On October 20, Libya’s eastern-based House of Representatives ratified the maritime memorandum Turkey signed with Tripoli in 2019, and a long contest over the Eastern Mediterranean entered a new phase. Between 2009 and 2015, drillers found large gas fields in the Mediterranean, and boundaries nobody had bothered to draw suddenly mattered. Greece and Cyprus drew theirs on the principle that islands generate full maritime zones. Turkey, which never joined the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, rejected that, and when its neighbors built a gas forum and pipeline plans without it, Ankara answered with the Libya deal, a line across the sea that denies Crete, Rhodes, and Karpathos any seabed rights beyond their territorial waters. Greece and Egypt replied with their own maps in 2020, as Greek and Turkish frigates collided that summer. Since then, it’s been a war of maps.
A Vote in Benghazi
For six years, the speaker of the Benghazi-based parliament, Aguila Saleh, kept the memorandum off the agenda while the eastern camp leaned on Cairo and Athens. Lawmakers removed Saleh on October 6, replaced him with a former chairman of the Libyan-Turkish friendship committee, and two weeks later, unanimously approved it. Quickly, Athens called the memorandum illegal, null and void. Brussels said it infringes the sovereign rights of third states. Cairo called it a clear infringement of Egypt’s exclusive economic zone, and Israel accused Turkey of destabilizing the region. On October 26, Greece’s foreign minister read a joint rejection in New York on behalf of Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, the UAE, Bahrain, and the EU, and Athens and Cairo agreed to open talks on extending their 2020 boundary eastward, into the very waters the Libyan vote assigns to Turkey. Washington called the ratification unhelpful and provocative. But the diplomatic alignment matters more than the words. The ratification has pushed Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt into a tighter bloc and drawn Israel and two Gulf states onto the same side.
Ankara did not back off and welcomed the vote, dismissed the objections, and offered Egypt a bilateral delimitation that, by its own count, would give Cairo more than 15,000 square kilometers of seabed that the 2020 line with Greece does not. Turkey’s case, also called Blue Homeland Doctrine, rests on three claims: that the longest mainland coast in the Eastern Mediterranean cannot be fenced in by small Greek islands lying off its shore, Kastellorizo above all; that a convention Turkey never signed cannot bind it; and that every regional energy structure built over the past decade was designed around Turkey’s exclusion, which left Ankara little reason to respect maps it never helped draw.
Maximalism Is Risky
Each capital can build a coherent argument. Greece and Cyprus rely on the convention text and on the nearly 170 parties behind it. Turkey invokes equity and a long line of court rulings that gave small islands reduced effect against a larger coast. Egypt defends a boundary it negotiated in good faith. Libya wants partners strong enough to back its offshore claims. Both camps have staked out maximalist positions, each has picked the legal principle that favors it, and no principle settles the map on its own.
Yet maximalism comes with a bill. Companies are likely to avoid waters that three governments claim and a fourth patrols. It is unlikely that any international oil company will explore contested blocks while uncontested ones exist elsewhere. Cyprus discovered the Aphrodite field in 2011, and its energy minister now expects a final investment decision in January 2027 and first gas in 2030 or 2031, two decades after discovery. The $6.5 billion EastMed pipeline from Israel and Cyprus to Greece died on the drawing board after Washington withdrew its support in 2022. The Great Sea Interconnector, the €1.9 billion cable linking Greece, Cyprus, and eventually Israel, still has 40% of its seabed surveys outstanding, including the stretch east of Kasos where Turkish warships shadowed a survey vessel in 2024, and its contractor now points to 2031. South of Crete, a Chevron-led consortium signed leases in February for four blocks, and test drilling will not start before 2030. Turkey’s defense ministry called the award a unilateral provocation.
The timing makes maximalism harder to defend. Disruption in the Strait of Hormuz has pushed Europe back into a scramble for gas. The Eastern Mediterranean should be part of the answer, yet its resources sit beneath a map nobody accepts, and the current trajectory points toward two directions. The first is quiet: Blocks stay unexplored, fields stay undeveloped, and the gas earns no government any revenue. The second is loud. A former European defense attaché in Athens rates the risk of a naval incident as very high if any party tries to enforce the Libyan line at sea, as 2020 showed. Every capital has treated the dispute as a contest it can win, and the result is a sea where nobody can drill.
A Shared Map
Functional alternatives may come from outside the Mediterranean. In the Black Sea, Romania and Ukraine spent years arguing over how much weight tiny Serpent Island should carry, the same question that divides Athens and Ankara over Kastellorizo. Romania took the case to the International Court of Justice in 2004, and in 2009, the court ruled unanimously that the island had no effect beyond its territorial sea. Both governments accepted the line. The certainty paid off in 2023. Romania’s OMV Petrom and Romgaz committed some €4 billion to Neptun Deep, the largest gas project in the European Union. In the Barents Sea, Norway and Russia split a 175,000-square-kilometer gray zone roughly in half in 2010 after four decades of talks and wrote rules in advance for any deposit that straddles the new line. In 1979, Malaysia and Thailand set their boundary claims aside, created a joint authority for the overlap area, and have shared its gas revenue since production began in 2005. All three worked because both sides decided that a settled sea was worth more than a war of maps. No Mediterranean government can copy any of these models wholesale, but together, they show that rival states can reach a durable settlement once they find the political will.
A workable Mediterranean deal would borrow from each: direct delimitation talks; a special agreement that sends the hardest island questions to the International Court of Justice or an arbitral tribunal with a scope all parties accept in advance; joint development zones in the overlap areas; and a regional gas forum that admits Turkey. Incident-prevention rules at sea and advance notification of surveys, which Ankara has already floated for the cable, should start yesterday.
Many in the region read the Libyan vote as symbolism, and they are right. Symbols harden into leverage, though, and leverage pays off only at a negotiating table. Every one-sided move, from Turkey’s deal with Libya to Greece’s marine parks and drilling licenses, makes the eventual compromise harder and more expensive for everyone. Shared reasoning costs less today than it will tomorrow, and investors who understand this first will get the better deal.
Large natural gas reserves lie beneath the Eastern Mediterranean. Yet much of that gas remains untapped because Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, and Libya hold overlapping claims. An October vote in Libya’s eastern parliament brought the dispute back to the forefront as each government grounds its position in a different legal principle. As the claims harden, energy companies tend to stay away from contested waters, projects are delayed by years, and the risk of an incident at sea grows. States in the Black Sea, the Arctic, and Southeast Asia once faced similar disputes, and their settlements may offer the region a possible path forward.
North Africa
On October 20, Libya’s eastern-based House of Representatives ratified the maritime memorandum Turkey signed with Tripoli in 2019, and a long contest over the Eastern Mediterranean entered a new phase. Between 2009 and 2015, drillers found large gas fields in the Mediterranean, and boundaries nobody had bothered to draw suddenly mattered. Greece and Cyprus drew theirs on the principle that islands generate full maritime zones. Turkey, which never joined the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, rejected that, and when its neighbors built a gas forum and pipeline plans without it, Ankara answered with the Libya deal, a line across the sea that denies Crete, Rhodes, and Karpathos any seabed rights beyond their territorial waters. Greece and Egypt replied with their own maps in 2020, as Greek and Turkish frigates collided that summer. Since then, it’s been a war of maps.
A Vote in Benghazi
For six years, the speaker of the Benghazi-based parliament, Aguila Saleh, kept the memorandum off the agenda while the eastern camp leaned on Cairo and Athens. Lawmakers removed Saleh on October 6, replaced him with a former chairman of the Libyan-Turkish friendship committee, and two weeks later, unanimously approved it. Quickly, Athens called the memorandum illegal, null and void. Brussels said it infringes the sovereign rights of third states. Cairo called it a clear infringement of Egypt’s exclusive economic zone, and Israel accused Turkey of destabilizing the region. On October 26, Greece’s foreign minister read a joint rejection in New York on behalf of Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, the UAE, Bahrain, and the EU, and Athens and Cairo agreed to open talks on extending their 2020 boundary eastward, into the very waters the Libyan vote assigns to Turkey. Washington called the ratification unhelpful and provocative. But the diplomatic alignment matters more than the words. The ratification has pushed Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt into a tighter bloc and drawn Israel and two Gulf states onto the same side.
Ankara did not back off and welcomed the vote, dismissed the objections, and offered Egypt a bilateral delimitation that, by its own count, would give Cairo more than 15,000 square kilometers of seabed that the 2020 line with Greece does not. Turkey’s case, also called Blue Homeland Doctrine, rests on three claims: that the longest mainland coast in the Eastern Mediterranean cannot be fenced in by small Greek islands lying off its shore, Kastellorizo above all; that a convention Turkey never signed cannot bind it; and that every regional energy structure built over the past decade was designed around Turkey’s exclusion, which left Ankara little reason to respect maps it never helped draw.
Maximalism Is Risky
Each capital can build a coherent argument. Greece and Cyprus rely on the convention text and on the nearly 170 parties behind it. Turkey invokes equity and a long line of court rulings that gave small islands reduced effect against a larger coast. Egypt defends a boundary it negotiated in good faith. Libya wants partners strong enough to back its offshore claims. Both camps have staked out maximalist positions, each has picked the legal principle that favors it, and no principle settles the map on its own.
Yet maximalism comes with a bill. Companies are likely to avoid waters that three governments claim and a fourth patrols. It is unlikely that any international oil company will explore contested blocks while uncontested ones exist elsewhere. Cyprus discovered the Aphrodite field in 2011, and its energy minister now expects a final investment decision in January 2027 and first gas in 2030 or 2031, two decades after discovery. The $6.5 billion EastMed pipeline from Israel and Cyprus to Greece died on the drawing board after Washington withdrew its support in 2022. The Great Sea Interconnector, the €1.9 billion cable linking Greece, Cyprus, and eventually Israel, still has 40% of its seabed surveys outstanding, including the stretch east of Kasos where Turkish warships shadowed a survey vessel in 2024, and its contractor now points to 2031. South of Crete, a Chevron-led consortium signed leases in February for four blocks, and test drilling will not start before 2030. Turkey’s defense ministry called the award a unilateral provocation.
The timing makes maximalism harder to defend. Disruption in the Strait of Hormuz has pushed Europe back into a scramble for gas. The Eastern Mediterranean should be part of the answer, yet its resources sit beneath a map nobody accepts, and the current trajectory points toward two directions. The first is quiet: Blocks stay unexplored, fields stay undeveloped, and the gas earns no government any revenue. The second is loud. A former European defense attaché in Athens rates the risk of a naval incident as very high if any party tries to enforce the Libyan line at sea, as 2020 showed. Every capital has treated the dispute as a contest it can win, and the result is a sea where nobody can drill.
A Shared Map
Functional alternatives may come from outside the Mediterranean. In the Black Sea, Romania and Ukraine spent years arguing over how much weight tiny Serpent Island should carry, the same question that divides Athens and Ankara over Kastellorizo. Romania took the case to the International Court of Justice in 2004, and in 2009, the court ruled unanimously that the island had no effect beyond its territorial sea. Both governments accepted the line. The certainty paid off in 2023. Romania’s OMV Petrom and Romgaz committed some €4 billion to Neptun Deep, the largest gas project in the European Union. In the Barents Sea, Norway and Russia split a 175,000-square-kilometer gray zone roughly in half in 2010 after four decades of talks and wrote rules in advance for any deposit that straddles the new line. In 1979, Malaysia and Thailand set their boundary claims aside, created a joint authority for the overlap area, and have shared its gas revenue since production began in 2005. All three worked because both sides decided that a settled sea was worth more than a war of maps. No Mediterranean government can copy any of these models wholesale, but together, they show that rival states can reach a durable settlement once they find the political will.
A workable Mediterranean deal would borrow from each: direct delimitation talks; a special agreement that sends the hardest island questions to the International Court of Justice or an arbitral tribunal with a scope all parties accept in advance; joint development zones in the overlap areas; and a regional gas forum that admits Turkey. Incident-prevention rules at sea and advance notification of surveys, which Ankara has already floated for the cable, should start yesterday.
Many in the region read the Libyan vote as symbolism, and they are right. Symbols harden into leverage, though, and leverage pays off only at a negotiating table. Every one-sided move, from Turkey’s deal with Libya to Greece’s marine parks and drilling licenses, makes the eventual compromise harder and more expensive for everyone. Shared reasoning costs less today than it will tomorrow, and investors who understand this first will get the better deal.
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