In recent months, there has been considerable speculation about the timeline for a $14 billion arms package for Taiwan that U.S. President Donald Trump is believed to have placed on hold amid talks with China’s Xi Jinping. But an equally concerning question has received far less attention: When will Taiwan’s president, Lai Ching-te, have the opportunity to transit through the United States so he can make a long-delayed visit to the island’s diplomatic partners in Latin America and the Caribbean?

Lai’s last attempt to visit Latin America was postponed last August after the Trump administration denied permission for him to transit through New York, reportedly over concern that a high-profile stopover could jeopardize trade negotiations with Beijing. Almost a year later, the trip has yet to be rescheduled. While no reason has been given for the prolonged delay, it is likely at least partly related to Trump’s diplomatic efforts with Xi. Beijing opposes stopovers of Taiwanese presidents on U.S. soil, and some Chinese interlocutors warn a transit could jeopardize future meetings between the two leaders.

In principle, Lai’s engagements with Taiwan’s diplomatic partners shouldn’t need U.S. approval. In practice, however, visits to Latin America and the Caribbean require a transit stop in the United States, and this requires sign-off from the president. It’s technically possible for an ultra-long-range aircraft to fly the nearly 9,000 miles from Taipei to Guatemala or Belize, Taiwan’s geographically closest diplomatic partners in the region. But logistical and safety challenges make a journey that long impractical for most airlines, let alone a presidential delegation. U.S. transits not only allow planes to refuel but also provide opportunities for Taiwan’s president to engage with diaspora communities and hold unofficial meetings with American officials.

To be precise, the Trump administration didn’t exactly deny Lai permission to transit through the U.S. last year. It only rejected his planned stop in New York. Media reports and individuals familiar with the matter indicated that alternative, lower-profile transit locations remained available. However, the prestige of a New York stopover filled with high-profile meetings was politically important for Lai, and he ultimately postponed the trip, citing domestic priorities such as typhoon recovery.

Now, over halfway through his term, Lai has yet to visit a single diplomatic partner in the Western Hemisphere, home to seven of the 12 countries that still recognize Taipei. How much responsibility Trump has for this neglect is unclear. Perhaps a less-sensitive transit location is still on the table, and Lai is the one holding back. If so, the blame falls squarely on his shoulders — as president of Taiwan, he should place the island’s diplomatic interests ahead of his political calculations. But given Trump’s apparent hesitancy to risk jeopardizing his diplomacy with Xi, it’s reasonable to assume that restrictions have tightened further since last August, as Trump has worked to secure a series of summits with Xi that began last October and could run through December.

As things currently stand, Lai has made only two overseas trips as president. The first was to Taiwan’s three Pacific Island partners in 2024. During that trip, Lai transited through Hawaii and Guam, neither of which is as politically sensitive as a stopover in the continental United States.

The second trip took place in May when Lai made a surprise visit to Eswatini, Taiwan’s last remaining diplomatic partner in Africa. That trip occurred days after Lai abruptly cancelled a visit to Eswatini because three countries on the flight route revoked permission for his plane to use their airspace. It succeeded only when Eswatini sent the king’s royal jet to transport Lai to and from the country.

For a Taiwanese president to go halfway through his term with only two international trips and no visit to Latin America is highly unusual. Lai’s predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen (2016-2024), transited through the continental U.S. every year while visiting diplomatic partners, with the only exceptions being the pandemic years from 2020 to 2022. Her predecessor, Ma Ying-jeou (2008-2016), made 12 official overseas trips as president, visiting each of Taiwan’s then-22 formal diplomatic partners and routinely transiting through U.S. cities. Even Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008), whose pro-independence activism severely strained his relationship with Washington, made more than a dozen overseas trips and transited through the continental U.S. during most of his travels to the Western Hemisphere.

Lai’s challenges traveling internationally could hardly come at a worse time. After losing 10 diplomatic partners during Tsai’s presidency, Taipei is desperately striving to hold onto its remaining 12 partners and the legitimacy their recognition provides. Although no countries have severed ties with the island since Lai took office, Beijing’s campaign to suppress its international space has reached new levels of intensity.

The challenge Lai had traveling to Eswatini is just one example. In June, Taiwanese delegates attending the Our Ocean Conference in Kenya were denied entry, ostensibly because their passports didn’t conform to Nairobi’s “one China” policy. Earlier this month, Papua New Guinea announced the closure of Taiwan’s unofficial representative office, which had operated in the country since 1990.

In Latin America, Taiwan is eyeing an opportunity to win back the diplomatic recognition of Honduras, which severed ties in favor of Beijing in 2023. President Nasry Asfura, who took office in January, has expressed interest in restoring relations with Taipei. Yet doing so would mean defying Beijing, which carries political and economic risks. Asfura may hesitate to take these risks if Taiwan’s president can’t even visit the countries in his region that already recognize Taipei.

For now, Lai’s diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere is effectively frozen and will likely remain so until he secures a U.S. transit that he’s willing to accept. While Taiwan’s diplomats remain active in the region, their efforts cannot replace a visit by the island’s president. If the Trump administration refuses to grant a stopover, then Lai could seek transit arrangements elsewhere, as Chen Shui-bian did when the George W. Bush administration denied him access to the continental United States in 2006. But given how effective Beijing has become at constraining Taipei’s diplomatic space, it’s unclear that any country besides the U.S. would risk hosting Taiwan’s president today.

Lai might have to accept whatever opportunity becomes available, even if it amounts to nothing more than a brief refueling stop in Alaska, similar to the arrangement Chen begrudgingly accepted in 2007 and 2008. Such an outcome would disappoint Lai, who is less than 18 months away from a reelection bid and understandably wants a transit that raises his profile. But the political and diplomatic cost of failing to visit the region where most of Taiwan’s diplomatic partners are located would far exceed that of getting an underwhelming U.S. stopover because Trump doesn’t want to upset Xi.

More than symbolic prestige is at stake. Taipei’s diplomatic efforts depend on its ability to  demonstrate to its formal partners — and prospective partners like Honduras — that it remains a capable international actor that can fulfill diplomatic obligations and defend its space on the world stage. Lai’s long-delayed trip to Latin America would go a long way toward delivering this message. But the timing and circumstances of that trip aren’t entirely up to him. The Trump administration also has a role to play in determining when the trip can occur.

Header image: William Lai. By 總統府