As Saudi Arabia and Israel flirt with establishing diplomatic ties, Iran is watching with concern and determined to prevent a greater convergence of Persian Gulf Arabs and Israel.
Current trends are the result of the transition of the world system from a U.S. hegemonic order to a great powers competition in which Washington focuses more on the rise of China and defeating Russia in Ukraine. Thus Washington has shifted from direct intervention in the Middle East to an “offshore balancing” strategy in which U.S. regional allies are expected to play a greater role in securing the region.
The U.S. now bills itself as a ‘‘security integrator” coordinating among Gulf Cooperation Council members (GCC) and Israel, which has been moved from U.S. European Command (EUCOM) to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to facilitate closer cooperation with the Arabs regarding perceived threats from Iran and its partners.
In this context, the process of normalizing Israel’s relations with the Persian Gulf Arabs is meant to increase regional integration to the detriment of Iran. The establishment of a ‘‘joint air defense system’’ — Middle East Air Defense or MEAD — is one goal of this convergence. Former Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid has dubbed this a ‘‘new regional architecture’’ whose main objective is to deter Iran and its proxy forces.
Not surprisingly, Iran considers normalization and especially a joint air defense system as a threat. Formal Saudi diplomatic ties with Israel would be particularly alarming given Saudi Arabia’s key position in the region, the Arab world, and the Islamic world. It could endanger the Iran-led “axis of resistance” and impact the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as potentially boost internal threats to Iran from separatist and other opposition groups.
Islamic Republic leaders see their security as depending on Iran’s influence in the region. Thus, Tehran is also closely watching efforts by Saudi Arabia to repair its relations with countries such as Syria and Iraq that have been seen to be in Iran’s orbit, as well as the Palestinian group Hamas.
So far, Saudi Arabia appears to remain ambivalent about joining the Abraham Accords, saying it will not normalize relations with Israel until there is progress toward a Palestinian state. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said that normalization with Saudi Arabia is one of his main goals and the Biden administration has also made it clear that it considers Saudi-Israeli normalization a top priority.
It should be noted that the normalization of Saudi relations with Israel would be a green light for other Arab and Islamic countries to follow, which also worries Iran.
Accordingly, Iran has sought to improve relations with Saudi Arabia in part to blunt the progress of the convergence of the Arabs, especially Persian Gulf states, with Israel. Although Iran has accepted bilateral relations between the Persian Gulf countries and Israel, it considers any wider convergence or security cooperation as a very serious threat.
If a joint air defense system is formed among the regional states, Israel and the U.S., Iran will seek to compensate. One factor in Iran’s recent announcement that it had developed a new hypersonic missile that could defeat existing missile defenses was to show that it retains significant prowess in terms of missiles and drones. This sends a message to the countries of the region that normalizing relations with Israel and increasing convergence to the detriment of Iran cannot guarantee their security, and that the only way to do so is to cooperate with Iran. Accordingly, Tehran announced that it is seeking to form its own regional alliance with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Oman.
Iran is also watching closely growing tensions between the U.A.E. and the U.S. Abu Dhabi announced on May 31 that it was suspending participation in a U.S.-led maritime alliance that is supposed to safeguard shipping in the Persian Gulf. The Emirati announcement reflected frustration with the U.S. failure to react to Iran’s seizure of two oil tankers, one of which was heading to Fujairah port from Dubai. The Biden administration responded belatedly to U.A.E. concerns by increasing the number of naval patrols.
Meanwhile, Riyadh is doing its own form of hedging. It sought restoration of ties with Iran not out of a desire to establish deep relations but rather as a tactic to establish a cold peace with the aim of safeguarding Saudi economic interests. This approach can be considered a kind of Plan C (diplomacy and de-escalation along with deterrence).
In fact, Saudi Arabia seeks to resolve regional issues that Washington has been unwilling or unable to accomplish. The U.S. “offshore balancing” strategy increases the independence of regional states and incentivizes Riyadh to reduce tensions with Iran, Turkey, Qatar, and Syria while giving a green light to Egypt, Bahrain, and Jordan to improves ties with Tehran.
The issue of Yemen is among the most important for Riyadh, which seeks to end the devastating proxy war with Iran that led to Houthi rocket and missile strikes on Saudi Arabia. The Houthi attack on Saudi Aramco facilities on September 14, 2019, temporarily halted half of Saudi Arabia’s crude oil production. By improving relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia hopes to facilitate a political settlement in Yemen that will prevent further strikes on the Saudi homeland.
In following a multi-dimensional strategy, Riyadh pursues a kind of de-escalation to secure its ambitious projects, including Vision 2030. At the same time, it is keeping open the prospect of normalizing relations with Israel to increase deterrence against Iran.
The Saudis are also seeking to build an indigenous missile and drone industry to compete with Iran and the capacity to enrich uranium to balance against both Iran and Israel. Riyadh has sought nuclear fuel technology from the U.S. as a condition for normalizing relations with Israel and even called for American security guarantees.
In turn, Iran has announced that it is ready to cooperate with Saudi Arabia in the nuclear field although the area of cooperation mentioned was nuclear medicine.
In sum, by improving relations with Iran, Riyadh has been able to seek a higher price from the U.S. to normalize with Israel. This does not lessen Iran’s concern about the growing trend of security, intelligence and military convergence between the Persian Gulf Arabs and Israel.
Javad Heiran-Nia directs the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran. He is currently working on a book about Iran’s middle class. Follow him on Twitter: @J_Heirannia.
Iran Fears Israel-Arab Security Integration More Than Normalization
By Javad Heiran-Nia
Middle East & North Africa
As Saudi Arabia and Israel flirt with establishing diplomatic ties, Iran is watching with concern and determined to prevent a greater convergence of Persian Gulf Arabs and Israel.
Current trends are the result of the transition of the world system from a U.S. hegemonic order to a great powers competition in which Washington focuses more on the rise of China and defeating Russia in Ukraine. Thus Washington has shifted from direct intervention in the Middle East to an “offshore balancing” strategy in which U.S. regional allies are expected to play a greater role in securing the region.
The U.S. now bills itself as a ‘‘security integrator” coordinating among Gulf Cooperation Council members (GCC) and Israel, which has been moved from U.S. European Command (EUCOM) to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to facilitate closer cooperation with the Arabs regarding perceived threats from Iran and its partners.
In this context, the process of normalizing Israel’s relations with the Persian Gulf Arabs is meant to increase regional integration to the detriment of Iran. The establishment of a ‘‘joint air defense system’’ — Middle East Air Defense or MEAD — is one goal of this convergence. Former Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid has dubbed this a ‘‘new regional architecture’’ whose main objective is to deter Iran and its proxy forces.
Not surprisingly, Iran considers normalization and especially a joint air defense system as a threat. Formal Saudi diplomatic ties with Israel would be particularly alarming given Saudi Arabia’s key position in the region, the Arab world, and the Islamic world. It could endanger the Iran-led “axis of resistance” and impact the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as potentially boost internal threats to Iran from separatist and other opposition groups.
Islamic Republic leaders see their security as depending on Iran’s influence in the region. Thus, Tehran is also closely watching efforts by Saudi Arabia to repair its relations with countries such as Syria and Iraq that have been seen to be in Iran’s orbit, as well as the Palestinian group Hamas.
So far, Saudi Arabia appears to remain ambivalent about joining the Abraham Accords, saying it will not normalize relations with Israel until there is progress toward a Palestinian state. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said that normalization with Saudi Arabia is one of his main goals and the Biden administration has also made it clear that it considers Saudi-Israeli normalization a top priority.
It should be noted that the normalization of Saudi relations with Israel would be a green light for other Arab and Islamic countries to follow, which also worries Iran.
Accordingly, Iran has sought to improve relations with Saudi Arabia in part to blunt the progress of the convergence of the Arabs, especially Persian Gulf states, with Israel. Although Iran has accepted bilateral relations between the Persian Gulf countries and Israel, it considers any wider convergence or security cooperation as a very serious threat.
If a joint air defense system is formed among the regional states, Israel and the U.S., Iran will seek to compensate. One factor in Iran’s recent announcement that it had developed a new hypersonic missile that could defeat existing missile defenses was to show that it retains significant prowess in terms of missiles and drones. This sends a message to the countries of the region that normalizing relations with Israel and increasing convergence to the detriment of Iran cannot guarantee their security, and that the only way to do so is to cooperate with Iran. Accordingly, Tehran announced that it is seeking to form its own regional alliance with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Oman.
Iran is also watching closely growing tensions between the U.A.E. and the U.S. Abu Dhabi announced on May 31 that it was suspending participation in a U.S.-led maritime alliance that is supposed to safeguard shipping in the Persian Gulf. The Emirati announcement reflected frustration with the U.S. failure to react to Iran’s seizure of two oil tankers, one of which was heading to Fujairah port from Dubai. The Biden administration responded belatedly to U.A.E. concerns by increasing the number of naval patrols.
Meanwhile, Riyadh is doing its own form of hedging. It sought restoration of ties with Iran not out of a desire to establish deep relations but rather as a tactic to establish a cold peace with the aim of safeguarding Saudi economic interests. This approach can be considered a kind of Plan C (diplomacy and de-escalation along with deterrence).
In fact, Saudi Arabia seeks to resolve regional issues that Washington has been unwilling or unable to accomplish. The U.S. “offshore balancing” strategy increases the independence of regional states and incentivizes Riyadh to reduce tensions with Iran, Turkey, Qatar, and Syria while giving a green light to Egypt, Bahrain, and Jordan to improves ties with Tehran.
The issue of Yemen is among the most important for Riyadh, which seeks to end the devastating proxy war with Iran that led to Houthi rocket and missile strikes on Saudi Arabia. The Houthi attack on Saudi Aramco facilities on September 14, 2019, temporarily halted half of Saudi Arabia’s crude oil production. By improving relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia hopes to facilitate a political settlement in Yemen that will prevent further strikes on the Saudi homeland.
In following a multi-dimensional strategy, Riyadh pursues a kind of de-escalation to secure its ambitious projects, including Vision 2030. At the same time, it is keeping open the prospect of normalizing relations with Israel to increase deterrence against Iran.
The Saudis are also seeking to build an indigenous missile and drone industry to compete with Iran and the capacity to enrich uranium to balance against both Iran and Israel. Riyadh has sought nuclear fuel technology from the U.S. as a condition for normalizing relations with Israel and even called for American security guarantees.
In turn, Iran has announced that it is ready to cooperate with Saudi Arabia in the nuclear field although the area of cooperation mentioned was nuclear medicine.
In sum, by improving relations with Iran, Riyadh has been able to seek a higher price from the U.S. to normalize with Israel. This does not lessen Iran’s concern about the growing trend of security, intelligence and military convergence between the Persian Gulf Arabs and Israel.
Javad Heiran-Nia directs the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran. He is currently working on a book about Iran’s middle class. Follow him on Twitter: @J_Heirannia.
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