Since 2021, Iran and Saudi Arabia have been trying to mend a break in relations that occurred in 2016 after Iranian protestors seized Saudi diplomatic missions in Tehran and Mashhad in retaliation for the execution of prominent Saudi Shiite opposition cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr.

The effort finally bore fruit and was announced on March 10, 2023 in Beijing. China, traditionally a passive diplomatic actor, had seized the moment to try its hand at global mediation. That move, however, was a long time in the making.

In 2021, Iran offered diplomatic talks to resume ties with Saudi Arabia. Riyadh rejected this, noting deep security disagreements. That led Admiral Ali Shamkhani, the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), to nominate Amir Saeed Iravani—then Shamkhani’s deputy and now Iran’s UN ambassador—as chief negotiator. The Saudis chose Khalid bin Ali al-Humaidan, director general of the kingdom’s General Intelligence Directorate. The two sides agreed that Iraq, under the leadership of then-Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, could serve as a facilitator.

An Iranian diplomat told this author on the condition of anonymity that Iran’s delegation was a mixture of experts from the Intelligence Ministry, Foreign Ministry, and SNSC. By 2022, the two countries had held five rounds of intensive talks in Baghdad. The negotiations came to a halt, however, after al-Kadhimi was replaced by Mohammad Shia al-Sudani as prime minister.

In 2022, according to the diplomat, a Saudi delegation visited Iran to assess the damage to their diplomatic missions as a prerequisite to their potential reopening. The Iranians, for their part, tested Saudi intentions when the Kingdom allowed Iranians once again to perform the Hajj. “Building trust cannot come easily,” the diplomat said. “First we had to see how the Saudis will treat our Hajj pilgrims.”

In July 2022, Riyadh detained an Iranian pilgrim who, in the Holy Shrine of Mecca, had raised his phone displaying a photo of Gen. Qassem Soleimani, the prominent Iranian general assassinated by the US in Iraq in 2020. The pilgrim had also taken a photo with the Kaaba in the background and posted it on his Instagram account. A few months later, Iran managed to secure his release via Omani authorities, who have frequently acted as go-betweens for Iran and its adversaries.

By then, however, Iraqi politics had intruded. Kadhimi was gone and Prime Minister Sudani showed little interest in continuing Iraq’s role as a mediator; he also did not enjoy the same level of Saudi trust as his predecessor. Frustrated by the pause, Saudi Arabia asked China to assume a mediator role when President Xi Jinping visited Riyadh in December 2022. Xi conveyed Riyadh’s message to Tehran, which accepted the Chinese offer.

In February 2023, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi visited China and met Xi. According to another Iranian diplomat in the delegation who also spoke to this author on the condition of anonymity, Iran found Saudi Arabia’s proposal for a resumption of ties acceptable.

In return for Iranian re-implementation of prior assurances of no interference in Saudi internal affairs, Iran demanded that Saudi Arabia stop funding Iran International, a Persian-language news channel that gives a platform to opponents of the Islamic Republic, and withdraw completely from Yemen and recognize the Ansarallah (Houthi) movement as a legitimate authority in the war-torn country.

Tehran also asked Riyadh to stop supporting Iranian opposition groups including the Mujahedin-e Khalq, the ethnic Arab group Al-Ahvaziya, and the Baloch militant group Jaish al-Adl. Iran considers all three terrorist organizations. In addition, Iran asked Saudi Arabia to ease the pressure on the country’s Shiite minority and allow members to visit the Iranian Shiite holy city of Mashhad.

SNSC Secretary Shamkhani visited Beijing on March 5 to finalize the terms of the agreement in trilateral meetings with Chinese State Councilor and former Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Saudi National Security Advisor Musaed bin Mohammed al-Aiban.

The agreement has the potential to help de-escalate regional conflicts, especially in Yemen, and indicates China’s desire to play a more active role as an international mediator. As Wang Yi noted while announcing the Iran-Saudi agreement, “This world has more than just the Ukraine question and there are still many issues affecting peace and people’s lives.”

This active role contrasts with China’s more passive approach to the negotiations that produced the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as well as yet unsuccessful talks to revive the JCPOA after Joe Biden replaced Donald Trump as US president in 2021.

In return for its mediation, China seeks both prestige and economic benefits. Jacopo Scita, a policy fellow at the Bourse and Bazaar Foundation and an expert on Sino-Iranian affairs, said in an interview that “China felt comfortable about a positive solution of the Iran-KSA process and decided that stepping in would have been a low risk move.” From its vantage point, China perceived the deal as “a good chance to claim a strong diplomatic victory in the Global South,” Scita added.

Iran’s Minister of Oil Javad Owji said a day after the announcement in Beijing that Iran has also defined several major economic projects with China and reached “good contracts and agreements with large Chinese companies, which will be announced in the future.” China has continued to import large quantities of Iranian oil despite US secondary sanctions, and is also a major purchaser of Saudi oil.

Saeed Azimi is a political journalist based in Tehran. Find him on Twitter at @saeedazimi1772. Photo: Embassy of the People’s Republic of China.