As Russia withdraws from Ukraine’s north and abandons efforts to capture Kyiv, Russian military officials have alluded to a new ambitious objective – control of a territorial crescent covering not just Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region but an arc of land along the country’s entire southern Azov and Black Sea coasts. The pronouncement is worrying for Moldova, a country located on the southwestern tip of Moscow’s supposed crescent of control that has its own Russian backed breakaway region. Located along the eastern spine of Moldova, the region of Transnistria has been effectively independent since 1992 and remains, at least rhetorically, committed to unification with Russia. And while many analysts believe the chances that Russia would seek to extend its conflict to Moldova remain remote, the parallels between Ukraine’s current crisis and that of its small neighbor are still raising serious concerns and represent a further challenge to peace and security in the region.
Moldova’s Russian-Backed Breakaway
The conflict between Moldova and the Russian-backed region of Transnistria has its origins in the country’s post-Cold War independence, when rising Moldovan nationalism and expanding political clout of ethnic Moldovans in state structures created perceived threats to the Russian speaking and Soviet oriented peoples that populated areas to the East of the Dniester River. Shortly after Moldova declared independence in 1991, conflict broke out between the two parties. With the backing of the Soviet 14th Army, Transnistria managed to secure de-facto independence in the 1992. In the intervening years, Russia has kept “peacekeepers” in the region and supported Transnistria’s resistance against determinative agreements with Moldova aimed at resolving the conflict. Today, there remain approximately 1,500 Russian troops in the breakaway region.
The situation in Moldova reflects a well-worn Russian playbook for maintaining its influence and interests in former Soviet satellites. In Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia, the Kremlin has leveraged separatist movements to secure a tactical and strategic toehold. In Moldova and Ukraine, Russia has cited threats to ethnic Russians as justification for cross-border military deployments, and in all three cases has cultivated an element of insecurity to offset perceived westward drifts from within Russia’s “sphere of influence”.
Moldova’s Unique Circumstances and Risks
Even as the United States, NATO, Europe, and other nations have embarked on an unprecedented military and political effort to thwart Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Moldova finds itself in a uniquely vulnerable position. Unlike Ukraine’s other neighbors, Moldova enjoys none of the protections offered by either European Union or NATO membership. While countries like Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania have clung ever more tightly to their NATO and EU affiliations as both a means of deterrence as well as a mechanism for expanding their military capabilities against Russian threats, Moldova has no such alliances. While the West has vigorously recommitted political and military resources to NATO’s Article 5 and the Lisbon Treaty’s Article 42.7’s mutual defense clauses, Moldova remains largely on its own.
Moreover, unlike Ukraine, Moldova’s own military capabilities remain marginal - a byproduct of its larger economic and political struggles. The nation of 3.5 million remains among the poorest and smallest countries in Europe, and, despite notable progress, has struggled with corruption and democratic backsliding. Moldova has few of its own resources to draw from for its own national defense. It has approximately 6,000 active troops and annual military expenditures of just $51 million in 2021 (compared to $5.4 billion from Ukraine in the same year).
Western Support for Moldova
Despite economic, political, and historical challenges, Moldova and the West have made notable progress in expanding security and commercial cooperation. The United States, in particular, has provided significant economic and military assistance, amounting to more than $1.7 billion since 1992. According to the Congressional Research Service, Moldova has historically been the third highest recipient of U.S. bilateral assistance in Europe and Eurasia, averaging $55.25 in aid between FY2019 and FY2022 (FY2022 reflects the Biden Administration’s budget request).
That assistance has included more than $140 million in security sector assistance between FY2010 and FY2021, according to the Security Assistance Monitor, including over $55 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), a program that provides funds to foreign partners to purchase U.S. defense articles and services.
And although Moldova is a constitutionally neutral state, it has also sought to improve its military integration with the United States and its European neighbors. Moldova joined the NATO Cooperation Council in 1992, has contributed troops to the NATO presence in Kosovo since 2014, and has sent soldiers to participate in joint military exercises with the United States.
Enduring Challenges
Moldova’s more recent westward lean has been undercut by political instability and shifting attitudes about the country’s relationship with Europe, the United States and Russia. While recent elections have been seen as promising, Moldova’s enduring structural challenges, its geographic location, and Russia’s clear eye towards revanchism in the region under the pretext of protecting Russian speakers places the country in an especially perilous and precarious position.
Watching the events in Ukraine unfold, Moldova remains on edge. On April 22, Major General Rustam Minnekayev, Russian acting commander of the central military district, said Russia’s re-oriented offensive was aimed at creating a land bridge from Russia, through the Donbass, and across Ukraine’s south to Moldova to give the Kremlin “another way out of Transnistria.” In echoes of Russian claims before its invasion of Ukraine, Minnekayev also suggested that the country’s Russian speakers were being oppressed by the Moldovan government.
While it’s unclear the degree to which Maj. General Minnekayev’s comments reflected the official view of the Kremlin, attacks in Transnistria have only heightened tensions and anxieties. In response to several explosions, which destroyed radio broadcast towers and struck a security building, Russia and Transnistrian leaders suggested the violence was the work of Ukrainian infiltrators. Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense insists the attacks are another false flag operations perpetrated by Russian security services. In another worrying development, the self-styled interior ministry of Transnistria has reported gunfire and drone sightings near a Russian munition depot in the enclave on April 27. Regardless of who is responsible, recent events have renewed fears that the war in Ukraine could find its most likely spillover in Moldova. The United States and its European partners should keep a close eye on developments in Moldova and the extent to which Russian military operations in Ukraine seep into Moldova’s eastern frontier. The recent statement from Defense Secretary Austin that “We’re not really sure what that’s all about, but that’s something that we’ll stay focused on,” suggests insufficient attention is being paid to this vulnerable potential flashpoint. In particular, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), whose mission to Moldova has sought to facilitate a comprehensive peace agreement between the government in Chișinău and Transnistria, should expand short term efforts to diffuse any escalation in tensions and enhance its observation and monitoring capacities in the country. Ultimately, the West should be intently focused on keeping simmering hostilities from boiling over and providing useful pretext for Russia to extend its war to another European country.
Is Moldova Next? Crisis Across Ukraine’s Western Border
By Elias Yousif
In Conventional Arms
As Russia withdraws from Ukraine’s north and abandons efforts to capture Kyiv, Russian military officials have alluded to a new ambitious objective – control of a territorial crescent covering not just Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region but an arc of land along the country’s entire southern Azov and Black Sea coasts. The pronouncement is worrying for Moldova, a country located on the southwestern tip of Moscow’s supposed crescent of control that has its own Russian backed breakaway region. Located along the eastern spine of Moldova, the region of Transnistria has been effectively independent since 1992 and remains, at least rhetorically, committed to unification with Russia. And while many analysts believe the chances that Russia would seek to extend its conflict to Moldova remain remote, the parallels between Ukraine’s current crisis and that of its small neighbor are still raising serious concerns and represent a further challenge to peace and security in the region.
Moldova’s Russian-Backed Breakaway
The conflict between Moldova and the Russian-backed region of Transnistria has its origins in the country’s post-Cold War independence, when rising Moldovan nationalism and expanding political clout of ethnic Moldovans in state structures created perceived threats to the Russian speaking and Soviet oriented peoples that populated areas to the East of the Dniester River. Shortly after Moldova declared independence in 1991, conflict broke out between the two parties. With the backing of the Soviet 14th Army, Transnistria managed to secure de-facto independence in the 1992. In the intervening years, Russia has kept “peacekeepers” in the region and supported Transnistria’s resistance against determinative agreements with Moldova aimed at resolving the conflict. Today, there remain approximately 1,500 Russian troops in the breakaway region.
The situation in Moldova reflects a well-worn Russian playbook for maintaining its influence and interests in former Soviet satellites. In Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia, the Kremlin has leveraged separatist movements to secure a tactical and strategic toehold. In Moldova and Ukraine, Russia has cited threats to ethnic Russians as justification for cross-border military deployments, and in all three cases has cultivated an element of insecurity to offset perceived westward drifts from within Russia’s “sphere of influence”.
Moldova’s Unique Circumstances and Risks
Even as the United States, NATO, Europe, and other nations have embarked on an unprecedented military and political effort to thwart Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Moldova finds itself in a uniquely vulnerable position. Unlike Ukraine’s other neighbors, Moldova enjoys none of the protections offered by either European Union or NATO membership. While countries like Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania have clung ever more tightly to their NATO and EU affiliations as both a means of deterrence as well as a mechanism for expanding their military capabilities against Russian threats, Moldova has no such alliances. While the West has vigorously recommitted political and military resources to NATO’s Article 5 and the Lisbon Treaty’s Article 42.7’s mutual defense clauses, Moldova remains largely on its own.
Moreover, unlike Ukraine, Moldova’s own military capabilities remain marginal - a byproduct of its larger economic and political struggles. The nation of 3.5 million remains among the poorest and smallest countries in Europe, and, despite notable progress, has struggled with corruption and democratic backsliding. Moldova has few of its own resources to draw from for its own national defense. It has approximately 6,000 active troops and annual military expenditures of just $51 million in 2021 (compared to $5.4 billion from Ukraine in the same year).
Western Support for Moldova
Despite economic, political, and historical challenges, Moldova and the West have made notable progress in expanding security and commercial cooperation. The United States, in particular, has provided significant economic and military assistance, amounting to more than $1.7 billion since 1992. According to the Congressional Research Service, Moldova has historically been the third highest recipient of U.S. bilateral assistance in Europe and Eurasia, averaging $55.25 in aid between FY2019 and FY2022 (FY2022 reflects the Biden Administration’s budget request).
That assistance has included more than $140 million in security sector assistance between FY2010 and FY2021, according to the Security Assistance Monitor, including over $55 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), a program that provides funds to foreign partners to purchase U.S. defense articles and services.
And although Moldova is a constitutionally neutral state, it has also sought to improve its military integration with the United States and its European neighbors. Moldova joined the NATO Cooperation Council in 1992, has contributed troops to the NATO presence in Kosovo since 2014, and has sent soldiers to participate in joint military exercises with the United States.
Enduring Challenges
Moldova’s more recent westward lean has been undercut by political instability and shifting attitudes about the country’s relationship with Europe, the United States and Russia. While recent elections have been seen as promising, Moldova’s enduring structural challenges, its geographic location, and Russia’s clear eye towards revanchism in the region under the pretext of protecting Russian speakers places the country in an especially perilous and precarious position.
Watching the events in Ukraine unfold, Moldova remains on edge. On April 22, Major General Rustam Minnekayev, Russian acting commander of the central military district, said Russia’s re-oriented offensive was aimed at creating a land bridge from Russia, through the Donbass, and across Ukraine’s south to Moldova to give the Kremlin “another way out of Transnistria.” In echoes of Russian claims before its invasion of Ukraine, Minnekayev also suggested that the country’s Russian speakers were being oppressed by the Moldovan government.
While it’s unclear the degree to which Maj. General Minnekayev’s comments reflected the official view of the Kremlin, attacks in Transnistria have only heightened tensions and anxieties. In response to several explosions, which destroyed radio broadcast towers and struck a security building, Russia and Transnistrian leaders suggested the violence was the work of Ukrainian infiltrators. Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense insists the attacks are another false flag operations perpetrated by Russian security services. In another worrying development, the self-styled interior ministry of Transnistria has reported gunfire and drone sightings near a Russian munition depot in the enclave on April 27. Regardless of who is responsible, recent events have renewed fears that the war in Ukraine could find its most likely spillover in Moldova. The United States and its European partners should keep a close eye on developments in Moldova and the extent to which Russian military operations in Ukraine seep into Moldova’s eastern frontier. The recent statement from Defense Secretary Austin that “We’re not really sure what that’s all about, but that’s something that we’ll stay focused on,” suggests insufficient attention is being paid to this vulnerable potential flashpoint. In particular, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), whose mission to Moldova has sought to facilitate a comprehensive peace agreement between the government in Chișinău and Transnistria, should expand short term efforts to diffuse any escalation in tensions and enhance its observation and monitoring capacities in the country. Ultimately, the West should be intently focused on keeping simmering hostilities from boiling over and providing useful pretext for Russia to extend its war to another European country.
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