crisis deepened, this recrimination turned into unprecedented public dissent by Shi’ites against Hezbollah. But a prolonged Israeli military occupation of large segments of the south, continuing the current tempo of attacks on civilians and destruction of homes and infrastructure coupled with Israeli resistance to making concessions in negotiations, will have a counter effect.  

Hezbollah will now work to deflect responsibility for the displacement crisis onto the Lebanese government, which has limited resources to provide a permanent solution amid ongoing security and economic strains. Hezbollah will also increasingly question the validity of continuing a bilateral negotiation track with Israel that does not lead to Israeli withdrawal, while seeking to resume the role it feels most comfortable playing — resisting Israeli occupation. With Israel declaring it will maintain freedom of maneuver, the security situation throughout the south will remain fragile and subject to constant violations. A likely scenario is a return to the 1982–2000 era of low-intensity conflict in south Lebanon, involving a permanently Israeli-occupied zone and a Hezbollah-led, Iran-funded military resistance.