All Eyes on the SG Race
By Richard Ponzio, Senior Fellow and Director
Global Governance, Justice, and Security Program
Alongside efforts to promote and preserve the legacy of UN Secretary-General António Guterres, including through delivery of his UN80 Initiative and the even more ambitious (and Member States-driven) Pact for the Future, the race to succeed Mr. Guterres has reached a new level of intensity and is likely to animate discussions among leading policy-makers and UN watchers throughout the General Assembly’s High-Level Week (September 20-26, 2026). Three key race-related issues (and sets of questions) to watch during UNGA High-Level are:
- With Rafael Mariano Grossi considered a front-runner heading into the Security Council’s first straw poll held on July 30, 2026, and Rebeca Grynspan considered a front-runner after this first straw poll, only to be eclipsed by Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett during the second straw poll held on 21 August, but then returning back on top with one more “encouragement” during yesterday’s (September 18, 2026) third Security Council straw poll, can we anticipate continued fluidity in this still wide open race for Secretary-General?
- Second, it is widely assumed among UN watchers that one (and possibly two) of Mr. Grossi’s eight “discourage” votes are from veto-wielding Permanent Five (P5) members of the Security Council. Can similar assumptions be made now among other front-runner candidates coming out of the third straw poll (and before the “color ballets,” likely issued by a fifth straw poll in October, make clear whether a candidate has been vetoed)?
- Finally, will the race begin to solidify around two or three leading candidates (for instance, Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett and Rebeca Grynspan, or could another candidate, such as Maria Fernanda Espinosa, breakthrough into the top tier during the next round?), how impactful will their private bilateral meetings with world leaders and public event presentations be during UNGA High-Level Week, and could we envisage a scenario where – during the fourth or fifth straw poll – one leading candidate succeeds in securing the nine “encourages” (with no discouraging ballots from the P5) needed to secure the Security Council’s nomination to the General Assembly? If unsuccessful, the straw polls could, unusually, extend past October and well into the latter months of 2026 (creating an opening for an unannounced dark horse to enter the selection contest).
As per custom, the General Assembly is likely to once again accept the Security Council’s nomination, and the new Secretary-General will assume office on the first of January 2027. Besides organizing a new team on the “38th Floor” and across the UN’s senior echelon – as well as confronting myriad global conflicts and humanitarian crises – the new Secretary-General will have a nine-month sprint to prepare the SDGs Summit planned for September 2027 (UNGA High-Level Week), where plans for a new, fifteen-year “Post-2030 Development Agenda” will receive high attention. In addition to restoring global trust and confidence in the work of the United Nations, the Secretary-General will need to prioritize a kind of integrated, “twinning approach” between the Post-2030 Development Agenda and unfinished business from the UN80 Initiative and Pact for the Future, given that each pull toward achieving a more capable United Nations for realizing a more prosperous, secure, and just world.
Discussions Behind Closed Doors
By Lisa Sharland, Senior Fellow and Director
Protecting Civilians & Human Security Program
It’s that time of year when the world’s leaders shut down parts of New York to take part in the UN General Assembly. U.S. President Trump is expected to deliver his statement on the morning of September 22. The U.S. priorities this year remains similar to last with a focus on driving the organization “back to basics” and “delivering prosperity through peace.” Over the past 12 months the United States has sought to slim down the UN bureaucracy and its operations by withholding funding and driving entities working on human rights through to peacekeeping missions to cut personnel and narrow their mandates and operations. It has also been working to shutter existing institutions — such as the International Criminal Court — arguing that they run counter to its sovereignty and interests.
Notably this year’s theme for the General Assembly is “Restoring trust, managing transformation: A United Nations that delivers for all.” Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s claim that the “rules-based order” was over earlier this year may prompt leaders from so-called ‘middle powers’ to clearly articulate and define their interests in the system. It would be helpful if many of them did, along with their expectations for a new UN Secretary-General.
The real business (and arguably, value) of this week on the UN calendar is the discussions that occur behind closed-doors, and during the bilaterals and pull-asides between leaders. The war in Iran is likely to be a focus, with the U.S. expected to engage with leaders from Gulf countries on the war in Iran. Alarmingly there are more conflicts between states around the globe than at any time since World War II. Civilians to continue to suffer from abhorrent crimes and levels of displacement, from Sudan to Gaza, Ukraine to Haiti, and beyond. Growing impunity for International Humanitarian Law coupled with the application and evolution of technology to conflict are only partly to blame.
Ultimately addressing these conflicts is in the hands of those heads of state and ministers who will be in New York. Like the United States, many countries are mindful of defending their own sovereignty and national interest in this era of growing geopolitical contestation and increasing military expenditure. As leaders and their delegations burn the midnight oil to survive next week, it is worth remembering that the UN was created primarily to prevent another global conflict. National sovereignty and multilateralism are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but they can reinforce one another when used effectively and collectively.
Connecting Commitments to Results
By Rebecca Snyder, Research Associate
Global Governance, Justice, and Security Program
As governments gather for UN General Assembly High-Level Week 2026, the development agenda faces a problem: growing commitments but a persistent implementation gap. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) remain the central benchmark, while the Pact for the Future offers a framework for renewing multilateral cooperation. The question is whether these commitments can be connected to delivery rather than generate new processes. Linking the Pact’s Actions to SDG indicators and review mechanisms is necessary: It can expose gaps, reduce duplication, and focus attention on progress.
The World Social Summit’s Doha Declaration and Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development’s Sevilla Commitment add critical pieces to that agenda: social foundations and development finance. Together, they reinforce a shift from declarations toward implementation, resources, and accountability.
The leadership transition will be central to High-Level Week 2026, as Member States turn their attention to selecting the next UN Secretary-General, who will take office in 2027. The choice will unfold against a consequential implementation agenda: the 2027 SDG Summit, the Pact for the Future’s high-level review in 2028, and the SDGs’ 2030 deadline. High-Level Week offers an early opportunity to frame what the next phase of multilateralism needs to deliver, and how the incoming Secretary-General can connect commitments to measurable results.
The Bleak Promise of This Year’s UN General Assembly
By Andrew Hyde, Senior Fellow
Strategic Foresight Hub
The annual diplomatic jamboree in New York that is High Level Week at the beginning of the UN General Assembly is an opportunity to step back and assess the state of the world, and of the UN. Neither will be pretty. What issues are highlighted (and those skipped) by national leaders in their general debate speeches and the positions they take will provide some clues to global sentiment around high-profile concerns. No doubt the conflicts in Ukraine and with Iran will be high on the list of many leaders, but likely so will global economic strains, especially energy, the impact of climate change, and the possible ramifications of artificial intelligence. So far, so predictable.
The role and fate of the UN itself will also be a more important part of the agenda than in years past. Budgetary crises, calls for reform, weak and divisive leadership by the Security Council and the UN Secretariat, winding up the sustainable development goals on a positive note by 2030, and the task of selecting a new Secretary-General will figure prominently. It is fair to say that the UN is facing one of its most severe identity crises since its founding 81 years ago. There is general consensus that it is no longer fit for purpose for the 21st Century, but it is very challenging to imagine what would be in the polarized position the world now finds itself in.
While world events have spiraled toward crises in ways the UN is currently ill-equipped to manage, a significant source of the turmoil can be traced to the general hostility and suspicion the Trump administration displays toward the world body. U.S. action and inaction on a range of issues have contributed significantly to the UN’s current plight. There has been the failure by Washington to meet its financial obligations, reportedly now totaling over $4 billion (with a small exception for a recent payment of $827 million to stave off a loss of voting rights). U.S. exits from dozens of international organizations, many within the UN system, contributed to the malaise. The Trump Administration has also pressed forward in promoting alternative mechanisms to traditional UN operations, such as with the Board of Peace, which many interpreted as a rival to the UN Security Council that would remain under firm American control. These and other actions have only added to the dismay many in the international community feel about the U.S. interest in and approach to multilateral institutions.
Yet, there is some cause for hope given certain recent examples of different kinds of U.S. engagement with the UN. The recent financial contributions have eased concerns about the UN’s bottom line for the remainder of the year. Washington’s voluntary financial contributions to some UN programs continue to flow — albeit at much lower levels — such as the announcement earlier this year to pay $1.8 billion into humanitarian pooled funds managed by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). While wary of traditional UN peacekeeping missions, the U.S. has pushed for a UN role in bespoke peace support operations in Haiti and maybe Sudan. Cautious praise by U.S. Ambassador to the UN Mike Walz for UN80, the Secretary General’s initial reform effort, also seems to indicate a willingness by Washington to at least partially operate within the existing system. Washington and the UN are finding novel ways to work together.
How Washington approaches the endgame of the Secretary-General’s race will be key. The best-case scenario is someone the rest of the world can support but also someone Donald Trump could envision as a “wingman” (or “wingwoman”) for his aspirations on the world stage, although that overlap may not exist. NATO’s Secretary General Mark Rutte serves as one template, although he has had to weather a storm of criticism by others for being too close and sympathetic to the White House. Like it or not, his approach has generally kept him out of the president’s line of fire and allowed him to diminish some of the divisions festering inside the Alliance.
Such a requirement for a new SG probably rules out all the current declared candidates. None are really international political figures in their own right and seem unlikely to earn much confidence from the White House. The office alone is not sufficient to earn a place alongside global leaders — someone to whom they can turn to get themselves out of jam or craft a solution to a seemingly intractable international dilemma; it will take someone with the right background and personality. It will no doubt appear impossible for any single individual to straddle today’s geopolitical divides while also leading the charge for international rules and institutions.
This will doubtless be a somber UNGA crowded by so many challenges and constraints. For many, the UN will appear to be an echo of its former self in terms of roles and capabilities. Yet the obvious need for global governance despite severe political headwinds can provide a path forward to better calibrated and sustainable international architecture.
The G-2 and the General Assembly
By Christopher Preble, Senior Fellow and Director
Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program
I would not be surprised if the UNGA meeting in New York is upstaged by the Trump-Xi summit that will follow it in Washington. So many critical global risks, from a new nuclear arms race to fears of out-of-control AI, are being exacerbated by US-China competition. Both sides believe that they can achieve a decisive advantage over the other, even if mutual vulnerability is the more likely outcome. Resources dedicated to expanding weapons arsenals or accelerating frontier AI models in order to “defeat” the other side, could and should be dedicated to reducing risks, not increasing them.
Xi Jinping is not attending UNGA and Donald Trump has routinely chastised the body. Both seem to see the world in terms of a “G-2” — as though their countries are the only ones that matter.
But the planet is not actually a G-2. And other states who are today suffering harm — either directly or indirectly — from US or Chinese actions, or who fear that they might, are highly motivated to identify effective means of protecting themselves, both as individual states, but also in collaboration with one another. And that is where the UN, with all of its faults and shortcomings, comes in. To be sure, collective action can come about in ad hoc ways, but the UN could facilitate such cooperation, even as most of the effort will be driven and sustained by the individual parties’ interests. And who knows? Maybe solutions developed by the rest of the world will find favor with China and the United States.
The AI Race: Policy Chases Reality
By Allison Pytlak, Senior Fellow and Director
Cyber Program
The 81st session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) convenes under the theme “Restoring trust, managing transformation: A United Nations that delivers for all,” under the presidency of Bangladesh’s Khalilur Rahman.
It is a fitting message for the UN as it grapples with the risks, benefits, and opportunities presented by technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) that are reshaping the world faster than policy and law can keep up.
AI will undoubtedly be a prominent theme during the UNGA High-level Debate. The last two years have produced new UN structures for AI governance: the Global Digital Compact, an Independent International Scientific Panel, and a Global Dialogue on AI Governance. The UN Security Council has considered the implications of AI for international peace and security, and a United Nations General Assembly-mandated process has explored implications of the use of AI in the military domain. Speaking to reporters in advance of UNGA81, UNSG Antonio Guterres identified “runaway artificial intelligence (AI)” as among three existential threats, just days after tech industry leaders called for slowing the pace of AI development.
Yet, Member State positions on AI are divided. Geopolitical rivalry, mainly between the U.S. and China, has turned AI development into a race for strategic advantage. This fragmentation makes it far harder for the UN to build unified and enforceable governance frameworks, which is complicated further by shifting views on the role and utility of the institution, notably from the U.S. Global Majority countries tend to take a more favorable view of AI, seeing the opportunities that it can present for economic growth and development in multiple industries and sectors. Yet, and despite the UN’s new structures for inclusive AI governance, there is a very real concern about the ability of Global Majority countries to not only access and participate meaningfully in these forums but to also not be left behind technologically. Concern about asymmetry in resource allocation and in having a seat at the table as governance frameworks are developed is likely to be a key point raised by Member States during the Debate, alongside the dangers of the AI race. These tensions and nuances are worth watching.
The Scramble for Latin America’s Minerals
By Anders Beal, Nonresident Fellow
Latin America Program
The global race for critical minerals is often framed as a US-China rivalry in which mineral-rich nations are territory to be conquered, not actors with their own interests. That framing is breaking down. Latin America holds the minerals needed for the energy transition, and governments in the region increasingly see those resources as leverage to attract partners that support national development through green industrialization.
On August 28, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Peru signed a strategic minerals pact to share geological data, coordinate oversight, and seek multilateral backing for joint research and investment. The declaration was non-binding, but its timing matters. In February, Washington convened 54 countries to launch FORGE, a bloc designed to break China’s grip on the refining of strategic minerals. At the time, Argentina, Chile, and Peru signed bilateral agreements with Washington that suggested alignment with the U.S. strategy. Six months later, however, the region appears to be pursuing an approach independent of either Washington or Beijing.
Indeed, the United States and China are not the only suiters for the mineral riches in the Western Hemisphere. Warming relations between Canada and the EU suggest that critical minerals are at the heart of geostrategic competition. Taking this into account, producer nations are beginning to hedge, leveraging their assets for negotiation. Part of that strategy involves greater regional coordination and cooperation. The new agreement suggests Latin American governments might one day develop common standards for environmental governance; coordinate incentives to attract minerals processing, rather than focus on the export of raw concentrate; and negotiate favorable royalty and tax schemes.
As with previous natural resources boomtimes, there are potential pitfalls. Deregulation to attract international investors could raise environmental and social concerns. Industrial policy, even among conservative leaders, could lead to resource nationalism. A failure by governments or companies to channel benefits to local communities could generate market instability. As the UN General Assembly convenes amid an energy crisis that has highlighted the urgency of the energy transition, the question is whether and how Latin America uses its mineral resources to reshape regional development — and the region’s role in the world.
The Scramble for Latin America’s Oil
By Juan Peñalosa, Nonresident Fellow
Latin America Program
The war in Iran will dominate debate in New York City during the UN General Assembly. Six months in, Hormuz traffic is down significantly and Houthi rebels hold much of Yemen’s Red Sea coast, limiting Saudi Arabia’s oil exports. As a result, the Atlantic basin is now the world’s swing supplier, at a time when production in Latin America is surging. That has raised global demand for Latin America’s energy supplies just as the United States attempts to tighten its own hold on the region’s natural resources.
Venezuela is the clearest example. A Pentagon-backed venture reportedly holds 100-year rights over seventeen fields, with Washington guaranteed a fifth of the output at cost and the right of first refusal for the remainder. In boasting about the deal, U.S. officials say it displaces foreign operators in those fields.
Elsewhere, however, Washington has had less success, as its Venezuela model is not easily replicated. In Guyana, Exxon is the major investor in the growing oil sector, but China’s CNOOC is also a big player. The Exxon contract, meanwhile, is controversial, creating political incentives to diversify the country’s partners. Brazil is even more challenging, given the bad blood between President Trump and President Lula da Silva, who favors state-controlled oil company Petrobras, and is campaigning for reelection on a platform that emphasizes national sovereignty.
Meanwhile, greater global reliance on Western Hemisphere energy has been obvious at the Panama Canal, where the Iran war boosted traffic. China has been buying more oil from Brazil and Guyana, while Germany has sought energy supplies from Guyana and Argentina. Notwithstanding the newly assertive U.S. foreign policy in the region, nobody is asking Washington’s permission.
The global scramble for Latin America’s minerals — including the lithium needed for batteries — reveals similar dynamics and offers lessons. In Venezuela, the United States has first dibs on mining projects. Elsewhere, however, it faces stiff competition, including in the race to access the vast rare earth reserves in Brazil. As in the oil business, Latin America generally shows the United States little favoritism as it evaluates potential investments and markets for its copper and other in-demand minerals.
In Venezuela, the United States has leverage by circumstance. Everywhere else, it has to earn it, and the region’s producers are asking the same question: What does Washington bring to the table?
For now, outside Venezuela, Latin American barrels go to whoever shows up first and with enough capital. For that reason, despite all the Monroe Doctrine bluster, U.S. officials may find themselves waiting in line in New York to court leaders from an increasingly strategic region.
Rising Stakes for Bangladesh as Crisis in Myanmar Persists
By Steve Ross, Senior Fellow
Crisis in Myanmar’s Rakhine State project
More than five years on from a military coup in Myanmar and nearly 10 years since “clearance operations” forced some 700,000 Rohingya to flee from Myanmar to Bangladesh, the stakes for Bangladesh are rising.
With Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister freshly sworn in as the President of the UN General Assembly and Prime Minister Tareque Rahman set to make his first appearance before the UN since assuming office in February, Bangladesh will, among other priorities, be looking to galvanize international support for a solution to the Rakhine crisis. The challenges are manifold: declining humanitarian support, meaning refugees receive as little as US $7 in food assistance per month; rising insecurity in the refugee camps; increasing frustration among the Bangladeshi communities hosting refugees; and a complex conflict across Myanmar, including escalating violence in Rakhine State, from where Rohingya fled.
Dynamics on the ground and the geopolitical context suggest that prospects for the “early repatriation” that Bangladesh seeks are limited. But the General Assembly nonetheless provides Bangladesh’s new government with an opportunity to differentiate itself from prior administrations and outline a clear approach to managing and resolving the crisis. Leveraging a side event planned for September 23 and the recently-formed committee that he leads, Bangladesh’s Prime Minister should use the General Assembly as a platform to articulate a strategy that is transparent about the likely timeline for returns; broadens space for longer-term planning and allowing greater income-generating opportunities for Rohingya; creates an enabling environment for Rohingya civil society, including by addressing insecurity in the refugee camps; and seeks to build constructive cross-border relations.
Such vision has been lacking since the Rohingya fled from Myanmar in 2017 and would help Bangladesh to lay the foundation for its ultimate goal of sustainable returns while mitigating risks and providing broader scope for international support in the interim.
As world leaders prepare to convene in New York for UNGA 81 next week, Stimson Center experts offer their thoughts on the major topics of this year — from the race for the UN Secretary-General seat and revitalizing trust in multilateralism to AI policy and rising stakes for Latin America, Bangladesh, and more.
International & Regional Organizations, International & Regional Organizations
All Eyes on the SG Race
By Richard Ponzio, Senior Fellow and Director
Global Governance, Justice, and Security Program
Alongside efforts to promote and preserve the legacy of UN Secretary-General António Guterres, including through delivery of his UN80 Initiative and the even more ambitious (and Member States-driven) Pact for the Future, the race to succeed Mr. Guterres has reached a new level of intensity and is likely to animate discussions among leading policy-makers and UN watchers throughout the General Assembly’s High-Level Week (September 20-26, 2026). Three key race-related issues (and sets of questions) to watch during UNGA High-Level are:
As per custom, the General Assembly is likely to once again accept the Security Council’s nomination, and the new Secretary-General will assume office on the first of January 2027. Besides organizing a new team on the “38th Floor” and across the UN’s senior echelon – as well as confronting myriad global conflicts and humanitarian crises – the new Secretary-General will have a nine-month sprint to prepare the SDGs Summit planned for September 2027 (UNGA High-Level Week), where plans for a new, fifteen-year “Post-2030 Development Agenda” will receive high attention. In addition to restoring global trust and confidence in the work of the United Nations, the Secretary-General will need to prioritize a kind of integrated, “twinning approach” between the Post-2030 Development Agenda and unfinished business from the UN80 Initiative and Pact for the Future, given that each pull toward achieving a more capable United Nations for realizing a more prosperous, secure, and just world.
Discussions Behind Closed Doors
By Lisa Sharland, Senior Fellow and Director
Protecting Civilians & Human Security Program
It’s that time of year when the world’s leaders shut down parts of New York to take part in the UN General Assembly. U.S. President Trump is expected to deliver his statement on the morning of September 22. The U.S. priorities this year remains similar to last with a focus on driving the organization “back to basics” and “delivering prosperity through peace.” Over the past 12 months the United States has sought to slim down the UN bureaucracy and its operations by withholding funding and driving entities working on human rights through to peacekeeping missions to cut personnel and narrow their mandates and operations. It has also been working to shutter existing institutions — such as the International Criminal Court — arguing that they run counter to its sovereignty and interests.
Notably this year’s theme for the General Assembly is “Restoring trust, managing transformation: A United Nations that delivers for all.” Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s claim that the “rules-based order” was over earlier this year may prompt leaders from so-called ‘middle powers’ to clearly articulate and define their interests in the system. It would be helpful if many of them did, along with their expectations for a new UN Secretary-General.
The real business (and arguably, value) of this week on the UN calendar is the discussions that occur behind closed-doors, and during the bilaterals and pull-asides between leaders. The war in Iran is likely to be a focus, with the U.S. expected to engage with leaders from Gulf countries on the war in Iran. Alarmingly there are more conflicts between states around the globe than at any time since World War II. Civilians to continue to suffer from abhorrent crimes and levels of displacement, from Sudan to Gaza, Ukraine to Haiti, and beyond. Growing impunity for International Humanitarian Law coupled with the application and evolution of technology to conflict are only partly to blame.
Ultimately addressing these conflicts is in the hands of those heads of state and ministers who will be in New York. Like the United States, many countries are mindful of defending their own sovereignty and national interest in this era of growing geopolitical contestation and increasing military expenditure. As leaders and their delegations burn the midnight oil to survive next week, it is worth remembering that the UN was created primarily to prevent another global conflict. National sovereignty and multilateralism are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but they can reinforce one another when used effectively and collectively.
Connecting Commitments to Results
By Rebecca Snyder, Research Associate
Global Governance, Justice, and Security Program
As governments gather for UN General Assembly High-Level Week 2026, the development agenda faces a problem: growing commitments but a persistent implementation gap. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) remain the central benchmark, while the Pact for the Future offers a framework for renewing multilateral cooperation. The question is whether these commitments can be connected to delivery rather than generate new processes. Linking the Pact’s Actions to SDG indicators and review mechanisms is necessary: It can expose gaps, reduce duplication, and focus attention on progress.
The World Social Summit’s Doha Declaration and Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development’s Sevilla Commitment add critical pieces to that agenda: social foundations and development finance. Together, they reinforce a shift from declarations toward implementation, resources, and accountability.
The leadership transition will be central to High-Level Week 2026, as Member States turn their attention to selecting the next UN Secretary-General, who will take office in 2027. The choice will unfold against a consequential implementation agenda: the 2027 SDG Summit, the Pact for the Future’s high-level review in 2028, and the SDGs’ 2030 deadline. High-Level Week offers an early opportunity to frame what the next phase of multilateralism needs to deliver, and how the incoming Secretary-General can connect commitments to measurable results.
The Bleak Promise of This Year’s UN General Assembly
By Andrew Hyde, Senior Fellow
Strategic Foresight Hub
The annual diplomatic jamboree in New York that is High Level Week at the beginning of the UN General Assembly is an opportunity to step back and assess the state of the world, and of the UN. Neither will be pretty. What issues are highlighted (and those skipped) by national leaders in their general debate speeches and the positions they take will provide some clues to global sentiment around high-profile concerns. No doubt the conflicts in Ukraine and with Iran will be high on the list of many leaders, but likely so will global economic strains, especially energy, the impact of climate change, and the possible ramifications of artificial intelligence. So far, so predictable.
The role and fate of the UN itself will also be a more important part of the agenda than in years past. Budgetary crises, calls for reform, weak and divisive leadership by the Security Council and the UN Secretariat, winding up the sustainable development goals on a positive note by 2030, and the task of selecting a new Secretary-General will figure prominently. It is fair to say that the UN is facing one of its most severe identity crises since its founding 81 years ago. There is general consensus that it is no longer fit for purpose for the 21st Century, but it is very challenging to imagine what would be in the polarized position the world now finds itself in.
While world events have spiraled toward crises in ways the UN is currently ill-equipped to manage, a significant source of the turmoil can be traced to the general hostility and suspicion the Trump administration displays toward the world body. U.S. action and inaction on a range of issues have contributed significantly to the UN’s current plight. There has been the failure by Washington to meet its financial obligations, reportedly now totaling over $4 billion (with a small exception for a recent payment of $827 million to stave off a loss of voting rights). U.S. exits from dozens of international organizations, many within the UN system, contributed to the malaise. The Trump Administration has also pressed forward in promoting alternative mechanisms to traditional UN operations, such as with the Board of Peace, which many interpreted as a rival to the UN Security Council that would remain under firm American control. These and other actions have only added to the dismay many in the international community feel about the U.S. interest in and approach to multilateral institutions.
Yet, there is some cause for hope given certain recent examples of different kinds of U.S. engagement with the UN. The recent financial contributions have eased concerns about the UN’s bottom line for the remainder of the year. Washington’s voluntary financial contributions to some UN programs continue to flow — albeit at much lower levels — such as the announcement earlier this year to pay $1.8 billion into humanitarian pooled funds managed by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). While wary of traditional UN peacekeeping missions, the U.S. has pushed for a UN role in bespoke peace support operations in Haiti and maybe Sudan. Cautious praise by U.S. Ambassador to the UN Mike Walz for UN80, the Secretary General’s initial reform effort, also seems to indicate a willingness by Washington to at least partially operate within the existing system. Washington and the UN are finding novel ways to work together.
How Washington approaches the endgame of the Secretary-General’s race will be key. The best-case scenario is someone the rest of the world can support but also someone Donald Trump could envision as a “wingman” (or “wingwoman”) for his aspirations on the world stage, although that overlap may not exist. NATO’s Secretary General Mark Rutte serves as one template, although he has had to weather a storm of criticism by others for being too close and sympathetic to the White House. Like it or not, his approach has generally kept him out of the president’s line of fire and allowed him to diminish some of the divisions festering inside the Alliance.
Such a requirement for a new SG probably rules out all the current declared candidates. None are really international political figures in their own right and seem unlikely to earn much confidence from the White House. The office alone is not sufficient to earn a place alongside global leaders — someone to whom they can turn to get themselves out of jam or craft a solution to a seemingly intractable international dilemma; it will take someone with the right background and personality. It will no doubt appear impossible for any single individual to straddle today’s geopolitical divides while also leading the charge for international rules and institutions.
This will doubtless be a somber UNGA crowded by so many challenges and constraints. For many, the UN will appear to be an echo of its former self in terms of roles and capabilities. Yet the obvious need for global governance despite severe political headwinds can provide a path forward to better calibrated and sustainable international architecture.
The G-2 and the General Assembly
By Christopher Preble, Senior Fellow and Director
Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program
I would not be surprised if the UNGA meeting in New York is upstaged by the Trump-Xi summit that will follow it in Washington. So many critical global risks, from a new nuclear arms race to fears of out-of-control AI, are being exacerbated by US-China competition. Both sides believe that they can achieve a decisive advantage over the other, even if mutual vulnerability is the more likely outcome. Resources dedicated to expanding weapons arsenals or accelerating frontier AI models in order to “defeat” the other side, could and should be dedicated to reducing risks, not increasing them.
Xi Jinping is not attending UNGA and Donald Trump has routinely chastised the body. Both seem to see the world in terms of a “G-2” — as though their countries are the only ones that matter.
But the planet is not actually a G-2. And other states who are today suffering harm — either directly or indirectly — from US or Chinese actions, or who fear that they might, are highly motivated to identify effective means of protecting themselves, both as individual states, but also in collaboration with one another. And that is where the UN, with all of its faults and shortcomings, comes in. To be sure, collective action can come about in ad hoc ways, but the UN could facilitate such cooperation, even as most of the effort will be driven and sustained by the individual parties’ interests. And who knows? Maybe solutions developed by the rest of the world will find favor with China and the United States.
The AI Race: Policy Chases Reality
By Allison Pytlak, Senior Fellow and Director
Cyber Program
The 81st session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) convenes under the theme “Restoring trust, managing transformation: A United Nations that delivers for all,” under the presidency of Bangladesh’s Khalilur Rahman.
It is a fitting message for the UN as it grapples with the risks, benefits, and opportunities presented by technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) that are reshaping the world faster than policy and law can keep up.
AI will undoubtedly be a prominent theme during the UNGA High-level Debate. The last two years have produced new UN structures for AI governance: the Global Digital Compact, an Independent International Scientific Panel, and a Global Dialogue on AI Governance. The UN Security Council has considered the implications of AI for international peace and security, and a United Nations General Assembly-mandated process has explored implications of the use of AI in the military domain. Speaking to reporters in advance of UNGA81, UNSG Antonio Guterres identified “runaway artificial intelligence (AI)” as among three existential threats, just days after tech industry leaders called for slowing the pace of AI development.
Yet, Member State positions on AI are divided. Geopolitical rivalry, mainly between the U.S. and China, has turned AI development into a race for strategic advantage. This fragmentation makes it far harder for the UN to build unified and enforceable governance frameworks, which is complicated further by shifting views on the role and utility of the institution, notably from the U.S. Global Majority countries tend to take a more favorable view of AI, seeing the opportunities that it can present for economic growth and development in multiple industries and sectors. Yet, and despite the UN’s new structures for inclusive AI governance, there is a very real concern about the ability of Global Majority countries to not only access and participate meaningfully in these forums but to also not be left behind technologically. Concern about asymmetry in resource allocation and in having a seat at the table as governance frameworks are developed is likely to be a key point raised by Member States during the Debate, alongside the dangers of the AI race. These tensions and nuances are worth watching.
The Scramble for Latin America’s Minerals
By Anders Beal, Nonresident Fellow
Latin America Program
The global race for critical minerals is often framed as a US-China rivalry in which mineral-rich nations are territory to be conquered, not actors with their own interests. That framing is breaking down. Latin America holds the minerals needed for the energy transition, and governments in the region increasingly see those resources as leverage to attract partners that support national development through green industrialization.
On August 28, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Peru signed a strategic minerals pact to share geological data, coordinate oversight, and seek multilateral backing for joint research and investment. The declaration was non-binding, but its timing matters. In February, Washington convened 54 countries to launch FORGE, a bloc designed to break China’s grip on the refining of strategic minerals. At the time, Argentina, Chile, and Peru signed bilateral agreements with Washington that suggested alignment with the U.S. strategy. Six months later, however, the region appears to be pursuing an approach independent of either Washington or Beijing.
Indeed, the United States and China are not the only suiters for the mineral riches in the Western Hemisphere. Warming relations between Canada and the EU suggest that critical minerals are at the heart of geostrategic competition. Taking this into account, producer nations are beginning to hedge, leveraging their assets for negotiation. Part of that strategy involves greater regional coordination and cooperation. The new agreement suggests Latin American governments might one day develop common standards for environmental governance; coordinate incentives to attract minerals processing, rather than focus on the export of raw concentrate; and negotiate favorable royalty and tax schemes.
As with previous natural resources boomtimes, there are potential pitfalls. Deregulation to attract international investors could raise environmental and social concerns. Industrial policy, even among conservative leaders, could lead to resource nationalism. A failure by governments or companies to channel benefits to local communities could generate market instability. As the UN General Assembly convenes amid an energy crisis that has highlighted the urgency of the energy transition, the question is whether and how Latin America uses its mineral resources to reshape regional development — and the region’s role in the world.
The Scramble for Latin America’s Oil
By Juan Peñalosa, Nonresident Fellow
Latin America Program
The war in Iran will dominate debate in New York City during the UN General Assembly. Six months in, Hormuz traffic is down significantly and Houthi rebels hold much of Yemen’s Red Sea coast, limiting Saudi Arabia’s oil exports. As a result, the Atlantic basin is now the world’s swing supplier, at a time when production in Latin America is surging. That has raised global demand for Latin America’s energy supplies just as the United States attempts to tighten its own hold on the region’s natural resources.
Venezuela is the clearest example. A Pentagon-backed venture reportedly holds 100-year rights over seventeen fields, with Washington guaranteed a fifth of the output at cost and the right of first refusal for the remainder. In boasting about the deal, U.S. officials say it displaces foreign operators in those fields.
Elsewhere, however, Washington has had less success, as its Venezuela model is not easily replicated. In Guyana, Exxon is the major investor in the growing oil sector, but China’s CNOOC is also a big player. The Exxon contract, meanwhile, is controversial, creating political incentives to diversify the country’s partners. Brazil is even more challenging, given the bad blood between President Trump and President Lula da Silva, who favors state-controlled oil company Petrobras, and is campaigning for reelection on a platform that emphasizes national sovereignty.
Meanwhile, greater global reliance on Western Hemisphere energy has been obvious at the Panama Canal, where the Iran war boosted traffic. China has been buying more oil from Brazil and Guyana, while Germany has sought energy supplies from Guyana and Argentina. Notwithstanding the newly assertive U.S. foreign policy in the region, nobody is asking Washington’s permission.
The global scramble for Latin America’s minerals — including the lithium needed for batteries — reveals similar dynamics and offers lessons. In Venezuela, the United States has first dibs on mining projects. Elsewhere, however, it faces stiff competition, including in the race to access the vast rare earth reserves in Brazil. As in the oil business, Latin America generally shows the United States little favoritism as it evaluates potential investments and markets for its copper and other in-demand minerals.
In Venezuela, the United States has leverage by circumstance. Everywhere else, it has to earn it, and the region’s producers are asking the same question: What does Washington bring to the table?
For now, outside Venezuela, Latin American barrels go to whoever shows up first and with enough capital. For that reason, despite all the Monroe Doctrine bluster, U.S. officials may find themselves waiting in line in New York to court leaders from an increasingly strategic region.
Rising Stakes for Bangladesh as Crisis in Myanmar Persists
By Steve Ross, Senior Fellow
Crisis in Myanmar’s Rakhine State project
More than five years on from a military coup in Myanmar and nearly 10 years since “clearance operations” forced some 700,000 Rohingya to flee from Myanmar to Bangladesh, the stakes for Bangladesh are rising.
With Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister freshly sworn in as the President of the UN General Assembly and Prime Minister Tareque Rahman set to make his first appearance before the UN since assuming office in February, Bangladesh will, among other priorities, be looking to galvanize international support for a solution to the Rakhine crisis. The challenges are manifold: declining humanitarian support, meaning refugees receive as little as US $7 in food assistance per month; rising insecurity in the refugee camps; increasing frustration among the Bangladeshi communities hosting refugees; and a complex conflict across Myanmar, including escalating violence in Rakhine State, from where Rohingya fled.
Dynamics on the ground and the geopolitical context suggest that prospects for the “early repatriation” that Bangladesh seeks are limited. But the General Assembly nonetheless provides Bangladesh’s new government with an opportunity to differentiate itself from prior administrations and outline a clear approach to managing and resolving the crisis. Leveraging a side event planned for September 23 and the recently-formed committee that he leads, Bangladesh’s Prime Minister should use the General Assembly as a platform to articulate a strategy that is transparent about the likely timeline for returns; broadens space for longer-term planning and allowing greater income-generating opportunities for Rohingya; creates an enabling environment for Rohingya civil society, including by addressing insecurity in the refugee camps; and seeks to build constructive cross-border relations.
Such vision has been lacking since the Rohingya fled from Myanmar in 2017 and would help Bangladesh to lay the foundation for its ultimate goal of sustainable returns while mitigating risks and providing broader scope for international support in the interim.
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