Chapter

China's Role in Conflict Mediation Project

China as a Mediator in North Korea: Facilitating Dialogues or Mediating Conflicts?

North Korea presents a useful case study to examine the ways that China’s interests, risk aversion, and process building drive its engagement in mediation

By Niklas Swanström

China

June 5, 2024

In this chapter of China and Conflict Mediation, Niklas Swanström analyzes China’s evolution in its approach to conflict facilitation and mediation in North Korea and the Korean Peninsula more broadly. Throughout the analysis, Swanström examines the successes and challenges, influenced by geopolitics, that Beijing has faced in its focus on process building in facilitation and mediation efforts on the peninsula.

China and Conflict Mediation Series

The China and Conflict Mediation series collects eight papers by senior experts on China’s evolving approach to conflict mediation around the world. Presenting case studies from four continents, each chapter examines the drivers, frameworks, and outcomes of China’s efforts to engage in conflict mediation. With analysis drawn from the historic context and current events that influence China’s decision to attempt mediation, this series provides insights into why China is increasingly active in this area, and what it means for China’s role in the international community.

Editor’s Note: Stimson invited Dr. Niklas Swanström, an expert in conflict studies and Chinese foreign policy, to examine the conflict mediation dynamics between China and North Korea. With his deep expertise in conflict management in Northeast Asia, Dr. Swanström offers unique insights into China’s approach to North Korea.

By Pamela Kennedy, Deputy Director, China Program

Introduction

China has arguably emerged as a major power militarily, politically, and economically, extending its influence globally and within its immediate region. This influence has been increasingly asserted, as seen in areas like Taiwan, Hong Kong, and other sensitive zones worldwide. Despite this great power status, China’s role as a mediator and facilitator¹ in international conflicts, especially through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), remains less understood.

The traditionally relatively low profile of Beijing has been due not only to China’s traditional reluctance to engage in other states’ internal affairs but also to its relative weakness and lack of experience and know-how in international mediation. However, things have changed as China’s leadership has increasingly abandoned its strict nonintervention policy when beneficial, and engaging more actively in global conflicts that impact its interests. Notably, discussions have arisen around China’s potential mediation role in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.² The reasons behind China’s involvement in conflict zones vary widely, from exploiting instability for political and economic gains to promoting international peace and stability. These divergent views often skew perceptions of China’s mediation role, complicating the reality with numerous gray areas. In practice, China’s mediation can overlap its roles as both a geopolitical tool and a genuine peacemaking effort, adding layers of complexity to its international stance.

Given the varying interpretations and multifaceted facts, how and why China operates in some of these conflict areas is less known, and therefore worthy of investigation. It would not be too far off to say that China’s position on mediation is currently in flux as Beijing is trying to sort out how and where China should engage internationally. The fact is that with the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing has become more active, much due to both its political and economic interests in the BRI region, and much more professional. Prior to the BRI, China had a modest presence as what has been termed as a “mediator.” By 2017, however, it had already increased to active “mediation” in nine conflicts.³ Still, deciding when to engage in mediation is assessed differently by Beijing. For instance, Afghanistan was one of the conflicts that China had explicit interests in as a result of the U.S.’s rapid departure and increased insecurity, but China very much preferred to operate in a multilateral setting in this particular case.⁴ Hence, in many ways the word “mediator” has sometimes been misrepresented, and it could be argued that there is no clear-cut case where China has been acting as an active mediator single-handedly pushing for an objective change.

The Korean Peninsula presents a significant case study. Pyongyang’s conflict with the international community broadly and specifically with the U.S. because of the development of its nuclear and missile programs has been a key focus for Beijing. The Korean Peninsula, and the support for North Korea, is both emotional and strategic for China. China participated in the Korean War (1950–1953) with its “voluntary forces,” and has a relationship with North Korea that has been as close as “lips and teeth.”⁵ However, more importantly, the interactions and dialogues between North Korea and the U.S. about, and most recently the Russian involvement on, the Peninsula have been and continue to be a significant concern for China geo-strategically, emerging as a threat to its national security. Beijing’s interests are often much more realist-oriented than its normative rhetoric and have forced China to take a more active role in the Peninsula, even as it was and continues to be a role that China has been largely uncomfortable with for many reasons that will be closely analyzed. Because of the proximity of North Korea and the geopolitical impact as well as the impact on other partners should Beijing fail to stand up for Pyongyang, China has seen the Korean Peninsula as one of the most crucial issues in its foreign policy to ensure risk management, counter U.S. influence and control, and guarantee North Korean stability and continued close relations with China. This is also why China has engaged in the conflict as a mediator and facilitator: to ensure control and relevance for Beijing.

This paper will begin with a short geopolitical context, followed by Chinese interests in mediating/facilitating in the Korean Peninsula and whether China has preferred mediation or facilitation. This will continue with an evaluation of China as a process- or solution-oriented agent, and finally end with a few conclusions. The core argument remains that China has not had, nor has, one single strategy when engaging in mediation, but it is driven by interests, risk aversion, and process building rather than mediation. China’s mediation efforts in North Korea, and the Korean Peninsula at large, differ very much in respect to the issues it faces: the unification of the Koreas, the end of the war, the sanctions, and the denuclearization process, as well as China’s ability to act as a geopolitical power. That said, North Korea is the first and arguably the most critical conflict China has served as a mediator or facilitator in, because of its proximity, strategic interests, and geopolitical relevance, and the lessons are well worth looking into as they influence the conflicts China has been engaged in afterward as well as possible future engagements.

This contribution outlines China’s preference for process-driven facilitation focusing on maintaining the status quo, instead of changing the situation through mediation, in the Korean Peninsula. Beijing’s actions have geopolitical undertones serving Chinese influence and prestige rather than appearing as more active mediation efforts to resolve conflicts. This process has been hampered and manipulated by both China and North Korea to ensure geopolitical gains and maximum maneuvering space. It is also important to note the diversification of strategies depending on the sensitivity of the issues, risks involved, and prestige attached, and this chapter will also touch on the lessons learned for China when engaging in the Korean Peninsula. Some generalizations can be drawn from this study regarding Beijing’s capacity, intentions, and general preference for engagement, but at the same time the importance of North Korea, the close proximity to China, and the geopolitical impact related to the tension with the U.S. also make it difficult to simply look at this particular case and draw broad conclusions. China’s mediation and facilitation ability is quickly changing and improving, and future engagements in other parts of the world will undoubtedly look different. They could also possibly be much more dominated by China and arguably more effective, though not necessarily in favor of the international community.

Geopolitical Context for China’s Mediation Role

Chinese leadership is determined to maintain the ability to shape the future in the Korean Peninsula in accordance with Chinese interests. China is undoubtedly the most critical partner for North Korea, holding the bulk of North Korea’s trade in its hands coupled with the provision of generous aid packages, breaching of international sanctions in favor of North Korea, and providing direct and political support to North Korea in the UN and other international organizations. Despite this support from Beijing, there is skepticism of China in North Korea, and North Korean leadership tends to focus much more on the U.S., to the extent, according to Chinese leaders, that China is neglected in favor of direct negotiations with the U.S.⁶ China, together with Russia, has backed North Korea in its dealings with the U.S. and the international community and has enabled North Korea to take a non-compromising position against UN sanctions and international pressure. Still, this relationship is not without frictions. North Korea is uneasy about the Chinese presence and pressure on North Korea and its perceived (and actual) control of much of North Korea’s international trade and security. Speaking to North Koreans, they are mindful of the dependency on China this has created, and North Korea as a result has been trying to balance the U.S., South Korea, Japan, and Russia against China. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its international isolation, North Korea has come to Russia’s aid, strengthening North Korea–Russia relations, arguably at the expense of Chinese influence.

The geopolitical tension between China and the U.S. and the international lack of consensus on how to deal with Pyongyang, as well as South Korea’s often far-reaching willingness to engage with North Korea, has made the international mediations and facilitation in North Korea less than successful as a result of the maneuvering space this has created for North Korea to play different actors against each other. North Korea has followed, and will continue to follow in the future, a cyclical pattern where it relies on and leans toward China to the extent that it becomes a concern for the regime in Pyongyang. North Korea then opens up dialogue with less assertive and influential powers, such as South Korea, Japan, or certain European states, around key topics until this creates international arousal and naive perceptions of possible changes in North Korea. This finally leads to dialogues with the U.S., which in turn leads to decreased pressure on North Korea, politically or even economically. This is in place until the North Korean government assumes it is too much liberalization or that the international expectations and pressure have become too high. At this point, North Korea would then take new provocative measures that create tensions internationally, and then they bounce back to China. With the strengthened relations with Russia, North Korea’s maneuver space has increased, and the “bounce” back is both slower and less intense. But this pattern has benefited the DPRK in balancing its international dependency and national independence, and there is no reason to see a shift in this behavior over an extended period. Still, it makes mediation and facilitation efforts very difficult, and the geopolitical climate makes it difficult for China and the U.S. to create a context in which mediation and facilitation could have a positive impact.

The complex relationship between China and North Korea, the North Korean manipulation of Sino-U.S. relations, and South Korea’s compromising position especially under former President Moon Jae-in, as well as the futile but necessary attempts by the international community trying to influence North Korea to dismantle its nuclear program through sanctions, have not been enabling in terms of mediation and facilitation. This is true considering both China as well as in the international community at large. Still, in terms of China, the country’s reluctance to act as the driving force on the Korean Peninsula also characterizes China’s role, ability, and ambitions as a mediator in North Korea and internationally.

Condensing China’s Korea Policy and Interests

Beijing does not have just a single defined interest in its engagement with North Korea and the Peninsula generally; rather, it varies over time concerning the issues raised. China is divided internally on what to do in Korea, and it often varies between ministries and different ideological variations under the leadership of President Xi Jinping.⁷ There are, however, five negatives that one can use to simplify the Chinese agenda and policy in the region: no war, no chaos, no nuclear weapons (especially not in South Korea and Japan), no exclusion of China, and ensuring that the U.S. does not determine the future of the Peninsula bilaterally with North Korea. This has materialized in a few strategies that will be explored below.

Beijing is not overly excited about a nuclear North Korea, as this could trigger nuclear programs in South Korea, Japan, or even Taiwan, as well as result in general geopolitical instability that could negatively impact mainland China’s agenda. That said, in many ways, the status quo is the preferred option for China, especially considering the pressure China can potentially apply to the U.S. in Korea, and also considering the risks that could be instigated by normalized relations between the U.S. and the DPRK and a possible unification or a regime collapse. However, nuclear disarmament of North Korea is and has been a dream in Western capitals but has never been a real option for North Korea, something they have been clear about. Beijing realized this early on and has refrained from engaging and forcing North Korea to cross the red lines that Pyongyang has set up, as it would both create tension with Pyongyang and potentially make China look both weak and unable to influence North Korea. Denuclearization is, as a result, highly desirable but not the most critical issue on the Chinese agenda. That said, Beijing is interested in managing North Korean nuclear development, preventing it from spreading instability, and ensuring that nuclear proliferation is controlled.

One of the main objectives, if not the main objective, of the Chinese leadership is the desire to avoid being marginalized in future nuclear or normalization negotiations. This is especially important, as these will have major geopolitical and economic impact over time and Beijing is rightly concerned that agreements could be reached without its input, even if such an agreement would be good for the international denuclearization agenda. China has been eager to participate, at least as a convener, or a resource provider in the form of giving advice on political and financial commitments for Pyongyang in the negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea. While this has not been possible in all cases, Beijing’s engagement in the Six-Party Talks was successful, and in the intra-Korean summits and high-level meetings such as the meetings between former U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-un, Beijing also played a positive and sometimes instrumental role. In all these cases, China actively “assisted” North Korea through pre-meetings, direct participation, or as a convener. The intention has not always been to change the agenda or to steer the direction, but often to abate a more general concern about being excluded and ensure that Pyongyang was not moving in a direction that could be hurtful to China. It should be noted that over time, China has taken a much more process-oriented approach that is directed more toward Chinese interests than anything else.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has understood the importance of turning China into a positive force in international relations if it is to be a real great power, and its global image is a central aspect of this. Since President Xi took power, improving the CCP’s image has been increasingly important, as he wants to play a high-profile and positive role on the Korean Peninsula in order to boost his position as a statesman and international leader, domestically and internationally. The U.S. came to the conclusion that it would need Chinese support to make any significant progress, possibly misreading both the interests and ability of China. Still, as prestige for Xi and the CCP is involved, it has been essential for the Chinese leadership not to take any risks when engaging North Korea and enlist themselves in what could be perceived as failures. Arguably, due to the failure of indirectly supporting Russia in Ukraine, the much-criticized COVID policy, and the economic problems China faces, it is important for China not to involve itself in another difficult engagement.

U.S. leadership has allowed Xi and China to steer the process because of a lack of options. Yet the return has been limited in terms of pressuring North Korea to get back to the denuclearization table, or in fact any constructive talks. It seems that all except the Chinese and North Koreans have overestimated why and how far the Chinese leadership has been willing, or able, to influence Pyongyang. This is especially clear after the collaboration and détente between Russia and North Korea. The aim from the Chinese leadership is not primarily to ensure denuclearization, but rather to ensure that North Korea reduces its provocative actions, thereby limiting U.S.-South Korea or even South Korean-Japanese cooperation further and improved military cooperation and also to reduce insecurity and instability in the region.⁸ With the new government in South Korea and President Yoon’s attempt to decrease Chinese influence, there is a much more sober view of what can be accomplished with North Korea. This might be even more important, as South Korea is in the process of improving relations with the U.S. and North Korea has decreased in importance in Seoul, or, more correctly, the view on what can be accomplished in dealing with North Korea has become more realistic. This is a development that has made the leadership in Beijing move closer to Pyongyang, and it is now even less interested in imposing any pressure on North Korea. Short of a nuclear test, Beijing will not issue any serious concerns for North Korea’s behavior; even in the event of a nuclear test, Chinese leadership would argue that it is the U.S. and ROK that have provoked North Korea to act.

China is, however, not trying to accommodate everything for North Korea, even if China has actively argued that sanctions should be partially lifted to make North Korea more stable and provide for economic loopholes in Sino-North Korean trade, especially for rare earth minerals and energy resources. Rather, Xi has been trying to reshape the direction of the denuclearization process toward a long-term process that guarantees China a place at the table with significant input on the future of North Korea. This is without necessarily reaching denuclearization, or for that matter decreasing all international pressure on North Korea, or even letting up too much pressure on North Korea. This is with the intention to influence the North Koreans to maintain good relations with China and to increase their leverage over Washington in future talks. Such reshaping would be detrimental to the U.S. efforts to ensure that Pyongyang has only two options to choose from: economic development or strengthening its nuclear programs. It has been apparent that Beijing has been more engaged and pushed for a process starting with a partial lifting of sanctions and increased trade while engaging Pyongyang in a long-term dialogue process focusing on China, rather than dealing with denuclearization and pressing for a short-term solution. This opens up a broader spectrum of engagements but would definitely decrease the chances of denuclearization of North Korea, something the author regardless has argued is a long-lost pipe dream. Russia’s engagement with North Korea has changed the Chinese position somewhat, and the early tendency in response is that China is more accommodating to North Korea to balance Russia. The Russian role will never replace the Chinese role, due to Russia’s pariah status and its economic constraints, but it is nevertheless an asset for North Korea.

North Korea is a convenient buffer state against a democratic South Korea allied with the U.S., offering a strategic depth for China toward the U.S. in the South, not least now when North Korea officially has declared unification void. The geostrategic advantage is apparent and holds, apart from the practical implications, a domestically driven need to keep the U.S. Armed Forces away from the Yalu River and the Chinese border. Despite the U.S. being central in the Chinese narrative of global competition, the U.S. in North Korea is much more concerning and a direct threat to China. It would not be realistic to compare the Sino-U.S. competition in, for example, Thailand with North Korea as North Korea holds a much bigger sway than any other actor.

The stability of North Korea is central to China in that aspect; China must ensure that the North Korean regime is stable, ideologically and politically connected to China, and capable of maintaining a stable social order and minimizing possible refugee outflows. Therefore, China is both reluctant to push Pyongyang away and also open to direct talks between North Korea and the U.S as long as China’s interests are covered. It has been argued that the leadership in Beijing could ultimately accept a democratic, unified Korea. Still, the possibility has been quickly eroding as the competition between the U.S. and China intensifies rather than the two countries finding a common platform. Russia constitutes a breathing space with its economic and military engagement for North Korea. Beijing has identified the status quo as the more stable and less threatening alternative. However, China has been somewhat accommodative toward U.S. interests as they have coincided with Chinese secondary interests, such as denuclearization, tension reduction, and lifting of sanctions, to mention a few. But now a change in the Chinese policy is in the cards as the tension between the U.S. and China and between the U.S. and North Korea, respectively, seems to intensify. Additionally, the Russo-North Korean partnership has triggered China to act more benevolently in relation to North Korea.⁹

Effectiveness of Chinese Mediation and Facilitation in the Korean Peninsula

High Expectations and Few Reality Checks

It is first crucial to set expectations for China as a mediator or even a facilitator. China has demonstrated its willingness to play a mediating or facilitating role on the Peninsula, but expectations about what this could mean should be modest, at least seen from a denuclearization view. Because of China’s close ties with the DPRK, the world has asked China to bring the DPRK to the negotiating table for denuclearization talks, especially as China dominates North Korean trade. In 2019, China’s share of North Korea’s trade stood at 95.4%, and in 2020 it stood at 88.2%;¹⁰ this is not even considering smuggling and illegal trade over the Korean-Chinese border. Much of North Korea’s international interaction is conducted via China, and if China stepped up its pressure on North Korea, it would undoubtedly hurt North Korea in all sectors despite North Korea’s recent détente with Russia.

The Chinese domination of North Korean trade and political connections would typically guarantee massive influence. However, only considering the numbers in terms of economic engagement has resulted in the international community having unrealistic expectations of what China should be able to force North Korea to do if it used its leverage. In the case of North Korea, the expectations must be much lower than they have been in other comparable conflicts.¹¹ The North Korean leadership has not been willing to be guided or pressured into something they are uncomfortable with, which showcases the limitations of both Chinese leverage and of willingness to pressure North Korea too far and therefore alienating North Korea and in the worst case push them toward the U.S. or Russia. Speaking to North Koreans, it is apparent that they are equally concerned about being dominated by China as about being bullied by the U.S., using North Korean wording, and it is painfully evident for the Chinese that too much pressure would push North Korea into Russian or American hands.

Pyongyang has made it crystal clear that if China pressures North Korea, it will either become isolationist with unforeseen consequences or play up U.S.-China rivalry. The latter would come about by approaching the U.S. and therefore decreasing China’s national security by either removing North Korea as a buffer state or engaging the U.S. politically and reducing China’s relevance regionally; neither is preferable for Beijing, but also not very likely. A more likely scenario is that North Korea would go isolationist, further than it is today, which could be destabilizing for China by creating growing instability, increased tension, and possible refugee problems, while concurrently making China lose control over the dialogue process and its influence over North Korea and political developments on the Peninsula. Trust between China and the U.S. is almost clinically absent, and the assumption in Beijing is that the U.S. would turn China’s failure with the DPRK against the Chinese leadership’s interests. The lack of trust between the U.S. and China as well as between North Korea and the U.S. have complicated the process to a degree that is hard to overstate.

From a denuclearization perspective, China has failed to bring the DPRK back to the table, even if Beijing has been instrumental in creating dialogues. Despite that, China has been successful in controlling and influencing the DPRK, bringing a calming effect on Pyongyang, something that seems strange considering that the DPRK has conducted repeated provocations in 2022-2024 that have the potential to increase insecurity on the peninsula to a degree not seen since the Korean War. Despite this, from the Chinese perspective, Chinese efforts have been a great success that has increased their prestige in an arduous process that has benefited President Xi and the Chinese leadership. Finally, they have secured a status quo situation, albeit unstable, that is not favorable for the U.S.

In essence, while Beijing’s expectations have been fulfilled to some degree, the international community’s expectations are largely unfulfilled, but nothing else should be expected considering that China holds the pace stick. This remains true as long as North Korea allows them to hold it for them, enabling Beijing to focus on Chinese interests in a period of growing Sino-U.S. tension, as long as North Korea’s interests are considered.

Is China a Facilitator or Mediator?

China’s foreign policy has usually been associated with noninterference, with arguments made that China is usually reluctant to engage in mediation, preferring not to engage in meddling in other states’ conflicts.¹² While it is true that China has not been engaged in traditional mediation in which China pushes for solutions and provides formulas to the parties on how to move forward, Wang Yi outlined the Chinese role as a mediator and, during the Six-Party Talks, he spoke about using active mediation toensure enhanced contacts and trust-building, seeking common interests while ensuring non-interference.¹³

In the case of North Korea, China’s contribution to the process has mainly been to identify (along with Russian and North Korean special envoys) denuclearization and peace as two processes (double track) that should proceed “in a stage-by-stage and simultaneous way,” prioritize “confidence-building,” and be accompanied by “corresponding measures” by concerned parties.¹⁴ This corresponded to the “double track and double stop” strategy of pursuing both denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula. The suggestion is that the two sides simultaneously engage in a process, with North Korea suspending nuclear and missiles tests and the U.S. and South Korea refraining from holding provocative joint military exercises, promoting a more active role for Xi in the process.¹⁵ As this proposal did not have the impact the CCP hoped for, it became rather evident that China has been engaged in process building and facilitation of dialogues, rather than working toward a solution through mediation. This is not to say that this is unreasonable, as a resolution seems very unlikely, but this will be touched upon later.

The Six-Party Talks were indicative of a more active Chinese role, starting in August 2003 with the first meeting and ending with the sixth meeting in September 2007. China’s engagement as a mediator and then especially as a convener and resource provider, as well as a possible implementer, was encouraged by all parties, but the talks ultimately failed to implement the September 19 Joint Statement in 2005 and the February 13 Joint Statement in 2007. This was less due to Chinese inability, but rather directly related to the refusal of North Korea to listen to China, and Pyongyang’s refusal to accept that the pressure was solely put on them to dismantle their nuclear program. There was also a lack of trust between North Korea, China, and the U.S., and the limitations on China’s reach in North Korea. This experience made China reevaluate its future engagements and turn toward a more process-oriented approach that guaranteed Chinese participation but minimized the risks for China, which will be discussed in more detail later.

There have been unrealistically high external expectations placed on China, and therefore China has been unsuccessful in producing concrete deliverables that matched international expectations. Despite this, China’s role as a mediator in the Six-Party Talks has been hailed as a success, notwithstanding the ultimate failure of the talks.¹⁶ Yet it is true that China has at times played a positive role but not always as a mediator, rather building a process of engagement as a facilitator more than focusing on a mediated resolution, not least after the Six-Party Talks. This is not to say that China’s efforts as a mediator had been disregarded completely in the Six-Party Talks, but rather that Beijing lacked the confidence to take a resolute role in the conflict and had been reluctant to guide it toward a resolution that would have been beneficial for all parties.

A few examples of successful facilitation efforts are the many behind-the-scenes meetings between the U.S. and North Korea that China has organized. These meetings often take place before major summits between North Korea and the U.S. For example, on July 19, 2005, a dinner between U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill and North Korean Vice-Minister Kim Gye-gwan as well as number of low-key meetings between the North Koreans and the Americans were all arranged by the Chinese.¹⁷

China has been reluctant to take a more active role as a traditional mediator; fulfilling roles as a facilitator has been the preferred option. This was partly due to the lack of experience, capacity, and domestic expertise to act in the Korean Peninsula as a mediator, but also the risk of failure was determined to be high. The failed Six-Party Talks were a main reason for China to change gears in the Korean Peninsula, taking a more limited role. The concern for failure has been critical and will be discussed in more detail later, but the Chinese leadership has been concerned with the prospect of an open mediation as it could then be argued that the Chinese leadership, i.e., President Xi, was the cause of the failure. It could be argued that his ability is not as high, international credentials could be damaged, influence in North Korea and other close states could be hurt, and most importantly it would look bad domestically, especially in the leadup to Xi’s reelection in 2022. The CCP fear of failure is often hyped, and they have failed to realize that the positive effects of even a less successful mediation could be substantial, but face-saving measures have been, and still are, important. Many of these concerns have been grounded domestically, ensuring that a positive picture of Xi Jinping and the CCP has spread in China and ensuring support of all political factions, ministries, and the population at large. Despite Xi’s apparent control of mainland China, something that has been strengthened with his reelection, there still seems to be some concern with the internal image and preference for focus on Taiwan and economic development, just to mention two issues. In 2023 and 2024, there seems to be a more active China; outside of North Korea, it seems China has taken a more active role in international conflicts.

Moreover, North Korea has refused to be led into a mediation process and Pyongyang has consistently been interested in dealing with the Americans directly, something that Beijing is not thrilled about; this led it therefore to promote multilateral structures as more important, or at least promote processes involving China. China’s agenda also did not fully overlap with those of the U.S. and other international actors, something that was regrettably ignored or not understood internationally. Beijing realized that it would be forced to take a rather assertive position toward Pyongyang in the conflict to break the stalemate, and it was not ready to challenge North Korea with so little prospect of a positive resolution of the situation seen from Chinese eyes.¹⁸ It was not unwise, from a Chinese perspective, to act as it did to avoid risks domestically, with North Korea, and internationally, especially as China correctly interpreted North Korea’s long-term intentions and willingness to act aggressively in defense of what Pyongyang views as a matter of life and death. It should also be noted that China is not interested in being responsible for North Korea’s actions; it is good for Beijing to be at some distance from North Korea. This is especially useful when Pyongyang engages in provocative actions, such as the missiles and artillery launches in 2022 and 2023 and disassociation from South Korea in 2024. If China takes a more active role, it are concerned that it would be associated with North Korea’s actions, another case of fear of failure or of being associated with failure of actions.

In the aftermath of both the 2018 Singapore and 2019 Hanoi summits, China was reluctant to assist the U.S. in bringing the North Koreans back to the negotiation table, as the leadership in Beijing was debating the usefulness of increasing pressure on Pyongyang. It was more comfortable with the role of the facilitator than the more assertive mediator, and also relations between China and the U.S. were quickly deteriorating. A supporting reality was that former President Trump took over much of the process and pressed for high-level bilateral meetings, something that marginalized China to a degree that Beijing was uncomfortable with. Moreover, it was evident that North Korea would not even agree to denuclearization negotiations, much less actual denuclearization unless major concessions from the U.S. and the UN were made, something that was not to happen. China on its side pushed for a partial lifting of sanctions as a first step toward such concessions, maintaining its central position in the process, realizing that Pyongyang would not take the first step and that former President Trump would not be able to accept this. This effectively put China back in the process as the bilateral talks failed, maybe without too many tears shed in Beijing.

It would be unfair to define success according to standards set by Washington or the UN, as it is not always in the hands, or interests, of Beijing as to how much it can accomplish. China simply did not have the expertise, due to limited experience as well as political support, to arrange an effective mediation, even though this is changing rapidly with the increased international engagement from Beijing’s side and its increased willingness to take a more active role, especially with a more content Xi holding complete and unchallenged power within China. Additionally, Beijing’s fear of failure preempted any serious attempts to mediate. Mediation is always associated with the prospect of failed efforts, as many mediations do not lead to resolution. Beijing has feared that they as the mediator would take some of the blame for failed mediation, both from the public and the parties involved, and that Chinese leadership could potentially be questioned. It was also a concern in Beijing that failure in bringing the North Koreans to the table could indicate the relative lack of influence China has on the leadership in Pyongyang, leading to domestic and international discredit. Alternatively, and much worse, is the prospect that Beijing would initiate a mediation process that failed. Hence, a multilateral facilitation process is a much safer option for Beijing, shifting some of the responsibility over to North Korea and the U.S, but still ensuring China a seat at the table for the future without the risks for President Xi. Additionally, China is yet to achieve the maturity or neutrality required to be a mediator; this is especially true in a geopolitical environment that has pitted China and North Korea against the U.S. and its allies.

President Xi’s reelection in the autumn of 2022 led to more adventurous schemes in terms of mediation and direct influence in conflicts by the CCP, taking political risks that it would have avoided beforehand. It is beyond doubt that Xi’s power has been reinforced after the reelection, and this will open up the possibility for new policies as he will not perceive his situation to be as challenged as before; he could thus be seeking a role as an international statesman to strengthen his own and China’s influence. But as the relations with the U.S. have reached an all-time low, it is difficult to see how China can be a partner with the U.S. in the Korean Peninsula, something that is needed to bring the process forward. To be able to fully utilize his new-won confidence, Xi would need the U.S. to play the game, together with North Korea, on Chinese terms, and this does not look promising today. Additionally, Beijing’s concern with Russian influence makes it more reluctant to push North Korea into a corner.

Building a Solutions-Oriented or Process-Building Strategy

Even if Beijing pushes for some concrete changes, such as lifting sanctions on North Korea and attempting to facilitate a denuclearization dialogue, the focus has been on providing a platform for a dialogue process guided by Chinese interests. The Chinese leadership has taken on a limited role—or at least more limited than the U.S. would have preferred it to take—even if Washington’s perception of Beijing as a mediator has changed with the geopolitical tension between China and the U.S. Most recently, China has been more interested in taking a leading role, excluding U.S. interests, and not surprisingly the U.S. has been less eager to have China guiding the talks or assuming the role of a more active mediator.

Realizing that no major positive changes will come from Pyongyang in the short term, seeing geopolitical tensions increasing and North Korea’s rapprochement with Russia, and understanding that North Korea has a preference to deal directly with the U.S. over time, Beijing has been reluctant to press for significant changes and upsetting the status quo. There is also the question of why North Korea would allow Beijing to play a more active role in the process than necessary, especially as China has few good alternatives. It is unlikely that Pyongyang would accept denuclearization or external interference in what they perceive as their national security, even though China is an important go-between for Pyongyang. The Chinese position is not against denuclearization or resolving the conflict in the short term, but it realizes that the end goal is not reachable for many years and has changed its policy accordingly. Beijing’s focus has, not unreasonably, been to mitigate risks involving engagement with North Korea.

China has been, and continues to be, sensitive to factors that could counter its own interests and strengthen the U.S. position in North Korea. Much of the concern from China is based on the reality that the government in Pyongyang would rather have a bilateral negotiation with Washington, excluding all external actors. Beijing has realized that it could be excluded from the negotiations if it pressures Pyongyang too much, or fails to offer North Korea something useful, something that has been made more apparent when considering the Russian factor today. Additionally, because of geopolitical tensions, the U.S. has less interest in involving a China that is not necessarily working for U.S. interests. Hence, Beijing has tried to build itself into a process that promises Chinese influence on the Korean Peninsula over time and guarantees some influence in a long-term process that eventually will touch upon denuclearization, regional security, and economic security for North Korea and China. It seems clear that the Chinese strategy to manage North Korea derives directly from its perception of how much leverage it has in North Korea. Because it is playing with what it perceives to be relatively bad cards, it has changed its strategy. It is not unrealistic to expect a much different and more direct involvement if Beijing perceives that it has better leverage.

The USIP Senior Study Group Report from May 2019 argued that the U.S. should “pursue negotiations based on a step-by-step, parallel-track process that can build the trust necessary for reciprocal measures toward denuclearization and a peace regime.” This is also how the Chinese leadership perceives how the process with North Korea should be managed, but Beijing sees denuclearization as the final, and perhaps not even possible, goal.¹⁹ The Chinese-proposed process would effectively allow for a partial lifting of sanctions and establish a process that has denuclearization as a distant target but would allow North Korea to engage internationally. This would strengthen the Chinese role in the negotiations as a facilitator and possibly as a mediator, in the future, as well as limit the U.S. role regionally. In fact, China has been using the mediation and facilitation process to limit the U.S. role in the Peninsula. North Korea could be in favor of such a process, as it would have more understanding for it, but it would also allow them time to make their nuclear program fully operational, making a reversal impossible, something that the international community cannot accept. For China, this would be the most positive development, strengthening its own role on the Korean Peninsula, minimizing the U.S.’s immediate role, and keeping good relations with North Korea.

High-Visibility and Low-Key Actions

High-profile mediation and facilitation tools, such as host diplomacy activities, top-level visits, and special envoys, have been the preferred tool for Beijing in situations where they do not have to risk political prestige or relations with North Korea.²⁰ This has enabled China to influence the process and ensure a spot at the table with maximum influence in media domestically as well as internationally and with only minor risks involved. China’s engagement in the Six-Party Talks characterized this from 2003 to 2007, but its more important impact has arguably not been in direct facilitation and mediation. Chinese leaders have traditionally been much more active in influencing the process by providing advice and a location for talks, but this has not always been seen publicly.

Prior to the summit talks between former President Trump and Chairman Kim, there were several delegations to and from China and North Korea that secured Beijing’s interests. Politburo Standing Committee member Li Zhanshu led a delegation to Pyongyang in 2018 in response to the North Korean leader’s visits to China, but there was skepticism even in China about whether such a visit would benefit the larger process. In 2019, Xi visited Pyongyang for the first time, after five visits to China in 2018 by Chairman Kim.²¹ This signaled the importance of China-North Korean relations. Yet, in sharp contrast, in 2016 and 2017 when China acted more in line with the United Nations sanctions, the result was North Korea’s nuclear tests right before China’s Belt and Road Forum in May 2017: a clear signal from Pyongyang to Beijing that they were not happy with the Chinese direction. These high-level delegations to and from North Korea were significant, but arguably the delegations traveling to and from North Korea that are not visible are more important for the process. North Korea’s increasingly close relations with Russia could potentially reduce the Chinese impact, but it is still unclear what the real policy impact will be over time.

By using a more modest “under the radar” engagement policy, China is in fact more successful than it has been in high-profile mediations, not by solving anything but by gaining access to and leverage over the party(s) to the conflict by controlling parts of the process. China has been successful in maneuvering between its lack of confidence and skills, its relative lack of impact in North Korea, and the geopolitical reality. China has used this success to maintain its own influence over the process and to maintain the status quo, making China more of a risk manager than anything else. In many ways, China has been very successful in managing the risks that North Korea encompasses, especially when it has been apparent that the U.S. and North Korea have no or little space to compromise. China has been very active in participating in and organizing track 1.5 and track II diplomacy exercises; even during the pandemic, China has actively engaged with international organizations and think tanks over facilitation issues in Europe and Asia, granted with little or no impact on Pyongyang. In all these cases, it has been evident that Beijing has taken a long-term perspective where it is increasingly ready to provide location and assistance and use track II diplomacy in low-key events. Despite such meetings not being public nor providing large political capital, they have been useful for the Chinese to maintain some influence and control without upsetting the status quo.

Xi has taken a much more assertive stance on facilitation and mediation with the intention of increasing his international standing and securing Beijing’s interests on the Korean Peninsula after the UN sanctions in 2016 and 2017. But he has used low-key processes that China controls and participates in, sugar-coated with some high-level actions aiming to boost his standing. Xi has changed the mode of interaction to some degree, with more statements and clarification of Chinese interests in the conflict. This was very explicit before the summit meetings between Kim and Trump, even if Chinese diplomats and Chinese officials are still mostly operating behind the scenes. The steps to actively mediate and push for solutions that could stabilize the Korean Peninsula are still a project in the making, and do not necessarily follow the same logic as UN or U.S. interests.

Standing Alone or Working Multilaterally?

China’s strategy has been to engage as one of many mediators or facilitators, or as a part of a multilateral effort, as much to be able to take credit for the mediation domestically, regionally, and internationally as to avoid risking too much.²² It is striking that even when the United States has supported a greater Chinese role and possibly given China a new role as a guarantor for Pyongyang, Beijing has not been able to move outside of its comfort zone.²³ The Six-Party Talks are one of the most prominent cases wherein the U.S. actively encouraged China to be more active, pushing North Korea in the direction the U.S. envisioned, and repeatedly hailing China for its efforts, while Beijing remained somewhat lukewarm to the possibility.²⁴ As a real multilateral process organized by China on the Korean Peninsula has not been sustained, Beijing’s actions have halted to some degree. However, it is noteworthy that Beijing was more active in the Six-Party Talks when it had strong international support and backing rather than in the later stages where changing geopolitics and the lack of trust hampered Chinese actions in the Korean Peninsula. Bluntly put, the risks for China with more direct engagement increased, and therefore Chinese leaders took a more process-oriented approach that allowed them to control, manage, and influence the process despite having little confidence in it.

It is notable that China operates best in an environment with strong international support on the Peninsula. Prior to the Olympic Games in Pyeongchang, 2018, there was an impressive international position on the need for disarmament, with both China and Russia cooperating, or at the very least not contradicting the international consensus. This essentially allowed China to operate not only with international support, but also in an environment where China was not the single actor that pressed for change but rather positioned itself as a go-between and a reasonable voice. Beijing could thus credit itself for its engagement while keeping the risks for prestige loss at a minimum. It allowed Chinese leadership to lead a process that was multilateral rather than bilateral and utilize their impact at a maximum against both North Korea and the U.S. Challenges arose when reliance on China became too strong and the risks increased for a more active Chinese leadership. This strong reliance on China in the dialogue process surrounding the Korean Peninsula has been problematic; however, looking at other conflicts such as the one in Afghanistan, Beijing still prefers a multilateral context. The obvious challenge for China has been that, in a multilateral context, they are protected against the lack of expertise and reputational risk through distributed responsibility, but at the cost of less control of the process. As Beijing improves its capacity and confidence, the reliance on multilateral processes will decrease with greater control by Beijing in the mediation and facilitation processes, giving China a much bigger impact on international relations. It should be noted that extreme risk aversion has been hampering the Chinese mediation and facilitation efforts by not utilizing the full potential of Chinese strategies.

China’s need for a multilateral backdrop has decreased over time and in relation to the sensitivity of the issues. Dealing with the denuclearization process and sanctions is still met with some reluctance, but China is also interested in engaging in less sensitive issues such as intra-Korean issues, which do not require China to hide behind an international blanket but allow China to develop its regional position.

China’s Preference for Status Quo or Change?

China is primarily interested in creating stability and economic prosperity for itself, and this is particularly interesting to note when China engages in the Japan-South Korea trade dispute or economic-related issues on the Korean Peninsula.²⁵ The process has been very similar to the economic aspects of Korean Peninsula facilitation, although China acted more as a mediator in the Japan-South Korea trade dispute. Regardless, China also played the role as a convener of discussion but failed to act more resolutely, possibly out of fear of failure to secure an agreement. This is not too dissimilar to the Korean Peninsula, where Chinese facilitation efforts seem to be hampered by China’s inability (like anyone else’s) to secure a lasting agreement. Additionally, for China, the possible loss of prestige if it fails to achieve an agreement is more concerning than the possible prestige it would gain if it succeeded. Beijing is still driven by negative fears of failure rather than the possible positive gains if successful; therefore, the process is much more important for China than the mediation efforts. This is partly due to the political environment in China, but also very much due to the sensitivity of prestige for President Xi personally.

China is not only North Korea’s main trading partner, it is also South Korea’s— a relationship that is much more lucrative for China, with 241 billion USD in trade compared to the trade with North Korea of 556.8 million USD.²⁶ This is a relationship that grew stronger during President Moon’s regime, but under President Yoon it is very likely that an attempt to reduce trade dependency on China might be witnessed even if President Yoon’s ability to act has been restricted in the most recent 2024 legislative elections. Before the pandemic, China and North Korea increased their economic contacts and border trade as well as the number of exchanges and trade delegations. The pandemic abruptly ended that liberalization of sanctions, even if the sanctions regime had very little to do with the trade decline.

Chinese leadership undoubtedly has some influence and leverage over North Korea, though the Chinese would not exaggerate it and the international community should be wise to do the same. In 2018, Kim Jong-un made four visits to China to consult with President Xi, and President Xi reciprocated by traveling to North Korea in January 2019. President Xi tried to influence Kim to refrain from escalating the conflict further, and Kim was reputedly trying to shape a common strategy that would benefit both China and North Korea. Before the Singapore Summit between Chairman Kim and former President Trump on June 12, 2018, and the second summit in Hanoi on February 27–28, 2019, while there were growing interactions between China and North Korea, there were also increasing engagements between China and the U.S. The priority for China was to de-escalate the conflict and convince Chairman Kim to engage with the U.S., but in the end, China was too cautious and ended up trying to influence from the sidelines. As a result, Chinese leaders missed an opportunity to influence a positive development and may have distracted the process negatively, resulting in what needs to be considered a failed high-level meeting.

Beijing is wary of failure, as this would indicate that China has limited diplomatic leverage, even with small dependent states such as the DPRK.²⁷ Despite being invited to do so, China has refused to offer to mediate in the Korean Peninsula and has been reluctant to provide leadership in a way that could indicate that China has failed in its efforts or that it has been unwilling to enforce solutions against the parties’, i.e. North Korea’s, will.

Chinese engagement is clearly identifiable in the different policy areas. Being both process-oriented and concerned with potential uncontrolled changes, China is more reluctant to overturn the status quo in peace negotiations and normalization of relations, in order to effectively maintain control over the process and reduce any risks that could derive from political changes. However, Chinese leadership is in agreement with the U.S. and the international community on the general development of the situation in North Korea, especially on the need for denuclearization or at least no further nuclearization in the region. Despite this, China’s core security interests clash with those of Washington and the West, making it difficult to make something actionable happen. The only issue that China is still strongly arguing for is the need to lift sanctions, with a view to making progress on the challenges to stability.

North versus South: Taking Sides?

In balancing ties with North and South Korea, China has grasped the need for the geopolitical buffer that North Korea constitutes, while simultaneously realizing the economic importance of South Korea.²⁸ This has led to a very careful policy formulation from China, despite its being more open to sanctions than it often is given credit for. Chinese leadership has been trying to balance its position of a lack of real impact and capacity, aiming to decrease the “risk” of failure and international pressure, with the intention to act in a way that strengthens China’s position in both Koreas.

Additionally, China has been trying to balance the two Koreas, as North Korea provides some strategic depth whereas South Korea provides economic depth for China. North Korea is a negligible economic actor for China, but South Korea has emerged as an important economic partner for China, and it is important for both China and South Korea to maintain strong working relations. This was highlighted when President Yoon refused to meet with Speaker Pelosi after her visit to Taiwan for fear of upsetting mainland China too much.²⁹

China aims to balance trade relations and exert influence in South Korea against the political impact on North Korea. This is regarding its interests in rare earth minerals and preventing U.S. influence in North Korea. That said, South Korean public opinion is anti-Chinese, mostly because of the Chinese sanctions against South Korea after the 2016 deployment of a U.S. THAAD missile defense system in South Korea. China failed to see the North Korean threat to South Korea and instead made out the THAAD system to be all about China. This was partly a failure to see the security challenges to South Korea but was also an opportunity to test the ROK-U.S. alliance and see how far South Korea would be willing to support the deployment without giving in to Chinese pressure.

The Chinese objective was to find common solutions or processes that engage both the North and South, as well as the summits between President Xi and former President Moon that focused on North Korea. China supported Moon’s initiatives to advance inter-Korean dialogue and broker a détente with North Korea. This isolated the U.S. to some extent, even if President Moon tried to arrange talks between the U.S. and North Korea, inviting the DPRK to participate in the Pyeongchang Olympics, meeting with Kim at Panmunjom, and visiting Pyongyang.³⁰ The Chinese leadership is concerned, for good reason, that President Yoon will have a much more restrictive policy toward the North and focus on strengthening its relations with the U.S. This would restrict China’s role in the Peninsula, as President Yoon would not seek Chinese assistance in managing the North Korean situation; it would most likely also increase ROK-U.S. military and political cooperation at the expense of China’s influence; and finally, it would effectively put China on the wrong side of the ideological fence when dealing with the ROK.

Lacking Experience and Building Expertise

Considering domestic expertise, the first attempts by Beijing in acting as a facilitator on the Korean Peninsula were characterized by crude and inefficient measures in the early stages, but that was also a part of the strategy. Beijing was never interested in implementing the U.S. agenda in the Korean Peninsula. American, European, Japanese, and South Korean policymakers and academics often exaggerated the willingness, in addition to the ability, of Beijing to act in North Korea, but China’s main objective was to maintain some control and influence over the process despite realizing the limitations. Downplaying its role enables China to control the process in which they have significant control rather than focusing on the results. Focusing on the results could, according to the Chinese, threaten the impact they have on North Korea, but the policy is also a result of the lack of expertise and fear of loss of prestige if the mediation should fail. This is not to say that this is bad policy from China. They have, in fact, been able to secure most of their interests by creating a long-term process that China has major influence over, both directly and indirectly, and they have simultaneously been able to decrease the U.S. role in North Korea.

China initially lacked mediation and facilitation expertise, in large part because it refrained from intervening in international affairs and the internal affairs of other states during the Deng Xiaoping era. It is only with Xi Jinping that this policy has changed; today, China is far more active in interfering in other states’ internal affairs. Focus was previously placed on Chinese national security, and China rarely engaged internationally as a go-between not only out of fear of taking sides but also fear of losing face in what could potentially be perceived as failures. As has been noted, China has been very risk averse, even if the potential positive effects could be more relevant for China over time. China’s education system, moreover, did not promote the skills of international relations experts by focusing on soft skills such as mediation, but rather built skill sets related to technological and economic development. With Xi, Beijing has developed a broader competence in mediation and facilitation, as well as international relations and law more generally. This is something that will generate a much more active international role for China over time, a process that is already in play.

China’s Mediatory Future and North Korea

China has not engaged primarily as a mediator in the Korean conflict; instead, it has facilitated dialogues or even acted as a risk manager, provided resources, and acted as a go-between in most of their efforts. That said, China has often had a more realistic and limited role in the process on the Korean Peninsula. Having realized that North Korea will not denuclearize, Beijing has focused on a process that could build trust and shape a regional mechanism for stability. The drawback to this strategy has been that the expectations of China have been much higher than what the country could realistically reach. Furthermore, China does not intend to push North Korea toward a solution, as the geopolitical situation in the region and North Korea itself have effectively halted such a development.

China is far from the mature mediator that would engage the parties and assist them toward a solution, as prestige, geopolitics, and national interests have been greater determining factors driving Chinese efforts. Additionally, Beijing has not been the neutral actor that it has claimed to be, and as a regional actor with immense interests, it has been reduced to advocating solutions that have been favorable to China. This being said, China has played a positive role as a facilitator and convener, with its limitations, focusing on maintaining Chinese objectives. Overextending the objectives, as many other actors have done, has not been conducive for effective facilitation or mediation on the Korean Peninsula. Not only has the denuclearization process stalled; peace talks, sanctions regimes, pandemic discussions, and more have all suffered immensely.

One of the major drawbacks to China’s approach has been that Chinese leadership has been more interested in the process than the results. This enables them to stay involved in the process and at the same time be able to prevent outcomes they would view as less desirable for China. Beijing has proved to be risk averse in two very different ways: one is to avoid association with failure, and the second is being able to manage risks that are related to the Korean Peninsula, such as U.S. influence, implosion of North Korea, loss of Chinese influence, and more. The fear of exclusion or having the U.S. and North Korea have discussions directly with each other has been a major concern for China, as a normalization of relations between the two countries would potentially hurt China’s interests. This is not to say that the focus on the process from Beijing has been wrong; on the contrary, it is probably the only process that would have been successful. The drawback is Chinese politicization and focus on its own strategic goals rather than the issues at stake in the discussions. Beijing moreover has the advantage that it is rather satisfied with the status quo, and the preference for a long-term process allows it to deliberately avoid quick solutions that could impact China negatively over time.

China’s lack of know-how and ability to act as a mediator has also been an obstacle, but as China is increasingly seeking involvement in mediating other conflicts, as well as pursuing a larger commitment on the Korean Peninsula, this could be a challenge of the past. There are indications that China is increasingly able to engage as a mediator or facilitator in conflict situations, not least when dealing with less democratic states. The preference from Beijing has been to act in more multilateral settings with few risks of failures involved, or at least those which minimize the loss of prestige. Prestige, or more correctly the possible loss of prestige, has held China back, and has made China risk averse in terms of acting as a mediator. It is beyond doubt that China has learned from its past experience on the Korean Peninsula, as well as other conflicts it has been involved in. Even if China previously strived to engage in multilateral events, it is increasingly eager to drive processes itself, even if engagement with respect to the Korean Peninsula is more driven by the fear of U.S. influence and the satisfaction with the status quo.

Some lessons learned from the Chinese engagement on the Korean Peninsula are that geopolitics plays a role; engagement has not only been to ensure that Chinese interests are considered, but maybe more importantly to ensure that the U.S. is not dominating the process. As a result of Chinese risk aversion, Chinese leaders have been more reliant on and comfortable with multilateral situations, but as China develops its confidence and ability, it is likely to decrease the reliance on multilateral frameworks to gain more direct control over the process. It seems evident that China will take a more active role as mediator in the near future, with increased confidence and improved experience in facilitation and mediation. This is the case even if the underlying fear of failure seems to haunt Chinese leadership, something that seems to hamper its engagement in other conflicts, for example, the war in Ukraine. With a more confident leader in Xi Jinping, this could also be an obstacle that diminishes over time, and it is likely that China will increasingly act as a mediator and facilitator around the world in the capacity of a global leader. Therefore, it is necessary for the U.S., EU, and democratic states at large to consider if and how the strengthened role of China as a mediator and facilitator in international conflicts will impact the regional order at large. It is very likely that China will further increase its ambitions if a more unpredictable and isolationist American president that aims to undercut U.S. ambitions for global leadership opens up a pathway for a Chinese global leadership.

Notes

1
Much of this chapter is derived from discussions and seminars with North Korean colleagues, scholars, and policymakers in North Korea, Sweden, and other locations from 2004 to 2022. No names or positions, unless they are in a published format and not derived from the author’s own communication, have been singled out. Chinese sources are treated with the same care, even if secondary sources here are much more prolific and easier to access. Defining mediation and facilitation in this context is important, and although mediators and facilitators seek the same objective, and the concepts are often used interchangeably, there are differences. Firstly, facilitation focuses on the process that seeks to find a common interest, and mediation is more of seeking a resolution of an immediate problem. Mediators would normally be more active and engaged in the process more directly, offering an outsider’s perspective and suggesting ways to break critical impasses. A facilitator, on the other hand, guides the process and ensures that resources are present and that all actors are acknowledged and catered to. In principle, the mediator takes a much more active role in the discussion, while the facilitator ensures that the process is moving forward even if an active facilitator and a less active mediator overlap. Facilitation is normally closer to a dialogue and is used as an instrument to foster relationships and reach consensus among stakeholders. Mediation is defined by the UN as a process whereby a third party assists two or more parties, with their consent, to prevent, manage, or resolve a conflict by helping them to develop mutually acceptable agreements. In this chapter, the critical issue is whether China views it as a process or aims to resolve the conflict by direct engagement.
2
Yun Sun, “The War in Ukraine: China as the Mediator?,” April 15, 2022, Stimson Center, https://www.stimson.org/2022/the-war-in-ukraine-china-as-the-mediator/; Yang Jian, “What Could China’s Mediation in the Ukraine Crisis Look Like,” The Diplomat, March 16, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/what-would-chinas-mediation-in-the-ukraine-crisis-look-like/.
3
Helena Legarda, “China as a Conflict Mediator: Maintaining Stability along the Belt and Road,” Mercator Institute for China Studies, August 22, 2018, https://merics.org/en/short-analysis/china-conflict-mediator.
4
Jason Li, “China’s Conflict Mediation in Afghanistan,” Stimson Center, August 16, 2021, http://stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/Li-Conflict-Mediation-with-Chinese-Characteristics-R3_03.pdf
5
Pratik
Jakhar, “ ‘Lips and Teeth’: The Enduring China-North Korea Relationship,” Jamestown Foundation, August 17, 2021, https://jamestown.org/program/lips-and-teeth-the-enduring-china-north-korea-relationship/.
6
It is also interesting to note that the monument in Pyongyang of Chinese war efforts in the Korean War was in decay for many years, to the dismay of the Chinese embassy in Pyongyang, and it was impossible for foreigners to visit. This lasted until North Korea needed Chinese support in face of the sanctions related to the nuclear tests. Similarly, the war museum in Pyongyang has taken away virtually all indications of Chinese participation in the exhibitions, and the Chinese role in the war is marginalized in the North Korean narrative.
7
Catherine Jones, “China’s Interests, Actors, and the Implementation of Sanctions Against North Korea,” The Asian Forum, Open Forum, September 24, 2015, https://theasanforum.org/chinas-interests-actors-and-the-implementation-of-sanctions-against-north-korea/; Niklas Swanström, “The Party-State Dichotomy: Convergence and Divergence in China’s Foreign Policy,” in China’s Foreign Policies Today: Who Is in Charge of What, ed. Axel Berkofsky and Giulia Sciorati, May 8, 2002, Istituto per gil Studi di Politica Internazionale, https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/chinas-foreign-policies-today-who-charge-what-34630.
8
Jung Pak, Trying to Loosen the Linchpin: China’s Approach to South Korea, Brookings Institute, July 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/research/trying-to-loosen-the-linchpin-chinas-approach-to-south-korea/.
9
Yonhap News Agency, “N. Korea’s foreign minister meets visiting Chinese vice FM: state media”, January 27, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240127000551315
10
Nina Jobst, “North Korean’s Trade with China as a Share of Total Foreign Trade 1999-2020,” Statista, May 29, 2022, https://www.statista.com/statistics/745703/north-korea-share-of-trade-with-china/.
11
Weidi Zhang, “Neither Friend nor Big Brother: China’s Role in North Korean Foreign Policy Strategy,” Palgrave Communications 4, no. 16 (2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-018-0071-2.
12
Cheng Qian and Xiaohuo Wu, “The Art of China’s Mediation during the Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula,” Asian Affairs: An American Review 36, no. 2 (Summer 2009).
13
Qian and Wu, “The Art of China’s Mediation,” 85-86.
14
Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun, “China Reaffirms Tradition: DPRK Friendship and Recovery of South Korean Ties,” Comparative Connections 20, no. 3 (January 2019): 83-92, https://cc.pacforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/1803_ChinaKorea.pdf.
15
Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 坚持实现无核化目标维护半岛和平与稳定—— 在朝鲜半岛核问题安理会部长级公开会上的发言, April 29, 2017, http://kp.china-embassy.gov.cn/zt/cxbdhwt/201705/t20170503_1343155.htm; Tang Zhiqiang, 半岛问题关键节点金正恩缘何访华, China News, March 28, 2018, http://news.china.com.cn/2018-03/28/content_50759365.htm.
16
Chung-in Moon, “Diplomacy of Defiance and Facilitation: The Six Party Talks and the Roy Moo Hyun Government,” Asian Perspectives 32, no. 4 (2008): 71-105.
17
Snyder, “Six-Party Success.”
18
Interviews in Pyongyang and during events related to facilitation and mediation on the Korean Peninsula.
19
USIP Senior Study Group Report, China’s Role in North Korea Nuclear and Peace Negotiations, United States Institute for Peace, May 6, 2019, https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/05/chinas-role-north-korea-nuclear-and-peace-negotiations; Xinhua, “China Proposes ‘Double Suspension’ to Defuse Korean Peninsula Crisis,” March 8, 2019, www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017- 03/08/c_136112435.htm; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press, March 9, 2016, www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1346238.shtml.
20
Legarda, “China as a Conflict Mediator.”
21
Chie Sang-Hun and Jane Perez, “A Top Chinese Official (Not Xi Jinying) Will Visit North Korea,” New York Times, September 4, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/04/world/asia/china-north-korea-xi-jinping.html.
22
Legarda, “China as a Conflict Mediator.”
23
Laura Zhou, “China May Take Bigger Role as ‘Guarantor and Mediator’ after Trump-Kim Nuclear Talks,” South China Morning Post, June 11, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy- defence/article/2150121/china-may-take-bigger-role-guarantor-and-mediator-after.
24
Ankit Panda, “The Long Road Back to the Six Party Talks,” The Diplomat, February 28, 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/02/the-long-road-back-to-the-six-party-talks/.
25
Grace Shao, “China Treads a Fine Line as It Seeks to Mediate in Japan-South Korea Trade Dispute,” CNBC, August 22, 2019.
26
The Observatory of Economic Complexity, accessed July 7, 2022, https://oec.world/en.
27
Zeno Leoni, “China as Global Peace Mediator: Pros and Cons,” Asia Times, March 5, 2022, https://asiatimes.com/2022/03/china-as-global-peace-mediator-pros-and-cons/.
28
Snyder and Byun, “China Reaffirms Tradition.”
29
Jon Herskovitz and Jenong-Ho Lee, “South Korea Leader Snubs Pelosi Over Holiday, Adding to His Woes,” Bloomberg, August 4, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-04/south-korea-leader- snubs-pelosi-due-to-vacation-adding-to-woes.
30
USIP Senior Study Group Report, China’s Role in North Korea.

Recent & Related

Resource

Update on China-Afghanistan Relations

Sarah Godek

Chapter

The Misalignment Between Chinese and African Peacemaking: The Case of Ethiopia’s Tigray Crisis

Paul Nantulya

Issue Brief

Making the Most of America’s Mega-Decade of Sports

Evan Cooper • Will A. Smith