April 15, 2026, marks three full years of the ongoing conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, a bloody conflict that has caused widespread destruction in the country and a catastrophic humanitarian crisis that has displaced approximately 9.3 million internally and more than 4 million across borders as refugees, desperately fleeing from the horrors of war and led to countless civilian deaths, including children and women. And this conflict caused destruction that affected all aspects of life. Documented cases of war crimes include targeted killings, rape, and arson. The conflict, which lasted for more than a thousand days, is no longer seen as an extended internal dispute, but rather as a revealing case of deeper transformations in the structure of the international system, where dynamics of internal disintegration intersect with patterns of geopolitical neglect, producing a complex model of post-state conflicts in an international environment characterized by selectivity and the erosion of collective response.
The United Nations’ characterization of the situation as a neglected crisis not only reflects the magnitude of the serious humanitarian disaster but also reveals a deep gap between the international perception of threats and the actual readiness to intervene, in an international context where crises compete and the hierarchy of priorities is reshaped according to considerations of power and interest. The decline in effective international attention is not due to its diminished value, but rather to the complexity of the interests of the powers involved and the international community’s preoccupation with other crises perceived as more “vital” to its immediate security.
The war in Sudan goes beyond being a conflict between the army and the Rapid Support Forces; it has taken the form of a gradual disintegration of the state and a transformation into a full-fledged war economy, where networks of violence intertwine with patterns of organized looting, resource control, and the use of starvation as a weapon. This pattern of conflicts not only produces humanitarian crises but also reshapes the social and economic structure, prolonging the duration of the conflict and making it difficult to contain within traditional mediation tools.
In this context, the stark contrast between the magnitude of the disaster and the level of international response becomes evident. The United Nations has launched the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan for Sudan for 2026, which requires funding of 9 billion to address what it has described as the largest crisis globally. The funding for this plan did not exceed 16% of what was required, which is an indicator not only of donor fatigue but also reflects a structural shift in the priorities of major powers that have begun to focus their resources on conflicts with direct strategic priority, such as competition with rising powers or wars with direct impacts on international security balances and energy markets, like the war on Iran.
Thus, Sudan becomes a victim of what can be termed geopolitical selectivity in dealing with crises. The multitude of geopolitical crises and the large number of conflicts have led to the Sudanese war being neglected in the media. The nature of the conflict has also greatly contributed to the insufficient spotlight on the tragedies of this brutal war. This conflict lacks an ideological dimension and is viewed internationally as a struggle for “money, power, and resources” among the warring military factions. And we must not forget that the multitude of mediation initiatives and negotiation sessions, along with the conflicting interests of the sponsors of these initiatives, have led to their failure, creating a state of indifference among the major powers. The targeting of local journalists and the frequent disruption of communications and internet services have made it difficult to convey the war’s atrocities to the world, turning it into a war outside media coverage.
Moreover, the decline in international interest in the Sudan war is not related to the diminished direct geopolitical value of Sudan in the calculations of major powers, given its vital location on the Red Sea and its proximity to regional and international competition hotspots. But because the crisis, despite its severity, has not translated into an immediate threat to global supply chains or energy corridors, it has fallen down the priority list compared to other crises that have a greater impact on the global economy. Sudan has a coastline exceeding 700 kilometers along the Red Sea, which is a vital artery through which about 25% of the world’s container traffic passes. It is one of the richest countries replete with gold and strategic minerals, making it the focus of regional and international powers seeking to control these resources. It is bordered by seven African countries; therefore, its collapse threatens the stability of the entire Horn of Africa region and neighboring countries (such as Chad, Egypt, and Ethiopia) due to the threat of subsequent waves of refugees and the specter of unbridled arms smuggling.
Conversely, the absence of effective international pressure has unleashed self-escalating dynamics within the conflict, as the parties continue to expand the scope of military operations without any significant international political cost. It is noted that the use of tools such as siege, starvation, and the destruction of agricultural infrastructure is no longer just an incidental result of the war but has turned into a systematic strategy to reshape the balance of power on the ground, which explains the sharp deterioration in food security, nearing famine levels in some areas. When the warring parties realize that the international community is content with statements of concern without tangible punitive measures, “escalation” becomes the least costly and most feasible option, creating a vicious cycle of self-perpetuating violence. The conflict has moved beyond the stage of traditional military confrontation to a “total war of attrition.” The destruction of agricultural infrastructure and the prevention of aid access is not “collateral damage,” but rather an attempt to break the popular support base of the other party and force them to surrender through starvation.
The ease of using siege as a political tool reflects a collapse in the system of international humanitarian law, where famine has become a means to redraw maps and spheres of influence instead of being a humanitarian crisis that requires intervention. The more dangerous aspect is that the perpetuation of the war is producing a fragile regional environment, extending its impact to neighboring countries through refugee flows, the spread of weapons, and the erosion of borders, threatening to turn Sudan into a chronic point of instability in East Africa and the Horn of Africa. As the ability of humanitarian organizations to reach the affected areas declines, and logistical and security constraints increase, the capacity to contain the repercussions gradually erodes, opening the door to more complex scenarios, including a deeper state disintegration and the transformation of the conflict into a multi-party struggle.
From a broader geopolitical perspective, the Sudanese crisis reflects a shift in the nature of the international system from a model that, at least theoretically, seeks to manage humanitarian crises, to a more pragmatic and selective model, where crises that do not affect the vital interests of major powers or fall outside the immediate circle of concern are left to worsen. This shift raises fundamental questions about the future of the international humanitarian system and its ability to respond to complex crises in an international environment characterized by increasing competition and declining cooperation. We have transitioned from the phase of “humanitarian intervention” that prevailed in the 1990s (despite its failures) to a phase of ignoring crises that do not have a structural impact. In Sudan, major powers lack a strong incentive to intervene because the crisis does not directly threaten global energy security as in other crises, nor does it pose a nuclear threat or a direct confrontation between major powers. It is treated as a “containment” crisis rather than a “solution” crisis, where the focus is only on preventing the flow of refugees or stopping the expansion of terrorist groups, without addressing the root causes of the conflict.
In the new international system, humanitarian work has become a tool of geopolitical competition. There is no longer an “international moral consensus”; aid and diplomatic pressures are only exercised when they serve to reduce the influence of a geopolitical adversary or enhance the influence of an ally, leaving Sudan in a gray area where the interests of regional and international powers (Russia, China, the West, and rising regional powers) conflict with each other. The current international system is experiencing “fatigue from the multitude of crises across all corners of the world.” This shift reflects the decline of the concept of “Responsibility to Protect” that was previously promoted.
Today, national sovereignty is used as an excuse to evade accountability, and international powers are content with statements of concern, establishing a new international model where nations are left to face their fate unless their geographical weight is valuable enough to drool over in the market of interests. Sudan represents the sad version of the “new world order,” where global humanitarian values are replaced by the balance of geopolitical profit and loss calculations, foreboding a future where humanitarian crises are “forgotten” unless they shake the thrones of major powers. Here, the importance of the Sudanese crisis lies not only in the numbers of casualties or unprecedented levels of hunger but also in its deeper significance as a case revealing the limitations of the international system in dealing with complex crises. The continued neglect of the crisis does not mean its containment; rather, it establishes a more dangerous phase, the repercussions of which may extend beyond the local framework to affect broader regional balances, at a time when reality demonstrates that negligence can prove to be one of the costliest forms of international failure in the long run.
Header image: Nyadil Machar, Lankien, South Sudan. By Aimee Brown/Oxfam
Sudan: How One of the Most Severe Humanitarian Crises Became Marginalized in the Global System
By Mohamed Ali Chihi
Middle East & North Africa
Three years into Sudan’s devastating war, one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises has been quietly sidelined. This piece argues that the marginalization is not accidental but reflects a deeper shift toward geopolitical selectivity, where crises lacking immediate strategic impact are deprioritized. As violence evolves into a war economy sustained by resource control and starvation tactics, traditional mediation tools have proven ineffective. The result is a widening gap between the scale of human suffering and the international system’s willingness to respond. Sudan, in this sense, is not just a crisis but a case study in the limits of today’s global order.
April 15, 2026, marks three full years of the ongoing conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, a bloody conflict that has caused widespread destruction in the country and a catastrophic humanitarian crisis that has displaced approximately 9.3 million internally and more than 4 million across borders as refugees, desperately fleeing from the horrors of war and led to countless civilian deaths, including children and women. And this conflict caused destruction that affected all aspects of life. Documented cases of war crimes include targeted killings, rape, and arson. The conflict, which lasted for more than a thousand days, is no longer seen as an extended internal dispute, but rather as a revealing case of deeper transformations in the structure of the international system, where dynamics of internal disintegration intersect with patterns of geopolitical neglect, producing a complex model of post-state conflicts in an international environment characterized by selectivity and the erosion of collective response.
The United Nations’ characterization of the situation as a neglected crisis not only reflects the magnitude of the serious humanitarian disaster but also reveals a deep gap between the international perception of threats and the actual readiness to intervene, in an international context where crises compete and the hierarchy of priorities is reshaped according to considerations of power and interest. The decline in effective international attention is not due to its diminished value, but rather to the complexity of the interests of the powers involved and the international community’s preoccupation with other crises perceived as more “vital” to its immediate security.
The war in Sudan goes beyond being a conflict between the army and the Rapid Support Forces; it has taken the form of a gradual disintegration of the state and a transformation into a full-fledged war economy, where networks of violence intertwine with patterns of organized looting, resource control, and the use of starvation as a weapon. This pattern of conflicts not only produces humanitarian crises but also reshapes the social and economic structure, prolonging the duration of the conflict and making it difficult to contain within traditional mediation tools.
In this context, the stark contrast between the magnitude of the disaster and the level of international response becomes evident. The United Nations has launched the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan for Sudan for 2026, which requires funding of 9 billion to address what it has described as the largest crisis globally. The funding for this plan did not exceed 16% of what was required, which is an indicator not only of donor fatigue but also reflects a structural shift in the priorities of major powers that have begun to focus their resources on conflicts with direct strategic priority, such as competition with rising powers or wars with direct impacts on international security balances and energy markets, like the war on Iran.
Thus, Sudan becomes a victim of what can be termed geopolitical selectivity in dealing with crises. The multitude of geopolitical crises and the large number of conflicts have led to the Sudanese war being neglected in the media. The nature of the conflict has also greatly contributed to the insufficient spotlight on the tragedies of this brutal war. This conflict lacks an ideological dimension and is viewed internationally as a struggle for “money, power, and resources” among the warring military factions. And we must not forget that the multitude of mediation initiatives and negotiation sessions, along with the conflicting interests of the sponsors of these initiatives, have led to their failure, creating a state of indifference among the major powers. The targeting of local journalists and the frequent disruption of communications and internet services have made it difficult to convey the war’s atrocities to the world, turning it into a war outside media coverage.
Moreover, the decline in international interest in the Sudan war is not related to the diminished direct geopolitical value of Sudan in the calculations of major powers, given its vital location on the Red Sea and its proximity to regional and international competition hotspots. But because the crisis, despite its severity, has not translated into an immediate threat to global supply chains or energy corridors, it has fallen down the priority list compared to other crises that have a greater impact on the global economy. Sudan has a coastline exceeding 700 kilometers along the Red Sea, which is a vital artery through which about 25% of the world’s container traffic passes. It is one of the richest countries replete with gold and strategic minerals, making it the focus of regional and international powers seeking to control these resources. It is bordered by seven African countries; therefore, its collapse threatens the stability of the entire Horn of Africa region and neighboring countries (such as Chad, Egypt, and Ethiopia) due to the threat of subsequent waves of refugees and the specter of unbridled arms smuggling.
Conversely, the absence of effective international pressure has unleashed self-escalating dynamics within the conflict, as the parties continue to expand the scope of military operations without any significant international political cost. It is noted that the use of tools such as siege, starvation, and the destruction of agricultural infrastructure is no longer just an incidental result of the war but has turned into a systematic strategy to reshape the balance of power on the ground, which explains the sharp deterioration in food security, nearing famine levels in some areas. When the warring parties realize that the international community is content with statements of concern without tangible punitive measures, “escalation” becomes the least costly and most feasible option, creating a vicious cycle of self-perpetuating violence. The conflict has moved beyond the stage of traditional military confrontation to a “total war of attrition.” The destruction of agricultural infrastructure and the prevention of aid access is not “collateral damage,” but rather an attempt to break the popular support base of the other party and force them to surrender through starvation.
The ease of using siege as a political tool reflects a collapse in the system of international humanitarian law, where famine has become a means to redraw maps and spheres of influence instead of being a humanitarian crisis that requires intervention. The more dangerous aspect is that the perpetuation of the war is producing a fragile regional environment, extending its impact to neighboring countries through refugee flows, the spread of weapons, and the erosion of borders, threatening to turn Sudan into a chronic point of instability in East Africa and the Horn of Africa. As the ability of humanitarian organizations to reach the affected areas declines, and logistical and security constraints increase, the capacity to contain the repercussions gradually erodes, opening the door to more complex scenarios, including a deeper state disintegration and the transformation of the conflict into a multi-party struggle.
From a broader geopolitical perspective, the Sudanese crisis reflects a shift in the nature of the international system from a model that, at least theoretically, seeks to manage humanitarian crises, to a more pragmatic and selective model, where crises that do not affect the vital interests of major powers or fall outside the immediate circle of concern are left to worsen. This shift raises fundamental questions about the future of the international humanitarian system and its ability to respond to complex crises in an international environment characterized by increasing competition and declining cooperation. We have transitioned from the phase of “humanitarian intervention” that prevailed in the 1990s (despite its failures) to a phase of ignoring crises that do not have a structural impact. In Sudan, major powers lack a strong incentive to intervene because the crisis does not directly threaten global energy security as in other crises, nor does it pose a nuclear threat or a direct confrontation between major powers. It is treated as a “containment” crisis rather than a “solution” crisis, where the focus is only on preventing the flow of refugees or stopping the expansion of terrorist groups, without addressing the root causes of the conflict.
In the new international system, humanitarian work has become a tool of geopolitical competition. There is no longer an “international moral consensus”; aid and diplomatic pressures are only exercised when they serve to reduce the influence of a geopolitical adversary or enhance the influence of an ally, leaving Sudan in a gray area where the interests of regional and international powers (Russia, China, the West, and rising regional powers) conflict with each other. The current international system is experiencing “fatigue from the multitude of crises across all corners of the world.” This shift reflects the decline of the concept of “Responsibility to Protect” that was previously promoted.
Today, national sovereignty is used as an excuse to evade accountability, and international powers are content with statements of concern, establishing a new international model where nations are left to face their fate unless their geographical weight is valuable enough to drool over in the market of interests. Sudan represents the sad version of the “new world order,” where global humanitarian values are replaced by the balance of geopolitical profit and loss calculations, foreboding a future where humanitarian crises are “forgotten” unless they shake the thrones of major powers. Here, the importance of the Sudanese crisis lies not only in the numbers of casualties or unprecedented levels of hunger but also in its deeper significance as a case revealing the limitations of the international system in dealing with complex crises. The continued neglect of the crisis does not mean its containment; rather, it establishes a more dangerous phase, the repercussions of which may extend beyond the local framework to affect broader regional balances, at a time when reality demonstrates that negligence can prove to be one of the costliest forms of international failure in the long run.
Header image: Nyadil Machar, Lankien, South Sudan. By Aimee Brown/Oxfam
Recent & Related