Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion in Nuclear Security Culture: Insider Threat Assessments at Nuclear Facilities

Nuclear security is increasingly vulnerable to insiders, thanks to structural biases in conceptualizing threats – a DE&I security culture provides answers.

By  Sneha Nair

The post-9/11 environment revitalized nuclear security both in the U.S. and abroad. Twenty years after the attacks, the security landscape has shifted, but approaches to nuclear security and insider threat mitigation remain the same. This paper will evaluate the existing threat environment to highlight how disproportionate focus on foreign elements and religious extremism leave room for far-right domestic violent extremists to slip through the cracks. Vulnerabilities in insider threat assessment programs and personnel screening methodologies will be highlighted through case studies, and an argument for a more diverse, equitable, and inclusive nuclear security culture will be proposed as a potential solution to reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism.

This policy paper was originally published by the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management and presented at their 65th Annual Meeting, July 24 – 28, 2022.

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Abstract

In the face of evolving threats, nuclear security frameworks must adapt to new risk factors and challenges, both internal and external. In examining what factors are the most likely to indicate an insider threat from nuclear facility personnel, the systems and methods to identify indicators – both for new hires and existing personnel – are based off of problematic and antiquated conceptualizations of who or what constitutes a threat. For nuclear facilities to more effectively screen their personnel for insider threats, the methodologies used must acknowledge the changes in the threat environment, understand the underlying biases in ‘othering’ frameworks, and adapt to present and future changes. To do this, a more diverse, equitable, and inclusive (DE&I) security culture must be the norm. By creating a DE&I security culture, nuclear facilities can more effectively incorporate these elements of diversity, equity, and inclusion into their broader nuclear security architecture from the ground up. This paper will examine case studies of insider threat incidents involving far-right extremists Brandon Russell and Ashli Babbit through a DE&I lens to highlight where gaps in nuclear security insider threat assessments exist. It will then go on to argue that by implementing DE&I into personnel reliability programs and nuclear security culture, nuclear facilities can improve insider threat assessments to screen for domestic violent extremists, protect against foreign threats, and more effectively identify risks to nuclear facilities.

Introduction

In an ever-changing environment, risk takes on a more fluid form. Pinning down who or what is a threat in the U.S. nuclear space becomes more and more challenging in a world filled with disinformation and evolving circumstances. What exacerbates these efforts to identify individuals who pose a risk to nuclear security is the flaw in the underlying framework for how we assess insider threats.

For decades, the U.S. has constructed the image of a ‘threat’ to fit a very particular image – specifically an image of someone who doesn’t present as an ‘American.’ This default American image is almost always presented as a white individual, with people who fail to present in this way being subject to additional scrutiny. This ‘othering’ of non-white and otherwise ‘non-American’ presenting individuals reinforces problematic biases in national and nuclear security frameworks.

While insider threat assessments focus on personnel reliability programs and effective training, and existing literature is quick to acknowledge that there are flaws in frameworks designed to identify red flags, what isn’t discussed is the underlying bias in determining not only what constitutes a red flag at the organizational level, but also the individual biases that come into play when determining who or what is reported under these schemes.

By examining case studies and the implications of bias within the insider threat personnel reliability programs, this paper will highlight how diversity, equity, and inclusivity (DE&I) shortcomings within a facility’s nuclear security culture can exacerbate or create vulnerabilities related to insider threats. It will also examine how more inclusive policies that mitigate biases can strengthen personnel reliability programs to flag indicators of insider threat behavior to strengthen nuclear security against a wider variety of risks.

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