Editor’s Note: Ali Dadpay is an Iranian-American economist who specializes in analyzing the impact of Iranian domestic and foreign policy on the country’s embattled economy.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Iran is being bombed, and its skies have effectively become an aerial highway for Israeli and American fighter jets. Pilots attack targets with precision and impunity, since Iranian air defenses appear unable to contest control of the country’s airspace.
The Islamic Republic’s inability to defend Iran’s infrastructure and even its own command centers is not simply a technological failure; it is the result of four decades of ideological favoritism shaping its military institutions and the political economy governing their resources.
Military institutions reflect the political nature of the regimes that build them. In Iran, defense priorities have long been shaped by ideological considerations and prestige projects. While the Islamic Republic spent billions of dollars on missile programs and regional military adventures, it failed to build and maintain an effective air defense system. The result is unprecedented in modern Iranian history: For the first time since the Second World War, Iran has effectively lost control over its skies.
Ignoring Legacies from the Pahlavi Era
This outcome is particularly striking given the lessons Iranian leaders once drew from their own history.
During the Second World War, British and Soviet forces invaded Iran in August 1941 despite its neutrality, after Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union. The Allies needed a reliable supply corridor to Russia, and Iran’s sovereignty proved expendable. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi never forgot the humiliation of coming to the throne after the occupiers forced his father to abdicate.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Shah invested heavily in Iran’s armed forces, particularly in building a modern and sophisticated air force. His critics accused him of excessive militarization and wasting Iran’s oil revenues on weapon systems the country did not need. Yet the strategic logic was straightforward: Control of the skies was the ultimate guarantee of sovereignty.
When the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979, it inherited a well-trained and well-equipped military establishment. But the new leaders deeply distrusted the regular army, known as Artesh. To hedge against this perceived risk, the regime quickly established a parallel military institution: the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).
From that moment onward, Iran had two military forces with very different political roles. Artesh remained the country’s conventional military under strict political supervision. The IRGC, however, became the political favorite — an ideological force with direct access to the ruling establishment and growing institutional autonomy.
The IRGC used its advantages to advance its own agenda. Over time, it evolved into a powerful political and economic network, distributing profits and patronage to its supporters in order to secure its interests and shape Iran’s military doctrine.
While Iran’s neighbors were modernizing their air forces and strengthening their air defenses, the IRGC pushed the country to spend billions of dollars on proxy groups, missile programs, and drone manufacturing. It is fair to say that Iran’s conventional military establishment was left to depreciate at an alarming rate.
Yet when the Guards proudly spoke of their thousands of missiles, no one dared to ask a simple question: Who would protect the warehouses storing them? The Islamic Republic’s efforts to purchase Russian anti-aircraft systems, such as the S-300, faced many challenges. While Iran signed an $800 million deal to acquire the long-range S-300 air defense missile system in 2007, the delivery was not completed until 2016. The agreement was once suspended in 2010 under pressure from the United States and Israel. The system proved vulnerable and performed poorly against much more advanced Israeli fighter jets during the 12-Day War in the summer of 2025. By the time the Islamic Republic signed a new secret deal, valued at $589 million, to acquire advanced shoulder-fired missiles in December 2025, time had run out.
Crowding Out a National Defense System
The conventional armed forces struggled to keep their bases and systems running. Receiving only half the funding the IRGC enjoys, the conventional air force and navy also had to deal with a political establishment that did not prioritize their requirements. It seems the Islamic regime’s expenditures on the missile program and IRGC proxy groups across the regime crowded out the need for a national defense system. Facing air forces that believe in the mantra “Bombers always get through,” the IRGC was more preoccupied with basing its missile launchers in Lebanon and Syria than helping to build a reliable surface-to-air missile system in Iran.
One cannot help but wonder whether Israeli pilots would have such a relaxed time reaching Tehran had the Islamic Republic spent a fraction of what its missile program cost on its air defenses.
Over the years, the IRGC missile program morphed into something much more than a weapons program. It became proof that “young revolutionary minds” could accomplish anything they set out to do. If Iran’s automobile industry struggled, it was suggested that the engineers building the missiles should take charge — they would surely make it work. If Iran’s proxies in Syria and Lebanon were threatened, the answer was simple: Remind Israel of the thousands of missiles Hezbollah could unleash.
In this sense, the missile program freed the Islamic Republic from the perceived need to follow conventional military logic or maintain strategic balance.
The IRGC amplified this narrative through constant propaganda and, in doing so, secured even greater resources for the program — often at the expense of Iran’s conventional armed forces. Over time, the missile program began to resemble something closer to Hitler’s Wunderwaffen: weapons that convinced their creators that technological miracles could deliver victory even when the strategic realities suggested otherwise.
Such beliefs are dangerous. They can persuade leaders that risks are manageable and encourage them to make decisions that a more sober assessment of their capabilities would have ruled out.
While many speculate over the outcome of the current war, the damage to Iran’s infrastructure was completely predictable.
Header image: Tehran view. By Mehrraz.
The Political Economy of Blows Against Iran’s Military and Civilian Infrastructure
By Ali Dadpay
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Ali Dadpay is an Iranian-American economist who specializes in analyzing the impact of Iranian domestic and foreign policy on the country’s embattled economy.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Iran is being bombed, and its skies have effectively become an aerial highway for Israeli and American fighter jets. Pilots attack targets with precision and impunity, since Iranian air defenses appear unable to contest control of the country’s airspace.
The Islamic Republic’s inability to defend Iran’s infrastructure and even its own command centers is not simply a technological failure; it is the result of four decades of ideological favoritism shaping its military institutions and the political economy governing their resources.
Military institutions reflect the political nature of the regimes that build them. In Iran, defense priorities have long been shaped by ideological considerations and prestige projects. While the Islamic Republic spent billions of dollars on missile programs and regional military adventures, it failed to build and maintain an effective air defense system. The result is unprecedented in modern Iranian history: For the first time since the Second World War, Iran has effectively lost control over its skies.
Ignoring Legacies from the Pahlavi Era
This outcome is particularly striking given the lessons Iranian leaders once drew from their own history.
During the Second World War, British and Soviet forces invaded Iran in August 1941 despite its neutrality, after Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union. The Allies needed a reliable supply corridor to Russia, and Iran’s sovereignty proved expendable. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi never forgot the humiliation of coming to the throne after the occupiers forced his father to abdicate.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Shah invested heavily in Iran’s armed forces, particularly in building a modern and sophisticated air force. His critics accused him of excessive militarization and wasting Iran’s oil revenues on weapon systems the country did not need. Yet the strategic logic was straightforward: Control of the skies was the ultimate guarantee of sovereignty.
When the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979, it inherited a well-trained and well-equipped military establishment. But the new leaders deeply distrusted the regular army, known as Artesh. To hedge against this perceived risk, the regime quickly established a parallel military institution: the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).
From that moment onward, Iran had two military forces with very different political roles. Artesh remained the country’s conventional military under strict political supervision. The IRGC, however, became the political favorite — an ideological force with direct access to the ruling establishment and growing institutional autonomy.
The IRGC used its advantages to advance its own agenda. Over time, it evolved into a powerful political and economic network, distributing profits and patronage to its supporters in order to secure its interests and shape Iran’s military doctrine.
While Iran’s neighbors were modernizing their air forces and strengthening their air defenses, the IRGC pushed the country to spend billions of dollars on proxy groups, missile programs, and drone manufacturing. It is fair to say that Iran’s conventional military establishment was left to depreciate at an alarming rate.
Yet when the Guards proudly spoke of their thousands of missiles, no one dared to ask a simple question: Who would protect the warehouses storing them? The Islamic Republic’s efforts to purchase Russian anti-aircraft systems, such as the S-300, faced many challenges. While Iran signed an $800 million deal to acquire the long-range S-300 air defense missile system in 2007, the delivery was not completed until 2016. The agreement was once suspended in 2010 under pressure from the United States and Israel. The system proved vulnerable and performed poorly against much more advanced Israeli fighter jets during the 12-Day War in the summer of 2025. By the time the Islamic Republic signed a new secret deal, valued at $589 million, to acquire advanced shoulder-fired missiles in December 2025, time had run out.
Crowding Out a National Defense System
The conventional armed forces struggled to keep their bases and systems running. Receiving only half the funding the IRGC enjoys, the conventional air force and navy also had to deal with a political establishment that did not prioritize their requirements. It seems the Islamic regime’s expenditures on the missile program and IRGC proxy groups across the regime crowded out the need for a national defense system. Facing air forces that believe in the mantra “Bombers always get through,” the IRGC was more preoccupied with basing its missile launchers in Lebanon and Syria than helping to build a reliable surface-to-air missile system in Iran.
One cannot help but wonder whether Israeli pilots would have such a relaxed time reaching Tehran had the Islamic Republic spent a fraction of what its missile program cost on its air defenses.
Over the years, the IRGC missile program morphed into something much more than a weapons program. It became proof that “young revolutionary minds” could accomplish anything they set out to do. If Iran’s automobile industry struggled, it was suggested that the engineers building the missiles should take charge — they would surely make it work. If Iran’s proxies in Syria and Lebanon were threatened, the answer was simple: Remind Israel of the thousands of missiles Hezbollah could unleash.
In this sense, the missile program freed the Islamic Republic from the perceived need to follow conventional military logic or maintain strategic balance.
The IRGC amplified this narrative through constant propaganda and, in doing so, secured even greater resources for the program — often at the expense of Iran’s conventional armed forces. Over time, the missile program began to resemble something closer to Hitler’s Wunderwaffen: weapons that convinced their creators that technological miracles could deliver victory even when the strategic realities suggested otherwise.
Such beliefs are dangerous. They can persuade leaders that risks are manageable and encourage them to make decisions that a more sober assessment of their capabilities would have ruled out.
While many speculate over the outcome of the current war, the damage to Iran’s infrastructure was completely predictable.
Header image: Tehran view. By Mehrraz.
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