Editor’s Note: Lawk Ghafuri is an Iraqi political analyst and writer focused on Iraq’s security and political landscape. His analysis examines the role of Shi’ite armed groups and foreign influence in shaping Iraq’s sovereignty and stability. Previously, he was head of Iraq affairs in Rudaw English Department.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
The rapid escalation of clashes in northeastern Syria is no longer a localized confrontation between Syrian government forces and Kurdish-led units; it represents a strategic shift with direct and immediate implications for Iraq.
For Baghdad, the problem is clear: Many elements within the Syrian government’s forces are former ISIS militants or fighters with extremist backgrounds, and they are steadily advancing toward border areas. In response, Iraqi state media confirmed on January 18 that additional Iran-aligned Popular Mobilizatin Front (PMF) units have been deployed along the Syria-Iraq border in Nineveh, while Iraqi army units have also been stationed along Anbar’s frontier. The prospect of these two ideologically driven forces confronting each other along Iraq’s border is not merely a security concern — it is potentially catastrophic.
That the fighting in Syria coincides with ongoing U.S. pressure on Baghdad to disarm Iran-backed militias while leaving Syrian Sunni jihadists free to operate and advance toward the border is not only unrealistic; it is strategically naive. For Iraq and Tehran, any such expectation would be treated with disbelief. Baghdad cannot consider reducing the leverage of its armed proxies without concrete guarantees that Syrian extremist elements will be contained, or the country risks turning the border into the next active battlefield.
Any serious discussion about disarming Iran-backed armed groups in Iraq that does not simultaneously confront the fate of Sunni extremist foreign fighters in Syria is detached from the realities of Middle Eastern conflict dynamics.
Treating these as separate issues ignores how militant ecosystems actually function: Pressure applied in one theater almost immediately reshapes militant flows into another. Iraq sits geographically and politically at the intersection of these pressures, and its stability cannot be assured by trying to isolate one problem from the other.
The prevailing policy narrative among Western capitals and some Iraqi leaders assumes that Iran-aligned militias can be disarmed while Sunni extremist groups in Syria are neutralized without spillover. This notion is fundamentally flawed. These security files are deeply interconnected, and Iraq bears the consequences of instability emanating from Syria.
Since the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in late 2024, Syria remains saturated with foreign jihadists and extremist networks as evidenced by the ISIS killing of three Americans in December 2025. Recent reporting shows that the Islamic State was reactivating fighters and increasing recruitment across both Syria and Iraq in 2025, exploiting regional instability and security gaps.
Displaced militants do not fade away when squeezed. They adapt by shifting theaters, exploiting permissive environments to regroup rather than abandoning armed struggle.
For Iraq, the nearest permissive environment is its Sunni-majority provinces. Areas such as Mosul, Salahaddin, and Anbar were devastated during ISIS’s territorial control and still struggle with weak governance, unresolved political grievances, and mistrust between communities and Baghdad’s central authorities.
Meanwhile, Washington persists in pressing Iraqi leadership to disarm Iran-backed armed groups, framing this as a matter of national sovereignty and security reform.
While understandable in principle, this ignores the political DNA of these militias. They emerged through deliberate Iranian strategic design to permanently alter Iraq’s balance of power after the U.S. invasion in 2003 and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime.
Many Iran-aligned armed groups operate under the umbrella of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), benefiting from legal cover while maintaining operational autonomy and direct ideological alignment with Tehran. Their influence spans political, economic, and security spheres, and they have played visible roles in both Iraqi and Syrian theaters — a clear example of transnational design.
Tehran’s strategic calculus focuses not on Sunni communities as they presently exist, but on what empowered Sunni actors could become if supported externally. A Sunni-dominated regime in Damascus — especially one drawing legitimacy from armed resistance or foreign fighter networks — would offer a powerful counter-narrative that could resonate across Iraq’s Sunni provinces, threatening the geopolitical status quo Tehran seeks to preserve.
For Tehran and its allies, Syria is existential, not merely tactical. From their perspective, disarming pro-Iran militias in Iraq while Sunni extremists and jihadists remain armed and mobile in Syria would be strategic suicide, removing critical deterrence mechanisms against future threats.
Borders do not magically contain militancy; they channel it. The Iraq-Syria border has historically served as a conduit for militant movements and ideologies, undermining simplistic notions that conflicts can be neatly contained within national boundaries.
Washington’s dual demand — that Iraq disarm Shiite militias while Sunni foreign jihadists in Syria are neutralized — assumes that these processes can occur in isolation. They cannot. Iraq’s stability is directly affected by what happens on and across its borders. Ignoring these interdependencies risks repeating past mistakes, when dismissing Syrian spillover contributed to ISIS’s re-emergence and the near collapse of Iraq’s state security.
Ultimately, as long as Sunni jihadists exist in Syria and Shiite jihadists remain entrenched in Iraq, structural barriers to Baghdad-Damascus normalization will persist. Diplomacy alone cannot override the influence of ideology and armed actors that define security realities on the ground.
If these dynamics remain unaddressed, Iraq will not serve as a buffer that defuses confrontation between competing regional forces. Instead, it risks becoming the battlefield where Sunni-Shiite rivalries are fought through proxies. Expecting Baghdad (with Tehran’s help) to disarm Iran-backed groups without a realistic strategy to deal with Syrian foreign jihadi networks is not optimism — it is a misreading of power, history, and survival logic.
Without structural solutions that address both fronts together, the region is heading toward another cycle of sectarian violence, and Iraq will once again pay the highest price..
Disarming Iran-Backed Iraqi Militias Without Addressing Syria’s Jihadis Won’t Work
By Lawk Ghafuri
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Lawk Ghafuri is an Iraqi political analyst and writer focused on Iraq’s security and political landscape. His analysis examines the role of Shi’ite armed groups and foreign influence in shaping Iraq’s sovereignty and stability. Previously, he was head of Iraq affairs in Rudaw English Department.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
The rapid escalation of clashes in northeastern Syria is no longer a localized confrontation between Syrian government forces and Kurdish-led units; it represents a strategic shift with direct and immediate implications for Iraq.
For Baghdad, the problem is clear: Many elements within the Syrian government’s forces are former ISIS militants or fighters with extremist backgrounds, and they are steadily advancing toward border areas. In response, Iraqi state media confirmed on January 18 that additional Iran-aligned Popular Mobilizatin Front (PMF) units have been deployed along the Syria-Iraq border in Nineveh, while Iraqi army units have also been stationed along Anbar’s frontier. The prospect of these two ideologically driven forces confronting each other along Iraq’s border is not merely a security concern — it is potentially catastrophic.
That the fighting in Syria coincides with ongoing U.S. pressure on Baghdad to disarm Iran-backed militias while leaving Syrian Sunni jihadists free to operate and advance toward the border is not only unrealistic; it is strategically naive. For Iraq and Tehran, any such expectation would be treated with disbelief. Baghdad cannot consider reducing the leverage of its armed proxies without concrete guarantees that Syrian extremist elements will be contained, or the country risks turning the border into the next active battlefield.
Any serious discussion about disarming Iran-backed armed groups in Iraq that does not simultaneously confront the fate of Sunni extremist foreign fighters in Syria is detached from the realities of Middle Eastern conflict dynamics.
Treating these as separate issues ignores how militant ecosystems actually function: Pressure applied in one theater almost immediately reshapes militant flows into another. Iraq sits geographically and politically at the intersection of these pressures, and its stability cannot be assured by trying to isolate one problem from the other.
The prevailing policy narrative among Western capitals and some Iraqi leaders assumes that Iran-aligned militias can be disarmed while Sunni extremist groups in Syria are neutralized without spillover. This notion is fundamentally flawed. These security files are deeply interconnected, and Iraq bears the consequences of instability emanating from Syria.
Since the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in late 2024, Syria remains saturated with foreign jihadists and extremist networks as evidenced by the ISIS killing of three Americans in December 2025. Recent reporting shows that the Islamic State was reactivating fighters and increasing recruitment across both Syria and Iraq in 2025, exploiting regional instability and security gaps.
Displaced militants do not fade away when squeezed. They adapt by shifting theaters, exploiting permissive environments to regroup rather than abandoning armed struggle.
For Iraq, the nearest permissive environment is its Sunni-majority provinces. Areas such as Mosul, Salahaddin, and Anbar were devastated during ISIS’s territorial control and still struggle with weak governance, unresolved political grievances, and mistrust between communities and Baghdad’s central authorities.
Meanwhile, Washington persists in pressing Iraqi leadership to disarm Iran-backed armed groups, framing this as a matter of national sovereignty and security reform.
While understandable in principle, this ignores the political DNA of these militias. They emerged through deliberate Iranian strategic design to permanently alter Iraq’s balance of power after the U.S. invasion in 2003 and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime.
Many Iran-aligned armed groups operate under the umbrella of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), benefiting from legal cover while maintaining operational autonomy and direct ideological alignment with Tehran. Their influence spans political, economic, and security spheres, and they have played visible roles in both Iraqi and Syrian theaters — a clear example of transnational design.
Tehran’s strategic calculus focuses not on Sunni communities as they presently exist, but on what empowered Sunni actors could become if supported externally. A Sunni-dominated regime in Damascus — especially one drawing legitimacy from armed resistance or foreign fighter networks — would offer a powerful counter-narrative that could resonate across Iraq’s Sunni provinces, threatening the geopolitical status quo Tehran seeks to preserve.
For Tehran and its allies, Syria is existential, not merely tactical. From their perspective, disarming pro-Iran militias in Iraq while Sunni extremists and jihadists remain armed and mobile in Syria would be strategic suicide, removing critical deterrence mechanisms against future threats.
Borders do not magically contain militancy; they channel it. The Iraq-Syria border has historically served as a conduit for militant movements and ideologies, undermining simplistic notions that conflicts can be neatly contained within national boundaries.
Washington’s dual demand — that Iraq disarm Shiite militias while Sunni foreign jihadists in Syria are neutralized — assumes that these processes can occur in isolation. They cannot. Iraq’s stability is directly affected by what happens on and across its borders. Ignoring these interdependencies risks repeating past mistakes, when dismissing Syrian spillover contributed to ISIS’s re-emergence and the near collapse of Iraq’s state security.
Ultimately, as long as Sunni jihadists exist in Syria and Shiite jihadists remain entrenched in Iraq, structural barriers to Baghdad-Damascus normalization will persist. Diplomacy alone cannot override the influence of ideology and armed actors that define security realities on the ground.
If these dynamics remain unaddressed, Iraq will not serve as a buffer that defuses confrontation between competing regional forces. Instead, it risks becoming the battlefield where Sunni-Shiite rivalries are fought through proxies. Expecting Baghdad (with Tehran’s help) to disarm Iran-backed groups without a realistic strategy to deal with Syrian foreign jihadi networks is not optimism — it is a misreading of power, history, and survival logic.
Without structural solutions that address both fronts together, the region is heading toward another cycle of sectarian violence, and Iraq will once again pay the highest price..
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