In February, the Trump administration went to war with Iran to end its nuclear program, destroy its missile industry, annihilate its navy, and cut off its regional proxies. Six months later, little progress toward those goals has been made, while the mission has largely narrowed to the single task of reopening the Strait of Hormuz, a waterway the war itself closed.
Meanwhile, the bill keeps climbing. This update tracks what the war has actually accomplished against what it was supposed to accomplish, taking stock of what it’s costing the United States and the world in the meantime.
The U.S. war against Iran is now more than six months old, with no end in sight.
The initial wave of fighting began on February 28 and continued until the two sides reached a ceasefire on April 8, later codified in a Memorandum of Understanding in mid-June.
On July 8, fighting began anew after Iran interfered with maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. On July 14, the U.S. military reinstated a blockade of Iranian ports and began conducting near-daily strikes, which continued throughout most of the month (a previous blockade of maritime traffic entering Iranian ports had ended on June 18 when the U.S. and Iran signed the memorandum of understanding). Nonetheless, the slowdown in ship traffic continues.
The answer to the question we asked in May – “Is the Iran war worth it?” – has not changed.
The initial U.S. objectives of the war were focused on ending Iran’s nuclear program, destroying its missile industry, annihilating its navy, and ending Iran’s support for terrorist proxies in the Middle East. Today, those goals have been cast aside as U.S. military operations are now almost exclusively focused on reopening the Strait of Hormuz to maritime traffic – a goal that is only necessary because of the initial decision to go to war. Meanwhile, the conflict’s costs keep climbing, and the second- and third-order consequences of the decision to go to war are also escalating.
Three months ago, we described the war as a strategic calamity that had done little to further U.S. national security interests while imposing hundreds of billions of dollars in direct and indirect costs on the United States.
Three months later, the U.S. war with Iran maintains that ignominious distinction.
Topline Points
The death toll of the war stands at between 8,000 and 10,000, with close to 50,000 injured, the vast majority civilians in Iran, Lebanon, and Israel.
Eighteen U.S. servicemembers have died, and more than 820 wounded.
One-third of all U.S. casualties have occurred since the April ceasefire.
The estimated cost of the war is close to $40 billion.
The United States has severely depleted its stockpile of munitions.
By August, the U.S. military had used 80% of its THAAD inventory and around half of its Patriot interceptors.
The U.S. Army has used “virtually all” of its Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) and Precision Strike Missiles (PrSM), long-range weapons expected to be relied on in any conflict with China.
It could take years to replenish U.S. stockpiles.
The diminished stockpiles are already having significant consequences in the Indo Pacific and Europe, as key American allies report delays in arms shipments and fears that Washington cannot maintain its alliance and treaty defense responsibilities if conflict occurs.
The total cost of the war is estimated at $220 billion and has cost the average U.S. household approximately $1,650.
Most of the costs to consumers are a result of a sharp rise in the price of gas. As of September 15, the average price for a gallon of gas was $4.32 – which is a 45% increase since the war began.
The rise in gas prices combined with a 70% increase in diesel fuel has cost Americans more than $106 billion and the average American household more than $816.
Inflation is up a full point since the war began.
Mortgage rates have increased by more than a point
Airline ticket prices are up 27% from where they were a year ago.
“Destroy [Iran’s] missiles and raze their missile industry to the ground.”
“Annihilate [Iran’s] navy.”
“Ensure that [Iran’s] terrorist proxies can no longer destabilize the region or the world and attack our forces.”
Prevent Iran from using “IEDs or roadside bombs, as they are sometimes called, to so gravely wound and kill thousands and thousands of people, including many Americans.”
“Ensure that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon.”
Trump also obliquely suggested another potential outcome from the war: regime change.
As we noted in May, the United States failed to decisively achieve any of these goals.
With the resumption of fighting in June, the United States largely abandoned these original objectives for a single, narrower goal: ending Iran’s ability to disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.
For example, a July 20 CENTCOM press release described the focus of recent U.S. military operations as “degrading Iran’s ability to continue attacking commercial vessels flowing through the Strait of Hormuz.” Nearly every CENTCOM press release about the renewed fighting has used similar language, with a focus on U.S. efforts related to reopening the Strait, ending attacks on commercial shipping, or destroying the capabilities Iran uses to threaten shipping.
The targets of U.S. operations reflect that shift.
Since July 8, U.S. strikes have concentrated on Iranian air defenses, command and control networks, coastal radar and other surveillance capabilities, missile and drone launch sites, underground storage facilities, and maritime assets, including naval bases and small boats.
Previously, U.S. military operations were, according to the Pentagon’s Inspector General in a September report to Congress, focused on Iranian ballistic missile garrisons, Iranian air defense sites, storage sites for Iranian cruise missiles and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), command-and-control centers, naval and naval mining assets, and Iran’s defense industrial base.
Indeed, one look at the map of targets hit by U.S. strikes tells the story.
Figure 1. U.S. Military Strikes on Iran from July 8-25
U.S. attacks in the first wave of fighting were geographically dispersed and focused on achieving the war’s original objectives; the second wave has concentrated overwhelmingly on Iran’s military assets along the Strait of Hormuz.
In addition, with the renewal of fighting, on July 14, the U.S. Navy reimposed a naval blockade on all maritime traffic entering and exiting Iranian ports and coastal areas. As of publication of this report, that blockade remains in effect.
Though U.S. officials continue to publicly claim that the primary goal of the war is to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, there’s little indication that recent U.S. strikes have targeted Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. According to Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, a nuclear expert at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, “none” of the second wave of U.S. attacks have focused on Iran’s nuclear program.1Researcher Interview, 8.31.26
Strikes on Iran’s missile production facilities have been similarly limited. According to Jim Lamson, a Senior Research Associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, who has studied the impact of U.S. attacks on Iran’s missile infrastructure, U.S. and Israeli attacks have “severely degraded … Iran’s production capacity, domestic supply chains, and longstanding efforts to achieve aerospace self-sufficiency.”
Nonetheless, Iran, says Lamson, “probably has hundreds if not thousands of missiles” that can be used to project military power across the region. “Iran has been hurt,” says Lamson, “but that doesn’t mean they can’t still do damage.”2Researcher Interview, 9.3.26 The Wall Street Journal recently reported that U.S. and Israeli officials are alarmed by the speed with which Iran is rebuilding its damaged missile infrastructure – and there is additional reporting that Iran has restarted its ballistic missile program.
While U.S. strikes dealt significant damage to Iran’s naval assets, it has not stopped Tehran from disrupting Strait of Hormuz shipping with land-based missiles and drones.
Since the renewal of fighting on July 8, Iran has hit at least 15 tankers traversing the Strait of Hormuz. As a result, ship traffic has slowed to a crawl. On September 2, only four vessels transited the Strait of Hormuz – the lowest level in months. Before the war, approximately 138 ships a day regularly traveled through the Strait.
Since July 14, the average flow of crude oil through the Strait was 4.9 million barrels a day – well below the approximately 20 million barrels a day that flowed before the war began.
In short, the annihilation of Iran’s Navy, at least to date, amounts to a Pyrrhic victory that has not fundamentally altered Iran’s ability to sow havoc in one of the world’s most strategically vital waterways.
More than six months in, U.S. military operations are discretely focused on reopening a waterway that was closed only because the United States went to war in the first place. Yet, even after two months of renewed fighting (beginning in early July), Washington is no closer to wresting control of the Strait of Hormuz’s shipping lanes from Iran.
Death Toll
The estimated death toll from the war now stands between 8,000 and 10,000 people.
United States
Eighteen U.S. servicemembers have been killed, including four since the ceasefire’s collapse, with 820 injured. One-third of all U.S. casualties have occurred since the ceasefire in April.
Iran
The Iranian government reported in mid-April that approximately 3,500 Iranians have been killed; other estimates put that number as high as 6,000.
According to the Iranian Health Ministry, there have been more than 26,500 total injuries. The war has also provided cover for a broader campaign of internal repression; more than 6,500 Iranians have been arrested since the war began, and an unknown number have been executed.
Lebanon
Soon after the war began, Hezbollah fighters, in solidarity with Iran, launched drone and missile attacks into Israel, leading to an Israeli military response and seizure of territory in southern Lebanon.
According to the Lebanese Health Ministry, more than 3,900 people have been killed, nearly 12,000 injured, and more than one million displaced. However, Lebanese authorities do not differentiate between combatants and non-combatants. Israeli officials have estimated that more than 2,500 Hezbollah fighters have been killed.
In Israel, 12 members of the Israel Defense Forces have been killed, with 78 wounded. Iranian attacks on Israel took the lives of 30 civilians and injured more than 7,800.
Dozens more have been killed and wounded in the Persian Gulf states of Oman, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.
Figure 2. Civilian Deaths in the Iran War
Direct (and Indirect) Military Costs
In congressional testimony on July 21, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth estimated the cost of the war at $37.5 billion, an increase of $12 billion from the figure he provided in late April. The Congressional Budget Office estimates the cost of the war is $38.1 billion, as of August 1, 2026. (The Office of the Under Secretary of War (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer puts the cost at $33.4 billion, as of June 29, with $22.3 billion of that total devoted to just munitions.)
However, these estimates do not include the potential costs of reconstructing U.S. bases in the Middle East damaged by Iranian attacks. According to one estimate, 228 structures or pieces of equipment at U.S. military sites across the Middle East have been damaged in the war, and repair costs could run as high as tens of billions of dollars. According to the Pentagon IG, “hundreds of buildings and structures at U.S. bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Oman, and Jordan” have been damaged during the conflict.
The Pentagon estimate also does not appear to include the 42 fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft, including drones, that have been lost or damaged since the war began.
Figure 3. U.S. Aircraft Damaged or Destroyed During OEF
The rising costs of the war have caused a budget shortfall at the Pentagon. The cash crunch forced the Pentagon to cancel training exercises and drain accounts intended for equipment, facilities, and maintenance. In addition, the Department of Defense apparently sought to divert billions in funding from the National Institutes of Health without notifying Congress. The Pentagon has even asked Congress for permission to move $4.3 billion from training and weapons purchases to address more pressing needs. In addition, the Navy has been forced to move money from payroll and other sources to cover combat costs and is delaying non-emergency maintenance.
In addition to the Pentagon’s cost, the State Department has incurred $113 million in costs related to Operation Epic Fury, though that number is likely to rise. In addition, U.S. embassies, consulates, and other diplomatic facilities are estimated by State to have suffered $184 million in damage.
Replacing Munitions Could Take Years and Cost Billions
The war’s effects on U.S. readiness may prove as consequential as its direct price tag.
By August, it was reported that the U.S. military had used 80% of its THAAD inventory and around half of its Patriot interceptors since the war began. On August 4, Reuters reported that the U.S. Army has used “virtually all” of its Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) and Precision Strike Missiles (PrSM), long-range weapons that would be expected to be relied on in any conflict with China.
Figure 4. U.S. Munitions Stockpiles
According to CSIS, the timeline for replacing these munitions could run over several years. Tomahawk inventories are not expected to return to pre-war levels until late 2030 or early 2031. Meanwhile, Patriot and THAAD inventories may require at least three years to recover.
The Iran War Has Left America and Its Allies More Vulnerable
The massive use of munitions against Iran has made it more difficult for the United States to confront potential threats elsewhere and is undermining the deterrent capabilities of America’s key allies.
In late August, the Washington Postreported that “Several U.S. military leaders have advised Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth that prolonging large-scale operations against Iran is unsustainable and risks weakening their ability to confront threats elsewhere, including the U.S. homeland.”
The heads of the U.S. European Command, the U.S. Pacific Command, and the U.S. Southern Command, as well as the Navy’s top admiral, reportedly did not “concur” with (but will still execute) a Pentagon order that some troops deployed in the Middle East remain there through September and others into 2027.
In addition, the munitions shortfall is putting key U.S. allies in potential harm’s way.
According to CSIS, “The United States has enough munitions for any plausible scenario in the Iran war, but the depleted inventories have created a window of vulnerability for a potential Western Pacific conflict.”
Indeed, key Asian allies including South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan are contemplating potential “years-long backlogs” of arms supplies from the United States.
Close to $30 billion in U.S. arms approved for sale to Taiwan are still undelivered, including nearly $900 million of Patriot missiles.
Deliveries of 400 Tomahawks to Japan are facing up to two years of delays.
NATO allies are also reporting growing concerns about “beyond critical” shortages of missile interceptors, which could leave them more vulnerable to Russian high-speed ballistic missiles.
A war in a region the administration says in the 2025 National Security Strategy should matter less to U.S. foreign policy is consuming the weapons systems Washington would need in higher-priority theaters.
Costs to the U.S. Economy
The direct military bill captures only a fraction of the war’s economic cost. According to Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics, the conflict has already cost the average American household about $1,650 – or more than $220 billion.3Researcher Interview, 9.16.26
The largest share of these costs comes from higher gas prices. Regular gasoline averaged around $3 per gallon before the war, rose to a high of around $4.50, and is around $4.32 as of September 15 – a 45% increase from before the war began.
Figure 5. Gas Prices
According to the Iran War Energy Cost Tracker at Brown University’s Watson Institute, higher fuel prices, as of mid-September, have cost consumers more than $107 billion, or approximately $822 per household.
Diesel fuel prices rose from $3.76 a gallon before the war to around $5.69 in April, before reaching a record high of $6.31 in mid-September.
Figure 6. Diesel Prices
These increases have raised transportation and distribution costs across the economy. Airline ticket prices are close to 27% higher than in 2025, largely due to higher jet fuel prices.
Jet fuel, which was trading at $90 a barrel at the beginning of the year, is around $150 – a more than 60% increase.
The resulting disruption to global oil supplies since February is more than double that of the 1973 oil crisis, previously the largest oil supply shortfall ever. Even six months later, the war is currently disrupting the transport of between 5 to 7 million barrels of oil per day.
Figure 7. Peak shortfalls in global oil supply during major geopolitical events.
Higher gas prices have also sparked a rise in inflation, which hit 4% at the beginning of June — the highest level in three years — before easing to 3.4% by mid-September. When the war began in February, inflation was at 2.4%.
Higher inflation means higher prices for consumer goods and ties the hands of the Federal Reserve in cutting interest rates. Keeping rates at their current level means slower economic growth, hundreds of billions in lost economic output, and lower tax revenues.
Higher interest rates also mean higher mortgage rates, which have contributed to the ongoing slump in U.S. home sales. The average interest rate on a 30-year home loan has risen to 7.22%, which is more than a point higher than before the war began.
Figure 8.
The Political Impact of the War
A majority of Americans oppose the Iran War and have done so since the very beginning. Indeed, support for the war, when it began, was lower than for any U.S. war going back to World War II (survey data on this question does not exist for the Vietnam War).
These numbers have largely remained unchanged over the past six months, with support for the war below 40% since mid-March. Opposition to the war has likely contributed to President Trump’s consistently low approval ratings.
Public opposition to the war arguably limits the president’s strategic options, pushes him toward resolving the conflict (even on unfavorable terms), and may give Iran impetus to adopt more recalcitrant negotiating positions.
Impact on the Global Economy
The economic damage is not confined to the United States. The World Bank projects global growth rates to slow to 2.5% in 2026, the slowest rate since the COVID-19 pandemic.
The war has been especially punishing for the Gulf states, with the World Bank estimating a 1.3% growth rate this year, down from 4.5% in 2025. The war has disrupted trade and investment, threatened major development projects, and exposed the economic risks created by the region’s dependence on the Strait of Hormuz.
The war forced the European Central Bank to postpone plans to cut interest rates and reduced its growth projections. The United Kingdom has paid the harshest price of any European country, with economic growth forecast to be downgraded from 1.2% to 0.7% and inflation rates predicted to hit 4% this year.
Gas prices, however, are only one of the major contributors to this global slowdown. Interruptions in the global fertilizer supply chain and in the nutrients that sustain the fertilizer industry, including nitrogen, phosphorus, and sulfur, are having a cataclysmic economic impact.
Impact on Global Agriculture
Approximately 30% of international fertilizer supply traverses the Persian Gulf. For example, 50% of globally traded sulfur and over 30% of global urea exports, a key synthetic fertilizer, transits the waterway.
Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz has led to fertilizer shortages, increasing agricultural costs and lowering crop yields. Overall, fertilizer prices have increased by 35% compared to the same period last year.
The price of anhydrous ammonia, a nitrogen fertilizer for crops like corn and wheat, is 29% higher than in February, before the war started.
Urea’s price has risen from $415 per metric ton in January 2026 to $770.5 in July – a nearly 90% increase.
An American Farm Bureau Federation survey in mid-April found that nearly 70% of American farmers said they couldn’t afford the fertilizer they needed for their spring planting.
Over the summer, the Trump administration asked Congress for more than $11 billion to help farmers impacted by the Iran War. To date, Congress has not fulfilled that request.
However, this request comes on the heels of $44 billion in direct payments to farmers in 2026 alone – or more than one quarter of projected net income. If Congress approves the additional $11 billion in funding, direct government payments to farmers would hit 33% of all farm income, the highest level since 2001.
Impact of the War on Global Agriculture
To date, global food prices have not dramatically increased. However, according to the World Bank, “Food inflation pressures increased in Latin America and the Caribbean and South Asia, eased in Europe and Central Asia, and remained uneven across Africa, with persistently high levels in parts of Eastern and Southern Africa.”
The impact of higher fertilizer prices may not be fully felt until next year. The planting season for 2027 begins in September, and if fertilizer prices remain high, it could push farmers to consider less fertilizer-intensive crops (for example, soybeans over corn). But it will almost certainly increase upfront costs for farmers, which could potentially lead to higher prices for consumers.
According to the World Food Programme, poorer countries are facing some of the greatest risks.
Projections for 2026 suggest that an additional 2.5 million people in Somalia could be unable to afford a basic food basket, and almost 60% of all households could be unable to afford essential needs, up from 47% in 2025.
In Afghanistan, up to 2.3 million additional people could become food insecure in the event of a prolonged closure of the border with Pakistan and an escalation of the Middle East crisis, adding to the 13.8 million who were food insecure before the crisis.
In Sri Lanka, projections indicate that up to 1.3 million additional people may be at risk of being unable to meet their basic food needs, adding to the 4.7 million baseline in 2026.
Conclusion
Six months into the Iran war, our basic verdict on whether it was worth it has not changed. The United States has not eliminated Iran’s nuclear program or missile capacity and infrastructure, or ended its support for regional proxies. The Iranian regime has consolidated power under new leadership and appears to be at little risk of falling.
Iran’s navy is damaged, but Tehran is still disrupting maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. The war’s immediate purpose has narrowed to reopening a waterway that the conflict helped close.
Against those meager results are the mounting costs. Thousands have died, including 18 U.S. servicemembers, and tens of thousands have been injured in countries across the Middle East.
The Pentagon has spent tens of billions of dollars, while damaged bases and depleted weapons stockpiles will take years and tens of billions of dollars to restore. American households are paying more for gas, inflation has risen, and borrowing costs have gone up. The economic shock – and interruptions to key agricultural inputs – is increasing the risk of hunger in countries far removed from the fighting.
Even if the United States had achieved its goals, it’s difficult to argue that the benefits to U.S. national security even remotely outweigh the war’s direct and indirect costs.
The United States cannot undo the damage of the past six months, but it can stop making the damage worse. More strikes are unlikely to deliver the sweeping victory promised at the outset. Washington’s priority should now be a negotiated end to the fighting, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, and a halt to the cycle of retaliation.
That outcome would fall well short of the administration’s original ambitions. But it would be better than continuing a conflict whose costs keep growing as its prospects for success shrink.
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In February, the Trump administration went to war with Iran to end its nuclear program, destroy its missile industry, annihilate its navy, and cut off its regional proxies. Six months later, little progress toward those goals has been made, while the mission has largely narrowed to the single task of reopening the Strait of Hormuz, a waterway the war itself closed.
Meanwhile, the bill keeps climbing. This update tracks what the war has actually accomplished against what it was supposed to accomplish, taking stock of what it’s costing the United States and the world in the meantime.
Grand Strategy, Middle East
The U.S. war against Iran is now more than six months old, with no end in sight.
The initial wave of fighting began on February 28 and continued until the two sides reached a ceasefire on April 8, later codified in a Memorandum of Understanding in mid-June.
On July 8, fighting began anew after Iran interfered with maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. On July 14, the U.S. military reinstated a blockade of Iranian ports and began conducting near-daily strikes, which continued throughout most of the month (a previous blockade of maritime traffic entering Iranian ports had ended on June 18 when the U.S. and Iran signed the memorandum of understanding). Nonetheless, the slowdown in ship traffic continues.
The answer to the question we asked in May – “Is the Iran war worth it?” – has not changed.
The initial U.S. objectives of the war were focused on ending Iran’s nuclear program, destroying its missile industry, annihilating its navy, and ending Iran’s support for terrorist proxies in the Middle East. Today, those goals have been cast aside as U.S. military operations are now almost exclusively focused on reopening the Strait of
Hormuz to maritime traffic – a goal that is only necessary because of the initial decision to go to war. Meanwhile, the conflict’s costs keep climbing, and the second- and third-order consequences of the decision to go to war are also escalating.
Three months ago, we described the war as a strategic calamity that had done little to further U.S. national security interests while imposing hundreds of billions of dollars in direct and indirect costs on the United States.
Three months later, the U.S. war with Iran maintains that ignominious distinction.
Topline Points
The Noise Before Defeat
At the outset of the Iran war, President Donald Trump laid out five key military and political objectives.
Trump also obliquely suggested another potential outcome from the war: regime change.
As we noted in May, the United States failed to decisively achieve any of these goals.
With the resumption of fighting in June, the United States largely abandoned these original objectives for a single, narrower goal: ending Iran’s ability to disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.
For example, a July 20 CENTCOM press release described the focus of recent U.S. military operations as “degrading Iran’s ability to continue attacking commercial vessels flowing through the Strait of Hormuz.” Nearly every CENTCOM press release about the renewed fighting has used similar language, with a focus on U.S. efforts related to reopening the Strait, ending attacks on commercial shipping, or destroying the capabilities Iran uses to threaten shipping.
The targets of U.S. operations reflect that shift.
Since July 8, U.S. strikes have concentrated on Iranian air defenses, command and control networks, coastal radar and other surveillance capabilities, missile and drone launch sites, underground storage facilities, and maritime assets, including naval bases and small boats.
Previously, U.S. military operations were, according to the Pentagon’s Inspector General in a September report to Congress, focused on Iranian ballistic missile garrisons, Iranian air defense sites, storage sites for Iranian cruise missiles and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), command-and-control centers, naval and naval mining assets, and Iran’s defense industrial base.
Indeed, one look at the map of targets hit by U.S. strikes tells the story.
Figure 1. U.S. Military Strikes on Iran from July 8-25
U.S. attacks in the first wave of fighting were geographically dispersed and focused on achieving the war’s original objectives; the second wave has concentrated overwhelmingly on Iran’s military assets along the Strait of Hormuz.
In addition, with the renewal of fighting, on July 14, the U.S. Navy reimposed a naval blockade on all maritime traffic entering and exiting Iranian ports and coastal areas. As of publication of this report, that blockade remains in effect.
Though U.S. officials continue to publicly claim that the primary goal of the war is to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, there’s little indication that recent U.S. strikes have targeted Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. According to Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, a nuclear expert at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, “none” of the second wave of U.S. attacks have focused on Iran’s nuclear program.1Researcher Interview, 8.31.26
Strikes on Iran’s missile production facilities have been similarly limited. According to Jim Lamson, a Senior Research Associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, who has studied the impact of U.S. attacks on Iran’s missile infrastructure, U.S. and Israeli attacks have “severely degraded … Iran’s production capacity, domestic supply chains, and longstanding efforts to achieve aerospace self-sufficiency.”
Nonetheless, Iran, says Lamson, “probably has hundreds if not thousands of missiles” that can be used to project military power across the region. “Iran has been hurt,” says Lamson, “but that doesn’t mean they can’t still do damage.”2Researcher Interview, 9.3.26 The Wall Street Journal recently reported that U.S. and Israeli officials are alarmed by the speed with which Iran is rebuilding its damaged missile infrastructure – and there is additional reporting that Iran has restarted its ballistic missile program.
While U.S. strikes dealt significant damage to Iran’s naval assets, it has not stopped Tehran from disrupting Strait of Hormuz shipping with land-based missiles and drones.
Since the renewal of fighting on July 8, Iran has hit at least 15 tankers traversing the Strait of Hormuz. As a result, ship traffic has slowed to a crawl. On September 2, only four vessels transited the Strait of Hormuz – the lowest level in months. Before the war, approximately 138 ships a day regularly traveled through the Strait.
Since July 14, the average flow of crude oil through the Strait was 4.9 million barrels a day – well below the approximately 20 million barrels a day that flowed before the war began.
In short, the annihilation of Iran’s Navy, at least to date, amounts to a Pyrrhic victory that has not fundamentally altered Iran’s ability to sow havoc in one of the world’s most strategically vital waterways.
More than six months in, U.S. military operations are discretely focused on reopening a waterway that was closed only because the United States went to war in the first place. Yet, even after two months of renewed fighting (beginning in early July), Washington is no closer to wresting control of the Strait of Hormuz’s shipping lanes from Iran.
Death Toll
The estimated death toll from the war now stands between 8,000 and 10,000 people.
United States
Eighteen U.S. servicemembers have been killed, including four since the ceasefire’s collapse, with 820 injured. One-third of all U.S. casualties have occurred since the ceasefire in April.
Iran
The Iranian government reported in mid-April that approximately 3,500 Iranians have been killed; other estimates put that number as high as 6,000.
According to the Iranian Health Ministry, there have been more than 26,500 total injuries. The war has also provided cover for a broader campaign of internal repression; more than 6,500 Iranians have been arrested since the war began, and an unknown number have been executed.
Lebanon
Soon after the war began, Hezbollah fighters, in solidarity with Iran, launched drone and missile attacks into Israel, leading to an Israeli military response and seizure of territory in southern Lebanon.
According to the Lebanese Health Ministry, more than 3,900 people have been killed, nearly 12,000 injured, and more than one million displaced. However, Lebanese authorities do not differentiate between combatants and non-combatants. Israeli officials have estimated that more than 2,500 Hezbollah fighters have been killed.
In Israel, 12 members of the Israel Defense Forces have been killed, with 78 wounded. Iranian attacks on Israel took the lives of 30 civilians and injured more than 7,800.
In Iraq, an estimated 146 combatants have been killed and more than 500 wounded, but those numbers are unconfirmed.
Dozens more have been killed and wounded in the Persian Gulf states of Oman, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.
Figure 2. Civilian Deaths in the Iran War
Direct (and Indirect) Military Costs
In congressional testimony on July 21, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth estimated the cost of the war at $37.5 billion, an increase of $12 billion from the figure he provided in late April. The Congressional Budget Office estimates the cost of the war is $38.1 billion, as of August 1, 2026. (The Office of the Under Secretary of War (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer puts the cost at $33.4 billion, as of June 29, with $22.3 billion of that total devoted to just munitions.)
Figure 3. U.S. Aircraft Damaged or Destroyed During OEF
Source: “Operation Epic Fury: April 1, 2026 -June 30, 2026” Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress
The rising costs of the war have caused a budget shortfall at the Pentagon. The cash crunch forced the Pentagon to cancel training exercises and drain accounts intended for equipment, facilities, and maintenance. In addition, the Department of Defense apparently sought to divert billions in funding from the National Institutes of Health without notifying Congress. The Pentagon has even asked Congress for permission to move $4.3 billion from training and weapons purchases to address more pressing needs. In addition, the Navy has been forced to move money from payroll and other sources to cover combat costs and is delaying non-emergency maintenance.
In addition to the Pentagon’s cost, the State Department has incurred $113 million in costs related to Operation Epic Fury, though that number is likely to rise. In addition, U.S. embassies, consulates, and other diplomatic facilities are estimated by State to have suffered $184 million in damage.
Replacing Munitions Could Take Years and Cost Billions
The war’s effects on U.S. readiness may prove as consequential as its direct price tag.
An analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies finds that the United States has burned through one-third to one-half of its most critical munitions stockpiles.
By August, it was reported that the U.S. military had used 80% of its THAAD inventory and around half of its Patriot interceptors since the war began. On August 4, Reuters reported that the U.S. Army has used “virtually all” of its Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) and Precision Strike Missiles (PrSM), long-range weapons that would be expected to be relied on in any conflict with China.
Figure 4. U.S. Munitions Stockpiles
According to CSIS, the timeline for replacing these munitions could run over several years. Tomahawk inventories are not expected to return to pre-war levels until late 2030 or early 2031. Meanwhile, Patriot and THAAD inventories may require at least three years to recover.
The Iran War Has Left America and Its Allies More Vulnerable
The massive use of munitions against Iran has made it more difficult for the United States to confront potential threats elsewhere and is undermining the deterrent capabilities of America’s key allies.
In late August, the Washington Post reported that “Several U.S. military leaders have advised Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth that prolonging large-scale operations against Iran is unsustainable and risks weakening their ability to confront threats elsewhere, including the U.S. homeland.”
The heads of the U.S. European Command, the U.S. Pacific Command, and the U.S. Southern Command, as well as the Navy’s top admiral, reportedly did not “concur” with (but will still execute) a Pentagon order that some troops deployed in the Middle East remain there through September and others into 2027.
In addition, the munitions shortfall is putting key U.S. allies in potential harm’s way.
According to CSIS, “The United States has enough munitions for any plausible scenario in the Iran war, but the depleted inventories have created a window of vulnerability for a potential Western Pacific conflict.”
Indeed, key Asian allies including South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan are contemplating potential “years-long backlogs” of arms supplies from the United States.
NATO allies are also reporting growing concerns about “beyond critical” shortages of missile interceptors, which could leave them more vulnerable to Russian high-speed ballistic missiles.
A war in a region the administration says in the 2025 National Security Strategy should matter less to U.S. foreign policy is consuming the weapons systems Washington would need in higher-priority theaters.
Costs to the U.S. Economy
The direct military bill captures only a fraction of the war’s economic cost. According to Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics, the conflict has already cost the average American household about $1,650 – or more than $220 billion.3Researcher Interview, 9.16.26
The largest share of these costs comes from higher gas prices. Regular gasoline averaged around $3 per gallon before the war, rose to a high of around $4.50, and is around $4.32 as of September 15 – a 45% increase from before the war began.
Figure 5. Gas Prices
According to the Iran War Energy Cost Tracker at Brown University’s Watson Institute, higher fuel prices, as of mid-September, have cost consumers more than $107 billion, or approximately $822 per household.
Diesel fuel prices rose from $3.76 a gallon before the war to around $5.69 in April, before reaching a record high of $6.31 in mid-September.
Figure 6. Diesel Prices
These increases have raised transportation and distribution costs across the economy. Airline ticket prices are close to 27% higher than in 2025, largely due to higher jet fuel prices.
Jet fuel, which was trading at $90 a barrel at the beginning of the year, is around $150 – a more than 60% increase.
The resulting disruption to global oil supplies since February is more than double that of the 1973 oil crisis, previously the largest oil supply shortfall ever. Even six months later, the war is currently disrupting the transport of between 5 to 7 million barrels of oil per day.
Figure 7. Peak shortfalls in global oil supply during major geopolitical events.
Higher gas prices have also sparked a rise in inflation, which hit 4% at the beginning of June — the highest level in three years — before easing to 3.4% by mid-September. When the war began in February, inflation was at 2.4%.
Figure 8.
The Political Impact of the War
A majority of Americans oppose the Iran War and have done so since the very beginning. Indeed, support for the war, when it began, was lower than for any U.S. war going back to World War II (survey data on this question does not exist for the Vietnam War).
Figure 9.
Source: New York Times
These numbers have largely remained unchanged over the past six months, with support for the war below 40% since mid-March. Opposition to the war has likely contributed to President Trump’s consistently low approval ratings.
Public opposition to the war arguably limits the president’s strategic options, pushes him toward resolving the conflict (even on unfavorable terms), and may give Iran impetus to adopt more recalcitrant negotiating positions.
Impact on the Global Economy
The economic damage is not confined to the United States. The World Bank projects global growth rates to slow to 2.5% in 2026, the slowest rate since the COVID-19 pandemic.
The war has been especially punishing for the Gulf states, with the World Bank estimating a 1.3% growth rate this year, down from 4.5% in 2025. The war has disrupted trade and investment, threatened major development projects, and exposed the economic risks created by the region’s dependence on the Strait of Hormuz.
The war forced the European Central Bank to postpone plans to cut interest rates and reduced its growth projections. The United Kingdom has paid the harshest price of any European country, with economic growth forecast to be downgraded from 1.2% to 0.7% and inflation rates predicted to hit 4% this year.
Gas prices, however, are only one of the major contributors to this global slowdown. Interruptions in the global fertilizer supply chain and in the nutrients that sustain the fertilizer industry, including nitrogen, phosphorus, and sulfur, are having a cataclysmic economic impact.
Impact on Global Agriculture
Approximately 30% of international fertilizer supply traverses the Persian Gulf. For example, 50% of globally traded sulfur and over 30% of global urea exports, a key synthetic fertilizer, transits the waterway.
Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz has led to fertilizer shortages, increasing agricultural costs and lowering crop yields. Overall, fertilizer prices have increased by 35% compared to the same period last year.
An American Farm Bureau Federation survey in mid-April found that nearly 70% of American farmers said they couldn’t afford the fertilizer they needed for their spring planting.
Over the summer, the Trump administration asked Congress for more than $11 billion to help farmers impacted by the Iran War. To date, Congress has not fulfilled that request.
However, this request comes on the heels of $44 billion in direct payments to farmers in 2026 alone – or more than one quarter of projected net income. If Congress approves the additional $11 billion in funding, direct government payments to farmers would hit 33% of all farm income, the highest level since 2001.
Impact of the War on Global Agriculture
To date, global food prices have not dramatically increased. However, according to the World Bank, “Food inflation pressures increased in Latin America and the Caribbean and South Asia, eased in Europe and Central Asia, and remained uneven across Africa, with persistently high levels in parts of Eastern and Southern Africa.”
The impact of higher fertilizer prices may not be fully felt until next year. The planting season for 2027 begins in September, and if fertilizer prices remain high, it could push farmers to consider less fertilizer-intensive crops (for example, soybeans over corn). But it will almost certainly increase upfront costs for farmers, which could potentially lead to higher prices for consumers.
According to the World Food Programme, poorer countries are facing some of the greatest risks.
Conclusion
Six months into the Iran war, our basic verdict on whether it was worth it has not changed. The United States has not eliminated Iran’s nuclear program or missile capacity and infrastructure, or ended its support for regional proxies. The Iranian regime has consolidated power under new leadership and appears to be at little risk of falling.
Iran’s navy is damaged, but Tehran is still disrupting maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. The war’s immediate purpose has narrowed to reopening a waterway that the conflict helped close.
Against those meager results are the mounting costs. Thousands have died, including 18 U.S. servicemembers, and tens of thousands have been injured in countries across the Middle East.
The Pentagon has spent tens of billions of dollars, while damaged bases and depleted weapons stockpiles will take years and tens of billions of dollars to restore. American households are paying more for gas, inflation has risen, and borrowing costs have gone up. The economic shock – and interruptions to key agricultural inputs – is increasing the risk of hunger in countries far removed from the fighting.
Even if the United States had achieved its goals, it’s difficult to argue that the benefits to U.S. national security even remotely outweigh the war’s direct and indirect costs.
The United States cannot undo the damage of the past six months, but it can stop making the damage worse. More strikes are unlikely to deliver the sweeping victory promised at the outset. Washington’s priority should now be a negotiated end to the fighting, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, and a halt to the cycle of retaliation.
That outcome would fall well short of the administration’s original ambitions. But it would be better than continuing a conflict whose costs keep growing as its prospects for success shrink.
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