Europe’s Pensive Moment
By Andrew Hyde, Senior Fellow, Strategic Foresight Hub
“The scale of the Democrats’ Congressional victory will provide alternative, empowered voices in Washington for allies and partners, while giving adversaries scope for pause.”
Those expecting a grand sigh of relief in Europe over the stunning U.S. midterm election results may be disappointed. Sure, many in Europe will hope an empowered Democratic Congress will be a pathway to relief from Presidential rhetoric, threats, and preening. As U.S. voters streamed to the polls on Tuesday, more sobering reflections at a conference in Brussels found a Europe that was intensely interested in the result but also realistic as to any dramatic change in course.
Seen from Europe, the U.S. has become part of a “triangle of pressure”— not as intense as Russia and China, but still a real source of concern for the future. While the tone and style coming from Washington may shift because of Congressional pressure, a more considered view is that the U.S. desire to have Europe shoulder more of its own security is deeply held and transcends political labels. Europe has now fully embraced the need to adopt true strategic autonomy not just on security issues but also on foreign policy. Now, it is occupied with figuring out how to do it. There is plenty of interest in what Democrats might bring to the table and how it could frustrate Trump’s plans, but it is coupled with a healthy dose of skepticism given the historical precedent of presidents often turning more to foreign policy when their party loses one or both houses of Congress, with a fear of what that might mean for Europe.
The scale of the Democrats’ victory will provide alternative, empowered voices in Washington for allies and partners, while giving adversaries scope for pause. The outcome cannot be a reversion to past practice and expectations, but the beginning of an updated version of a transatlantic partnership.
The Republican Party’s Loss May Be an Opportunity for North Korea
By Rachel Minyoung Lee, Senior Fellow, 38 North Program
“Pyongyang may calculate that a politically weakened Trump, eager for a foreign policy achievement, could be more receptive to its demands.”
President Trump may be disappointed with his party’s midterm election losses, but North Korea could be offering some consolation by resurfacing the possibility of dialogue.
Kim Jong Un’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, issued two statements on the eve and on the day of the midterms. The immediate trigger was the FBI’s attribution of the Binance cryptocurrency theft to North Korea. However, she used the occasion to challenge Washington’s broader “hostile policy,” including its calls for North Korea’s denuclearization, and signal once again that dialogue may be possible if Washington changes course. Since February, North Korea has called on Washington to respect its nuclear status and abandon its “hostile policy” as conditions for reengagement.
Whether the statements were timed to coincide with the elections is unclear. Nor do they indicate any softening of Pyongyang’s position: While Kim Yo Jong was issuing these statements, North Korea was launching missiles and Kim Jong Un was emphasizing continued defense development. Pyongyang also continues to reject denuclearization.
Still, Pyongyang may calculate that a politically weakened Trump, eager for a foreign policy achievement, could be more receptive to its demands. Even without formal recognition as a nuclear state, North Korea may see potential benefits from another summit by enhancing its international standing or portraying Trump’s remarks on its nuclear capabilities as tacit acceptance of its nuclear status.
Pyongyang has once again placed the ball in Washington’s court.
Midterm Voters Issue Verdict on Iran War
By Christopher Preble, Senior Fellow and Director, Reimagining U.S. Grand Strategy Program
“The irony is that the wave of mostly Republican incumbents swept out of office last night didn’t vote to approve the Iran war.”
Heading into the midterm elections, there was no mystery surrounding what Americans cared most about: Fuel and food costs were too high, and the Iran war was historically unpopular. The only open question: Would the subset of Americans who actually vote be motivated by these same concerns?
We now have our answer. NBC exit polls found that 63% of voters thought that “taking military action against Iran” was the “wrong decision,” and 74% declared it to be a “crucial” or “a major factor” in deciding their vote for Congress.
The irony is that the wave of mostly Republican incumbents swept out of office last night didn’t vote to approve the Iran war. President Trump started the conflict without even bothering to ask them. He similarly neglected to make a case to the American people for why war with Iran was, in fact, necessary.
It is not supposed to work this way. The decision to take the country to war rests with Congress; the president’s authority is confined to repelling sudden attacks, not initiating the use of force. This arrangement is essential for ensuring that the most consequential foreign policy decision enjoys broad public support.
In light of the election results, and voters’ unequivocal dissatisfaction with the Iran war, the task for both the lame-duck Congress, and the newly elected members of the House and Senate who will take office in January, is clear: end the war. The lame-duck Congress should refuse to appropriate any funds to keep the war going. New incoming members should honor the letter and spirit of the Constitution that they will swear an oath to, including with respect to the war power.
The new chairs of the relevant committees should convene hearings to hold Trump administration officials accountable for launching a reckless and illegal war that has wreaked havoc. They should establish a pattern of congressional oversight regarding U.S. foreign policy, generally, something that frankly has been absent for years. And in both the House and Senate, and on both sides of the aisle, members should consider concrete steps to ensure that President Trump — and, critically, his successors — are unable to launch or sustain costly and unnecessary wars in the future. This could include a comprehensive reform of the War Powers Resolution passed in 1973.
Lastly, everyone, from Americans frustrated by a seemingly never-ending series of Middle Eastern wars, to the elected officials who they send to Washington, should revisit core assumptions about how the U. S. engages with that region, and reduce or eliminate the de facto permanent U.S. military presence there.
The View from New Delhi
By Daniel Markey, Senior Fellow, South Asia Program
“Indians. . . will hope that the massive Democratic wave signals something more profound than public anger over high gas prices and will eventually translate into a broader U.S. policy reorientation away from important aspects of Trumpism.”
India will breathe a small sigh of relief after the U.S. midterms.
New Delhi initially expected Trump 2.0 to be a friendly partner. Instead, the US-India relationship has suffered disruptions, frustrations, and disagreements over trade, Iran, Russia, immigration, Pakistan, and more.
In the immediate term, India will hope that a Democratic congress can clip the president’s wings and somehow bring a speedy end to the Iran war. New Delhi will also perceive a weakened, lame-duck Trump as more likely to sign a long-awaited trade deal on favorable terms.
Indians will also hope that the massive Democratic wave signals something more profound than public anger over high gas prices and will eventually translate into a broader U.S. policy reorientation away from important aspects of Trumpism. In particular, New Delhi craves the restoration of what had been a U.S. consensus favoring partnership with a rising India as a core pillar in a global geopolitical strategy to balance China. This election cannot deliver full confidence on that score, but it will give India’s leaders new reasons to take a “wait and see” approach over the next two years rather than altogether losing their patience with Washington.
Democrats and the Foreign Aid Budget
By Evan Cooper, Research Analyst, Reimagining U.S. Grand Strategy Program
“Democrats may now seize on the opportunity to restart some funding flows and foreign aid, which could lead to something of a resurgence of the international organizations and NGOs that were decimated by cuts pushed by the Trump administration.”
The overwhelming victory by the Democrats in the midterm elections sets up what will be a consequential, but lower profile battle over the structure of the foreign policy apparatus in following massive cuts made by the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). With firm control over budgetary authority, Democrats in the House and Senate face a choice over whether to try to push the administration to return to a pre-DOGE system or attempt to find a path forward that integrates Democrats’ preferences with the Trump administration’s approach.
This strategic question will be most prominently on display with USAID and the State Department. Democratic foreign policy leaders in Congress, such as Rep. Gregory Meeks, the Ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, have stated that USAID should be returned to its status as an independent agency and that its employees who were terminated should be reinstated. Similar cases have been made for reinstating foreign service officers who were arbitrarily terminated under Reduction in Force (RIF) orders in 2025.
Democrats will face challenges in snapping back the State Department and USAID to what the institutions looked like pre-DOGE. Much of the reorganization of offices and bureaus that has taken place in the State Department is firmly within the purview of the administration, and efforts to reinstate employees, even when backed with court orders, have proven arduous.
But Democrats may now seize on the opportunity to restart some funding flows and foreign aid, which could lead to something of a resurgence of the international organizations and NGOs that were decimated by cuts pushed by the Trump administration. Democrats face a critical choice of whether to work with the administration to build out funding in areas where some support in the administration exists, such as rare earth mineral development projects and some life-saving aid, or push for readoption of major foreign aid projects that will face resistance from the administration and may ultimately exist only as talking points for Democrats.
What the Midterm Results Could Mean for South Korea
By J. James Kim, Senior Fellow and Director, Korea Program
“Given that President Trump will likely be broadly constrained from pushing his agenda through Congress, he may turn his attention to foreign policy.”
The result of the midterm elections signals two interesting sets of potential developments for South Korea, which suggest mixed outcomes. One is that the tariff risks could rise rather than fall given that President Trump has repeatedly singled out South Korea whenever he focused on tariffs in the past. If the administration’s attention shifts back to tariffs, then South Korea could be on the receiving end of renewed threats, new tariff measures, or both. The Democratic majorities in Congress, however, may decide to exercise more due diligence and scrutiny to both export controls and foreign investments into the United States. On one hand, a brighter spotlight on export controls and supply chains could constrain the administration’s ability to make concessions regarding both direct and indirect trade with China. On the other hand, greater oversight over South Korea’s investments could slow down the pace of project implementation, especially on still-uncertain projects like the Alaska liquefied natural gas (LNG) pipeline deal.
Given that President Trump will likely be broadly constrained from pushing his agenda through Congress, he may turn his attention to foreign policy. How the administration manages issues, such as the Ukrainian and Iranian conflicts, could indirectly impact the South Korean economy (i.e., energy prices) and the security situation on the Peninsula (i.e.,DPRK-Russia relations). President Trump could also seek re-engagement with North Korea, which, until recently, has been a neglected issue. Since Seoul has been interested in engagement with Pyongyang, this would be a welcome development for South Korea. Finally, Democratic majorities in Congress could push for greater oversight on matters related to the alliance, such as wartime operational control (OPCON).
Grand Strategy, Korean Peninsula, South Asia
Europe’s Pensive Moment
By Andrew Hyde, Senior Fellow, Strategic Foresight Hub
Those expecting a grand sigh of relief in Europe over the stunning U.S. midterm election results may be disappointed. Sure, many in Europe will hope an empowered Democratic Congress will be a pathway to relief from Presidential rhetoric, threats, and preening. As U.S. voters streamed to the polls on Tuesday, more sobering reflections at a conference in Brussels found a Europe that was intensely interested in the result but also realistic as to any dramatic change in course.
Seen from Europe, the U.S. has become part of a “triangle of pressure”— not as intense as Russia and China, but still a real source of concern for the future. While the tone and style coming from Washington may shift because of Congressional pressure, a more considered view is that the U.S. desire to have Europe shoulder more of its own security is deeply held and transcends political labels. Europe has now fully embraced the need to adopt true strategic autonomy not just on security issues but also on foreign policy. Now, it is occupied with figuring out how to do it. There is plenty of interest in what Democrats might bring to the table and how it could frustrate Trump’s plans, but it is coupled with a healthy dose of skepticism given the historical precedent of presidents often turning more to foreign policy when their party loses one or both houses of Congress, with a fear of what that might mean for Europe.
The scale of the Democrats’ victory will provide alternative, empowered voices in Washington for allies and partners, while giving adversaries scope for pause. The outcome cannot be a reversion to past practice and expectations, but the beginning of an updated version of a transatlantic partnership.
The Republican Party’s Loss May Be an Opportunity for North Korea
By Rachel Minyoung Lee, Senior Fellow, 38 North Program
President Trump may be disappointed with his party’s midterm election losses, but North Korea could be offering some consolation by resurfacing the possibility of dialogue.
Kim Jong Un’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, issued two statements on the eve and on the day of the midterms. The immediate trigger was the FBI’s attribution of the Binance cryptocurrency theft to North Korea. However, she used the occasion to challenge Washington’s broader “hostile policy,” including its calls for North Korea’s denuclearization, and signal once again that dialogue may be possible if Washington changes course. Since February, North Korea has called on Washington to respect its nuclear status and abandon its “hostile policy” as conditions for reengagement.
Whether the statements were timed to coincide with the elections is unclear. Nor do they indicate any softening of Pyongyang’s position: While Kim Yo Jong was issuing these statements, North Korea was launching missiles and Kim Jong Un was emphasizing continued defense development. Pyongyang also continues to reject denuclearization.
Still, Pyongyang may calculate that a politically weakened Trump, eager for a foreign policy achievement, could be more receptive to its demands. Even without formal recognition as a nuclear state, North Korea may see potential benefits from another summit by enhancing its international standing or portraying Trump’s remarks on its nuclear capabilities as tacit acceptance of its nuclear status.
Pyongyang has once again placed the ball in Washington’s court.
Midterm Voters Issue Verdict on Iran War
By Christopher Preble, Senior Fellow and Director, Reimagining U.S. Grand Strategy Program
Heading into the midterm elections, there was no mystery surrounding what Americans cared most about: Fuel and food costs were too high, and the Iran war was historically unpopular. The only open question: Would the subset of Americans who actually vote be motivated by these same concerns?
We now have our answer. NBC exit polls found that 63% of voters thought that “taking military action against Iran” was the “wrong decision,” and 74% declared it to be a “crucial” or “a major factor” in deciding their vote for Congress.
The irony is that the wave of mostly Republican incumbents swept out of office last night didn’t vote to approve the Iran war. President Trump started the conflict without even bothering to ask them. He similarly neglected to make a case to the American people for why war with Iran was, in fact, necessary.
It is not supposed to work this way. The decision to take the country to war rests with Congress; the president’s authority is confined to repelling sudden attacks, not initiating the use of force. This arrangement is essential for ensuring that the most consequential foreign policy decision enjoys broad public support.
In light of the election results, and voters’ unequivocal dissatisfaction with the Iran war, the task for both the lame-duck Congress, and the newly elected members of the House and Senate who will take office in January, is clear: end the war. The lame-duck Congress should refuse to appropriate any funds to keep the war going. New incoming members should honor the letter and spirit of the Constitution that they will swear an oath to, including with respect to the war power.
The new chairs of the relevant committees should convene hearings to hold Trump administration officials accountable for launching a reckless and illegal war that has wreaked havoc. They should establish a pattern of congressional oversight regarding U.S. foreign policy, generally, something that frankly has been absent for years. And in both the House and Senate, and on both sides of the aisle, members should consider concrete steps to ensure that President Trump — and, critically, his successors — are unable to launch or sustain costly and unnecessary wars in the future. This could include a comprehensive reform of the War Powers Resolution passed in 1973.
Lastly, everyone, from Americans frustrated by a seemingly never-ending series of Middle Eastern wars, to the elected officials who they send to Washington, should revisit core assumptions about how the U. S. engages with that region, and reduce or eliminate the de facto permanent U.S. military presence there.
The View from New Delhi
By Daniel Markey, Senior Fellow, South Asia Program
India will breathe a small sigh of relief after the U.S. midterms.
New Delhi initially expected Trump 2.0 to be a friendly partner. Instead, the US-India relationship has suffered disruptions, frustrations, and disagreements over trade, Iran, Russia, immigration, Pakistan, and more.
In the immediate term, India will hope that a Democratic congress can clip the president’s wings and somehow bring a speedy end to the Iran war. New Delhi will also perceive a weakened, lame-duck Trump as more likely to sign a long-awaited trade deal on favorable terms.
Indians will also hope that the massive Democratic wave signals something more profound than public anger over high gas prices and will eventually translate into a broader U.S. policy reorientation away from important aspects of Trumpism. In particular, New Delhi craves the restoration of what had been a U.S. consensus favoring partnership with a rising India as a core pillar in a global geopolitical strategy to balance China. This election cannot deliver full confidence on that score, but it will give India’s leaders new reasons to take a “wait and see” approach over the next two years rather than altogether losing their patience with Washington.
Democrats and the Foreign Aid Budget
By Evan Cooper, Research Analyst, Reimagining U.S. Grand Strategy Program
The overwhelming victory by the Democrats in the midterm elections sets up what will be a consequential, but lower profile battle over the structure of the foreign policy apparatus in following massive cuts made by the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). With firm control over budgetary authority, Democrats in the House and Senate face a choice over whether to try to push the administration to return to a pre-DOGE system or attempt to find a path forward that integrates Democrats’ preferences with the Trump administration’s approach.
This strategic question will be most prominently on display with USAID and the State Department. Democratic foreign policy leaders in Congress, such as Rep. Gregory Meeks, the Ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, have stated that USAID should be returned to its status as an independent agency and that its employees who were terminated should be reinstated. Similar cases have been made for reinstating foreign service officers who were arbitrarily terminated under Reduction in Force (RIF) orders in 2025.
Democrats will face challenges in snapping back the State Department and USAID to what the institutions looked like pre-DOGE. Much of the reorganization of offices and bureaus that has taken place in the State Department is firmly within the purview of the administration, and efforts to reinstate employees, even when backed with court orders, have proven arduous.
But Democrats may now seize on the opportunity to restart some funding flows and foreign aid, which could lead to something of a resurgence of the international organizations and NGOs that were decimated by cuts pushed by the Trump administration. Democrats face a critical choice of whether to work with the administration to build out funding in areas where some support in the administration exists, such as rare earth mineral development projects and some life-saving aid, or push for readoption of major foreign aid projects that will face resistance from the administration and may ultimately exist only as talking points for Democrats.
What the Midterm Results Could Mean for South Korea
By J. James Kim, Senior Fellow and Director, Korea Program
The result of the midterm elections signals two interesting sets of potential developments for South Korea, which suggest mixed outcomes. One is that the tariff risks could rise rather than fall given that President Trump has repeatedly singled out South Korea whenever he focused on tariffs in the past. If the administration’s attention shifts back to tariffs, then South Korea could be on the receiving end of renewed threats, new tariff measures, or both. The Democratic majorities in Congress, however, may decide to exercise more due diligence and scrutiny to both export controls and foreign investments into the United States. On one hand, a brighter spotlight on export controls and supply chains could constrain the administration’s ability to make concessions regarding both direct and indirect trade with China. On the other hand, greater oversight over South Korea’s investments could slow down the pace of project implementation, especially on still-uncertain projects like the Alaska liquefied natural gas (LNG) pipeline deal.
Given that President Trump will likely be broadly constrained from pushing his agenda through Congress, he may turn his attention to foreign policy. How the administration manages issues, such as the Ukrainian and Iranian conflicts, could indirectly impact the South Korean economy (i.e., energy prices) and the security situation on the Peninsula (i.e.,DPRK-Russia relations). President Trump could also seek re-engagement with North Korea, which, until recently, has been a neglected issue. Since Seoul has been interested in engagement with Pyongyang, this would be a welcome development for South Korea. Finally, Democratic majorities in Congress could push for greater oversight on matters related to the alliance, such as wartime operational control (OPCON).
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