Editor’s Note: Tülin Daloğlu has been covering Turkey and the Middle East for nearly three decades, writing extensively for both Turkish and English-language publications, including the International Herald Tribune, The Middle East Times, Al-Monitor, ForeignPolicy.com, and the Washington Times.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Turkey is witnessing a dramatic shift in its politics from the ballot box to the courtroom. Instead of the democratic process of campaigns and elections, the political state of play is increasingly determined by prosecutors, judges, and procedural interpretations of statutes.
The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has relied on legal action as its principal weapon against the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), with profound consequences for Turkey’s political system, opposition strategy, and the balance between democracy and authoritarianism.
What began as a series of scattered corruption cases and allegations of procedural irregularities against CHP leaders has evolved into a sprawling legal process that threatens the opposition’s organizational survival, leadership legitimacy, and electoral viability. Since March 19, over a dozen CHP big city mayors and hundreds of their associated officials have been detained, including the party’s charismatic leader, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu. The arrests have led to massive street protests but have not stopped the prosecutorial offensive.
For years, the CHP has been relegated to opposition status, failing to oust the AKP at the ballot box. How much this is due to the failings of the party and how much to the policies of the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan depends on one’s political point of view. Despite AKP insistence that it has no involvement in the legal troubles faced by the main opposition, however there are signs that the ruling party is stirring the pot from behind the scenes.
Exploiting the rise of nationalism in the country and an alliance with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the AKP government has in recent years secured electoral victories by persistently accusing the CHP of collaborating with the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), which is represented in parliament. This was before the AKP embarked on its so-called “Turkey without terror” initiative, seeking to end decades of fighting with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), whose long-jailed leader, Abdullah Öcalan, earlier this year called for the end of the party’s armed struggle. It remains unclear whether the AKP is interested in resolving the Kurdish question or merely using it to stay in power.
The CHP currently faces two major cases in the judiciary. One is a lawsuit that carries the potential to trigger a possibly fatal rupture among party members. It alleged irregularities at the 2023 CHP Congress and was filed on February 15, 2025 by Lütfü Savaş, a former mayor of Hatay province who entered politics with the AKP and later joined the CHP. Savaş himself has been consistently linked to corruption allegations and condemned by his city’s people for abandoning them in their darkest hour when a major earthquake struck that part of the country on February 6, 2023, killing over 23,000 people in that province alone. Despite all of that, he managed to run again in the following local elections, which he lost. Some political observers see Savaş as a tool of the ruling party; others regard him as merely acting for personal gain.
The second lawsuit targets Istanbul Mayor İmamoğlu directly. The popular mayor, who has defeated AKP candidates three times and was considered likely to defeat Erdoğan in presidential elections, was initially charged by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office with “forgery of official documents,” alleging that an inter-university transfer process from Girne American University to İstanbul University was forged. Then on March 19, İmamoğlu was also accused of corruption, bribery, and rigging public tenders.
The prosecutions against İmamoğlu illustrate a troubling new reality. With at least eight active cases, each carrying the possibility of disqualification from office, the opposition’s most visible figure faces an ordeal of attrition: The more cases that are filed, the greater the chance one will succeed in eliminating him from political competition.
Beyond individuals, prosecutors have sought to frame CHP-led municipalities as part of a systemic “corruption organization,” though little public evidence has been presented to substantiate the allegations. “Witnesses” testify without material proof, turning trials into spectacles of accusation. Civil courts have further complicated the party’s own internal processes, with lawsuits challenging the legitimacy of its 2023 congress as well as its Istanbul provincial party leadership election, thereby threatening its institutional coherence. Nevertheless, recent polls show that the party retains — and is even growing in — popular support.
By invoking the doctrine of “absolute nullification” through civil judges, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Election Council (YSK) has been displaced beyond its proper scope, distorting a safeguard of electoral law into a tool of political contestation. The doctrine entails that once objection and appeal periods under a political parties’ law expire, the only residual remedy is the narrow concept of absolute nullity, confirmed by the YSK, which can rule on issues of individual candidacy eligibility rather than grounds for annulling an entire election. The courtroom battles have spilled into the streets, with tens of thousands protesting İmamoğlu’s arrest and the imposition of a court-appointed trustee over its Istanbul branch, and denouncing the trials as a coup against democracy. Economic markets, too, have trembled in response, underscoring how judicialized politics destabilizes not only democracy but also financial confidence.
For the CHP, the consequences are profound: endless defensive litigation, erosion of internal legitimacy, and the constant threat of disqualification hanging over its most prominent leaders. For Turkey, the result is a drift from competitive authoritarianism toward hegemonic authoritarianism, where electoral victories are annulled judicially rather than politically contested at the ballot box.
In this context, it remains to be seen whether the judiciary can withstand political pressures from an administration that seeks to prolong its domination of Turkish politics into a third decade. The issue far transcends the CHP, which, despite its own failings, must not be sidelined if the country’s future is to align with democratic norms.
Turkey’s Ruling Party Uses the Courts to Defeat its Political Opposition
By Tülin Daloğlu
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Tülin Daloğlu has been covering Turkey and the Middle East for nearly three decades, writing extensively for both Turkish and English-language publications, including the International Herald Tribune, The Middle East Times, Al-Monitor, ForeignPolicy.com, and the Washington Times.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Turkey is witnessing a dramatic shift in its politics from the ballot box to the courtroom. Instead of the democratic process of campaigns and elections, the political state of play is increasingly determined by prosecutors, judges, and procedural interpretations of statutes.
The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has relied on legal action as its principal weapon against the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), with profound consequences for Turkey’s political system, opposition strategy, and the balance between democracy and authoritarianism.
What began as a series of scattered corruption cases and allegations of procedural irregularities against CHP leaders has evolved into a sprawling legal process that threatens the opposition’s organizational survival, leadership legitimacy, and electoral viability. Since March 19, over a dozen CHP big city mayors and hundreds of their associated officials have been detained, including the party’s charismatic leader, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu. The arrests have led to massive street protests but have not stopped the prosecutorial offensive.
For years, the CHP has been relegated to opposition status, failing to oust the AKP at the ballot box. How much this is due to the failings of the party and how much to the policies of the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan depends on one’s political point of view. Despite AKP insistence that it has no involvement in the legal troubles faced by the main opposition, however there are signs that the ruling party is stirring the pot from behind the scenes.
Exploiting the rise of nationalism in the country and an alliance with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the AKP government has in recent years secured electoral victories by persistently accusing the CHP of collaborating with the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), which is represented in parliament. This was before the AKP embarked on its so-called “Turkey without terror” initiative, seeking to end decades of fighting with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), whose long-jailed leader, Abdullah Öcalan, earlier this year called for the end of the party’s armed struggle. It remains unclear whether the AKP is interested in resolving the Kurdish question or merely using it to stay in power.
The CHP currently faces two major cases in the judiciary. One is a lawsuit that carries the potential to trigger a possibly fatal rupture among party members. It alleged irregularities at the 2023 CHP Congress and was filed on February 15, 2025 by Lütfü Savaş, a former mayor of Hatay province who entered politics with the AKP and later joined the CHP. Savaş himself has been consistently linked to corruption allegations and condemned by his city’s people for abandoning them in their darkest hour when a major earthquake struck that part of the country on February 6, 2023, killing over 23,000 people in that province alone. Despite all of that, he managed to run again in the following local elections, which he lost. Some political observers see Savaş as a tool of the ruling party; others regard him as merely acting for personal gain.
The second lawsuit targets Istanbul Mayor İmamoğlu directly. The popular mayor, who has defeated AKP candidates three times and was considered likely to defeat Erdoğan in presidential elections, was initially charged by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office with “forgery of official documents,” alleging that an inter-university transfer process from Girne American University to İstanbul University was forged. Then on March 19, İmamoğlu was also accused of corruption, bribery, and rigging public tenders.
The prosecutions against İmamoğlu illustrate a troubling new reality. With at least eight active cases, each carrying the possibility of disqualification from office, the opposition’s most visible figure faces an ordeal of attrition: The more cases that are filed, the greater the chance one will succeed in eliminating him from political competition.
Beyond individuals, prosecutors have sought to frame CHP-led municipalities as part of a systemic “corruption organization,” though little public evidence has been presented to substantiate the allegations. “Witnesses” testify without material proof, turning trials into spectacles of accusation. Civil courts have further complicated the party’s own internal processes, with lawsuits challenging the legitimacy of its 2023 congress as well as its Istanbul provincial party leadership election, thereby threatening its institutional coherence. Nevertheless, recent polls show that the party retains — and is even growing in — popular support.
By invoking the doctrine of “absolute nullification” through civil judges, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Election Council (YSK) has been displaced beyond its proper scope, distorting a safeguard of electoral law into a tool of political contestation. The doctrine entails that once objection and appeal periods under a political parties’ law expire, the only residual remedy is the narrow concept of absolute nullity, confirmed by the YSK, which can rule on issues of individual candidacy eligibility rather than grounds for annulling an entire election. The courtroom battles have spilled into the streets, with tens of thousands protesting İmamoğlu’s arrest and the imposition of a court-appointed trustee over its Istanbul branch, and denouncing the trials as a coup against democracy. Economic markets, too, have trembled in response, underscoring how judicialized politics destabilizes not only democracy but also financial confidence.
For the CHP, the consequences are profound: endless defensive litigation, erosion of internal legitimacy, and the constant threat of disqualification hanging over its most prominent leaders. For Turkey, the result is a drift from competitive authoritarianism toward hegemonic authoritarianism, where electoral victories are annulled judicially rather than politically contested at the ballot box.
In this context, it remains to be seen whether the judiciary can withstand political pressures from an administration that seeks to prolong its domination of Turkish politics into a third decade. The issue far transcends the CHP, which, despite its own failings, must not be sidelined if the country’s future is to align with democratic norms.
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