The Trump administration’s signing of a ceasefire extension and framework for a peace deal with Iran will hopefully end what has been a costly and entirely unproductive war. The United States spent billions of dollars in munitions, triggered an economic crisis, and suffered casualties without achieving any of the administration’s goals of installing a new(ish) regime in Tehran, ending Iran’s use of proxies in the region, eliminating its drone and missile arsenal, or most critically, securing its nuclear material.

With a 60-day ceasefire now in place, Washington is back where it started: trying to ensure Iran cannot pursue a nuclear weapon. The Trump administration should recognize that it does not possess the power to impose its maximalist demands on Iran. If it does not right-size its expectations for what can be accomplished, the ceasefire is likely to be little more than an intermission before the next round of fighting.

This is not a new problem. In April of 2025, the United States and Iran began talks in Oman that, while coming at a tense moment, were reported to be constructive. But in June of that year, the United States, along with Israel, launched strikes on Iran under the premise that Iran was nearing a nuclear weapon and had to be stopped, ending diplomatic efforts. When Washington later tried to restart talks, it returned with essentially the same demand that had long made negotiations so difficult: Iran could not maintain any domestic nuclear program. Iran demonstrated a willingness to continue talks but was insistent that the red lines provided by the United States were not acceptable and that the dismantling of its nuclear program was a non-starter. In response, the United States sent military assets to the region in early 2026 and threatened war if its demands were not met. When Tehran was reluctant to accede to those maximalist demands, the United States launched what would prove to be a costly and unsuccessful war.

Iran now exits this latest round of war still in control of its nuclear materials, with its government intact, and with a new, powerful bargaining chip: the ability to halt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Trump, meanwhile, faces a reckoning at home over a deeply unpopular war with little to show for it. Trump desires a deal that he can sell as a significant constraint on Iranian nuclear ambitions. But he now has less leverage to do so because of Iran’s proven ability to weather U.S. attacks and still impose serious costs. It is therefore a good sign that in a June 14 interview, Trump appeared to walk back his previous demand that Iran end all enrichment, suggesting instead that Tehran could be permitted to enrich at low levels after suspending enrichment for an undetermined period.

Early reports that the current ceasefire provides a 60-day framework to develop a larger deal offers an opportunity that should not be squandered. A workable deal does not need to forbid any Iranian enrichment or dispose of its nuclear material. It needs to prevent Iran from building a bomb, which can be done through limits on enrichment levels, robust monitoring, and constraints that extend Iran’s breakout time. In return, the United States should be prepared to offer meaningful sanctions relief, including by lifting some sanctions or unfreezing Iranian assets early on as a sign of good faith. Rather than using its economic power as a stick, the United States can incentivize Iranian cooperation with the promise of increased trade and easier financial flows, which Tehran will need as it rebuilds.

Hawks will attack any economic concessions as weakness, but carrots are the only realistic way to get what the United States needs. The administration will face pressure from elements of the U.S. political right and Israel to return to war against Iran. Already, some American commentators have called for the administration to return to maximum pressure and resume fighting if demands are not met, while Israeli politicians have rejected the deal outright, threatening to act as a spoiler. Amidst this pressure, the administration will face a difficult choice about how to approach further talks. But if the administration takes anything away from the past year, it should be that American power has its limits. The United States could not bomb Iran into accepting its maximalist terms, nor could it eliminate Iran’s nuclear materials, topple its government, or force its surrender. If the administration wants the ceasefire to become something more durable, it should abandon maximalist demands before they become a recipe for failed negotiations and another war.