A Ukrainian military commander watched helplessly as a swarm of attack drones he sent towards targets in Russia suddenly dropped from the sky. The uncrewed vehicles were not shot down by enemy soldiers. Instead, they were remotely disabled when access to the Starshield satellite network their operators use to control them was lost.  

It remains unclear who made the decision to shut down Starshield over Ukraine. According to the New York Times, SpaceX officials and officials inside the government place the blame on each other. No matter who made the call, the incident demonstrated conclusively the inherent dangers that come from relying too heavily on cyber-based physical defense systems. In war, it doesn’t matter if the decision is made by a tech mogul or a junior enlisted cyber warrior, the weapons that are meant to be transformational can quickly be rendered useless with a few keystrokes.  

Defense professionals should explore and develop new technology that can provide a battlefield advantage. But American defense officials should consider the Ukrainian example before they continue galloping towards building a robot army. Doing so incorrectly assumes the US military will always have unfettered control of the electromagnetic spectrum that underpins the digital infrastructure necessary to operate modern weapons. 

A basic rule of military planning is to never assume away an enemy capability. A significant enemy capability in the 21^st century is the ability to disrupt and potentially disable the digital networks necessary to operate many modern weapons. And as Ukrainian authorities are now learning, defense contractors and non-combatant foreign governments have similar abilities. 

Policymakers in Washington are assuming away an adversary’s capability to disrupt digital networks when they advocate for ever-increasing cyber-dependent physical systems in the military. 

That is not to suggest that military leaders should reject technological advances. The force should pragmatically adopt new technologies that are proven effective through independent and realistic testing. But these new technologies should supplement, rather than supplant, existing weapons. The military needs to be able to continue to fight effectively when access to digital networks is disrupted. 

For example, Army leaders have added launchers for Switchblade loitering munition drones onto M1A2 Abrams tanks with a program called Precision Effects & Reconnaissance, Canister-Housed (PERCH). The current version of the system is bolted onto the exterior of the tank, which the crew controls with a tablet inside the turret. Adding capabilities like the Switchblade system by bolting them onto existing vehicles is the proper approach because if the new technology is compromised or corrupted remotely, the disruption would not affect the tank’s other functions and take the crew out of the fight completely. 

But the current arrangement with these tanks is only temporary. In keeping with the national security establishment’s efforts to digitize the entire military, the next generation of main battle tank will fully integrate the Switchblade system into the vehicle’s computer system. This exponentially increases cyber vulnerabilities within the force. 

The Starshield example in Ukraine should serve as a stark warning for Washington policymakers. Full digital integration in the military may give the appearance of progress and increased lethality but could ultimately result in future defeat if all of the country’s sophisticated weapons can be neutralized with a few lines of computer code.