Editor’s Note: Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of silk roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Over the past few months, Russia has been actively engaged in mediation efforts from Israel to Syria to Iran, trying to prevent an already unstable region from devolving into wider conflict.
On January 28, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa paid a visit to Moscow, following a similar trip in October. Two days later, Iranian top national security official Ali Larijani met Russian President Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin as Iran scrambled to stave off new U.S. threats of attack over Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. Earlier in January, Putin held phone calls with the leaders of Israel and Iran, offering Russian help at preventing a new war between them at a time when Iran had been convulsed with internal protests and was cracking down forcefully on widespread opposition to the regime.
Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian told Putin at the time that Iran was seeking to return calm to the country, according to the Kremlin’s account of the call. The parties also reaffirmed their mutual commitment to further strengthening the Russian-Iranian strategic partnership and the practical implementation of joint economic projects in various fields.
Speaking to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Putin said that he was “in favor of intensifying political and diplomatic efforts to ensure stability and security in the region.” Putin’s outreach followed reports that Netanyahu sent a message to Iran through Russia in which the Israeli leader said his country was not looking for a new war with the Islamic Republic.
According to the Washington Post, Israeli-Iranian contacts via Russia preceded the outbreak of the latest protests in Iran and had to do with Israel’s continuing attacks on Iranian ally Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Russia’s diplomatic activism comes at a time when it fears a weakening Iran, cornered by internal unrest and outside military and economic pressure. Over the past two years, Iran has gone through fundamental and negative changes. Its position in the Middle East has been seriously undermined by Israeli strikes against members of the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” and its influence in Iraq and the South Caucasus is also seriously challenged by projects such as a proposed “Trump Road for Peace and Prosperity” intended to link Azerbaijan with its ethnic enclave of Nakhchivan via southern Armenia.
Internally, the US-led sanctions regime has created a new level of economic tensions that have spread to large parts of society. Since the June war against Iran by Israel and the U.S. and the “snapback” of UN sanctions in September, the Iranian currency has lost another 40% of its value. The collapse of the rial triggered protests in late December, which, for the first time since the 1979 revolution, began in the Tehran bazaar, normally a bastion of support for the Islamic Republic, and spread across the country. The Iranian government cracked down with unprecedented force, killing thousands of protestors and jailing many more.
Russia does not want to see a strong, nuclear-armed Iran. But it also fears having an extremely unstable actor to the south. Both countries have plenty of overlapping interests ranging from transregional infrastructure projects such as the International North-South Transport Corridor to space, nuclear, and military cooperation, as well as sanctions evasion efforts. Pursuit of a new global order in which the West’s role is diminished is another powerful incentive animating both sides. This remains the case despite Russian reluctance to come to Tehran’s aid during the Israeli/U.S. attacks on Iranian nuclear and other facilities last June.
Russia has been verbally supportive of Iran when it comes to external pressure on the Islamic Republic. On January 13, Moscow condemned “subversive external interference” in Iran’s domestic affairs and called potential military airstrikes “categorically unacceptable.” Russia’s logic is straightforward. It fears that further escalation between Iran and Israel/the U.S. could endanger what remains of its economic and military position in the Middle East as well as Russian prestige. Seeing an ally such as Iran constantly bombed barely a year after a Russian-allied regime in Syria fell to Turkey-backed Islamists would only further diminish Moscow’s power. But Russia cannot do much in a practical sense. Sending troops to Iran to help it quell internal unrest or withstand external pressure is a red line for Moscow. Sharing expertise and perhaps vital intelligence would be more realistic.
At the same time, Russia’s ties with Israel – home to millions of Russian immigrants – makes Moscow much better positioned than Europe or the U.S. to act as a go-between for Israel with Iran. Russia has been asked to mediate between the two longtime enemies before. When the 12-day war ended in June, Israel reportedly reached out to Russia to help further de-escalate the situation. One possibility should the Iranian nuclear issue become the focus of diplomatic negotiations again – as appears to be the case now – is that Moscow could take Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile, just as it accepted Iranian enriched uranium under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that Trump withdrew from in 2018.
For Israel, Russian mediation is critical not only for the Iran file, but also regarding Syria. Since the fall of the Assad dynasty in December 2024, Israel has engaged in an intensive bombing campaign of Syrian military targets. Eager to retain a foothold in Syria, Russia has benefited from Israeli concerns about Turkey’s growing presence in Syria. Indeed, Israel appears to prefer having Russians in south Syria rather than Turks.
Moscow is reportedly mediating a security agreement between Syria and Israel. To prevent border clashes, Russia has proposed redeploying Russian patrols to southern Syria near the Israeli border. Under the proposed agreement, Syria’s southern border would be demilitarized. Moscow benefits from Israeli-Syrian disagreements as it allows the Russian side to wedge itself into the conflict and convince the new Damascus government to allow Russia to retain access to several military bases in Syria.
While Russia usually abstains from being directly involved in Middle East conflicts, it has always sought to be seen as a regional balancer. Yet there are limits to what Russia can achieve on the ground. In response to reported Israeli reservations, Russia seems to have halted preparations to pursue a deployment in southern Syria. Moreover, despite reports in late December that an “understanding” between Russia and the United States on Syria-Israel rapprochement was in the making, it is clear that Damascus sees Washington as a more valuable partner than Moscow. While Russia’s focus remains primarily on the Ukraine war, its historic ties to the Middle East have allowed the region’s combatants to see Moscow as a useful geopolitical actor and a buffer against overdependence on a Trump administration with a short attention span. Russia’s mediation efforts are a good tool for Moscow to solidify and, where possible, expand its influence in the Middle East.
Russia Ramps up Mediation Efforts in the Middle East
By Emil Avdaliani
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of silk roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Over the past few months, Russia has been actively engaged in mediation efforts from Israel to Syria to Iran, trying to prevent an already unstable region from devolving into wider conflict.
On January 28, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa paid a visit to Moscow, following a similar trip in October. Two days later, Iranian top national security official Ali Larijani met Russian President Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin as Iran scrambled to stave off new U.S. threats of attack over Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. Earlier in January, Putin held phone calls with the leaders of Israel and Iran, offering Russian help at preventing a new war between them at a time when Iran had been convulsed with internal protests and was cracking down forcefully on widespread opposition to the regime.
Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian told Putin at the time that Iran was seeking to return calm to the country, according to the Kremlin’s account of the call. The parties also reaffirmed their mutual commitment to further strengthening the Russian-Iranian strategic partnership and the practical implementation of joint economic projects in various fields.
Speaking to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Putin said that he was “in favor of intensifying political and diplomatic efforts to ensure stability and security in the region.” Putin’s outreach followed reports that Netanyahu sent a message to Iran through Russia in which the Israeli leader said his country was not looking for a new war with the Islamic Republic.
According to the Washington Post, Israeli-Iranian contacts via Russia preceded the outbreak of the latest protests in Iran and had to do with Israel’s continuing attacks on Iranian ally Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Russia’s diplomatic activism comes at a time when it fears a weakening Iran, cornered by internal unrest and outside military and economic pressure. Over the past two years, Iran has gone through fundamental and negative changes. Its position in the Middle East has been seriously undermined by Israeli strikes against members of the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” and its influence in Iraq and the South Caucasus is also seriously challenged by projects such as a proposed “Trump Road for Peace and Prosperity” intended to link Azerbaijan with its ethnic enclave of Nakhchivan via southern Armenia.
Internally, the US-led sanctions regime has created a new level of economic tensions that have spread to large parts of society. Since the June war against Iran by Israel and the U.S. and the “snapback” of UN sanctions in September, the Iranian currency has lost another 40% of its value. The collapse of the rial triggered protests in late December, which, for the first time since the 1979 revolution, began in the Tehran bazaar, normally a bastion of support for the Islamic Republic, and spread across the country. The Iranian government cracked down with unprecedented force, killing thousands of protestors and jailing many more.
Russia does not want to see a strong, nuclear-armed Iran. But it also fears having an extremely unstable actor to the south. Both countries have plenty of overlapping interests ranging from transregional infrastructure projects such as the International North-South Transport Corridor to space, nuclear, and military cooperation, as well as sanctions evasion efforts. Pursuit of a new global order in which the West’s role is diminished is another powerful incentive animating both sides. This remains the case despite Russian reluctance to come to Tehran’s aid during the Israeli/U.S. attacks on Iranian nuclear and other facilities last June.
Russia has been verbally supportive of Iran when it comes to external pressure on the Islamic Republic. On January 13, Moscow condemned “subversive external interference” in Iran’s domestic affairs and called potential military airstrikes “categorically unacceptable.” Russia’s logic is straightforward. It fears that further escalation between Iran and Israel/the U.S. could endanger what remains of its economic and military position in the Middle East as well as Russian prestige. Seeing an ally such as Iran constantly bombed barely a year after a Russian-allied regime in Syria fell to Turkey-backed Islamists would only further diminish Moscow’s power. But Russia cannot do much in a practical sense. Sending troops to Iran to help it quell internal unrest or withstand external pressure is a red line for Moscow. Sharing expertise and perhaps vital intelligence would be more realistic.
At the same time, Russia’s ties with Israel – home to millions of Russian immigrants – makes Moscow much better positioned than Europe or the U.S. to act as a go-between for Israel with Iran. Russia has been asked to mediate between the two longtime enemies before. When the 12-day war ended in June, Israel reportedly reached out to Russia to help further de-escalate the situation. One possibility should the Iranian nuclear issue become the focus of diplomatic negotiations again – as appears to be the case now – is that Moscow could take Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile, just as it accepted Iranian enriched uranium under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that Trump withdrew from in 2018.
For Israel, Russian mediation is critical not only for the Iran file, but also regarding Syria. Since the fall of the Assad dynasty in December 2024, Israel has engaged in an intensive bombing campaign of Syrian military targets. Eager to retain a foothold in Syria, Russia has benefited from Israeli concerns about Turkey’s growing presence in Syria. Indeed, Israel appears to prefer having Russians in south Syria rather than Turks.
Moscow is reportedly mediating a security agreement between Syria and Israel. To prevent border clashes, Russia has proposed redeploying Russian patrols to southern Syria near the Israeli border. Under the proposed agreement, Syria’s southern border would be demilitarized. Moscow benefits from Israeli-Syrian disagreements as it allows the Russian side to wedge itself into the conflict and convince the new Damascus government to allow Russia to retain access to several military bases in Syria.
While Russia usually abstains from being directly involved in Middle East conflicts, it has always sought to be seen as a regional balancer. Yet there are limits to what Russia can achieve on the ground. In response to reported Israeli reservations, Russia seems to have halted preparations to pursue a deployment in southern Syria. Moreover, despite reports in late December that an “understanding” between Russia and the United States on Syria-Israel rapprochement was in the making, it is clear that Damascus sees Washington as a more valuable partner than Moscow. While Russia’s focus remains primarily on the Ukraine war, its historic ties to the Middle East have allowed the region’s combatants to see Moscow as a useful geopolitical actor and a buffer against overdependence on a Trump administration with a short attention span. Russia’s mediation efforts are a good tool for Moscow to solidify and, where possible, expand its influence in the Middle East.
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