Editor’s Note: Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz is a Senior Researcher in the Iran and the Shi’ite Axis Program at the Institute for National Security Studies, a prominent Israeli think tank. Citrinowicz served for 25 years in a variety of command positions units in Israel Defense Intelligence (IDI), including as the head of the Iran branch in the Research and Analysis Division (RAD) and as the division’s representative in the United States.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Among the many uncertainties as Israel and Hamas begin to implement a U.S. and Arab-backed ceasefire for Gaza is whether the Houthis will also stop their attacks on Israel in support of the Palestinian and other causes.
The Houthis’ firing of four drones at Eilat on the second anniversary of the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7 seemed another indication of a flawed Israeli strategy against the Yemeni militant group, which began attacking Israel and commercial shipping in the Red Sea in November 2023.
Israel found itself unprepared when the Houthi attacks started. Israel lacked intelligence about the group, despite its history of strong anti-Israel and anti-Jewish rhetoric. Israeli leaders assumed that using force against Yemeni targets would create a balance of deterrence against the Houthis, similar to the one Israel had sought to construct against Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, that would force the group to cease firing at Israel and Israeli interests in the Red Sea. Unlike other elements of the “axis of resistance” backed by Iran, however, the Houthis appear to lack a center of gravity that can be successfully targeted by Israel.
Israel launched a series of attacks, starting on July 20, 2024, mainly against Houthi infrastructure sites in the Hodeida port area, as well as power plants and the airport in Sana’a, the Yemeni capital. Although the attacks exacted a price, mainly economic, from the Houthis and the Yemeni population, it seemed to be one the Houthis could tolerate. Indeed, the group appeared to only gain in popularity as a result of the conflict, which the Houthis saw as also strengthening their regional and international status.
The first to recognize this reality was the Iranian leadership, which understood that, given the constraints on Hezbollah and Shi’ite militias in Iraq, the Houthis were better positioned to become the frontline of the struggle against Israel. Iran, therefore, increased military aid to the Houthis to help them maintain the pace of attacks against Israel and commercial shipping.
Even if the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas holds, Israel’s Houthi problem is unlikely to disappear. It will not be possible to put the Houthi genie back in the bottle because the Houthis now see themselves as defenders of the whole axis of resistance, not only Hamas. Therefore, the Houthis may launch missiles and drones towards Israel to protest attacks on other components of the axis, just as they have taken responsibility in the past for firing at Israel due to Israeli attacks on Tehran and Beirut and because of Jews entering the Temple Mount, site of the Al-Aqsa mosque, the third holiest site in Islam. The Houthis’ latest statement regarding Israeli attacks in Lebanon indicates the Houthis’ future intentions and their view of themselves as the protectors of the axis.
Israel needs to prepare for a long and active arena against Yemen without connection to the campaign in Gaza. The strategy cannot be based on “silver bullet” operations, such as assassinations, which Israel has employed against Hezbollah’s leadership.
In devising such a campaign, Israel needs to compensate for its lack of understanding of its adversary and lack of presence in the Red Sea region. Exaggerated boasts that Israel can deliver regime change to Sana’a underestimate the necessity for a long series of activities, not only military, that Israel needs to mount to reduce the Houthi threat.
First and foremost, Israel needs to strengthen its intelligence, with an emphasis on understanding the strategic capabilities of the Yemeni organization, including the sites of its missiles and launchers. Although the recent assassination of several senior Houthi government officials indicated a certain improvement in Israeli intelligence, without more knowledge about the location of Houthi tribal officials, alongside continuous attacks against these targets, Israel will likely have difficulty creating a sense of fear among the organization’s senior leadership.
Alongside this, Israel must work in conjunction with the U.S. Fifth Fleet and countries in the region, such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, that also have an interest in weakening the Houthis. Israel needs to reduce Iran’s — and China’s — ability to supply the Houthis with components for their strategic arrays — recently, several such shipments were intercepted in Aden — as well as to generate intelligence about Iranian Qods Force elements in Yemen working to upgrade the Houthis’ capabilities, mainly in the missile field.
Above all, Israel must establish a presence in the Red Sea that allows it operational flexibility and develop a coalition with relevant Gulf states and elements in southern Yemen led by groups such as the Leadership Council, headed by Rashad Alimi, whose goal is to supplant the Houthi regime.
As long as the Houthis remain in power, they are likely to use their strategic capabilities against Israel and enable Iran to deepen its foothold in this strategic region. Despite the view of senior Israeli officials that Israel’s 12-day war against Iran would deter the Houthis, it appears that the opposite was true.
Therefore, Israel must prepare for a long and continuous campaign, combining operational and political moves with economic pressure to cut the Houthis off from Iranian and Chinese supplies while reducing Yemeni self-production capabilities. Only a coordinated campaign, not sporadic operations, can significantly decrease the Houthis’ ability to project a significant threat to Israel, whether by direct fire or by attacking ships en route to Israel. In the meantime, it might be prudent for Israeli politicians to refrain from self-congratulation about the steps they have taken so far against the Houthi threat.
Israel Needs a Better Strategy to Defeat the Houthis in Yemen
By Danny Citrinowicz
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz is a Senior Researcher in the Iran and the Shi’ite Axis Program at the Institute for National Security Studies, a prominent Israeli think tank. Citrinowicz served for 25 years in a variety of command positions units in Israel Defense Intelligence (IDI), including as the head of the Iran branch in the Research and Analysis Division (RAD) and as the division’s representative in the United States.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Among the many uncertainties as Israel and Hamas begin to implement a U.S. and Arab-backed ceasefire for Gaza is whether the Houthis will also stop their attacks on Israel in support of the Palestinian and other causes.
The Houthis’ firing of four drones at Eilat on the second anniversary of the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7 seemed another indication of a flawed Israeli strategy against the Yemeni militant group, which began attacking Israel and commercial shipping in the Red Sea in November 2023.
Israel found itself unprepared when the Houthi attacks started. Israel lacked intelligence about the group, despite its history of strong anti-Israel and anti-Jewish rhetoric. Israeli leaders assumed that using force against Yemeni targets would create a balance of deterrence against the Houthis, similar to the one Israel had sought to construct against Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, that would force the group to cease firing at Israel and Israeli interests in the Red Sea. Unlike other elements of the “axis of resistance” backed by Iran, however, the Houthis appear to lack a center of gravity that can be successfully targeted by Israel.
Israel launched a series of attacks, starting on July 20, 2024, mainly against Houthi infrastructure sites in the Hodeida port area, as well as power plants and the airport in Sana’a, the Yemeni capital. Although the attacks exacted a price, mainly economic, from the Houthis and the Yemeni population, it seemed to be one the Houthis could tolerate. Indeed, the group appeared to only gain in popularity as a result of the conflict, which the Houthis saw as also strengthening their regional and international status.
The first to recognize this reality was the Iranian leadership, which understood that, given the constraints on Hezbollah and Shi’ite militias in Iraq, the Houthis were better positioned to become the frontline of the struggle against Israel. Iran, therefore, increased military aid to the Houthis to help them maintain the pace of attacks against Israel and commercial shipping.
Even if the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas holds, Israel’s Houthi problem is unlikely to disappear. It will not be possible to put the Houthi genie back in the bottle because the Houthis now see themselves as defenders of the whole axis of resistance, not only Hamas. Therefore, the Houthis may launch missiles and drones towards Israel to protest attacks on other components of the axis, just as they have taken responsibility in the past for firing at Israel due to Israeli attacks on Tehran and Beirut and because of Jews entering the Temple Mount, site of the Al-Aqsa mosque, the third holiest site in Islam. The Houthis’ latest statement regarding Israeli attacks in Lebanon indicates the Houthis’ future intentions and their view of themselves as the protectors of the axis.
Israel needs to prepare for a long and active arena against Yemen without connection to the campaign in Gaza. The strategy cannot be based on “silver bullet” operations, such as assassinations, which Israel has employed against Hezbollah’s leadership.
In devising such a campaign, Israel needs to compensate for its lack of understanding of its adversary and lack of presence in the Red Sea region. Exaggerated boasts that Israel can deliver regime change to Sana’a underestimate the necessity for a long series of activities, not only military, that Israel needs to mount to reduce the Houthi threat.
First and foremost, Israel needs to strengthen its intelligence, with an emphasis on understanding the strategic capabilities of the Yemeni organization, including the sites of its missiles and launchers. Although the recent assassination of several senior Houthi government officials indicated a certain improvement in Israeli intelligence, without more knowledge about the location of Houthi tribal officials, alongside continuous attacks against these targets, Israel will likely have difficulty creating a sense of fear among the organization’s senior leadership.
Alongside this, Israel must work in conjunction with the U.S. Fifth Fleet and countries in the region, such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, that also have an interest in weakening the Houthis. Israel needs to reduce Iran’s — and China’s — ability to supply the Houthis with components for their strategic arrays — recently, several such shipments were intercepted in Aden — as well as to generate intelligence about Iranian Qods Force elements in Yemen working to upgrade the Houthis’ capabilities, mainly in the missile field.
Above all, Israel must establish a presence in the Red Sea that allows it operational flexibility and develop a coalition with relevant Gulf states and elements in southern Yemen led by groups such as the Leadership Council, headed by Rashad Alimi, whose goal is to supplant the Houthi regime.
As long as the Houthis remain in power, they are likely to use their strategic capabilities against Israel and enable Iran to deepen its foothold in this strategic region. Despite the view of senior Israeli officials that Israel’s 12-day war against Iran would deter the Houthis, it appears that the opposite was true.
Therefore, Israel must prepare for a long and continuous campaign, combining operational and political moves with economic pressure to cut the Houthis off from Iranian and Chinese supplies while reducing Yemeni self-production capabilities. Only a coordinated campaign, not sporadic operations, can significantly decrease the Houthis’ ability to project a significant threat to Israel, whether by direct fire or by attacking ships en route to Israel. In the meantime, it might be prudent for Israeli politicians to refrain from self-congratulation about the steps they have taken so far against the Houthi threat.
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