Biological and Chemical Weapons
Biological Weapons Proliferation Concerns
According to the US government, 13 nations currently have active biological weapons programs. The following summary draws on open-source news reports and official government statements regarding specific countries.1
China
China began an offensive biological weapons program during the 1950s and there are suspicions that this work continues to this day, even though China signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1984. Currently, China possesses sufficient capacity in the biotechnology and munitions industries to develop, weaponize, produce, and deliver biological agents. While China remains an active participant in Convention review conferences and negotiations toward a monitoring protocol, US Defense Department sources assert that Chinese confidence-building declarations under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention are "inaccurate and incomplete." 1
Cuba
According to a senior State Department official, the United States believes that Cuba possesses a limited offensive biological weapons program and has provide dual-use biotechnology to other nations. Cuba is known to have one of the most advanced biomedical industries in Latin America and leads in the production of pharmaceuticals and vaccines. Cuba has been a member of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention since 19761
Iran
Iran joined the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1973, but is thought to have begun an offensive biological weapons program during the 1980s Iran-Iraq War. US intelligence sources believe that Iran’s efforts might have been spurred on further by revelations about the extent of Iraq’s program in the 1990s. Not only does Iran have a solid domestic biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry that can simultaneously serve cover and support an offensive bioweapons program, Iran has actively sought dual-use technology from other countries. US officials believe that Iran is still focusing for the most part on research and development, but may have already manufactured and stockpiled small quantities of agent.1
Iraq 1
Iraq signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1972. After the Gulf War, Iraq stonewalled United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors charged with verifying the dismantlement of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs. For years, Iraq completely denied any offensive bioweapons program at all, admitting only in 1995 to having maintained an active offensive program that researched, produced, and stockpiled agents including anthrax, botulinum, aflatoxin, and ricin. From 1996 through 1998, UNSCOM inspected various sites in Iraq in an effort to verify Iraqi claims that the program it once denied had been dismantled and the agent destroyed. No inspections have occurred since Sadaam Hussein halted UNSCOM’s access to the country in 1998. UNSCOM’s successor, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, was created in 1999 but has yet to step on Iraqi soil.
In early 2001, US sources stated that satellite imagery revealed reconstruction of a former biological weapon facility in Falluja, west of Baghdad. Bombed by US and UK aircraft in 1998, the rebuilt facility was processing castor beans. While the Iraqi government insists that the beans are being legitimately used to produce castor oil for brake fluid, US sources are concerned ricin may be the actual end product. Iraq tops the list of nations that most concern the US government in terms of biological weapons activities.
|
Agent* |
Total Amount Declared |
Declared Amount of Contracted Agent for Filling Munitions |
Confirmed by UNSCOM Inspectors? |
|
Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) |
22,245 gallons |
2,245 gallons: |
No |
|
Clostridium botulinum |
100,396 gallons |
5,125 gallons: |
No |
|
aflatoxin |
581 gallons |
total amount not available: 7 bombs filled; 4 missile warheads filled |
No |
|
ricin |
2.7 gallons |
total amount not available |
No |
|
Clostridium perfringens |
900 gallons |
90 gallons |
No |
*Note: Iraq admits to producing 20 milliliters of tricothecen mycotoxins for research purposes. See Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Weapons: The Past as Future?" Journal of American Medical Association 278, no. 5 (6 August 1997):420.
Libya
Despite having ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1982, Libya never filed confidence-building data declarations with the United Nations, and US officials believe it continues research and development on biological agents. However, US officials state that they have little evidence that Libyan program has progressed beyond the possible production of small quantities of agent. Possible stumbling blocks in the Libyan program include a lack of a technological foundation, equipment shortages, and knowledgeable personnel, some or all of which may have resulted from the imposition of United Nations sanctions from 1992 to 1999. Libya has demonstrated a willingness to support joint research on biological weapons with other Arab countries, provided the activities do not take place on Libyan soil.1
North Korea
The maturity of the North Korean bioweapons program is such that the US government ranks it second only to Iraq’s germ weapons program in terms of the threat it poses. Top US officials have stated that North Korea began a dedicated biological weapons program in the 1960s and may have gone as far as to produce and weaponize some agents. While North Korea’s biotechnology industry is very basic, North Korea has the indigenous capacity to support production of agents such as anthrax, cholera, and plague. A country that expends more one-quarter of its annual gross domestic product on military programs, North Korea is also capable of producing the munitions that could be used to deliver these agents.1
Return to Top of PageSyria
Syria has signed but not ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. The US government has stated that Syria, which has an elementary-level biotechnology industry, is likely have engaged in offensive biological weapons research and development. The US Department of Defense estimates that without assistance from other countries, Syria is currently incapable of producing or weaponizing significant amounts of agent.1
Return to Top of PageTaiwan
Taiwan, which joined the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1973, is said not to have biological weapons, but it continues to manifest an active interest in conducting biological research of a military-applied nature. Taiwan has a significant scientific and technical base in microbiology and a large number of skilled biotechnology specialists, mostly trained in America and Western Europe. Taiwan is moving to upgrade its biotechnology sector, which makes wide use of technologies basic to the production of biological weapons. Taiwan participates internationally in scientific and technical cooperation of biology, and engages actively in industrial cooperation with the United States, Japan, France, and other Western countries. Also, various joint biomedical programs are underway in such areas as immunology, genetic engineering, and tropical medicine. Taiwan's military biological centers train personnel in medical and biological specialties. Sufficient evidence to determine if Taiwan is producing or weaponizing biological agents does not exist, but Taiwan's advanced scientific research and industrial base would enable the country to produce biological weapons with relative ease. 1
Sources: Department of Defense Nuclear Posture Review Briefing, available on the web at: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/g020109-D-6570C.html John Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, 6 May 2002 speech to the Heritage Foundation; 1998 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Department of Defense, Proliferation Threat and Response, 2001; CIA Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, July-December 2000, released 7 September 2001; John Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, address to the Fifth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, November 2001; Bob Einhorn, Assistant Secretary, of State for Nonproliferation Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 10/5/2000.