Space Security Program
The Bush National Space Policy
Freedom of Action, Not Diplomacy
October 10, 2006
Ten years after the Clinton Administration released its National Space Policy; the Bush Administration has finally released its version. Some of the unclassified language remains exactly the same, but on balance, the new policy clearly shifts toward an emphasis on the Air Force’s freedom of action in space. The new policy will reinforce international perceptions that the US may choose to develop, test, or deploy space weapons, while reaffirming the administration’s rejection of negotiations or even discussions on space security. A side-by-side comparison of key security related passages from the Clinton and Bush policies follows:
Items in red are new, Items in blue are changed
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Clinton 1996 |
Bush 2006 |
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In this new century, those who effectively utilize space will enjoy added prosperity and security and will hold a substantial advantage over those who do not. Freedom of action in space is as important to the United States as air power and sea power. In order to increase knowledge, discovery, economic prosperity, and to enhance the national security, the United States must have robust, effective, and efficient space capabilities. (Background, Page 1) | |
| The United States will consider and, as appropriate, formulate policy positions on arms control and related measures governing activities in space, and will conclude agreements on such measures only if they are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the security of the United States and our allies. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) is the principal agency within the Federal government for arms control matters. ACDA, in coordination with the DoD, DCI, State, DoE, and other appropriate Federal agencies, will identify arms control issues and opportunities related to space activities and examine concepts for measures that support national security objectives. |
The United States will oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space. Proposed arms control agreements or restrictions must not impair the rights of the United States to conduct research, development, testing, and operations or other activities in space for U.S. national interests (Principles, Page 2)
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Enable unhindered U.S. operations in and through space to defend our interests there (United States Space Policy Goals, Page 2) | |
| Develop and deploy space capabilities that sustain U.S. advantage and support defense and intelligence transformation (National Security Space Guidelines, Page 4) | |
| Consistent with treaty obligations, the United States will develop, operate and maintain space control capabilities to ensure freedom of action in space and, if directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries. These capabilities may also be enhanced by diplomatic, legal or military measures to preclude an adversary's hostile use of space systems and services. |
Develop capabilities, plans, and options to ensure freedom of action in space, and, if directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries (National Security Space Guidelines, Page 4) |
| Strengthen and maintain the national security of the United States; | Strengthen the nation's space leadership and ensure that space capabilities are available in time to further U.S. national security, homeland security, and foreign policy objectives (United States Space Policy Goals, Page 2) |
| The United States will maintain its general policy of not supporting the development or acquisition of space launch vehicle systems in non-MTCR states….The United States will work to stem the flow of advanced space technology to unauthorized destinations. Executive departments and agencies will be fully responsible for protecting against adverse technology transfer in the conduct of their programs. | As a guideline, space-related exports that are currently available or are planned to be available in the global marketplace shall be considered favorably. Exports of sensitive or advanced technical data, systems, technologies, and components, shall be approved only rarely, on a case-by-case basis. (Effective Export Policies, Page 9) |
The policy is not completely new; some of the language is almost exactly the same:
| The United States is committed to the exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all humanity. "Peaceful purposes" allow defense and intelligence-related activities in pursuit of national security and other goals. | The United States is committed to the exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes, and for the benefit of all humanity. Consistent with this principle, "peaceful purposes" allow U.S. defense and intelligence-related activities in pursuit of national interests (Principles, Page 1) |
| The United States will seek to minimize the creation of space debris. The U.S. Government will take a leadership role in international fora to adopt policies and practices aimed at debris minimization and will cooperate internationally in the exchange of information on debris research and the identification of debris mitigation options. |
The United States shall seek to minimize the creation of orbital debris by government and non-government operations in space in order to preserve the space environment for future generations. The United States shall take a leadership role in international fora to encourage foreign nations and international organizations to adopt policies and practices aimed at debris minimization and shall cooperate in the exchange of information on debris research and the identification of improved debris mitigation practices. (Orbital Debris, Page 9) |
The unclassified space policy can be found at
http://www.ostp.gov/html/US National Space Policy.pdf
The Clinton 1996 space policy can be found at
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/nstc-8.htm
More on the Stimson Center’s Space Security Project can be found at www.stimson.org/space
