Editor’s Note: Javad Heiran-Nia is Director of the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran. His book “Iran and the Security Order in the Persian Gulf: The Presidency of Hassan Rouhani” was published by Routledge.

By: Middle East Program Team

On September 30, 2026, two deadlines were supposed to coincide: the withdrawal of remaining U.S. and international troops from Iraq and the disarmament of Iraqi militias. But as the date approaches, Baghdad’s disarmament timetable has become increasingly ambiguous.

Iraqi National Security Adviser Qasim al-Araji has now said that there is no fixed deadline for the committee overseeing the process of bringing weapons under state control, while the September 30 date still applies to the withdrawal of coalition forces.

That distinction matters. Rather than marking the end of the disarmament process, September 30 may instead become the beginning of a longer and more politically managed phase of negotiations. Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi is expected to seek additional time for the process during a scheduled meeting this week with U.S. President Donald Trump in New York, while reaffirming Iraq’s commitment to placing the use of force exclusively under state authority. A source in the Iraqi government has indicated that Baghdad currently does not expect to resolve the issue by the end of September and is seeking to manage the deadline rather than bring the process to a definitive conclusion.

The ambiguity reflects Baghdad’s central dilemma: bringing weapons under state control without provoking a confrontation with powerful Iran-aligned factions embedded in Iraq’s political and security system. While some groups have signaled greater openness to integrating their armed structures into the state, several of the most powerful factions — including Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba — have rejected the government’s disarmament timetable, arguing that foreign forces must first leave Iraq.

The issue is increasingly shifting from whether Iraq’s armed factions will disarm by September 30 to how and under what conditions Baghdad can bring their weapons, command structures, and military capabilities under effective state control. With no fixed deadline now set for completing the process, the government faces the challenge of maintaining political consensus, responding to pressure from Washington, and avoiding confrontation with powerful factions, while the groups themselves gain more time to negotiate the terms of their integration into Iraq’s security structure. The result is a gradual and contested transition in which September 30 may mark only the beginning of a longer process.

The key issue is not simply the presence of weapons by the so-called Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), but whether military and operational capabilities remain outside the effective control of the state’s chain of command.

Armed Groups Set Conditions

In this context, the group Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada conditioned its participation on 10 demands, including the full withdrawal of U.S. and Turkish forces, restrictions on the use of Iraqi airspace, stronger air defenses, federal control of Kurdistan’s borders, and the removal of groups opposed to the Islamic Republic of Iran from northern Iraq.

Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada framed its continued possession of arms as a response to security threats rather than a permanent instrument, making retention or relinquishment conditional on changes in Iraq’s security environment.

Hadi al-Ameri, the long-time leader of the Iran-backed Badr Brigades, framed the issue as weapons regulation rather than full disarmament. However, al-Ameri has also supported the principle of state authority over weapons.

The Iraqi government had set September 30 as the deadline for armed groups to address weapons remaining outside state control to coincide with the scheduled end of the international coalition’s mission in Iraq. Government spokesman Haider al-Aboudi said weapons remaining outside state authority after the deadline could face legal measures.

In late August, however, Iraqi security adviser Al-Araji clarified that Baghdad intends to pursue state control over weapons gradually through dialogue, while avoiding direct confrontation with powerful Shi’ite armed groups.

From this perspective, the central issue is not disarmament in the classical DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration) sense, but rather the transfer of effective control over weapons, decisions regarding the use of force, and command authority to the central government.

It should be noted that the PMF, created in the wake of the 2014 ISIS onslaught into Iraq, was formally institutionalized by Iraq’s parliament in November 2016. A law granted it legal status as part of the Iraqi armed forces, placed it under the direct authority of the commander-in-chief, and prohibited its members from engaging in partisan political activity.

The Iraqi government intensified efforts in June 2026 to establish a state monopoly over PMF weapons, emphasizing national sovereignty and tighter control over armed groups. Baghdad has pursued negotiations aimed at integrating militia personnel into the formal security structure and severing links between PMF units and political organizations.

While groups such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Saraya al-Salam have shown some willingness to operate within the state framework, Kata’ib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba have taken a harder line.

This highlights divisions among Shi’ite armed factions, with their positions shaped largely by their political and economic ties to Tehran.

Iran’s Stance on PMF Disarmament

In addition to their fight against ISIS, the PMF militias have played a role for Iran within the “Axis of Resistance” that goes beyond that of simple proxies. Since the U.S. and Israel attacked Iran in February, PMF units have struck Saudi Arabia, Jordan, U.S. bases, and Iraqi energy infrastructure, allowing Tehran to retaliate indirectly for those strikes.

Given pressure from the United States and the Iraqi government to disarm resistance groups, Iran has shifted from explicit opposition to changing the nature and name of the process from disarmament to regulation and integration, so that weapons remain in the hands of aligned groups.

From Tehran’s perspective, the legal and administrative integration of Iraqi armed groups may be acceptable, but eliminating their independent operational capabilities would constitute a major strategic loss. This concern was underscored during the reported August 2026 visit of Esmail Qaani, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ Quds Force, to Baghdad, where he reportedly urged Iran-aligned factions not to surrender their weapons for the time being, while also avoiding armed confrontation with the Iraqi government and pursuing a political settlement.

Iranian parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf’s August 19 visit to Baghdad also stressed the need to avoid a confrontation between the Iraqi government and Iran-aligned factions and included proposals to temporarily relocate heavy weapons pending a political agreement.

Overall, Iran seeks a negotiated settlement that preserves the core capabilities of Iran-aligned factions.

Iran’s growing reliance on Iraqi militias reflects the weakening of its broader “Axis of Resistance” following the decline of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the loss of Syria as a strategic corridor. This has increased the importance of Iran-aligned Iraqi armed groups and the Houthis as remaining key regional assets for Tehran.

However, the PMF has been less successful in deterring U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran than in regional power projection and retaliation.

In this context, recent attacks on Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline, which the Iraqi and Saudi governments have both attributed to resistance groups in Iraq, were meant to thwart Saudi attempts to bypass the Strait of Hormuz and drive energy prices higher so that Iran’s leverage in controlling the Strait would not be undermined.

Iran increasingly views the current confrontation not as a bilateral exchange with the United States or Israel, but as a multi-front war in which different theaters — including Iraq, the Persian Gulf, and strategically important maritime chokepoints — are integrated into a single strategic battlespace.

The PMF’s dual structure — partially embedded within the formal state framework while some constituent groups maintain clandestine and autonomous structures — provides Iran with the ability to conduct operations without direct attribution to Iran or the Iraqi state. Reports indicate that the Quds Force has provided Iraqi cells with capabilities for conducting attacks against targets in Iraqi Kurdistan as well as the Arab Gulf states. This flexibility would be significantly reduced in the event of full integration into the Iraqi state’s command structure.

Preserving the PMF in the Power Structure

PMF political, economic, and institutional influence makes it an important component of Tehran’s broader leverage in Iraq. Accordingly, Iran’s preferred outcome is not necessarily to preserve the PMF in its current form, but to retain a degree of independent military and political capacity among Iran-aligned factions.

From Iran’s perspective, this dual structure offers a strategic advantage: it allows military capabilities to remain embedded within an institution that enjoys state legitimacy and access to public funding, while enabling certain constituent groups to retain a degree of operational autonomy under specific circumstances.

Another important dimension of the crisis is the linkage between the weapons issue, Turkey’s presence, and the security situation in northern Iraq.

Iran-aligned groups — particularly Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada — have linked the issue of relinquishing weapons to Turkish forces, activities by the Kurdish Workers Party, a militant group, the status of the Kurdistan Region’s borders, and the presence of groups opposed to the Islamic Republic in northern Iraq. In its August 29 conditions, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada also called for the withdrawal of Turkish forces and the transfer of control over the Kurdistan Region’s borders to the Iraqi federal government.

In effect, these groups argue that so long as external threats to Iraq remain, the complete disarmament of Shi’ite armed factions is not advisable.

Politically, this argument provides a justification for maintaining weapons and shifts the debate from state authority over weapons toward the broader issue of Iraqi sovereignty.  However, this argument conflicts with the position of the Iraqi government and presidency regarding the status of the Kurdistan Region’s Peshmerga. The Iraqi president has stated that the because of its constitutional status, the Peshmerga — a historic Kurdish armed force — are not part of the effort to disarm and integrate non-state groups.

Iran is also concerned that the expansion of economic and geopolitical cooperation between Baghdad and Ankara, particularly within the framework of the Development Road project, could gradually alter Iraq’s position within regional alignments in ways favorable to Turkey and adverse to Iran.

In this context, the 2026 war has increased the strategic value of alternative trade routes through Turkey, including the Development Road. The project could reduce the Gulf Arab states’ dependence on the Strait of Hormuz and thereby weaken Iran’s leverage. Consequently, Iran-aligned groups in Iraq oppose such projects.

The emergence of new forms of cooperation among Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Egypt could also alter Iran’s strategic environment. Although these relationships do not necessarily constitute a coherent anti-Iranian bloc, deeper security cooperation among these states could increase their collective deterrence capacity and, if further institutionalized, constrain Tehran’s regional room for maneuver.

Within this broader environment, the PMF is no longer merely a proxy force serving a deterrent function but an instrument through which Iran can implement an offensive doctrine within the framework of regional and attritional warfare. This emerging role, particularly when used to directly target U.S. partners and interests, has become a destabilizing factor capable of disrupting existing security arrangements. As a result, Iraq risks shifting from a relatively secure rear area into a frontline theater of Iran’s regional confrontation with the United States and its partners.

The key distinction for Tehran is thus not between the existence and non-existence of the PMF as an institution, but between formal institutional integration and the actual elimination of independent military and operational capabilities. Iran can potentially accommodate the former; the latter represents a core strategic challenge for Tehran.