Editor’s Note: Dr. Kristian Alexander is a geopolitical analyst based in the UAE and Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute Switzerland (MEIS). He previously served as Senior Fellow and Lead Researcher at the Rabdan Security and Defense Institute (RSDI), as well as Trends Research & Advisory (Abu Dhabi), and prior to that as an Assistant Professor at Zayed University (Abu Dhabi).

By Middle East Program Team

The attacks on Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport have brought Yemen’s renewed war into Saudi Arabia’s economic and political center and further threaten the kingdom’s development plans.

Saudi authorities reported a dozen deaths and more than 300 injuries after an October 10 attack. This was followed by another projectile that struck a passenger terminal the following day. The incidents demonstrate the Houthis’ capacity to endanger Saudi infrastructure, without establishing that every launch succeeded or that Saudi air defenses have collapsed. The question is how a force with vastly fewer resources repeatedly imposes costs on a technologically superior state.

The strikes followed renewed Saudi-backed operations in Yemen. Escalation accelerated in July when the Saudis struck Sana’a airport to prevent the landing of an Iranian plane carrying Houthis who had attended the funeral of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran. This was followed by Houthi attacks against Saudi targets including oil facilities and the Houthi capture of the port of Mocha on the Red Sea coast near the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint. By October, Riyadh was supporting an offensive to reverse Houthi gains along Yemen’s western coast. The attacks on Saudi airports belong to this coercive exchange as the movement seeks to make Saudi intervention expensive while strengthening its territorial and negotiating position.

Why Advanced Air Defenses Cannot Prevent Every Attack

The Houthis can choose where and when to attack while Saudi Arabia must protect airports, cities, energy facilities, and military bases across a large territory. Different weapons require different responses as low-flying missiles can leave little time to react while small drones can be difficult to detect and distinguish from other objects. Systems designed to stop ballistic missiles may be less effective against these threats. Protecting the kingdom therefore requires more than advanced equipment. It also depends on early warning, coordination, and sufficient defensive missiles at the locations under threat.

Repeated attacks put this protection under pressure. Even when incoming weapons are destroyed, each interception uses ammunition that must be replaced. Shooting down inexpensive drones with costly defensive missiles also makes prolonged protection expensive. Saudi Arabia has sought assistance as supplies came under strain, but the available evidence does not indicate whether shortages contributed to the airport attacks. It would be premature to conclude that the defenses were overwhelmed, ran out of ammunition, or suffered equipment failures. Damage can occur when a weapon gets through or when debris falls after an interception. Saudi Arabia must maintain protection continuously while the Houthis can gain political leverage from occasional attacks that cause damage and disruption.

The Houthis present their attacks as responses to Saudi military action and restrictions affecting Yemen. Their rhetoric links Sana’a’s airport to Saudi airports through a claimed principle of reciprocity. Warnings to airlines and travelers seek to influence commercial behavior alongside Saudi decision-making. The movement pursues deterrence by discouraging further intervention and compellence by pressing Riyadh to change existing policies. Airports magnify this pressure because airlines, passengers, and businesses independently reassess risk, extending disruption beyond physical damage.

The psychological target is Saudi Arabia’s promise of stability. Economic diversification requires confidence among investors, tourists, and international organizations. The Financial Times reported that senior energy executives withdrew from a Riyadh conference after the strike, illustrating the wider consequences. Restraint risks appearing ineffective while escalation invites retaliation. For Houthi audiences, reaching Riyadh projects strength despite hardship at home. These effects do not prove that the movement has achieved its demands. Civilian casualties can consolidate opposition to it, and retaliation does not remove the obligation to protect civilians.

The attacks may also strengthen the Houthi position in peace negotiations. A UN roadmap announced in December 2023 envisaged a nationwide ceasefire, payment of public-sector salaries, and further easing of restrictions on Sana’a airport and Hudaydah port. By raising the cost of confrontation for Saudi Arabia, the Houthis may hope to secure more favorable terms on these issues.

Institutions and Ideology Sustain Houthi Power

Ansar Allah, the formal name for the Houthis, emerged from northern Yemen’s Zaydi revivalist movement and fought six wars against the state between 2004 and 2010. These conflicts forged experienced cadres, tribal connections, and hardened leadership networks. Taking Sana’a in 2014 enabled the movement to absorb army weapons and personnel and establish supervisors linking ministries, local councils, and tribal leaders to its leadership. External weapons alone cannot explain this transformation from insurgency into a territorial authority capable of regenerating forces and mobilizing state resources.

Taxes, customs, fuel-related income, and compulsory contributions sustain its apparatus. Leader Abdelmalek al-Houthi’s authority and veteran loyalties facilitate coordination while recruitment combines ideology, patronage, economic inducements, and coercion. Poverty makes income and material support effective incentives without implying political conviction. Religious identity, resistance to foreign intervention, and solidarity with Palestine supply mobilizing narratives. External attacks can reinforce claims to defend Yemen, attracting sympathy beyond the original constituency, including among critics of domestic rule. This capacity to mobilize does not establish universal popular consent.

Iran Enables Capability Without Determining Every Decision

Iranian assistance has expanded Houthi military capabilities. U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency publications identify Iranian links to missiles, drones, and components intercepted at sea. A 2024 UN expert report identified training and assistance involving Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah, and Iraqi specialists. Technical knowledge helps the movement operate, maintain, and reproduce capabilities after equipment is lost. Local assembly nevertheless depends on specialized components and expertise, but it does not establish industrial independence or explain the command arrangements behind the recent attacks.

Tehran, embroiled in its own war against the U.S., gains leverage over Saudi Arabia and maritime routes without deploying a conventional expeditionary force or financing Houthi governance entirely. However, the Houthis retain their own leadership, territorial ambitions, and bargaining priorities. Alignment does not establish Iranian direction of every operation, although dependence on technical cooperation creates influence. Disrupting supplies could constrain replenishment without eliminating existing weapons, trained personnel, or domestic resources. Diplomacy with Tehran can therefore complement efforts to restrain the movement but cannot replace engagement with its own incentives.

Saudi retaliation requires a defined objective. Disrupting capabilities, limiting territorial expansion, and restoring commercial access differ from overthrowing Houthi rule. Air strikes can damage equipment, but lasting effects depend on whether losses exceed replacement capacity. Dispersal and difficult terrain complicate this calculation while civilian harm can reinforce Houthi resistance narratives. The challenge is to connect military pressure with protection at home and a credible route to fewer attacks.

Allied intelligence, equipment, and defensive assistance should be distinguished from offensive combat commitments. Pakistan and Turkey have signaled support without committing unconditionally to a Yemen war. European involvement remains limited. U.S. decisions may also reflect domestic politics as another commitment before November’s midterms could further undermine the Republican party’s chances. Partners can defend Saudi territory while resisting open-ended responsibility for Yemen. Solidarity does not automatically produce a coalition capable of defeating the Houthis.

Yemen’s Divided Opposition Remains the Decisive Constraint

The forces opposing the Houthis agree on the need to challenge the movement but differ over who should govern Yemen and how the country should be organized. Government forces, groups linked to the Islah party, tribal fighters, Tareq Saleh’s National Resistance, the Giants Brigades, and southern groups pursue different political and territorial goals. Bringing them together under the Presidential Leadership Council does not automatically create a unified military command or a shared vision for Yemen’s future. Disrupted oil exports and divided control over revenues also weaken the government’s ability to pay salaries and provide services. Even Yemenis dissatisfied with Houthi rule may hesitate to support opponents who cannot offer a credible alternative.

Saudi air power can support advances on the ground, but holding recovered territory requires coordinated local forces, public trust, and functioning administration. Retaking coastal areas could reduce Houthi leverage over shipping without eliminating their ability to launch missiles into Saudi Arabia. Capturing Sana’a would require a far greater military effort and a political agreement among the forces seeking to govern it. The Houthis benefit from greater internal cohesion than their opponents, although this does not make them invulnerable or able to sustain fighting indefinitely.

The strikes on Riyadh show that Saudi Arabia’s problem is a political and strategic one that no arsenal of interceptors can solve alone. The Houthis have combined low-cost weapons, Iranian technical help, a resilient domestic base, and a divided adversary to create leverage far beyond their conventional strength. Saudi Arabia’s realistic path lies in restoring deterrence while returning to a negotiated settlement that addresses the Houthis’ core demands, and in helping to build a more cohesive Yemeni opposition. Any such outcome will have to account for the fact that, after more than a decade of conflict, the Houthis are an entrenched part of Yemen’s political landscape.