Editor’s Note: Fatima Abo Alasrar writes at The Ideology Machine, a publication on authoritarian information systems and Middle East policy, and is a Senior Analyst at the Washington Center for Yemeni Studies.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Events in Yemen among the anti-Houthi coalition have taken a dramatic turn. The Southern Transitional Council (STC), created with the backing of the United Arab Emirates and folded into Yemen’s governing structure through Saudi mediation, has dissolved. Its leader, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, has fled to Abu Dhabi and faces treason charges. Saudi Arabia has assumed direct control of the southern political file, with a Supreme Military Committee now operating under coalition command.
What these events reveal is straightforward: The South became a liability for Saudi Arabia — not because Riyadh opposed southern aspirations, but because it could not control the vehicle carrying them.
Saudi Arabia tried to bring the STC into its orbit. The 2019 Riyadh Agreement, which followed fierce contention and opposition from government-aligned factions, gave the STC seats on the Presidential Leadership Council, and recognized the southern cause as legitimate. But despite Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic and political investment, the gravitational center never shifted. The STC remained the UAE’s project: built on UAE funding, equipped with UAE weapons, shaped by UAE priorities. Its enmity toward the Islah mirrored Abu Dhabi, not Riyadh. Its commitment to the Abraham Accords with Israel reflected Emirati strategy, not Saudi interests.
In late December 2025, the STC responded militarily to provocations in Hadramout, sidelining government-aligned forces and expanding into eight southern governorates. Saudi calls to de-escalate went ignored, confirming what Riyadh had long suspected: The STC was not a partner it could steer. A force positioned on Saudi Arabia’s border and openly aligned with the UAE while seeking political recognition from Israel, at a moment when the Kingdom has staked significant political capital on progress toward a resolution for Palestinians, had become a liability rather than an asset.
What Riyadh saw clearly was a pattern of UAE-aligned actors positioning along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden corridor for years, with Israeli diplomatic engagement following close behind. Days before Saudi strikes hit Mukalla, Israel formally recognized the breakaway republic of Somaliland. While Riyadh rejected Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, Abu Dhabi did not. For Saudi strategic planners, these developments form a trajectory: a UAE-Israel architecture extending southward, with the STC as its Yemeni node. Riyadh decided to sever that node before it consolidated further. Hadramout’s geography added urgency as the governorate shares a long frontier with Saudi Arabia and al-Mahra features in plans for a potential oil pipeline to the Arabian Sea, bypassing both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandab chokepoints.
The Takeover
The STC miscalculated its power by testing Saudi Arabia’s red lines. Despite having power on the ground, STC lacked influence in the Saudi court. Riyadh moved from multiple directions to clip the STC’s wings. When Zubaidi sent a delegation to Riyadh but failed to attend the talks, the Presidential Leadership Council stripped him of his seat and charged him with treason. Saudis released details that the UAE had extracted him to Abu Dhabi, routing him by ship to Berbera, then military jet through Mogadishu, transponders dark. Meanwhile, the STC delegation that went to Saudi Arabia in good faith disappeared for 48 hours, then resurfaced on Saudi television to announce the Council’s dissolution. The southern street watched in shock. So did much of the world. These actors are supposed to be allies.
Within days, Yemen’s governing and military formations had been restructured in ways not seen since the war began with the Houthi takeover of the North in 2014. Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman announced that Saudi Arabia would directly manage the southern political file through a new preparatory committee and conference. President al-Alimi dismissed the defense minister and appointed a new governor for Aden. A Supreme Military Committee was established under Saudi command. All military installations in Hadramout, al-Mahra, and Aden transferred to pro-government command under direct Saudi oversight.
The internationally recognized government remains in place, but the locus of decision-making has shifted to Riyadh. For a country that has guarded its sovereignty fiercely through a decade of war, this is a threshold crossed. Yemen is not occupied per se. But it is no longer pretending to steer itself.
The Southern Cause, Recognized and Constrained
Even as Riyadh moved against the STC, it acknowledged the legitimacy of southern grievances. Khalid bin Salman described the southern issue as “a just cause” that requires resolution through dialogue. The cause has genuine roots: the 1994 war that crushed secession just four years after unification, marginalization and exploitation of southern resources without representation, and persistent structural neglect that predates both the current conflict and the STC itself.
The core demand from much of the southern street remains self-determination, and that is a red line that Saudi Arabia will not accommodate. Saudi messaging has emphasized that the STC never represented southern consensus, pointing to the Hadramout Tribal Alliance and other factions. The framing positions Riyadh as rescuing the southern cause from an Emirati proxy that hijacked it. Yet Yemeni factions making that accusation are themselves products of Saudi patronage, hosted in Riyadh’s hotels, funded through Saudi channels, and unbothered by the parallel. Foreign backing, it seems, only delegitimizes when it flows from the wrong capital.
The dilemma Riyadh now faces is straightforward: How does one sponsor a cause whose logical conclusion one cannot permit? Endorsing secession would contradict a decade of Saudi opposition to Yemeni fragmentation. Imposing unity could deepen Southerners’ sense of exclusion and insecurity. The conference has a venue, but it does not yet have a destination.
Meanwhile, mass protests erupted across the South following the STC’s dissolution, with thousands in the streets demanding the return of Zubaidi and the release of STC members held in Riyadh. These protests are not simply about the STC; they are the first public stress test of Saudi Arabia’s newly assumed role. The scale signals that the southern street is watching and judging. What it will accept from Riyadh remains to be seen.
Amid all this, the risk is not Yemeni instability. That has been the baseline for years. The risk is that both Gulf states now have something to prove and the means to prove it. Saudi Arabia needs the STC dissolution and the new military formation to hold. The UAE sits outside the frame, uninterested in Riyadh’s success. And Yemenis, as always, are caught in the middle of a conversation that was never really about them.
Saudi Arabia Takes Full Control of Yemen’s South
By Fatima Abo Alasrar
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Fatima Abo Alasrar writes at The Ideology Machine, a publication on authoritarian information systems and Middle East policy, and is a Senior Analyst at the Washington Center for Yemeni Studies.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Events in Yemen among the anti-Houthi coalition have taken a dramatic turn. The Southern Transitional Council (STC), created with the backing of the United Arab Emirates and folded into Yemen’s governing structure through Saudi mediation, has dissolved. Its leader, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, has fled to Abu Dhabi and faces treason charges. Saudi Arabia has assumed direct control of the southern political file, with a Supreme Military Committee now operating under coalition command.
What these events reveal is straightforward: The South became a liability for Saudi Arabia — not because Riyadh opposed southern aspirations, but because it could not control the vehicle carrying them.
Saudi Arabia tried to bring the STC into its orbit. The 2019 Riyadh Agreement, which followed fierce contention and opposition from government-aligned factions, gave the STC seats on the Presidential Leadership Council, and recognized the southern cause as legitimate. But despite Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic and political investment, the gravitational center never shifted. The STC remained the UAE’s project: built on UAE funding, equipped with UAE weapons, shaped by UAE priorities. Its enmity toward the Islah mirrored Abu Dhabi, not Riyadh. Its commitment to the Abraham Accords with Israel reflected Emirati strategy, not Saudi interests.
In late December 2025, the STC responded militarily to provocations in Hadramout, sidelining government-aligned forces and expanding into eight southern governorates. Saudi calls to de-escalate went ignored, confirming what Riyadh had long suspected: The STC was not a partner it could steer. A force positioned on Saudi Arabia’s border and openly aligned with the UAE while seeking political recognition from Israel, at a moment when the Kingdom has staked significant political capital on progress toward a resolution for Palestinians, had become a liability rather than an asset.
What Riyadh saw clearly was a pattern of UAE-aligned actors positioning along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden corridor for years, with Israeli diplomatic engagement following close behind. Days before Saudi strikes hit Mukalla, Israel formally recognized the breakaway republic of Somaliland. While Riyadh rejected Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, Abu Dhabi did not. For Saudi strategic planners, these developments form a trajectory: a UAE-Israel architecture extending southward, with the STC as its Yemeni node. Riyadh decided to sever that node before it consolidated further. Hadramout’s geography added urgency as the governorate shares a long frontier with Saudi Arabia and al-Mahra features in plans for a potential oil pipeline to the Arabian Sea, bypassing both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandab chokepoints.
The Takeover
The STC miscalculated its power by testing Saudi Arabia’s red lines. Despite having power on the ground, STC lacked influence in the Saudi court. Riyadh moved from multiple directions to clip the STC’s wings. When Zubaidi sent a delegation to Riyadh but failed to attend the talks, the Presidential Leadership Council stripped him of his seat and charged him with treason. Saudis released details that the UAE had extracted him to Abu Dhabi, routing him by ship to Berbera, then military jet through Mogadishu, transponders dark. Meanwhile, the STC delegation that went to Saudi Arabia in good faith disappeared for 48 hours, then resurfaced on Saudi television to announce the Council’s dissolution. The southern street watched in shock. So did much of the world. These actors are supposed to be allies.
Within days, Yemen’s governing and military formations had been restructured in ways not seen since the war began with the Houthi takeover of the North in 2014. Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman announced that Saudi Arabia would directly manage the southern political file through a new preparatory committee and conference. President al-Alimi dismissed the defense minister and appointed a new governor for Aden. A Supreme Military Committee was established under Saudi command. All military installations in Hadramout, al-Mahra, and Aden transferred to pro-government command under direct Saudi oversight.
The internationally recognized government remains in place, but the locus of decision-making has shifted to Riyadh. For a country that has guarded its sovereignty fiercely through a decade of war, this is a threshold crossed. Yemen is not occupied per se. But it is no longer pretending to steer itself.
The Southern Cause, Recognized and Constrained
Even as Riyadh moved against the STC, it acknowledged the legitimacy of southern grievances. Khalid bin Salman described the southern issue as “a just cause” that requires resolution through dialogue. The cause has genuine roots: the 1994 war that crushed secession just four years after unification, marginalization and exploitation of southern resources without representation, and persistent structural neglect that predates both the current conflict and the STC itself.
The core demand from much of the southern street remains self-determination, and that is a red line that Saudi Arabia will not accommodate. Saudi messaging has emphasized that the STC never represented southern consensus, pointing to the Hadramout Tribal Alliance and other factions. The framing positions Riyadh as rescuing the southern cause from an Emirati proxy that hijacked it. Yet Yemeni factions making that accusation are themselves products of Saudi patronage, hosted in Riyadh’s hotels, funded through Saudi channels, and unbothered by the parallel. Foreign backing, it seems, only delegitimizes when it flows from the wrong capital.
The dilemma Riyadh now faces is straightforward: How does one sponsor a cause whose logical conclusion one cannot permit? Endorsing secession would contradict a decade of Saudi opposition to Yemeni fragmentation. Imposing unity could deepen Southerners’ sense of exclusion and insecurity. The conference has a venue, but it does not yet have a destination.
Meanwhile, mass protests erupted across the South following the STC’s dissolution, with thousands in the streets demanding the return of Zubaidi and the release of STC members held in Riyadh. These protests are not simply about the STC; they are the first public stress test of Saudi Arabia’s newly assumed role. The scale signals that the southern street is watching and judging. What it will accept from Riyadh remains to be seen.
Amid all this, the risk is not Yemeni instability. That has been the baseline for years. The risk is that both Gulf states now have something to prove and the means to prove it. Saudi Arabia needs the STC dissolution and the new military formation to hold. The UAE sits outside the frame, uninterested in Riyadh’s success. And Yemenis, as always, are caught in the middle of a conversation that was never really about them.
Recent & Related