The 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS), with the next decade in mind, stated that “the strategic guidance and policies under this Strategy will dramatically transform Japan’s national security policy after the end of WWII from the aspect of its execution.” While the NSS does not change the direction of Japan’s defense space policy over the past decade, the strategy, together with the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and Defense Buildup Program (DBP), which were also endorsed alongside the NSS, will substantially enhance these efforts.
Progress Over the Last Decade
While the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) have been a user of space services, such as weather forecasting and satellite communications, for more than four decades, it was only after the enactment of the Basic Space Law in 2008 that the JSDF started to consider building its space capabilities.
Against this background, Japan has planned and implemented dedicated space programs for defense purposes over the past decade. Recognizing outer space as a national security agenda, Japan’s first NSS in 2013 stated that Japan would build a system for space situational awareness (SSA). Based on this statement, the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) for FY 2014 and beyond, approved by the Cabinet on the same day as the NSS, stipulated that the JSDF is committed to SSA.
In addition, the Japan Ministry of Defense (JMOD) launched two dedicated communications satellites in 2017 and 2018, respectively. While the private sector operates those satellites through a private finance initiative, they became the first satellites owned by the JMOD.
Japan’s defense efforts in the space domain further intensified with the NDPG and Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP) approved by the Cabinet in 2018. The 2018 NDPG introduced a new defense concept of cross-domain operations, “which organically fuse capabilities in all domains to generate synergy and amplify the overall strength, so that even when inferiority exists in individual domains such inferiority will be overcome and national defense accomplished.” The NDPG positioned space as a new domain alongside the cyber and electromagnetic spectrum, prioritizing the investment of resources in those domains in order to achieve seamless cross-domain operations.
As for specific missions and capabilities, the 2018 NDPG stated that the JSDF would conduct SSA not only from the ground but also from space, and the 2018 MTDP newly included the acquisition of space-based optical telescopes, i.e., SSA satellites. In addition, the NDPG introduced a new mission to ensure “superiority in use of space at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies” and established that the JSDF would “work to strengthen capabilities including mission assurance capability and capability to disrupt opponent’s command, control, communications and information.” To implement these missions, the NDPG and MTDP specified the necessity of creating a space domain mission unit within the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF).
Based on the 2018 NDPG and MTDP, in 2020, the ASDF created the Space Operations Squadron as the first JSDF unit dedicated to the space domain. In 2022, the ASDF established the Space Operations Group as the higher echelon unit to command the Space Operations Squadron and other units. Ten years after the publication of the 2013 NSS, the Space Operations Group is scheduled to start operating its space domain awareness (SDA) system—the term JSDF began using in 2022 instead of SSA—utilizing a ground-based radar to surveil objects in geostationary orbit in financial year (FY) 2023.
New Strategy Documents and Challenges Ahead
The latest NSS contains several notable elements which were not included in the 2013 NSS. One is the specification of enhanced cooperation between the JSDF and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). This shows the growing collaboration between the JSDF and JAXA over the past decade. For example, in addition to personnel exchanges between the two organizations, the JSDF is collaborating with JAXA to develop an SDA satellite, which aims to be launched by FY 2026. Also, after ASDF’s Space Operations Group begins operating the aforementioned SDA system in FY 2023, JAXA is expected to share its SSA data with the unit.
Secondly, the new NSS includes a statement that a framework for the Government’s decision-making in a contingency will be set up. Although the details are still unknown, it suggests that the government is aware that the threats to space assets are becoming more probable and is cognizant of the necessity to prepare for such contingencies.
The third new item refers to expanding the development of capabilities to hinder opponents’ space use, such as space-based command, control, communications, and information (C3I). While the acquisition of capabilities to disrupt space-based C3I was already included in the 2018 NDPG, it is notable that the 2022 NSS states that such capabilities will be strengthened and will not limit their targets to C3I alone. By hindering opponents’ space use—including infrastructure they would rely on in offensive military actions—the JSDF intends to disrupt land, sea, and air operations to prevent the invasion of Japan. Though it is not clear what these enhanced capabilities refer to, it is improbable that Japan will develop destructive direct ascent anti-satellite missiles as the government declared in 2022, following the lead of the U.S., which stated that it will not conduct satellite destruction tests using such missiles.
Fourth, the 2022 NSS states that the government will actively utilize the private sector’s space technologies for defense purposes and foster the space industry. In this context, the NSS includes the construction of satellite constellations as a specific item. Namely, said satellite constellations will be utilized for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (ISRT) to operationalize standoff defense capabilities. For now, it is not clear how those satellite constellations would be acquired, but if the JMOD were to take possession, it would mean a significant increase in the number of the ministry’s satellites.
Moreover, the JMOD/JSDF intends to remarkably expand the size and budget of its space-related organizations and programs. The NDS includes the restructuring and rebranding of the ASDF to the Air and Space Self-Defense Force. The DBP also states that a space-dedicated unit, commanded by a general officer, will be created in the ASDF. Those announcements are astonishing, considering there was no such dedicated unit three years ago. On top of that, the JMOD plans to allocate approximately one trillion yen (roughly 7.5 billion U.S. dollars) for space-related efforts over the five years commencing FY 2023, more than doubling the ministry’s annual space budget.
While Japan intends to boost its defense-related space capabilities over the next decade, there are challenges in achieving this goal. The 2022 NSS clearly states that the strategy “will fulfill its complete purpose only when its contents are to be executed.” Therefore, the above-mentioned space programs need to be implemented within a defined time frame.
An especially critical consideration is that the acquisition of ISRT satellite constellations needs to keep pace with the acquisition of standoff defense capabilities. Although the JMOD has yet to announce details about the constellation, it could consist of a minimum of several dozen Earth observation satellites to be placed in low Earth orbit (LEO). So far, however, no company in Japan has built or operated a satellite constellation of such a scale, nor does the JMOD have any experience operating an LEO satellite constellation.
In this regard, a strategy worth pursuing is for Japan’s public and private sectors to cooperate with the U.S. companies that possess the expertise necessary to develop and operate such constellations. Several companies in the U.S. already operate LEO satellite constellations and have begun providing Earth observation or satellite communication services.
Additionally, it would be advantageous for Japan to consider cooperation with the U.S. on space-based ISRT. The U.S. Department of the Air Force is conducting a study with the National Reconnaissance Office on Ground Moving Target Indicators (GMTI), and the Space Warfighting Analysis Center of the U.S. Space Force has completed a force design for GMTI in 2022. The Space Development Agency of the U.S. Space Force also intends to develop the Custody Layer to “provide 24/7, all-weather custody of time-sensitive, left-of-launch surface mobile targets” as part of the planned Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture, utilizing commercial services and other resources.
Japan’s efforts to acquire defense-related space capabilities that have materialized over the past decade demonstrate potential for the country to make even greater strides in the next decade. These initiatives will bring about new opportunities for U.S.-Japan cooperation in the space domain.
Yasuhito Fukushima, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow at the Global Security Division, the Policy Studies Department, the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo. He is currently a Visiting Scholar at the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation in San Diego. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the organization to which the author belongs. Photo: NASA image of JAXA’s (Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency) H-II Transfer Vehicle-6.
Japan endeavors to utilize space for defense purposes
By Yasuhito Fukushima
In Japan
The 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS), with the next decade in mind, stated that “the strategic guidance and policies under this Strategy will dramatically transform Japan’s national security policy after the end of WWII from the aspect of its execution.” While the NSS does not change the direction of Japan’s defense space policy over the past decade, the strategy, together with the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and Defense Buildup Program (DBP), which were also endorsed alongside the NSS, will substantially enhance these efforts.
Progress Over the Last Decade
While the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) have been a user of space services, such as weather forecasting and satellite communications, for more than four decades, it was only after the enactment of the Basic Space Law in 2008 that the JSDF started to consider building its space capabilities.
Against this background, Japan has planned and implemented dedicated space programs for defense purposes over the past decade. Recognizing outer space as a national security agenda, Japan’s first NSS in 2013 stated that Japan would build a system for space situational awareness (SSA). Based on this statement, the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) for FY 2014 and beyond, approved by the Cabinet on the same day as the NSS, stipulated that the JSDF is committed to SSA.
In addition, the Japan Ministry of Defense (JMOD) launched two dedicated communications satellites in 2017 and 2018, respectively. While the private sector operates those satellites through a private finance initiative, they became the first satellites owned by the JMOD.
Japan’s defense efforts in the space domain further intensified with the NDPG and Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP) approved by the Cabinet in 2018. The 2018 NDPG introduced a new defense concept of cross-domain operations, “which organically fuse capabilities in all domains to generate synergy and amplify the overall strength, so that even when inferiority exists in individual domains such inferiority will be overcome and national defense accomplished.” The NDPG positioned space as a new domain alongside the cyber and electromagnetic spectrum, prioritizing the investment of resources in those domains in order to achieve seamless cross-domain operations.
As for specific missions and capabilities, the 2018 NDPG stated that the JSDF would conduct SSA not only from the ground but also from space, and the 2018 MTDP newly included the acquisition of space-based optical telescopes, i.e., SSA satellites. In addition, the NDPG introduced a new mission to ensure “superiority in use of space at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies” and established that the JSDF would “work to strengthen capabilities including mission assurance capability and capability to disrupt opponent’s command, control, communications and information.” To implement these missions, the NDPG and MTDP specified the necessity of creating a space domain mission unit within the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF).
Based on the 2018 NDPG and MTDP, in 2020, the ASDF created the Space Operations Squadron as the first JSDF unit dedicated to the space domain. In 2022, the ASDF established the Space Operations Group as the higher echelon unit to command the Space Operations Squadron and other units. Ten years after the publication of the 2013 NSS, the Space Operations Group is scheduled to start operating its space domain awareness (SDA) system—the term JSDF began using in 2022 instead of SSA—utilizing a ground-based radar to surveil objects in geostationary orbit in financial year (FY) 2023.
New Strategy Documents and Challenges Ahead
The latest NSS contains several notable elements which were not included in the 2013 NSS. One is the specification of enhanced cooperation between the JSDF and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). This shows the growing collaboration between the JSDF and JAXA over the past decade. For example, in addition to personnel exchanges between the two organizations, the JSDF is collaborating with JAXA to develop an SDA satellite, which aims to be launched by FY 2026. Also, after ASDF’s Space Operations Group begins operating the aforementioned SDA system in FY 2023, JAXA is expected to share its SSA data with the unit.
Secondly, the new NSS includes a statement that a framework for the Government’s decision-making in a contingency will be set up. Although the details are still unknown, it suggests that the government is aware that the threats to space assets are becoming more probable and is cognizant of the necessity to prepare for such contingencies.
The third new item refers to expanding the development of capabilities to hinder opponents’ space use, such as space-based command, control, communications, and information (C3I). While the acquisition of capabilities to disrupt space-based C3I was already included in the 2018 NDPG, it is notable that the 2022 NSS states that such capabilities will be strengthened and will not limit their targets to C3I alone. By hindering opponents’ space use—including infrastructure they would rely on in offensive military actions—the JSDF intends to disrupt land, sea, and air operations to prevent the invasion of Japan. Though it is not clear what these enhanced capabilities refer to, it is improbable that Japan will develop destructive direct ascent anti-satellite missiles as the government declared in 2022, following the lead of the U.S., which stated that it will not conduct satellite destruction tests using such missiles.
Fourth, the 2022 NSS states that the government will actively utilize the private sector’s space technologies for defense purposes and foster the space industry. In this context, the NSS includes the construction of satellite constellations as a specific item. Namely, said satellite constellations will be utilized for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (ISRT) to operationalize standoff defense capabilities. For now, it is not clear how those satellite constellations would be acquired, but if the JMOD were to take possession, it would mean a significant increase in the number of the ministry’s satellites.
Moreover, the JMOD/JSDF intends to remarkably expand the size and budget of its space-related organizations and programs. The NDS includes the restructuring and rebranding of the ASDF to the Air and Space Self-Defense Force. The DBP also states that a space-dedicated unit, commanded by a general officer, will be created in the ASDF. Those announcements are astonishing, considering there was no such dedicated unit three years ago. On top of that, the JMOD plans to allocate approximately one trillion yen (roughly 7.5 billion U.S. dollars) for space-related efforts over the five years commencing FY 2023, more than doubling the ministry’s annual space budget.
While Japan intends to boost its defense-related space capabilities over the next decade, there are challenges in achieving this goal. The 2022 NSS clearly states that the strategy “will fulfill its complete purpose only when its contents are to be executed.” Therefore, the above-mentioned space programs need to be implemented within a defined time frame.
An especially critical consideration is that the acquisition of ISRT satellite constellations needs to keep pace with the acquisition of standoff defense capabilities. Although the JMOD has yet to announce details about the constellation, it could consist of a minimum of several dozen Earth observation satellites to be placed in low Earth orbit (LEO). So far, however, no company in Japan has built or operated a satellite constellation of such a scale, nor does the JMOD have any experience operating an LEO satellite constellation.
In this regard, a strategy worth pursuing is for Japan’s public and private sectors to cooperate with the U.S. companies that possess the expertise necessary to develop and operate such constellations. Several companies in the U.S. already operate LEO satellite constellations and have begun providing Earth observation or satellite communication services.
Additionally, it would be advantageous for Japan to consider cooperation with the U.S. on space-based ISRT. The U.S. Department of the Air Force is conducting a study with the National Reconnaissance Office on Ground Moving Target Indicators (GMTI), and the Space Warfighting Analysis Center of the U.S. Space Force has completed a force design for GMTI in 2022. The Space Development Agency of the U.S. Space Force also intends to develop the Custody Layer to “provide 24/7, all-weather custody of time-sensitive, left-of-launch surface mobile targets” as part of the planned Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture, utilizing commercial services and other resources.
Japan’s efforts to acquire defense-related space capabilities that have materialized over the past decade demonstrate potential for the country to make even greater strides in the next decade. These initiatives will bring about new opportunities for U.S.-Japan cooperation in the space domain.
Yasuhito Fukushima, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow at the Global Security Division, the Policy Studies Department, the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo. He is currently a Visiting Scholar at the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation in San Diego. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the organization to which the author belongs. Photo: NASA image of JAXA’s (Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency) H-II Transfer Vehicle-6.
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