Editor’s Note: Javad Heiran-Nia directs the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran and has written for Stimson on Iran’s foreign and domestic politics. Hessam Habibi Doroh is a researcher at Khayrion Think Tank, a Bratislava-based think tank and consulting platform focusing on the MENA region. Doroh is also the author of “Sunni Communities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2013-2021,” teaches International Relations, intercultural and interreligious studies, and is working on his PhD at the University of Public Service in Budapest.

By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project

Unlike the 12-day war in June, which largely bypassed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, the US-Israeli war on Iran that began on February 28 triggered intense Iranian retaliation on military and civilian targets in GCC countries.

The attacks broke with the “Neighborhood Policy” that for half a decade had been the primary foreign focus of the Islamic Republic. This policy faded in the shadow of a war that Iran viewed as an existential threat and in recognition of the weakening of proxy forces who had served in the past as Iran’s “forward defense.”

Consequently, Iran’s relations with the Gulf Arab states have reached an unparalleled level of damage and erosion. This is not a temporary tension, but rather a profound disruption in an infrastructure of trust, cooperation, and mutual understanding that had been built with difficulty over the past few years.

The war has elevated certain issues for Iran, including a desire that U.S. forces withdraw from the region and concerns about the growing security, intelligence, and military ties between some Gulf Arabs and Israel.

While Iran has sought to regionalize the war to deter Gulf Arab states — and the U.S. — from further attacks, Iran’s policy toward GCC members varies. For example, Iran’s policy toward Oman remains based on strategic partnership and cooperation.  

Unlike other Arab states, Oman described the war from the outset as illegal and refused to provide military or logistical support to the U.S. or Israel. Muscat had hosted negotiations between Iran and the U.S. prior to the war. Even after Iran attacked facilities at the ports of Sohar and Salalah, Omani officials never directly accused Iran, and Tehran did not take responsibility for the attacks, attributing them instead to Israel. On April 26, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi traveled to Oman and met with Sultan Haitham bin Tarik, the first visit by an Iranian official to a GCC member state following the ceasefire. Oman also absented itself from an April 28 GCC meeting that issued anti-Iran statements.

Iran is aware that it needs Oman’s cooperation to institutionalize monitoring of ship traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s proposal to reopen the strait includes the establishment of joint maritime patrols and possibly, the levying of tolls or other fees on passing ships. So far, however, this proposal has been rejected by Muscat, which is expected to continue its traditional policy of neutrality.

From De-Escalation to Confrontation with the UAE

Iran’s approach to the United Arab Emirates is quite different, shifting from de-escalation to comprehensive confrontation. Tehran has identified the UAE, due to its more active role in the anti-Iran coalition and its hosting of foreign military facilities, as its primary GCC target and the most vulnerable among its southern neighbors.

Iran has gone so far as to openly threaten to “crush the UAE,” and Iranian officials have communicated this change of approach to Saudi and Omani counterparts. On May 4, Iran is alleged to have struck an oil industrial zone in the key Emirati port of Fujairah in apparent retaliation for the U.S. sinking several small Iranian boats in the Strait of Hormuz as part of a U.S. attempt to reopen the strategic waterway.

Tehran seeks to raise the cost of the UAE’s close military-security cooperation with the U.S. and Israel and weaken Emirati morale by targeting the UAE’s main vulnerability: an economy based on tourism and foreign investment.

The UAE has been hit by more Iranian missile and drone attacks than any other country in the region — even more than Israel, with at least 2,000 ballistic missiles and drones launched at Emirati targets. The attacks were not limited to military facilities but also included critical civilian infrastructure and even commercial landmarks such as the Burj Al Arab hotel, which has been closed for 18 months.

Iran seeks to exploit existing rifts among GCC members, especially between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. At the same time, Tehran recognizes that the UAE, which has deepened its partnership with Israel in recent years, will likely expand that cooperation in defense, security, and intelligence sharing. Bahrain and possibly Kuwait may follow Abu Dhabi’s lead.

Iran believes that Saudi Arabia, even though it has no love for Iran, will be more cautious and regards Israel as a strategic threat trying to establish regional hegemony at the expense of the interests of most Arab countries.

Differing views toward Israel among Arab countries are important to Iran because they prevent formation of a joint air defense system, led by the U.S. and including Israel. Tehran worries more about collective security cooperation of this sort than of bilateral relations with Israel by GCC states.

In the aftermath of the war, Iran is expected to try to rebuild its relationship with Saudi Arabia, which appears to have recognized that it cannot eliminate the Iranian threat. The future of relations will likely be defined by mutual caution and efforts to agree on rules to govern Hormuz and the Yemen conflict, coupled with the continuation of geopolitical rivalry through regional proxies.

While the war halted the de-escalation process that began in 2023, when Iran and Saudi Arabia restored full diplomatic relations, it did not destroy it. Both countries appear to understand that in the post-war environment, maintaining diplomatic channels and reaching a new “modus vivendi” is essential. According to reports, Iran’s new approach to Saudi Arabia will be one of managing tensions and attempting to prevent escalation into direct conflict.

Iran has long sought to establish a comprehensive security system in the Middle East that does not rely on foreign forces. It has proposed joint maritime patrols in the Strait of Hormuz, in exchange for Saudi and Egyptian involvement in securing the Bab al-Mandeb and the Suez Canal.

Riyadh needs regional stability to advance its ambitious economic goals. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has forced Saudi Arabia to reroute oil exports to the Red Sea, which is vulnerable to threats from the Iran-allied Houthis.

Another motivation for Iran to repair relations with Saudi Arabia is to prevent formation of a new military-political coalition centered around Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey.

In its relations with Saudi Arabia, Iran has noted Riyadh’s differences with the UAE over the OPEC oil cartel, which the Emiratis have just quit, and over relations with Israel. Saudi Arabia also opposes UAE efforts to change the regional political order by supporting separatist militias in Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia. Riyadh, in contrast, has supported central governments across the region.

Damage to Iran’s Relations with Qatar

The 2026 war has inflicted deep and multi-layered damage on Iran-Qatar relations, pitting key partners in exploiting the world’s largest gas field against one another and breaking the red line of energy security.

On March 18, Israel, with U.S. support, attacked facilities in the Iran-controlled part of the field, South Pars, which supplies 70% of Iran’s gas consumption. In response, Iran targeted the Ras Laffan Industrial City in Qatar — the world’s largest LNG production facility — with extensive missile attacks. These attacks caused significant and widespread damage to the facility, which supplies 20% of the world’s LNG.

Iran has long been uncomfortable with Qatar’s close military cooperation with Washington. While Qatar values hosting U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) forward headquarters at Al Udeid Air Base, Tehran has always considered the large American military presence there as a threat to Iran’s national security.

Although relations between Tehran and Doha have entered a new and tense phase, the two countries have not severed relations. The most important factor preventing a complete rupture is their mutual dependence on the South Pars gas field. This requires constant technical coordination to avoid disrupting production on either side.

The challenge for Qatar and other GCC members and Iran is to re-engage after the war while deterring Tehran from targeting vulnerable infrastructure and restoring freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf.  

Iran’s approach can be described as a combination of seeking to maintain and, if possible, increase its regional influence, de-escalate direct tensions, and deter future attacks.