Nearly six months after protests erupted in Iran following the beating death in police custody of a 22-year-old Iranian Kurdish woman, Mahsa Jina Amini, the Islamic Republic of Iran is severely shaken but still in power.
More than 500 protestors have died at the hands of security forces, thousands have been arrested,four have been executed, and others remain on death row for actions that in a democratic country would not be crimes at all, let alone capital offenses. Meanwhile, Iran maintains strong influence in neighboring countries, continues to provide Russia with lethal drones to pummel innocent Ukrainians, and has advanced its nuclear program to the point where it could produce sufficient fuel for several bombs in a matter of weeks.
Since the 1979 revolution toppled the pro-Western shah, the Islamic Republic and the US have had a mostly adversarial relationship that on several occasions nearly led to major conflict. The outlook as the revolution marks its 44th anniversary on Feb. 11, 2023 is bleak. Yet there are US policy tools that have worked with other foes in the past and can be revamped to promote positive change in Iran while reducing the chances of war and proliferation.
Multiple US administrations negotiated arms control agreements with the old Soviet Union while pushing back on Russian aggression. Ronald Reagan branded the USSR an “evil empire” and demanded that its leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, “tear down” the Berlin Wall. At the same time, the US used “soft power” to engage Russians and Eastern Europeans in ways that ultimately helped end Soviet rule. Many of these policies are applicable to Iran.
The Biden administration has already been much quicker off the mark than the Obama administration to condemn Iranian abuses. President Biden raised the death of Amini in his speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2022, and other officials, from National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan to Secretary of State Tony Blinken, have repeatedly accused Iran of gravely abusing human rights. On Feb. 5, 2023, First Lady Jill Biden awarded a special Grammy to a young Iranian who wrote what has become the protestors’ anthem, “Baraye.”
The State and Treasury departments have identified and sanctioned scores of Iranian officials and institutions for their roles in the crackdown on protests, as well as for Iran’s arms transfers to Russia. At the same time, the Treasury Department issued new general licenses to facilitate the provision of technology that makes it easier for Iranians to overcome government filtering of the Internet. Iranian activists have used services such as Starlink and Western-based social media to amplify reports of protests and repression.
There is more to be done. It should be easier for Iranians in the US to send remittances to their families in Iran. This could enable workers who otherwise fear financial ruin to go on strike. Sanctions could also be eased to permit Iranians, particularly in the tech field, to work remotely for US and multinational companies and be compensated for their labor.
The Biden administration also needs to hone its public diplomacy to amplify Iranian protestors’ demands. This includes devoting more resources to US government-funded Persian-language media outlets while ensuring that they reflect a wide range of views and respect the democratic principles the US espouses and that many Iranians — both in Iran and in the diaspora — say they would like to see implemented in Iran.
There are other programs that can be augmented. The US has a long history of people-to-people diplomacy with citizens of adversarial nations. This includes the State Department’s International Visitor Leadership Program, which from 2006 to 2017 brought more than 500 Iranians to the US for programs on women’s entrepreneurship, climate science, seismology, ophthalmology, and journalism, among other fields. Given the current atmosphere, it may be too risky for Iranians to come to the US, but more neutral venues could be used.
The US should also increase visas allotted to Iranian graduate students. The products of high-quality universities in Iran, such graduates excel in STEM and make a positive contribution to US academic research. If they choose to return home, they usually take with them positive experiences that counter Iranian propaganda and expand the portion of Iran’s population predisposed to seek a better relationship with the US when the circumstances are more favorable.
Of course, US policy toward Iran has been most effective when it has been multilateral. Despite its expressed nonchalance, the Islamic Republic cares about being named and shamed in the United Nations, which voted last year to remove Iran from a UN Commission on the Status of Women just months after Iran was elected as a member. The European Union and Britain have also issued condemnations of Iran’s crackdown and sanctioned human rights abusers. The US should work with developing countries as well to make it harder for the Islamic Republic to tune out the criticism.
Dealing with the Nuclear Piece
There have been few policy decisions more self-defeating than that of the Trump administration in 2018 in quitting the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) when Iran was in full compliance with it. The US withdrawal led Iran to become more aggressive in the region, including against US forces and US partners, and to rapidly expand its nuclear program. Trump’s decision also undercut those within the Iranian political system who sought a better relationship with the West and contributed to a consolidation of power by those who favor stronger ties with fellow authoritarian regimes in Russia and China.
Unfortunately, efforts to revive the JCPOA over the past two years have not born fruit. But that does not mean that diplomacy should be abandoned. For the time being, it makes sense to keep the JCPOA in suspended animation and consider smaller incentives to slow Iran’s progress toward the ability to make a nuclear bomb. One approach has been suggested by the International Crisis Group and by the Arms Control Association: to identify discrete steps that would impede Iran’s nuclear advances in return for limited sanctions relief. These should address key areas of concern including Iran’s large and growing stockpile of enriched uranium, its installation of more advanced centrifuges, and the decreasing visibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) into Iran’s nuclear activities.
According to IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi, Iran in mid-January 2023 had about 70 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent. If further enriched to 80-90 percent, that is more than enough fissile material for several nuclear weapons. Iran has also continued to deploy more advanced centrifuges, going well beyond the 30 cascades of IR-1 centrifuges allowed for under the JCPOA. Iran would still need time, however, to master the actual production of a usable warhead.
Equally if not more concerning is the IAEA’s diminishing visibility into Iran’s nuclear advances. Since February 2021, Iran has reduced IAEA access. Most seriously, on June 10, 2022, Iran turned off and removed 27 cameras that had been filming Iranian facilities albeit no longer transmitting data in real time. As Grossi has stated, even if Iran were to allow the cameras to be reinstalled and to operate as intended, “it is going to be very difficult for me to reconstruct the puzzle of this whole period of forced blindness.”
One possible step would be for Iran to reinstall and reactivate the IAEA cameras and reduce its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile in return for releasing a portion of Iranian oil revenues frozen in foreign banks. Such a deal would likely cause consternation among some quarters but there is precedent in the Joint Plan of Action that preceded the JCPOA, which provided limited sanctions relief in return for a freeze on the program. Another possibility is to waive US sanctions on Iranian oil sales to Europe and Asia for a limited period. This would have the double benefit of curbing Iran’s nuclear advances and helping US allies do without Russian energy. Such an approach could also encourage China to persuade Iran to re-embrace a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis. As the biggest importer of Middle East oil, China stands much to lose if a peaceful resolution cannot be found.
Another obvious concern is proliferation. If there is no JCPOA revival or interim agreement, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey will likely look to advance their own nuclear aspirations. The UAE has renounced any weapons intentions and Turkey remains under a NATO umbrella, but both possess the technical knowhow to change direction quickly. Saudi intentions, in particular, are murky and there is little transparency about its plans to develop an indigenous enrichment and reprocessing capability. Israel, meanwhile, refuses to acknowledge that it possesses an arsenal of at least 80 nuclear weapons.
Diplomacy is also necessary to secure the release of three US-Iranian citizens, who have been imprisoned for bogus crimes, and several European Iranians also seized as hostages. Showy exercises like Centcom’s recent “Juniper Oak” maneuvers may have some deterrence value. But a resort to massive military means to “contain” Iran would only further immiserate Iranians while risking a wider conflict that would set back the entire Middle East and exacerbate the global energy crisis. It would also likely incentivize Iran to develop nuclear weapons to deter new attacks.
“Regime change” is often touted as the ultimate solution. But despite the desire of many for the Islamic Republic to disappear, the prospects for a near-term toppling of the regime are uncertain given the many-layered organizations tasked with safeguarding the revolution and the absence, so far, of significant cracks in the security establishment. There is also no clarity about who or what would replace the current system and the possibility that the alternative could be a military dictatorship — or chaos, civil war and partition. The US should amplify voices within Iran that have called for an end to the morality police, a moratorium on the execution of political prisoners, and acceptance of the increasingly liberal reality of Iranian society. While meaningful change is unlikely while Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is in charge, the regime’s bloody crackdown has sparked a debate throughout society, including in the governing elite, about the wisdom of continuing to impose “revolutionary” mores more than four decades after the fall of the Shah.
Conclusion
The Iranian regime has doubled down on domestic repression and formed an “Axis of Authoritarians” with Russia and China. In the long run, however, these policies may be difficult to sustain. Russia has failed in its objectives for regime change in Ukraine and Russian leader Vladimir Putin himself may be vulnerable if Russian battlefield losses continue to mount. China’s Xi Jinping looks more impregnable, having been confirmed for a third term by a passive Communist party. But China’s own development is slowing because of Xi’s mismanagement of the Covid crisis and alienation of China’s private entrepreneurs and intelligentsia. Betting so much on China and Russia—which also have close ties with Iran’s regional rivals—is not a winning strategy for Iran.
Meanwhile, Iran’s Supreme Leader is old, ailing, and out of touch. Iran’s well-educated women are fed up with 44 years of second-class status as signified by the enforced hijab, and Iran’s Gen Z wants a life more like that of its cohort in freer societies. The regime will have to accommodate their aspirations to a greater extent, or it will not survive.
The task for Western governments is to encourage positive change, penalize and push back against abuses and continue to hold out the prospect of Iran’s re-integration into the international community if it no longer menaces its people and its region. “Plan A”—with an emphasis on diplomacy and soft power—remains the best option, because there is no “Plan B” without potentially worse consequences.
A Common-sense Policy on Iran
By Barbara Slavin
In Middle East & North Africa
Nearly six months after protests erupted in Iran following the beating death in police custody of a 22-year-old Iranian Kurdish woman, Mahsa Jina Amini, the Islamic Republic of Iran is severely shaken but still in power.
More than 500 protestors have died at the hands of security forces, thousands have been arrested,four have been executed, and others remain on death row for actions that in a democratic country would not be crimes at all, let alone capital offenses. Meanwhile, Iran maintains strong influence in neighboring countries, continues to provide Russia with lethal drones to pummel innocent Ukrainians, and has advanced its nuclear program to the point where it could produce sufficient fuel for several bombs in a matter of weeks.
Since the 1979 revolution toppled the pro-Western shah, the Islamic Republic and the US have had a mostly adversarial relationship that on several occasions nearly led to major conflict. The outlook as the revolution marks its 44th anniversary on Feb. 11, 2023 is bleak. Yet there are US policy tools that have worked with other foes in the past and can be revamped to promote positive change in Iran while reducing the chances of war and proliferation.
Multiple US administrations negotiated arms control agreements with the old Soviet Union while pushing back on Russian aggression. Ronald Reagan branded the USSR an “evil empire” and demanded that its leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, “tear down” the Berlin Wall. At the same time, the US used “soft power” to engage Russians and Eastern Europeans in ways that ultimately helped end Soviet rule. Many of these policies are applicable to Iran.
The Biden administration has already been much quicker off the mark than the Obama administration to condemn Iranian abuses. President Biden raised the death of Amini in his speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2022, and other officials, from National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan to Secretary of State Tony Blinken, have repeatedly accused Iran of gravely abusing human rights. On Feb. 5, 2023, First Lady Jill Biden awarded a special Grammy to a young Iranian who wrote what has become the protestors’ anthem, “Baraye.”
The State and Treasury departments have identified and sanctioned scores of Iranian officials and institutions for their roles in the crackdown on protests, as well as for Iran’s arms transfers to Russia. At the same time, the Treasury Department issued new general licenses to facilitate the provision of technology that makes it easier for Iranians to overcome government filtering of the Internet. Iranian activists have used services such as Starlink and Western-based social media to amplify reports of protests and repression.
There is more to be done. It should be easier for Iranians in the US to send remittances to their families in Iran. This could enable workers who otherwise fear financial ruin to go on strike. Sanctions could also be eased to permit Iranians, particularly in the tech field, to work remotely for US and multinational companies and be compensated for their labor.
The Biden administration also needs to hone its public diplomacy to amplify Iranian protestors’ demands. This includes devoting more resources to US government-funded Persian-language media outlets while ensuring that they reflect a wide range of views and respect the democratic principles the US espouses and that many Iranians — both in Iran and in the diaspora — say they would like to see implemented in Iran.
There are other programs that can be augmented. The US has a long history of people-to-people diplomacy with citizens of adversarial nations. This includes the State Department’s International Visitor Leadership Program, which from 2006 to 2017 brought more than 500 Iranians to the US for programs on women’s entrepreneurship, climate science, seismology, ophthalmology, and journalism, among other fields. Given the current atmosphere, it may be too risky for Iranians to come to the US, but more neutral venues could be used.
The US should also increase visas allotted to Iranian graduate students. The products of high-quality universities in Iran, such graduates excel in STEM and make a positive contribution to US academic research. If they choose to return home, they usually take with them positive experiences that counter Iranian propaganda and expand the portion of Iran’s population predisposed to seek a better relationship with the US when the circumstances are more favorable.
Of course, US policy toward Iran has been most effective when it has been multilateral. Despite its expressed nonchalance, the Islamic Republic cares about being named and shamed in the United Nations, which voted last year to remove Iran from a UN Commission on the Status of Women just months after Iran was elected as a member. The European Union and Britain have also issued condemnations of Iran’s crackdown and sanctioned human rights abusers. The US should work with developing countries as well to make it harder for the Islamic Republic to tune out the criticism.
Dealing with the Nuclear Piece
There have been few policy decisions more self-defeating than that of the Trump administration in 2018 in quitting the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) when Iran was in full compliance with it. The US withdrawal led Iran to become more aggressive in the region, including against US forces and US partners, and to rapidly expand its nuclear program. Trump’s decision also undercut those within the Iranian political system who sought a better relationship with the West and contributed to a consolidation of power by those who favor stronger ties with fellow authoritarian regimes in Russia and China.
Unfortunately, efforts to revive the JCPOA over the past two years have not born fruit. But that does not mean that diplomacy should be abandoned. For the time being, it makes sense to keep the JCPOA in suspended animation and consider smaller incentives to slow Iran’s progress toward the ability to make a nuclear bomb. One approach has been suggested by the International Crisis Group and by the Arms Control Association: to identify discrete steps that would impede Iran’s nuclear advances in return for limited sanctions relief. These should address key areas of concern including Iran’s large and growing stockpile of enriched uranium, its installation of more advanced centrifuges, and the decreasing visibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) into Iran’s nuclear activities.
According to IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi, Iran in mid-January 2023 had about 70 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent. If further enriched to 80-90 percent, that is more than enough fissile material for several nuclear weapons. Iran has also continued to deploy more advanced centrifuges, going well beyond the 30 cascades of IR-1 centrifuges allowed for under the JCPOA. Iran would still need time, however, to master the actual production of a usable warhead.
Equally if not more concerning is the IAEA’s diminishing visibility into Iran’s nuclear advances. Since February 2021, Iran has reduced IAEA access. Most seriously, on June 10, 2022, Iran turned off and removed 27 cameras that had been filming Iranian facilities albeit no longer transmitting data in real time. As Grossi has stated, even if Iran were to allow the cameras to be reinstalled and to operate as intended, “it is going to be very difficult for me to reconstruct the puzzle of this whole period of forced blindness.”
One possible step would be for Iran to reinstall and reactivate the IAEA cameras and reduce its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile in return for releasing a portion of Iranian oil revenues frozen in foreign banks. Such a deal would likely cause consternation among some quarters but there is precedent in the Joint Plan of Action that preceded the JCPOA, which provided limited sanctions relief in return for a freeze on the program. Another possibility is to waive US sanctions on Iranian oil sales to Europe and Asia for a limited period. This would have the double benefit of curbing Iran’s nuclear advances and helping US allies do without Russian energy. Such an approach could also encourage China to persuade Iran to re-embrace a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis. As the biggest importer of Middle East oil, China stands much to lose if a peaceful resolution cannot be found.
Another obvious concern is proliferation. If there is no JCPOA revival or interim agreement, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey will likely look to advance their own nuclear aspirations. The UAE has renounced any weapons intentions and Turkey remains under a NATO umbrella, but both possess the technical knowhow to change direction quickly. Saudi intentions, in particular, are murky and there is little transparency about its plans to develop an indigenous enrichment and reprocessing capability. Israel, meanwhile, refuses to acknowledge that it possesses an arsenal of at least 80 nuclear weapons.
Diplomacy is also necessary to secure the release of three US-Iranian citizens, who have been imprisoned for bogus crimes, and several European Iranians also seized as hostages. Showy exercises like Centcom’s recent “Juniper Oak” maneuvers may have some deterrence value. But a resort to massive military means to “contain” Iran would only further immiserate Iranians while risking a wider conflict that would set back the entire Middle East and exacerbate the global energy crisis. It would also likely incentivize Iran to develop nuclear weapons to deter new attacks.
“Regime change” is often touted as the ultimate solution. But despite the desire of many for the Islamic Republic to disappear, the prospects for a near-term toppling of the regime are uncertain given the many-layered organizations tasked with safeguarding the revolution and the absence, so far, of significant cracks in the security establishment. There is also no clarity about who or what would replace the current system and the possibility that the alternative could be a military dictatorship — or chaos, civil war and partition. The US should amplify voices within Iran that have called for an end to the morality police, a moratorium on the execution of political prisoners, and acceptance of the increasingly liberal reality of Iranian society. While meaningful change is unlikely while Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is in charge, the regime’s bloody crackdown has sparked a debate throughout society, including in the governing elite, about the wisdom of continuing to impose “revolutionary” mores more than four decades after the fall of the Shah.
Conclusion
The Iranian regime has doubled down on domestic repression and formed an “Axis of Authoritarians” with Russia and China. In the long run, however, these policies may be difficult to sustain. Russia has failed in its objectives for regime change in Ukraine and Russian leader Vladimir Putin himself may be vulnerable if Russian battlefield losses continue to mount. China’s Xi Jinping looks more impregnable, having been confirmed for a third term by a passive Communist party. But China’s own development is slowing because of Xi’s mismanagement of the Covid crisis and alienation of China’s private entrepreneurs and intelligentsia. Betting so much on China and Russia—which also have close ties with Iran’s regional rivals—is not a winning strategy for Iran.
Meanwhile, Iran’s Supreme Leader is old, ailing, and out of touch. Iran’s well-educated women are fed up with 44 years of second-class status as signified by the enforced hijab, and Iran’s Gen Z wants a life more like that of its cohort in freer societies. The regime will have to accommodate their aspirations to a greater extent, or it will not survive.
The task for Western governments is to encourage positive change, penalize and push back against abuses and continue to hold out the prospect of Iran’s re-integration into the international community if it no longer menaces its people and its region. “Plan A”—with an emphasis on diplomacy and soft power—remains the best option, because there is no “Plan B” without potentially worse consequences.
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