On his way to Asia, U.S. President Donald Trump publicly reiterated an interest in meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. A few days later, he indicated he might offer sanctions relief. Meanwhile, North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui was in Russia to reaffirm strong ties and in Belarus to open a new chapter in bilateral relations.

The U.S. president’s outreach to Kim was a commendable effort, but it is unsurprising he returned home without a meeting. In a parliamentary speech in September, Kim said he could engage with the United States only if it abandoned its denuclearization demand. He also made clear that North Korea would not relinquish its nuclear programs in exchange for sanctions relief. Trump’s remarks before and during his Asia trip did not indicate any change in U.S. policy toward North Korea. Furthermore, North Korea’s distrust of the United States has remained deep since the collapse of the second US-North Korea summit in Hanoi in 2019. The Trump administration’s bombing of Iranian nuclear sites and its ongoing military campaign against Venezuelan drug cartels likely have reinforced that thinking. In sum, Pyongyang had little motivation to respond to Trump’s overtures.

The geopolitical landscape has shifted dramatically since the Hanoi summit’s collapse. North Korea has fundamentally recalibrated its foreign policy, publicly renouncing its three-decade policy of normalizing relations with the United States through denuclearization. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine accelerated North Korea’s pivot to Moscow, which was already underway. Now, bilateral relations have reached new heights, exemplified by their new treaty and Kim Jong Un’s supplies of ammunition and troops to Russia. Meanwhile, North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs have advanced substantially. Emboldened by the new geopolitical environment and burgeoning ties with Russia, North Korea adopted a new doctrine allowing preemptive nuclear strikes, codified the country’s nuclear status into the constitution, and abandoned its 50-year-old goal of peaceful unification.

North Korea reacts sensitively to any movement by key stakeholders to push the denuclearization agenda. A case in point: Pyongyang issued a statement mere hours before the South Korea-China summit on the sidelines of the recent APEC Summit, criticizing South Korea for adding denuclearization to the agenda. This unusual preemptive warning targeted both China and South Korea, and it was effective. China did not publicly mention denuclearization after the summit, just as it omitted the word “denuclearization” from its official report on President Xi Jinping’s talks with Kim in September. China’s increasing reluctance to publicly pursue denuclearization further complicates the already complex North Korean nuclear issue.

North Korea will present its domestic and foreign policies at the Ninth Party Congress in early 2026, which should provide clearer insight into its intentions toward the Trump administration and, by extension, prospects for another Trump-Kim summit.