Chapter

China's Role in Conflict Mediation Project

The Misalignment Between Chinese and African Peacemaking: The Case of Ethiopia’s Tigray Crisis

China’s engagement during the Tigray crisis from November 2020 to November 2022 prioritized state stability and economic interests, clashing with African mediation norms

By Paul Nantulya

China

April 6, 2026

In this chapter of China and Conflict Mediation, Paul Nantulya examines China’s engagement during Ethiopia’s Tigray crisis. His analysis assesses the tension between China’s concern for non-interference and its growing economic interests across Africa, which limits Chinese ability to play a more active role in peacemaking. The differing approaches of Chinese and African mediation practices further emphasize how China’s promotion of peace in Ethiopia did not go far enough to address the root causes of the conflict.

China and Conflict Mediation Series

The China and Conflict Mediation series collects eight papers by senior experts on China’s evolving approach to conflict mediation around the world. Presenting case studies from four continents, each chapter examines the drivers, frameworks, and outcomes of China’s efforts to engage in conflict mediation. With analysis drawn from the historic context and current events that influence China’s decision to attempt mediation, this series provides insights into why China is increasingly active in this area, and what it means for China’s role in the international community.

Editor’s Note: Stimson invited Paul Nantulya, a scholar and practitioner specializing in African security and Chinese foreign policy, to examine China’s conflict mediation in Ethiopia. Drawing from his research as well as experience working on various peace processes, Mr. Nantulya explores how the Chinese approach diverges from the principles and practices of African conflict mediation.

By Pamela Kennedy, Deputy Director, China Program

Introduction

In February 2022, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) appointed a senior diplomat, Xue Bing, to the newly created post of Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa.¹ He joined a pool of senior Chinese diplomats routinely dealing with African civil wars. They included Xu Jinghu, then-Special Representative on African Affairs; Zhai Jun, China’s Special Envoy to the Middle East; Liu Yuxi, China’s then-Ambassador to the African Union (AU); and incumbent Chinese Ambassadors accredited to the Southern African Development Community (SADC), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Arab Maghreb Union, and United Nations from their capitals of accreditation in Gaborone, Botswana; Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania; Abuja, Nigeria; Rabat, Morocco; and New York, United States.

Mediation is a “newish” area of Chinese foreign policy. Chinese diplomats appear to be “learning the ropes,” to paraphrase China’s former Special Representative on African Affairs, Zhong Jianhua.² Prior to 2006, China did not engage in significant mediation except for North Korea and the Israel/Palestine crisis. Since then, Chinese diplomats have been involved in crisis diplomacy in Nepal (2006–2009), Sudan (2007–2008), India/Pakistan (2008), Zimbabwe and Rwanda/Democratic Republic of Congo (2008), Sudan/South Sudan (2008–), Myanmar (2013), Syria/Iraq and Afghanistan (since 2014), Bangladesh/Myanmar (since 2017), Afghanistan/Pakistan (since 2017), Iran (2018), and South Sudan (since 2016).³

China used a combination of tools in each situation: shuttle diplomacy, targeted loans and development assistance, international contact groups, high-level visits, envoy diplomacy, and host diplomacy.⁴ However, all these activities occurred behind the scenes with the exception of Sudan and South Sudan, where Chinese diplomats took a much higher profile and worked with the United Nations (UN) and even with U.S. envoys in the case of Sudan.

However, despite China’s growing appetite for crisis diplomacy, there has been very little analysis of China’s mediation policies and practices. This policy brief helps to close this gap by examining Chinese mediation in the Horn of Africa using Ethiopia’s Tigray crisis between November 2020 and November 2022 as a case study. It starts by offering a recapitulation of the principles and standards of African peacemaking. Next, it examines Chinese peacemaking methodologies and approaches, highlighting their contrasts with Africa’s. It then discusses the drivers behind China’s growing interest in African mediation, highlighting Beijing’s entry into the Tigray crisis. The paper concludes by highlighting some key takeaways from the competing views about China’s role in mediation and future directions.

Recalling the Principles of African Mediation

Chinese diplomats often say their approach to peace talks in Africa aims to facilitate “African solutions to African problems” and aligns perfectly with the African Union (AU) and African methods. It is therefore fair that any study on Chinese activities in African peace negotiations examines whether China’s version of mediation and crisis management is concordant with African approaches. Africa has experienced more than its fair share of violence. A 2020 study by Allard Duursma uses a unit of analysis called a conflict dyad-year to categorize African conflicts.⁵

It finds that between 1960 and 2017, Africa experienced 1,114 conflict dyad-years, where dyads involved governments and rebel groups and a conflict dyad-year represented one year of a conflict.⁶ Of these, 380 conflict dyad-years (not 380 conflicts) were managed through some form of mediation. African third parties were involved as mediators in 278 of these conflict dyad-years⁷

In 138 of the conflict dyad-years, African mediators worked independently or jointly with non-African third parties. Negotiated settlements were concluded in 170 of the conflict dyad-years between 1960 and 2017. 21 were concluded without third-party involvement, 75 through African mediation, seven with non-African mediation, and 67 with mixed African and foreign mediation.⁸

Success is not always easy to measure as many conflicts reignite after a period, or new protagonists emerge when old conflicts have been settled. However, Africans undoubtedly have a tremendous repertoire of mediation experience. Renowned scholar-diplomat Francis Mading Deng offers a theory of African mediation based on the African predilection of “talking it out.” This can be described as a strong tradition of perpetrators and victims coming together directly or through third-party mediation to air grievances, re-construct the course of events, establish fault, ascribe punishment and recompence, and reestablish trust among survivors.⁹

Tim Murithi, another renowned thought leader on African peace talks, offers a methodology of mediation that stresses public participation, space for victims and perpetrators to engage non-violently, acknowledging guilt and remorse, re-establishing interdependence, and reinforcing agreements in good faith.¹⁰ One of Africa and the world’s most respected leaders, former South African President Nelson Mandela, established a practice of mediation centered on patience, tenacity, pragmatism, and strategic thinking, advocating for reconciliation and justice through negotiation, particularly with difficult adversaries.¹¹

However, African mediation faces several challenges. Seasoned African mediator and AU advisor Laurie Nathan suggests that the best practices developed through African mediation have not been fully exploited due to insufficient institutional support for mediators, failure to expand available expertise, and the absence of functional mediation units within the AU and regional organizations.¹² Nathan also calls attention to the choice of mediator, suggesting that it can shape success or failure. According to him, mediators who are also deployed by states and inter-governmental organizations tend to focus on prescribed outcomes and have a proclivity for pressuring the parties to reach a settlement as quickly as possible. They tend to regard the solutions as obvious and consider one or more of the parties as unreasonable. Other factors that push them to pursue speedy outcomes include the intensity of the crisis, political calculations, and financial cost.¹³

Gilbert Khadiagala, another well-known African mediation expert, argues that mediators serving in senior government capacities neither have the time nor patience to understand and manage the complexities of mediation.¹⁴ Retired elder statesmen and stateswomen have better chances of success because they have more time and are less beholden to political pressure.

They also derive influence by virtue of their previous roles, and the traditional African reverence for elders. Their credibility and moral suasion are greatly increased if they left power democratically.¹⁵

Several standards of African peacemaking have been created over the years. Mediation principles identified by the African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), one of Africa’s largest peacemaking organizations, identifies recurrent mediation principles that top African mediators generally accept, including the impartiality of the mediator; a non-judgmental attitude towards the parties, their issues, and the nature of agreements reached; confidentiality of all conversations by the parties; and their voluntary participation in all stages of the process.¹⁶

The African Union (AU)/ACCORD Handbook on Mediation notes that mediation occurs under the express invitation of the parties and can only proceed when they are willing to reach agreement. However, the handbook also notes that mediation might not be appropriate if the power imbalance is too severe. In such cases, prospective mediators should establish whether the power relationship among the parties is sufficiently balanced so that one party cannot unilaterally dictate the outcome and enforce compliance.¹⁷ All told, mediation is an interactive process that requires the mediator to assist the parties to identify the issues in the conflict, educate each other about their grievances, needs, and interests, and come up with a possible settlement. However, they must be willing to use mediation as the primary means to resolve their disputes.

In an interview for this study, John Katunga, a peacemaking expert and dispute resolution advisor at the World Bank, said that successful mediation re-establishes social cohesion among conflicting communities and enhances their ability to increase their assets and bargaining power.¹⁸ Key to this is the imperative of changing exclusionary power structures and creating more socially and politically inclusive institutions: the essence of democracy.

A Stark Contrast: China’s Evolving Approach to Mediation

Despite China’s stated commitment to aligning its peacemaking efforts with African solutions to African problems, its evolving approach is not neatly aligned with Africa’s. First and foremost, China is deferential to incumbent authorities and goes to great lengths to avoid offending them. According to Chinese scholar Kwok Chung Wong, China’s closeness to governing parties is useful when trying to build trust and influence with them.¹⁹ However, it is a liability in the eyes of opposing forces who tend not to view China as an even-handed arbiter. As previously discussed, peace talks can only be effective when the mediator is viewed by all sides as an even-handed and honest broker.

China vigorously defends its policy of aligning with incumbent governments by invoking “non-interference,” which precludes it from taking sides or doing anything outside the scope of state-to-state and party-to-party relations.²⁰ China also claims neutrality, impartiality, and respect for sovereign independence (zhuquan duli; 主权独立) to justify its deep aversion to working across political divides and with armed and unarmed opponents.

However, as ACCORD points out, neutrality and impartiality are very different things.²¹ Impartiality means treating all parties fairly, and without bias. Neutrality means not taking a position on any issue, regardless. While mediators are expected to be impartial, they are not neutral.

Former South African President, Nelson Mandela constantly admonished the Burundian negotiating parties for their misdeeds throughout his mediation of the Burundi crisis, which this author observed while working at ACCORD, then part of his mediation team. Mandela was particularly sensitive to attacks on civilians and frequently called out and publicly shamed the rebels and the government forces when it happened, something Chinese diplomats rarely do.²²

All told, Mandela was impartial but not neutral, a core tenet of African mediation that runs counter to the official Chinese style that shows deference to incumbent governments, unless in the most exceptional situations.²³ China’s approach to mediation is also minimalist; it shies away from tackling the root causes of conflict, which by design requires the reconfiguring of the political system and reducing the government’s power and representation, as reflected in the 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation of Burundi.

Such a method would be too intrusive for the Chinese government, which would consider it interference in internal matters. The Chinese approach, by contrast, tends to be limited to stopping the fighting and reducing violence, especially in conflicts where China has major economic stakes such as South Sudan and Sudan. In these two cases, China’s active and robust mediation was motivated by strategic economic interests. ²⁴ Indeed, China’s first deployment of combat troops to a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission was in South Sudan in 2012, a deployment that was closely linked to protecting the pipelines of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which rebels tend to target whenever crisis erupts.²⁵

In the African concept and practice of peacemaking, conflict reduction and the deployment of military and civilian peacekeepers are part of a larger and more complex process of dismantling the structures of violence, rebuilding trust, and establishing a new political architecture. Power-sharing, democratic elections, redress for victims, and measures to safeguard human and political rights are some of the longer-term measures African mediators prioritize when dealing with protracted conflicts. These measures are at odds with China’s system of governance, which is built on a much narrower concept of stability predicated on absolute ruling party control of society and government.

Why China is Increasingly Involved in African Mediation

Three primary reasons explain China’s increasing involvement in African mediation.

First, China believes its increased investments in international conflict mediation and UN peacekeeping enhance its self-perception as a great power with growing global influence. China once shunned such activities as mere tools of Western hegemony.²⁶

Today, it deploys more peacekeepers than the other permanent members of the UN Security Council. China has also created more UN offices dedicated to these activities than its peers on this Council. That said, its deployments (1,802 in January 2025) pale in comparison to African countries, which deployed around 25,017 troops or 41% of the UN’s total strength of 61,197 troops as of January 2025.²⁷

Second, China is concerned that its vast and growing economic interests are increasingly vulnerable to insecurity. According to the Chinese government, 350 security incidents involving Chinese citizens and other interests occurred between 2010 and 2015 alone.²⁸ These dangers have been underscored in Niger where China National Petroleum Cooperation (CNPC) assets, including a 2,000 kilometer oil pipeline linking Niger’s Agadem oilfields to the port of Seme in neighboring Benin, have been frequently targeted by armed groups opposed to the military junta that installed itself in 2023.²⁹ Matters worsened in August 2023 when Benin closed its border with Niger and refused to load CNPC crude at its ports for export to China. The oil started flowing again in May 2024 following frantic mediation by CNPC and Chinese officials, but the threat remains.³⁰

Third, China views mediation as part of a larger security strategy to secure and expand the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an ambitious program launched in 2013 to create alternative economic corridors linked to the Chinese economy.³¹ Publicly available data show that the roll-out of the BRI coincided with the uptick in Chinese participation in mediation activities in Africa mostly through shuttle diplomacy, leveraged aid, international contact groups, special envoy diplomacy, and discreet talks supported by Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs).

Chinese Mediation in Ethiopia: A Mixed Record

Ethiopia’s Strategic Importance to China

The crisis between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) had a profound impact on China. When fighting escalated in 2020, China Gezhouba Group Company, a major Chinese SOE and one of the world’s largest construction firms, scrambled to evacuate around 400 Chinese workers from the Tigray regional capital Mekelle.³² They were building a water supply system with a targeted completion date of April 2022. Over 180 employees of another major Chinese SOE, China CAMC Engineering Company, also fled Tigray.³³ They were working on the Wolkaiyt Sugar Development Project,³⁴ one of Ethiopia’s 13 sugar factories.³⁵ Another Chinese firm, Shanghai Metallurgical Equipment Group, operated a wire rod production line in Tigray.

In total, roughly 600 Chinese workers had to be evacuated from Tigray as government counteroffensives intensified.³⁶ The Chinese government was unable to deploy the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to conduct these evacuations as Ethiopia has no coastline. It instead relied on the Ethiopian security forces and the efforts of its SOEs in Tigray which mobilized vehicles to ferry Chinese workers out of the area.³⁷

China faced such situations before, like in Libya in 2011 and South Sudan in 2013. In Libya, China used naval assets, military aircraft, civilian vessels, and buses to evacuate nearly all 35,000 Chinese workers trapped in the fighting.³⁸ In South Sudan, China used a Chinese security firm, DeWe Security, and reportedly worked with armed locals to evacuate around 330 Chinese oil workers out of Juba.³⁹ China also joined a multinational mediation effort involving the UN, European countries, and the United States to defuse the crisis.⁴⁰ Beijing, in this particular instance, felt threatened by rebel attacks on the CNPC-built oil pipeline extending from South Sudan’s Upper Nile State to Port Sudan on the Red Sea.

In 2015, China deployed peacekeepers to the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) as part of this larger effort. According to the International Crisis Group, China faced the choice of stepping in and supporting mediation or withdrawing and abandoning its assets — most significantly oilfields — to looting and destruction.⁴¹ Hence, in the interests of managing its risk exposure, China was willing to stretch its policy of non-interference, raising questions about its assumed neutrality.

In Tigray, China’s tentative steps towards mediation were driven by the safety of roughly 400 Chinese construction and manufacturing projects in Ethiopia worth over $4 billion by the start of the violence.⁴² However, other stakes were also at play. Ethiopia is sometimes described by Chinese analysts as “China’s most eager student” as it has adapted China’s models of governance and economic development more thoroughly than many other African countries.⁴³

Ethiopia, moreover, is a key hub of the Belt and Road. Its growth rates of 10% per annum between 2012 and 2022 came about in part by modeling aspects of the Chinese economy: labor-intensive export-led growth, massive investments in infrastructure through the BRI, the development of niche exports through export processing zones, and linking these to Chinese-style industrial parks.⁴⁴ Much of the infrastructure Ethiopia used to boost its economy — roads, rail, airports, power plants, and electric transmission lines — were financed and built by Chinese SOEs.

Chinese firms including Sinohydro, Gezhouba, Voith Hydro Shanghai, and China International Water and Electricity Corporation helped construct the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), Africa’s largest — and the world’s seventh largest — hydroelectric power project.⁴⁵ Furthermore, Tigray hosts the $100 million Mekelle Industrial Park, one of Ethiopia’s most important economic assets. This sprawling facility is among Ethiopia’s 12 Chinese-built and operated industrial parks, forming the economic backbone of the country’s Eastern Industrial Zone.⁴⁶ China also systematically trained, advised, and gave hands-on mentoring to Ethiopia’s economists, planning authorities, and central and local governments.

On the political side, the then-ruling TPLF/Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) was one of the Communist Party of China’s (CPC’s) closest partners in the Global South, not just in Africa. The two sides built a comprehensive and systematic relationship in which TPLF/EPDRF cadres were dispatched annually to China to learn party management, ideological work, party supervision of state and government, propaganda systems, economic modeling, poverty eradication, and how to monitor, shape, and guide public opinion.⁴⁷

China and Ethiopia also have strong military ties as evidenced by the influence of Chinese military doctrine in the Ethiopia National Defense Force (ENDF), including the order of battle, and significant Chinese weaponry in its inventories. These include the AR2 Multiple Rocket Launchers, L-15 jet fighters, Wing Loong I unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), surface-to-surface missile systems, and infantry fighting vehicles, among other hardware.⁴⁸ Beyond this, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has closely mentored ENDF senior leaders, including through a specialized Ethiopia Senior Officers Course at Beijing’s National Defense University, among other programs.⁴⁹

Ethiopia’s importance to China is also tied to its debt liability of $14.5 billion, including 20 loans for transportation infrastructure and another 20 for energy projects taken out between 2000 and 2022 from various Chinese lenders.⁵⁰ China is particularly interested in Ethiopia’s stability as it provides some assurance that its lenders will get their money back. Indeed, Chinese banks showed reluctance to lend Ethiopia more money during the height of the Tigray crisis. In August 2021, Demisu Lemma, the head of Chinese cooperation in Ethiopia’s finance ministry, announced that China’s Export-Import (EXIM) Bank refused to release $339 million for fear it would create more pressure on the country’s debt stock.⁵¹

China’s Engagement in the Tigray Crisis: A Real Peace Initiative or Power Politics?

The Tigray crisis is fundamentally a power struggle and rupture within the TPLF-dominated EPRDF, leading to the formation of the Prosperity Party. China had deep ties to the TPLF and the broader front during the Ethiopian Civil War from 1974 to 1991 and was its chief ideological ally during its years at the head of the Ethiopian government until its dissolution in 2019. Indeed, most TPLF/EPRDF junior and senior cadres and top officials were trained in China — many as graduate students — with a large number even fluent in Chinese. The Tigray crisis therefore presented a quagmire for China given its exceptionally strong ties to both sides of the dispute: the TPLF and their former comrades in the Prosperity Party, the successor to the EPRDF.⁵² On the surface of it, these deep historical affinities across-the-board put China in a unique position to mediate their dispute.⁵³

China’s response to the conflict was not straightforward, however. When Prime Minister and former senior EPRDF cadre Abiy Ahmed moved against his former comrades in 2019, China watched the unfolding events quietly and appeared unsure of how to react. The killing of Ethiopia’s longest serving foreign minister and TPLF founder Seyoum Mesfin in January 2021 during the opening stages of the fighting came as a shock to Beijing, significantly raising the stakes.⁵⁴ Seyoum was Ethiopia’s Ambassador to China for nearly a decade and was known to be close to China’s top political and military leaders.⁵⁵ In his last high-level assignment, he worked closely with Ambassador Zhong Jianhua, formerly China’s Ambassador to Ethiopia and later the Special Representative on African Affairs to the Chinese government on the South Sudan crisis.⁵⁶

China crafted its official comments carefully given its stated aversion to interfering in internal affairs and its longstanding links to Seyoum and the broader TPLF leadership. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin issued an unusual but anodyne statement hoping that “all Ethiopian people, including those in Tigray enjoy peace, stability, and prosperity” — neither openly endorsing the government nor the rebellion.⁵⁷

In November 2021, the UN Security Council held a debate on Ethiopia as TPLF forces were closing in on the capital, Addis Ababa. Chinese representative to the UN Zhang Jun’s statement didn’t use the term “Government of Ethiopia” as is customary in official Chinese messaging, opting to replace it with “People of Ethiopia.”⁵⁸ Hence Beijing played safe, keeping options open in case of a sudden change of government. To be sure, China criticized the imposition of Western sanctions on the Ethiopian authorities in keeping with its stance on noninterference. Beyond that, its statements of support for them remained lukewarm, calling instead on all sides to “fulfil their obligations under international humanitarian law, protect the safety and security and civilians, including foreign nations, and facilitate humanitarian relief.”⁵⁹

China’s official communications shifted decisively in support of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed when the TPLF retreated in early December after losing ground following in a fierce government counteroffensive. From this point on, Chinese statements adopted the more familiar tone of deference to the government while still calling for an end to the violence.

On December 1, 2021, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi made an unannounced stop in Ethiopia on his way from the 8^th Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Dakar, Senegal. This was aimed at signaling China’s firm support for Prime Minister Abiy at a time when Addis Ababa was still unsafe and Western embassies were still evacuating their citizens.⁶⁰ Wang announced that Ethiopia had the ability to “solve its own problems” and described interference by foreign powers as unacceptable. Ethiopia’s Deputy Prime Minister Demeke Mekonnen said Ethiopia appreciated China’s solidarity.⁶¹

Wang also said China would assist through dialogue, while announcing a new Chinese peace initiative called the “Conference on Peace and Development in the Horn of Africa.”⁶² However, had Wang followed an African script, he might, for instance, have flown to Tigray to meet the TPLF leadership — who were all well known to China — and returned to Addis to hold consultations with the government and arrange follow-up talks. This could have been conducted in close coordination with the Addis Ababa-based AU and regional mediators, Olusegun Obasanjo, the former President of Nigeria, and Uhuru Kenyatta, the former Kenyan President.

A review of public statements, coupled with an interview with a senior TPLF leader for this study, shows that China, despite its unique position, did not use back channels to reach out to the TPLF as would be expected by any mediator. Instead, China strongly defended the Ethiopian government and made it clear that it was banking on its survival. This led to a breakdown of trust between China and the TPLF.

The TPLF also accused China of becoming a party to the conflict by supplying the Ethiopian military with drones and missile systems.⁶³ This claim was made by the front’s former spokesperson, Getachew Reda (then in exile), on a BBC broadcast on December 21, 2021.⁶⁴ However, a month earlier, the Front’s then-Chairman Debretsion Gebremichael only mentioned Iran, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in a letter to the UN Secretary-General accusing the countries of meddling.⁶⁵ Numerous media reports based on flight charts and satellite imagery suggest Ethiopia acquired Chinese drones during the course of the crisis.⁶⁶ On January 31, 2022, the then Ethiopian government spokesperson Leggese Tulu told the BBC that government forces were using drones but would not say where.⁶⁷

China’s next move came in January 2022 when Wang Yi visited Comoros, Eritrea, and Kenya in keeping with a tradition dating back to 1991 of making Africa the first foreign visit of the incumbent Chinese foreign minister. His first stop was Eritrea, which incurred U.S. sanctions in November 2021 for fighting alongside Ethiopia in Tigray.⁶⁸ Wang condemned the sanctions and elevated China-Eritrea relations to a strategic partnership, bringing Eritrea into a growing club of African countries that enjoy strategic partnerships with China. According to a readout by the then-Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin (now Ambassador to Cambodia), the two sides also “exchanged views on the Horn of Africa and opposed non-regional forces destabilizing and creating conflicts and undermining peace and security.”⁶⁹

Next up was Kenya, where Wang announced that China would appoint a Special Envoy for Horn of Africa Affairs.⁷⁰ Kenya played a key mediation role on the Tigray crisis on behalf of the AU and in its capacity as a member of the AU Peace and Security Council. Ex-President Uhuru Kenyatta’s personal stature in Ethiopian peace initiatives boosted these efforts.⁷¹ Notably, Wang’s announcement also came while then-U.S. Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa Jeffrey Feltman was visiting Ethiopia, a move seen by many as an effort by China to outflank American regional diplomacy.⁷² During working meetings chaired by President Kenyatta, Wang also suggested that Horn of Africa countries should “decide their own destiny” and convene a Chinese-sponsored peace conference to address their conflicts.⁷³ According to the Chinese government, the Kenyan side accepted the proposal.⁷⁴

China’s then Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, Ambassador Xue Bing, was appointed on February 22, 2022.⁷⁵ At the end of March, he visited Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, and Uganda to drum up support for the proposed conference, signal China’s evolving role in mediation, and amplify Chinese interests.⁷⁶ Strategic competition against Western countries featured heavily in Xue’s messaging. In the middle of his tour, he held a wide-ranging press conference at the Chinese embassy in Nairobi where he said regional countries told him they were fed up with “the preaching from Western countries.”⁷⁷

“Some Western countries come here and tell you how to do it [resolve conflicts],” Xue added. “I have a feeling that countries are fed up with that.” He further stated, “They [the Horn of Africa countries] say China respects us, treats us as equals, and so they want to see us play a more active and constructive role. We thus have to answer the call of our friends here.”⁷⁸

Xue also reported that all the visited countries welcomed China’s proposals for a regional peace conference. The conference was held on June 21–22 in Addis Ababa with Kenya and Ethiopia serving as co-hosts.⁷⁹

On April 18, 2022, Ambassador Xue published an article on this initiative in Qiushi, China’s top theoretical journal.⁸⁰ He explains that the initiative is focused on helping countries “address security, development, and governance challenges,” “shut out external interference,” and “learn from China’s successful experience” in party construction and poverty alleviation to “find development paths that suit their national conditions.”⁸¹ Foreign Minister Wang Yi identifies three pillars of this initiative: 1) intra-regional dialogues on security, 2) expanding Chinese-funded regional connectivity projects, and 3) exploring solutions to governance challenges by sharing the Chinese experience.⁸²

At the UN, China focused its diplomacy on seemingly contradictory objectives: shielding Ethiopia from scrutiny, underscoring support for AU mediation, and emphasizing commitment to Ethiopia’s sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity. China criticized the U.S. for sanctioning Ethiopia in September 2021 and removing it from its preferential trade program, the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, in January 2022. According to China, these actions constituted “interference in Ethiopia’s internal affairs.”⁸³ Notably, in December 2021, China voted “no” on a UN Human Rights Council resolution to appoint an independent commission to investigate allegations that Ethiopian government forces conducted ethnic cleansing in Tigray.⁸⁴ China said it was “opposed to any politicization of human rights issues,” echoing language used by the Ethiopian government.⁸⁵

In March 2022, and with China’s reported backing, Ethiopia launched a failed bid to block funding for this commission during debates in the UN General Assembly’s Budget Committee.⁸⁶ As a fresh round of AU-mediated talks between the TPLF and the Ethiopian government opened in South Africa in October 2022, China (and Russia) blocked a statement put before the Security Council by the African non-permanent members — collectively known as the “A-3” (at that time Gabon, Ghana, and Kenya).⁸⁷

All things considered, China did not mediate in the classical sense, raising questions about the efficacy of the “Initiative on Peace and Development in the Horn of Africa” as a mediation instrument. In a 2019 press conference, Wang Yi described China’s approach to African peacemaking as being based on, inter alia, supporting “African people to solve African problems in African ways,” particularly noting China’s contributions to peacekeeping under UN frameworks.⁸⁸ However, China’s opposition to an African-sponsored resolution calling for a ceasefire contradicted this statement. Unsurprisingly, Kenya, as a member of the A-3 at the time was angry with the Chinese (and Russian) positions and publicly expressed misgivings.⁸⁹

All this contrasts sharply with China’s engagement on Sudan’s Darfur crisis from 2005 to 2009. China’s then-Special Representative on African Affairs, Liu Giujin — its first peace envoy — worked closely with the AU, the UN, and his U.S. counterpart Andrew Natsios.⁹⁰

China’s voting behavior at the UN was also notably different. It chose not to veto UN resolutions that referred Sudanese officials — including President Hassan Omar El Bashir — to the International Criminal Court for war crimes. China also voted to deploy the UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).⁹¹ Sudan was deeply irritated by China’s stances and initially opposed this deployment. However, concerted Chinese diplomacy including a visit to Khartoum by then-Chinese President Hu Jintao in February 2007 paved the way for UNAMID’s entry to Darfur.⁹² China also actively participated in the larger UN and AU multilateral peace initiative, which it did not do in the Tigray crisis. Beijing additionally used its “good offices” to bring the warring parties to the table, a role it also did not play in Ethiopia.

China’s participation in the Darfur peace process is instructive on many counts. Initially, China remained on the sidelines and used abstentions to defend Sudan.⁹³ This gradually changed when African and international pressure mounted over its perceived indifference to the crisis, with some even calling for a boycott of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, a critically important event for China that marked its entry on the world stage.

In many African circles, China was heavily criticized for seemingly prioritizing its economic interests while Sudanese state-sponsored Arab militias committed ethnic cleansing against African ethnic groups in Darfur. Simply put, China’s basic posture appeared morally repugnant, forcing it to act to salvage its reputation. Chinese leaders tend to be sensitive to such accusations, especially when they come from African and other developing countries as they challenge China’s narratives of “solidarity” and “leadership” as a “fellow developing country.”

Beyond moral and reputational concerns, China also had significant stakes in breaking with its policy of non-interference in the case of Darfur. It had a lot to lose economically as Sudan and South Sudan’s oil pipelines were built and operated by Chinese state-owned firms. They frequently threatened or attacked by rebels, posing a significant security risk for China. Secondly, with investments worth more than $6 billion in the oil sector alone, China had a lot to lose economically if the crisis spiraled out of control.⁹⁴

Sudan’s debt liability to China, particularly to the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), was also a key consideration. Beijing had no choice but to put its weight behind peace talks, even if that meant working with other international partners that it would normally avoid, like the United States. China confronted strikingly similar dynamics in Ethiopia but did not adopt a similar posture of engaging the government and rebels in an even-handed way to realize a peace settlement.

Assessment

China’s strong backing for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the Ethiopian government undermined its role as an impartial third party. The AU’s Mediation Support Handbook stresses that without impartiality, a proposed mediator cannot win or maintain the confidence of the parties.⁹⁵

China’s diplomatic work at the height of the Tigray crisis fell short of this principle as it was predicated on rallying support for the Ethiopian government at every stage. The TPLF consequently did not perceive China as an even-handed mediator.

China’s approach to the crisis also raises several conceptual, procedural, and methodological questions. The first Horn of Africa Peace and Development Conference of June 2022 was co-chaired by Ethiopia, then a country in conflict. This alone meant that mediation in the classical African sense cannot have been central to the initiative’s objectives. In African philosophical thought, a country cannot co-chair or even attend a meeting meant to address a crisis in which it is a belligerent. Indeed, when the AU Peace and Security Council is discussing a conflict in which a member is a party, that country must remove itself from the room.

The second Horn conference took place in Beijing in June 2024, by which time a second ceasefire had been reached between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF in Pretoria, South Africa. Chinese diplomats do not appear to have been involved in reaching that South African-mediated agreement, yet one of the objectives of the Horn initiative is to “support regional peace and development through concrete actions.”⁹⁶

It is also unclear whether China’s then Horn of Africa envoy Xue Bing coordinated his flurry of diplomatic engagements with other actors involved in high-level mediation of the Tigray crisis, such as the AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo, the Kenyan Special Envoy, Uhuru Kenyatta, and other governments involved in crisis talks like Kenya and South Africa.

During the first Horn of Africa Peace and Development Conference, Special Envoy Xue offered to mediate disputes “based on the will of countries in this region,” without mentioning Ethiopia.⁹⁷ Senior Ethiopian leaders did not respond when asked if they would take up China’s offer.⁹⁸ Meanwhile, Eritrea, which joined forces with the Ethiopian military to fight the TPLF, did not send a representative. A readout of the conference makes numerous references to the need for peace as a pathway to stability and development. However, China’s penultimate proposition was a commitment to realign its BRI program with the development policies of Horn of Africa countries.⁹⁹

China’s “Peace and Development Initiative in the Horn of Africa,” according to Wang Yi, aims to accelerate “regional revitalization to overcome development challenges.” Priority will go towards developing the “two principal axes, the Mombasa-Nairobi and Addis Ababa-Djibouti railways, to form a development framework of ‘two axes plus two coasts.’” This, he explains, will go together with speeding up the construction of the Belt and Road.¹⁰⁰ All told, China’s peace initiative in the region appears to be predicated first and foremost on protecting and advancing its geostrategic and economic interests, particularly around the BRI.

Some analysts of Africa-China relations suggest that China’s concept of peace is fundamentally different and should be assessed on its own merits. They describe China’s approach as “developmental peace,” [fazhan heping; 发展和平], which is premised on achieving peace through heavy investments in economic development and labor-intensive production like infrastructure.¹⁰¹

According to Steven Kuo, China’s peace model centers on respect for sovereignty and non-interference, political stability, and national interest over individual and group interests, and state-directed infrastructure and economic development.¹⁰² To illustrate, he notes that China helped fund the infrastructure rehabilitation and economic revitalization components of Liberia’s post-conflict recovery program established by the former UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).¹⁰³ However, he also notes that Beijing did not participate in another core component of UNMIL, namely, strengthening democratic governance and rule of law. To make sense of this, Kuo argues that China does not have a tradition of peace and conflict studies, partly explaining why its views are “skewed towards favoring incumbent governments, irrespective of their track records.”¹⁰⁴

China’s model of peace is influenced by international relations theorists such as Qin Yaqing and Yan Xuetong, who draw on Confucianism to propose alternative values that China can bring to its approach to global affairs, which include the tenets of societal harmony and benevolent rule in which leaders are charged with caring for the people.¹⁰⁵ This is perceived as distinct from and as a possible alternative to conceptions of Western liberal peace, which advance civil and political rights and liberal democracy.¹⁰⁶

John Katunga argues that development, peace, justice, and reconciliation go together. “There is this argument that development interventions automatically constitute peacebuilding since lack of economic opportunities breeds conflicts. However, this is clearly not the case in practice.”¹⁰⁷ Katunga cites Rwanda, which received more development aid than many of its neighbors but lost all of it in less than a month during the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. “Clearly, Rwanda’s development donors didn’t pay attention to underlying social cleavages that festered even as Rwanda made strides in economic growth,” Katunga suggests. “I am still convinced that economic construction does not necessarily guarantee lasting peace, particularly when power differences and dignity deficits continue to be reflected in development interventions.”¹⁰⁸

Ethiopia is affected by a similar paradox. According to the Economist, Ethiopia’s real GDP per person rose by an average rate of 9.3% from 1999 to 2019: 0.4 points less than China’s.¹⁰⁹ The World Bank notes that since 2000, when Ethiopia had one of the world’s highest poverty rates, the headcount poverty rate fell 24 percentage points to 23.4%. This was mostly driven by agricultural growth, industrialization, pro-poor spending on basic services, and rural safety nets,¹¹⁰ thanks mainly to massive Chinese inputs into Ethiopia’s economy. However, grievances over power sharing, representation, and inclusion continued despite Ethiopia’s impressive economic growth, underscoring the limits of “developmental peace.” Political elites have also continued to manipulate ethnicity for political ends, further deepening the sense of alienation that characterizes Ethiopia’s conflicts.

Katunga also highlights the differences between “positive peace” and “negative peace.” Positive peace transforms structures of violence, builds inclusive, democratic, and representative institutions, and enhances people’s dignity by delivering justice. Negative peace, by contrast, creates peace through the absence or reduction of violence but leaves underlying root causes intact. In this sense, a country might seem peaceful and stable on the surface, especially when major development interventions are brought in.

However, if structures of oppression, inequality, lack of representation, and injustice remain, the ground is prepared for more conflicts.¹¹¹ Hence, by focusing exclusively on economic development, China’s developmental peace runs the risk of ignoring the tensions that exploded in places like Rwanda in 1994 and Tigray in 2019-2023. In other words, “developmental peace” can be prone to supporting negative peace.

Some lessons from history are worth pondering in this connection. Sudan’s long-running crisis between successive governments in Khartoum in the north and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A) in the south was partly triggered by development projects that ignored and even exacerbated social conflicts. One example was the massive Jonglei Canal that diverted fresh water from the Sudd wetlands in Southern Sudan to Northern Sudan and Egypt.

While this project created employment opportunities, it also reinforced inequities stemming from power imbalances, resource control, and neglect of Southern Sudan by the governing elites in Khartoum. At the heart of the tension was the lack of equity and equitable distribution in how compensation for those affected by the canal was conceptualized, which ignored the needs and inputs of displaced Southern Sudanese communities. This was the subject of a doctoral thesis by the late John Garang de Mabior, who went on to found the SPLM/A in 1983.¹¹² Notably, SPLM/A attacks on the canal under his leadership brought construction to a halt.¹¹³

Across Africa, the evidence suggests that economic development cannot be equated with peace, even though the two are interrelated. However, many Chinese political theorists argue differently. He Yin, an early proponent of “developmental peace,” argues that “liberal peace” without strong and effective government can perpetuate instability. Using the case of East Timor, he highlights the benefits of a strong central government, suggesting that only in those conditions can liberal peace and developmental peace coexist.¹¹⁴

Zhao Lei, a professor at the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Party School suggests that China’s approach to peacemaking emphasizes respect for the right of a country to make its own decisions and prioritizes reestablishing the administrative functions of the state. International assistance in this context should be concerned with the country’s self-identified development priorities.¹¹⁵

Wang Xuejun of the Institute of African Studies at Zhejiang Normal University argues that productive activities should supersede other elements like strengthening Western-style democracy. He also says that the “survival of the government that is a party to any crisis is paramount.”¹¹⁶

Liu Haifang, one of China’s most influential Africa specialists, argues that development opportunities are key to alleviating violence in fragile contexts.¹¹⁷ Katunga agrees with Liu but argues that economic development should meet certain tests if it is to promote peacebuilding.¹¹⁸ First, it should apply a “do-no-harm” framework, namely in-built measures to limit unintended consequences. Second, development must take on board community needs, social capital and assets, and priorities. Third, development should contribute to peace dividends. One example is the 2009–2013 UN-sponsored Northern Uganda Early Recovery Project,¹¹⁹ designed as a peace dividend of the peace process between the Ugandan government and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The project worked with affected communities to improve household incomes, expand agricultural and non-agricultural production, increase access to credit, enhance health and nutrition, increase access to safe water and sanitation, and improve community capacities for conflict prevention.¹²⁰

Similarly, during the Burundi peace process, Nelson Mandela mobilized international donors to contribute $440 million towards peace, reconstruction, and development as part of a post-conflict peace dividend.¹²¹ These priorities were discussed and agreed by the conflicting parties during the negotiations.

In summary, Chinese conceptions of developmental peace have much to learn from African peacemaking philosophies and practice. In the African experience, massive inputs of economic development have not necessarily contributed to peace; indeed, in many cases, they exacerbate conflict. Hence, these inputs should not be confused with peacemaking and do not automatically lead to sustainable settlements of protracted crises. In fact, they can worsen pre-existing conflicts if they lack equity, are not sensitive to the local context, and ignore patterns of marginalization.

Conclusion

China views itself as a newcomer in conflict mediation. China’s former Africa envoy Ambassador Zhong Jianhua said as much during a panel discussion on China’s role in re-energizing peace talks in South Sudan in July 2021, which this author attended.¹²²

He toned down expectations by noting that China’s role as a peace broker should not be overestimated. “When I first entered into the South Sudan [peace] process and talked with so many people, I really was shocked to understand it is such a complicated case for us, particularly…for Chinese,” noting differences in how the Chinese understanding of a country or a state was completely different from most of the other politicians he spoke with in South Sudan. He expressed that building consensus was the most important thing for South Sudan, noting that “it took me several years to understand this. It certainly took a longer time for a lot of people from China to understand this…if we want to solve the problem of South Sudan, it must come from the South Sudanese people themselves, then the neighboring countries, the regional countries, then the AU, and then the outsiders.”¹²³

Professor Liu Haifang took a similar view by suggesting that African stakeholders should view China as a “passive actor.” She explained that these words were coined by the Chinese Special Representative for Africa, Xu Jinghu, during an exchange with her students at Tsinghua University in Spring 2021. This appears to be widely shared among China’s top diplomats dealing with Africa. According to Liu, “…my students and I interviewed the first Chinese Special Envoy, Liu Guijin. He emphasized…many times that we [Chinese] cannot call ourselves a mediator. We probably should…call ourselves a promoter for peace because there is no Chinese mediation formula.”¹²⁴

The concept of “passivity” reflects a lingering aversion to China appearing to be too intrusive in African conflicts given the norms of “non-interference.” However, there have been exceptions, such as China’s role in South Sudan, where Ambassador Zhong brought warring parties to the negotiating table, and Sudan, where President Hu Jintao used China’s economic and political leverage to secure the government’s acceptance of a UN peace plan in Darfur. However, China’s default position is to preserve close ties with ruling elites, meaning its peace efforts often fail the impartiality test when examined against African peacemaking methodologies. Furthermore, Chinese peacemaking is generally perceived to be aimed at creating stable conditions for Chinese economic and security interests, not necessarily to address the root causes of protracted deadly conflict.

Some argue that China is in a strong position to deliver tangible peace dividends given its vast economic investments in Africa, especially infrastructure, and the significant economic and financial resources at its disposal.¹²⁵ However, China’s economic engagements seldom occur as part of a larger peacebuilding framework, and there is no evidence yet of China intentionally offering economic investments as a component of a high-level peace process. Thus, the added value of Chinese economic activities in conflict transformation remains limited.

China’s involvement in the Tigray crisis from November 2020 to November 2022 highlights the limits of Chinese peacemaking in Africa, the differences between the Chinese and African philosophies and practices, and the conundrum facing Chinese diplomats as they weigh active engagement versus non-interference. While several senior Chinese leaders declared their interest in a peaceful settlement, China never wavered in its firm defense of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and did not reach out to the rebels to prepare a framework for talks. China appears to have been more interested in restoring stability, narrowly defined as the Abiy government regaining control, and thus being able to protect Chinese interests.

In April 2023, the Ethiopian Prime Minister decorated China’s former Horn of Africa Envoy, Xue Bing, with an award for his and China’s contributions to the South African-mediated ceasefire.¹²⁶ However, South African observers of those negotiations say Beijing did not play an active role, overtly or behind the scenes.¹²⁷ Since then, China has focused on demonstrating its continued commitment to the Ethiopian government.

The biggest illustration of that came in September 2024 when senior Ethiopian and Chinese military leaders signed a wide-ranging military pact where the two sides pledged to work together in the field of “fifth generation warfare.” This will see China’s Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) transfer military technology and military equipment to Ethiopia, while upgrading their military capacity through training, education, and the joint production of military hardware.¹²⁸

In summary, China, in the case of Ethiopia, can be said to have been more of a “peace promoter” than a “mediator” in the African understanding of the concept, to paraphrase Liu Haifang. Going forward, China is likely to confront more of these types of situations over the next 5–10 years given the size of its economic footprint and the security exposure this creates. There are over 10,000 Chinese firms operating in Africa, and many are SOEs. In energy alone, Chinese SOEs have a total portfolio of $52.4 billion, spread across 83 projects in over 30 African countries, from stable countries like Tanzania to highly unstable countries like South Sudan.¹²⁹

In the area of infrastructure, Chinese SOES and policy banks have financed one in five major infrastructure projects in Africa and constructed one in three.¹³⁰ As in the energy sector, these projects range from stable countries like Namibia to countries engulfed in crises like Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR). In May 2023, unknown gunmen attacked a gold mine in Chimbolo in the CAR, killing nine Chinese nationals.¹³¹ A similar attack by rebel militias occurred at a mining site in July 2024 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), killing six Chinese nationals.¹³² Under the current China-Africa three-year plan (2024–2027), China and its African partners committed themselves to additional large-scale industrial projects as part of a $50 billion package pledged at the ninth Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Summit in Beijing in September 2024.¹³³ Therefore, it can be argued that Chinese diplomats will continue to be drawn into African conflicts, where the pull to reexamine their principle of non-interference will be as strong as ever.

Paul Nantulya is a research associate at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. His areas of expertise include Chinese foreign policy, China/Africa relations, African partnerships with Southeast Asian countries, mediation and peace processes, the Great Lakes region, and East and Southern Africa. Prior to joining the Africa Center, Mr. Nantulya served as a regional technical advisor on South Sudan for Catholic Relief Services (CRS) from 2009 to 2011. In 2005-09, Mr. Nantulya was CRS/Sudan’s governance manager in Juba. He was part of the ACCORD team that worked with President Nelson Mandela on the Arusha Peace Process on Burundi (1999-2001), President Thabo Mbeki and Deputy President Jacob Zuma on ceasefire talks (2001-03), President Ketumile Masire on the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (2002), and Dr. Nicholas Haysom on the Sudan peace process (2002-03). Mr. Nantulya holds a B.A. in international relations from United States International University in Nairobi, Kenya, a Graduate Certificate in Japanese from the Japan Africa Interchange Institute in Nairobi, Kenya, and an M.S. in Defense and Strategic Studies from Missouri State University in Springfield, MO.

Header image: IAEA Ethiopia Bilateral Meeting, Vienna, September 2024. By Dean Calma / IAEA

Notes

1
“China appoints special envoy for Horn of Africa affairs,” Xinhua, February 2, 2022, https://english.news.cn/20220222/ba761cee9a8b4889ae4597dd412e55ae/c.html and Ayah Aman, “China Appoints Envoy for Horn of Africa,” Al Monitor, January 1, 2022, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/01/china-appoints-envoy-horn-africa.
2
Eric Olander, “China’s Role in Re-Energizing the South Sudan Peace Process,” China Africa Podcast, July 30, 2021, https://chinaafricaproject.com/podcasts/chinas-role-in-re-energizing-the-south-sudan-peace-process/.
3
Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), “China as a Conflict Mediator: Maintaining Stability Along the Belt and Road,” Helena Legarda, August 22, 2018, https://merics.org/en/short-analysis/china-conflict-mediator.
4
Ibid.
5
Allard Duursma, “African Solutions to African Challenges: The Role of Legitimacy in Mediating Civil Wars in Africa” International Organization 74, no. 2 (2020), 312, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27104596.
6
Allard Duursma, “African Solutions to African Challenges: The Role of Legitimacy in Mediating Civil Wars in Africa.”
7
Ibid, 314–315.
8
Ibid, 315.
9
Francis Mading Deng, Talking it Out: Stories in Negotiating Human Relations (London, UK: Kegan Paul, 2006).
10
Tim Murithi, “African Approaches to Building Peace and Social Solidarity” African Journal on Conflict Resolution 6, no. 2 (July 2006), 26–28, https://www.accord.org.za/publication/ajcr-volume-06-no-2-2006/.
11
Program on Negotiation (PON), “Nelson Mandela: Negotiation Lessons from a Master,” Harvard University Law School, April 2, 2025, https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/leadership-skills-daily/nelson-mandela-lessons-from-a-master-negotiator-nb/.
12
Laurie Nathan, “Mediation in African Conflicts: The Gap Between Mandate and Capacity,” African Mediators Retreat (working paper), August 2016, https://www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/111MediationinAfricanconflicts-Thegapbetweenmandateandcapacity-April-2007.pdf.
13
Ibid, 17.
14
Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Meddlers or Mediators: African Intervenors in Civil Conflicts in Eastern Africa, (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, August 2011).
15
“Interview with Dr. Gilbert Khadiagala,” Thinking Africa (video), May 2011, https://www.thinkingafrica.org/V2/portfolio/meddlers-or-mediators-khadiagala/.
16
These principles can be found throughout the handbook as recurrent principles advised to guide mediation, see: African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes and African Union, African Union Mediation Support Handbook, (Durban: South Africa, September 2014).
17
Ibid.
18
Interview with John Katunga, Senior Peacebuilding Technical Advisor, Catholic Relief Services, Sunday, May 1, 2022.
19
For example, see Kwok Chung Wong and Fujian Li, “Rise of China’s Developmental Peace: Prospects for Asian Hybrid Peacebuilding,” in Operationalization of Hybrid Peacemaking in Asia: From Theory to Practice, eds. Yuji Uesugi, Anna Deekeling, Sophie Shiori Umeyama, and Lawrence McDonald-Colbert, (London, UK: Palgrave Mc Millan, 2021): 127-157.
20
For example, see Jason Li, “Conflict Mediation with Chinese Characteristics: How China Justifies Its Non-Interference Policy,” The Stimson Center, August 27, 2019, https://www.stimson.org/2019/conflict-mediation-chinese-characteristics-how-china-justifies-its-non-interference-policy/.
21
This was a core principle of ACCORD’s work in mediation settings across Africa, in which this author participated, in particular the Burundi peace talks under former South African President, Nelson Mandela, and the Inter-Congolese Dialogue mediated by former Botswana President Ketumile Masire.
22
“Mandela Criticizes Buyoya,” The New Humanitarian, March 29, 2000, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/13253/burundi-mandela-criticises-buyoya; See also, “Mandela Warns Burundi Rebels,” Reliefweb, November 6, 2000, https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/mandela-warns-burundi-rebels.
23
Consider again Mandela’s decidedly non-neutral stance toward the number of fatalities in mediation in Burundi, from Ian Fisher, “Warring Sides in Burundi Get a Scolding from Mandela,” The New York Times, January 7, 2000, https://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/17/world/warring-sides-in-burundi-get-a-scolding-from-mandela.html.
24
Jason Li, “Conflict Mediation with Chinese Characteristics: How China Justifies Its Non-Interference Policy.”
25
Daniel Hartnett, “China’s First Deployment of Combat Forces to a UN Peacekeeping Mission—South Sudan,” U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 13, 2012, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/MEMO-PLA-PKO_final_0.pdf. Frans Paul van der Putten, “China’s Evolving Role in Peacekeeping and African Security,” Netherlands Institute of International Relations, September 2015, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018-02/China%27s_Evolving_Role_in_Peacekeeping_and_African_Security.pdf.
26
Allen Carlson, “Helping to keep the peace (albeit reluctantly): China’s recent stance on sovereignty and multilateral intervention,” Pacific Affairs 77, no. 1 (Spring 2004), https://www.jstor.org/stable/40022272.
27
See latest chart, updated in January 2025 from United Nations, “Troop and Police Contributors,” https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors.
28
Paul Nantulya, “Chinese Security Contractors in Africa,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, October 8, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/10/08/chinese-security-contractors-in-africa-pub-82916.
29
Christian Geraud Neema Byamungu, “Two Chinese Oil Workers Kidnapped in Niger” China Global South Project, February 5, 2025, https://chinaglobalsouth.com/2025/02/05/two-chinese-oil-workers-kidnapped-in-niger/.
30
Antonio Cascais, “Benin Gives Green Light for Niger’s Oil Exports to China,” May 16, 2025, DW, https://www.dw.com/en/benin-gives-green-light-for-nigers-oil-exports-to-china/a-69074552.
31
Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS),“China as a Conflict Mediator: Maintaining Stability Along the Belt and Road.”
32
Austin Bodetti, “What Ethiopia’s Ethnic Unrest Means for China,” The Diplomat, December 10, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/what-ethiopias-ethnic-unrest-means-for-china/.
33
Austin Bodetti, “What Ethiopia’s Ethnic Unrest Means for China.”
34
AidData, “Project ID: 69512—China Eximbank provides $500 million loan for Welkait Sugar Mill Project,” n.d., https://china.aiddata.org/projects/69512/.
35
Gemechu Yilikal Mose and Palani Ponnurangam, “Investigating the Effect of Cane Molasses on the Performance of Base Bitumen,” International Journal of Research and Innovation in Applied Science (IJRIAS) 3, no. 6 (June 2018), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/370658593_Investigating_the_Effect_of_Cane_Molasses_on_the_Performance_of_Base_Bitumen.
36
Austin Bodetti, “What Ethiopia’s Ethnic Unrest Means for China.”
37
“SME Mekelle Operation Team Successfully Withdrew from Tigray Region,” Shanghai Metallurgy Equipment Group, Press Release, November 27, 2020,
https://www.sme-group.com/blog/sme-mekele-operation-team-withdraw-from-tigray-region-successfully. Huang Panyue, “Chinese Embassy in Ethiopia evacuates compatriots from Tigray
conflict,” China Military Online, November 23, 2020, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/TopStories/4874483.html.
38
Gabe Collins and Andrew S. Erickson, “Implications of China’s Military Evacuation of Citizens from Libya,” China Brief 1, no. 4 (March 11, 2011), https://jamestown.org/program/implications-of-chinas-military-evacuation-of-citizens-from-libya/.
39
Charles Clover, “Chinese Private Security Companies Go Global,” Financial Times, February 26, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/2a1ce1c8-fa7c-11e6-9516-2d969e0d3b65.
40
Yanmei Xie, “To Intervene or Not? China’s Foreign Policy Experiment in South Sudan Raises Questions,” International Crisis Group (ICG), October 2, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/intervene-or-not-chinas-foreign-policy-experiment-south-sudan-raises-questions and Intergovernmental Authority on Development, “Lessons for IGAD Mediation Arising from the South Sudan Peace Talks 2013-2015,”August 2019, 4, https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/lessons-igad-mediation-arising-south-sudan-peace-talks-2013-2015.
41
International Crisis Group, “China’s Foreign Policy Experiment in South Sudan,” July 10, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/288-china-s-foreign-policy-experiment-south-sudan.
42
Joseph Sany and Thomas P Sheehy, “Despite High Stakes in Ethiopia, China Sits on the Sidelines of Peace Efforts,” United State Institute of Peace (Analysis and Commentary), January 19, 2022, https://web.archive.org/web/20220215045340/https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/01/despite-high-stakes-ethiopia-china-sits-sidelines-peace-efforts.
43
Brookings, “Political Party Training: China’s Ideological Push in Africa?” Yun Sun, July 5, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2016/07/05/political-party-training-chinas-ideological-push-in-africa/.
44
Elsje Fourie, “China’s Example for Meles’ Ethiopia: When Development ‘Models’ Land,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 53, no. 3 (September 2015), 289-316, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26309821 and Aaron Tesfaye, “Chapter 3, China and Ethiopia: Economic Relations,” in China and Ethiopia, ed. Aaron Tesfaye (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2020).
45
Raphael J. Piliero, “Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam: Assessing China’s Role,” U.S. China Perception Monitor, June 5, 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20210605163708/https://uscnpm.org/2021/06/05/gerd-assessing-chinas-role/https://web.archive.org/web/20210605163708/https://uscnpm.org/2021/06/05/gerd-assessing-chinas-role/, Lisa Klaassen, “Everywhere and Nowhere to be Seen: How China’s Role in the GERD Dispute Challenges Beijing’s Non-Interference Principle,” Zhōngguó Shíkè 中国时刻, October 27, 2021, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/cff/2021/10/27/everywhere-and-nowhere-to-be-seen-how-chinas-role-in-the-gerd-dispute-challenges-beijings-non-interference-principle/, and ACCORD, “The Politics of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) – an Ethiopian Perspective,” Mohammed Seid Ali and Embiale Beyene Admasu, July 7,
2021, https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/the-politics-of-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-gerd-an-ethiopian-perspective/.
46
Istvan Tarrosy, Zoltán Vörös, and Seife Hailu Gebreslassie, “China and Ethiopia, Part 4: Mekelle Industrial Park,” The Diplomat, April 16, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/china-and-ethiopia-part-4-mekelle-industrial-park/
and Chris Alden and Jing Gu, “China–Africa Economic Zones as Catalysts for Industrialization,” Institute for Development Studies, May 23, 2021, https://www.ids.ac.uk/publications/china-africa-economic-zones-as-catalysts-for-industrialisation/.
47
Yun Sun, “Political Party Training: China’s Ideological Push in Africa?”
48
Defenceweb, “Ethiopia turns Chinese APCs into Self-Propelled Artillery,” November 26, 2024, https://www.defenceweb.co.za/african-news/ethiopia-turns-apc-into-self-propelled-artillery/.
See also: Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans, “Made In China: Ethiopia’s Fleet Of Chinese UAVs,” Oryx, September 2, 2021, https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2021/09/made-in-china-ethiopias-fleet-of.html, and Inder Singh Bisht, “Ethiopia Acquires Dozens of Chinese Wheeled Howitzers,” January 26, 2023, The Defense Post, https://thedefensepost.com/2023/01/26/ethiopia-chinese-wheeled-howitzers/?_gl=1fdjndj_gaMTExNjIwMjI4MC4xNzQzNTE0MzQ3_ga_W7TS6SK2MX*MTc0MzUxNjQ0Ni4yLjAuMTc0MzUxNjQ0Ni4wLjAuMA.
49
Paul Nantulya, “China’s Blended Approach to Security in Africa” Italian Institute for International Political Studies, July 22, 2021, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/chinas-blended-approach-security-africa-31216 and Paul Nantulya, “China’s “Military Political Work” and Professional Military Education in Africa,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, October 30, 2023, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/china-pla-military-political-work-pme-africa/.
50
See the latest figures on Boston University’s “Chinese Loans to Africa Database,” available at: https://www.bu.edu/gdp/chinese-loans-to-africa-database/.
51
“China’s Exim Bank Withholds $339 in Funds to Ethiopia, Cites Debt Repayment Pressures,” Reuters, August 16, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/ethiopia-debt-idAFL8N2PN47O.
52
Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “China and Ethiopia: Authoritarian Affinities and Economic Cooperation,” China Perspectives, no. 4 (2012), https://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/6041.
53
One of the strongest cases for China to engage in ending the conflict was made by Lukas Fiala of the London School of Economics. See Lukas Fiala, “Why Ethiopia’s Fate Matters to China,” Italian Institute for International Political Studies, November 26, 2021, https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/why-ethiopias-fate-matters-china-32469.
54
“Tigray: Ethiopian army kills ex-Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin,” Al Jazeera, January 13, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/13/ethiopia-says-former-foreign-minister-killed-by-military.
55
“Seyoum Mesfin (1949-2021),” Ethiopia Observer, January 16, 2021, https://www.ethiopiaobserver.com/2021/01/16/seyoum-mesfin-1949-2021/.
56
People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Ambassador Zhong Jianhua, Special Representative of he Chinese Government on African Affairs, Meets with IGAD Chief Mediator Seyoum Mesfin for South Sudan Issue and Representatives of Different Parties in The South Sudan Negotiations,” March 29, 2014, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/2913_665441/sousu_663756/ssaa_663760/202406/t20240611_11418048.html.
57
Eric Olander, “Chinese Foreign Ministry Issues a Rare Albeit Bland Statement on the Conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray Region,” February 23, 2021, https://chinaglobalsouth.com/2021/02/23/chinese-foreign-ministry-issues-a-rare-albeit-bland-statement-on-the-conflict-in-ethiopias-tigray-region/.
58
For example, see the statement of Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations Zhang Jun at a UN Security Council meeting on the situation in Ethiopia, from United Nations, Security Council, “8899th meeting,” November 8, 2021, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv.8899.pdf.
59
Ibid. 9. For further reference, a chronological listing of all UN debates on Ethiopia is listed on the UN Security Council website which is available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/ethiopia/.
60
Eric Olander, “Ethiopia: Chinese Foreign Minister’s Visit Shows Beijing’s Support for Abiy,” The Africa Report, December 13, 2021, https://www.theafricareport.com/155619/ethiopia-chinese-foreign-ministers-visit-shows-beijings-support-for-abiy/.
61
“Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi Arrives in Ethiopia” China Global Television Network, (Video), December 1, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZR-GZ6dG4I8.
62
Paul Nantulya, “China’s Diplomacy in the Horn—Conflict Mediation as Power Politics,” Spotlight, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, October 12, 2022, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/china-diplomacy-horn-conflict-mediation-power-politics/.
63
“Getachew Reda, GoT Spokesman, Tells BBC that UAE, Iran, China, Among Others Providing Ethiopia Drones,” BBC, December 21, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ddvl0djC_pQ.
64
“Getachew Reda, GoT Spokesman, Tells BBC that UAE, Iran, China, Among Others Providing Ethiopia Drones.”
65
“Tigray’s President Condemns Turkey, UAE, Iran Over ‘Meddling in Ethiopia’s Genocidal War,’ Urges UNSC Guterres to Intervene,” Global News Net, December 1, 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20211202002858/https://globenewsnet.com/news/tigray-condemns-turkey-uae-iran-for-meddling-in-the-genocidal-ethiopia-war-urges-un-secretary-general-to-intervene/.
66
Eric Olander, “Al Jazeera: UAE Providing Ethiopia Use of Chinese Made Wing-Loong II Drones,” China Africa Project, December 13, 2021, https://chinaafricaproject.com/2021/12/13/al-jazeera-uae-providing-ethiopia-use-of-chinese-made-wing-loong-ii-drones/, Fred Harter, “Ethiopia’s Drone Wars: Iran, China and Turkey Deliver the Air Power Behind Abiy’s Resurgence,” The Africa Report, January 25, 2022, https://www.theafricareport.com/169947/ethiopias-drone-wars-iran-china-and-turkey-deliver-the-air-power-behind-abiys-resurgence/, and Wim Zwijnenburg, “Ethiopia Now Confirmed to Fly Chinese Armed Drones,” Pax, November 18, 2021, https://paxforpeace.nl/news/blogs/ethiopia-now-confirmed-to-fly-chinese-armed-drones.
67
Peter Mwai, “Tigray Conflict: What Do We Know About Drone Strikes in Ethiopia?,” BBC, January 31, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/60045176.
68
Maggie Fick, “Eritrea Condemns New U.S. Sanctions,” Reuters, November 13, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/eritrea-condemns-new-us-sanctions-2021-11-13/.
69
Shannon Tiezzi, “China Looks to Play More Active Role in Horn of Africa Conflicts,” The Diplomat, January 7, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/china-looks-to-play-more-active-role-in-horn-of-africa-conflicts/.
70
Duncan Miriri, “China Plans Peace Envoy for Conflict-Riven Horn of Africa,” Reuters, January 6, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-appoint-special-envoy-horn-africa-2022-01-06/.
71
Raudhat Sayeeda Saddam, “Ethiopia’s Tigray Crisis and Kenya’s Mediation Role,” Horn Institute for Strategic Studies, November 22, 2021, https://horninstitute.org/ethiopias-tigray-crisis-and-kenyas-mediation-role/.
72
Cobus Van Staden, “Taking Stock of Wang Yi’s African Tour,” The China Africa Project, January 7, 2022, https://chinaafricaproject.com/analysis/taking-stock-of-wang-yis-african-tour/.
73
Duncan Miriri, “China plans peace envoy for conflict-riven Horn of Africa” and Government of the People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Wang Yi Talks about the “Initiative of Peaceful Development in the Horn of Africa,”” January 7, 2022. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/2913_665441/3014_664044/3016_664048/202201/t20220107_10479933.html/.
74
“Kenyan President Meets with Chinese State Councilor,” Xinhua, January 7, 2022, https://english.news.cn/africa/20220107/cd55e467530b425b9917763e1eec793c/c.html.
75
“China appoints special envoy for Horn of Africa affairs,” Xinhua, February 22, 2022, https://english.news.cn/20220222/ba761cee9a8b4889ae4597dd412e55ae/c.html.
76
Jevans Nyabiage, “China’s Special Horn of Africa Envoy has Work Cut Out Ahead of First Peace Meet in Conflict-hit Region,” South China Morning Post, March 21, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3171174/chinas-special-horn-africa-envoy-has-work-cut-out-ahead-first.
77
Eliud Kibii, “Horn of Africa States Fed Up With West Interference, China Special Envoy Says in Kenya Visit,” The Star, March 19, 2022, https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2022-03-20-horn-of-africa-states-fed-up-with-west-interference-china-special-envoy-says-in-kenya-visit/.
78
“China has Undertaken to Organize a First Ever Peace and Security Convention This Year 2022,” Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) (Video), March 19, 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NGlbFnROmd4.
79
Jevans Nyabiage, “June date set for China-sponsored Horn of Africa peace conference,” South China Morning Post, June 6, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3180569/june-date-set-china-sponsored-horn-africa-peace-conference and Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, “Roundup: First China-Horn of Africa peace conference concludes with call for realizing shared aspirations,” June 23, 2022, http://www.focac.org/eng/zfzs_1/202206/t20220623_10708534.htm.
80
Xue Bing, “China Sincerely Contributes to Peace, Development of Horn of Africa,” Qiushi, April 18, 2022, http://en.qstheory.cn/2022-04/18/c_743957.htm.
81
Xue Bing, “China Sincerely Contributes to Peace, Development of Horn of Africa.”
82
Government of the People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Wang Yi Talks About the Initiative of Peaceful Development in the Horn of Africa,” January, 7 2022. https://web.archive.org/web/20220107105941/https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202201/t20220107_10479933.html.
83
Eric Olander, “China’s New Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa Winds Down Tour With a Pointed Message: “Countries are Fed Up With the West,”” The China Africa Project, March 21, 2022, https://chinaafricaproject.com/2022/03/21/chinas-new-special-envoy-to-the-horn-of-africa-ends-tour-with-a-pointed-message-countries-are-fed-up-with-the-west/.
84
Jevans Nyabiage, “China Votes ‘no’ on Tigray Abuses Probe by UN Team, Calls it Interference in Ethiopia’s Affairs,” South China Morning Post, December 19, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3160246/china-votes-no-tigray-abuses-probe-un-team-calls-it.
85
Ibid.
86
“Ethiopia Fails to Block UN Funding for Human Rights Investigation,” Voice of America, April 1, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/ethiopia-fails-to-block-un-funding-for-human-rights-investigation/6510719.html.
87
Alex De Waal, “Will the US Use its Leverage Now to End the Killing in Ethiopia?, Responsible Statecraft, October 24, 2022, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/10/24/will-the-us-use-its-leverage-now-to-end-the-killing-in-ethiopia/.
88
Government of the People’s Republic of China, Consulate in New York, “Wang Yi: China Plays a Unique and Constructive Role in Africa’s Peace and Security,” January 5, 2019. https://newyork.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/xw/201901/t20190110_4715536.htm.
89
Alex De Waal, “Will the US Use its Leverage Now to End the Killing in Ethiopia?”
90
Andrew Natsios, “China in Sudan: The Challenge of Non-Interference in a Failed State,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Summer/Fall 2012, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/43134235.pdf.
91
United Nations, Security Council, “Security Council Authorizes Deployment of United Nations-African Union ‘Hybrid’ Peace Operation in Bid to Resolve Darfur Conflict,” July 31, 2007. https://web.archive.org/web/20070912145503/https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9089.doc.htm.
92
Andrew Natsios, “China in Sudan: The Challenge of Non-Interference in a Failed State.” Reuters, “China’s Leader Visits Sudan and Focuses on Growing Economic Ties,” The New York Times, February 2, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/03/world/africa/03darfur.html.
93
Middle East Institute, “China’s Evolving Conflict Mediation in the Middle East,” Jesse Marks, March 25, 2022, https://www.mei.edu/publications/chinas-evolving-conflict-mediation-middle-east.
94
European Union, European Coalition on Oil in Sudan, “Sudan’s Oil Industry: Facts and Analysis,” April 2008, 9. https://www.ecosonline.org/reports/2008/dossier%20final%20groot%20web.pdf
95
African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes and African Union, African Union Mediation Support Handbook, 82.
96
“China Hosts 2nd Horn of Africa Peace Conference,” Anadolu Agency, June 25, 2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/china-hosts-2nd-horn-of-africa-peace-conference/3257682.
97
“China’s 1st Horn of Africa Envoy Offer to Mediate in Region,” Associated Press, June 20, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/politics-africa-china-addis-ababa-abiy-ahmed-2069a4305a5aca2732f65262bde3732d.
98
Ibid.
99
Roundup: “First China-Horn of Africa Peace Conference Concludes with call for Realizing Shared Aspirations,” Xinhua, June 23, 2022, http://www.focac.org/eng/zfzs_1/202206/t20220623_10708534.htm.
100
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, “Wang Yi Talks about the “Initiative of Peaceful Development in the Horn of Africa,” January 10, 2022, http://www.focac.org/eng/ttxx_1/202201/t20220110_10480474.htm.
101
Paul Andrew Gwaza, “Developmental Peace: Understanding China’s Policy Towards Africa in Peace and Security,” January 3, 2015,http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2544850.
102
Steven Kuo, “China’s Approach to Peace in Africa is Different. How and Why,” The Conversation, January 27, 2020, https://theconversation.com/chinas-approach-to-peace-in-africa-is-different-how-and-why-129467.
103
Ibid.
104
Ibid.
105
Steven Kuo, “China’s Approach to Peace in Africa is Different. How and Why,” The Conversation, January 27, 2020, https://theconversation.com/chinas-approach-to-peace-in-africa-is-different-how-and-why-129467.
106
Yeonju Jung, “Can China’s Developmental Peace Be an Alternative to Liberal Peace? A Critical Feminist Interrogation,” Central European Journal of International and Security Studies 18, no. 4 (2024), https://www.cejiss.org/can-china-s-developmental-peace-be-an-alternative-to-liberal-peace-a-critical-feminist-interrogation.
107
Interview with John Katunga Murhula, Senior Technical Advisor, Peacebuilding and Justice, Catholic Relief Services, May 9, 2022.
108
Ibid.
109
“The Violence in Ethiopia Imperils an Impressive Growth Record,” The Economist, November 20, 2021, https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2021/11/20/the-violence-in-ethiopia-imperils-an-impressive-growth-record.
110
The World Bank, “Ethiopia Poverty Assessment: Harnessing Continued Growth for Accelerated Poverty Reduction,” 2020, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/33544.
111
Interview with John Katunga Murhula.
112
John Garang de Mabior, “Identifying, Selecting, and Implementing Rural Development Strategies for Socio-Economic Development in the Jonglei Projects Area, Southern Region, Sudan,” PhD thesis, Iowa State University Digital Repository, 1981, see, for example, 220. https://paanluelwel2011.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/dr-john-garangs-phd-dissertation-identifying-selecting-and-implementing-rural-development-strategies.pdf.
113
Human Rights Watch, “Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights,” November 24, 2003, https://www.hrw.org/report/2003/11/24/sudan-oil-and-human-rights.
114
He Yin, “A tale of two “peaces”: Liberal peace, developmental peace, and peacebuilding” in New Paths and Policies Towards Conflict
Prevention: Chinese and Swiss Perspectives, eds. Courtney J. Fung, Björn Gehrmann, Rachel F. Madenyika, and Jason G. Tower (London, UK: Routledge, March 15, 2021).
115
Zhao Lei, “Two Pillars of China’s
Global Peace Engagement Strategy: UN Peacekeeping and International Peacebuilding,” International Peacekeeping, Volume 18, Issue 3, (2011).
116
Wang Xuejun, “Developmental Peace: Understanding China’s Africa Policy in Peace and Security,” in Chris Alden, Abiodun Alao, Zhang Chun, Laura Barber (eds) China and Africa: Building Peace and Security Cooperation on the Continent (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
117
“Africa’s Security Partnership with China: Looking to the Future,” Institute for Security Studies (video), September 29, 2021, https://issafrica.org/events/africas-security-partnership-with-china-looking-to-the-future.
118
Interview with John Katunga Murhula, Senior Technical Advisor, Peacebuilding and Justice.
119
United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, “Northern Uganda Early Recovery Project: Beneficiary Stories,” n.d., https://www.un.org/humansecurity/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Beneficiary-stories.pdf.
120
Ibid.
121
World Bank, “Burundi Donor Conference Pledges $440 Million in Urgent Aid,” Reliefweb, December 12, 2000, https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/burundi-donor-conference-pledges-440-million-urgent-aid.
122
Eric Olander, “China’s Role in Re-Energizing the South Sudan Peace Process,” China Global South Project, July 30 2021, https://chinaglobalsouth.com/podcasts/chinas-role-in-re-energizing-the-south-sudan-peace-process/.
123
Ibid.
124
Ibid.
125
Bernardo Mariani, “China’s Engagement in Conflict and Post-Conflict Settings: The Quest for Stability,” Peacerep, 2022, 31, https://peacerep.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/China-Report-Digital.pdf.
126
Government of the People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Affairs of the Foreign Ministry Xue Bing Attends the Expression of Gratitude on the Conclusion of the Peace Talks of Ethiopia,” April 24, 2023, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq_665435/2913_665441/2984_663984/2986_663988/202304/t20230425_11065445.html.
127
Interview with Kwezi Mngqibisa, Senior Research Fellow, Center for African Diplomacy, University of Johannesburg, April 4, 2024.
128
“Ethiopia, China Vow to Enhance Military Cooperation,” Ethiopia News Agency, September 15, 2024, https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/eng_5153383 and “Ethiopia strengthens military ties with China, acquires ch-7 stealth drones,” The Reporter, September 21, 2024, https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/41925/.
129
See China Global South Project, “User Guide: Interactive Map of Chinese Energy Projects in Africa,” regularly updated, https://chinaglobalsouth.com/energy/.
130
National Bureau for Asian Research, “(In)Roads and Outposts: Critical Infrastructure in China’s Africa Strategy: NBR Special Report No. 98,” ed. Nadège Rolland, May 3, 2022, https://www.nbr.org/publication/inroads-and-outposts-critical-infrastructure-in-chinas-africa-strategy-introduction/.
131
“Armed Men Kill nine Chinese Nationals in Central African Republic,” The Guardian, March 22, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/20/armed-men-kill-chinese-nationals-central-african-republic.
132
“Militia Attack in DR Congo Kills Six Chinese Nationals, Congo Soldiers,” Reuters, July 4, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/china-condemns-militia-attack-democratic-republic-congo-that-killed-its-2024-07-04/.
133
Center for Global Development, “Channeling the FOCAC 2024 Financing Pledge in a Time of Global Turmoil,” W Gyude Moore, March 17, 2025, https://www.cgdev.org/publication/channeling-focac-2024-financing-pledge-time-global-turmoil.

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