From Terrorists to Technology: Changing Threats Require Changed Approaches

Twenty-five years after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the threat from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has changed in ways that would have been difficult to imagine at the turn of the century. Before 9/11, the proliferation of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons was largely viewed as a threat posed by states and their arsenals. The 9/11 attacks demonstrated that catastrophic harm could also be inflicted by non-state actors. The anthrax attacks in the United States that followed further heightened fears about the prospect of disaffected insiders, “lone wolves,” and terrorists pursuing biological weapons and other WMD, and helped to catalyze the launch in 2002 of the G8-led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP) to prevent terrorists and those who harbor them from acquiring or developing WMD and related materials, equipment, and technologies. While both state and non-state actors remain real and present threats today, rapidly advancing and converging technologies are drastically reshaping who can access, develop, detect, and deploy WMD, requiring approaches to threat reduction to adapt once more.

Kananaskis 2002: Cold War Legacy Reframed

The mechanism that the G8 leaders announced at their first post-9/11 summit at Kananaskis in June 2002 was modeled on the U.S. Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, which had been working bilaterally with Moscow since 1991 to secure and dismantle vulnerable cold war WMD stockpiles and delivery systems across Russia and the former Soviet Union. At Kananaskis, G8 leaders effectively turned the CTR Program into a multilateral endeavor, with the GP committing to contribute up to US$20 billion over 10 years, with an initial focus on destroying or securing the vast WMD legacy concentrated in Russia and other former Soviet countries.

The GP achieved tangible results during its first decade, including the destruction of approximately 40,000 tonnes of chemical weapons in 5.6 million munitions, the dismantlement of nearly 200 decommissioned Russian nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile materials, and the redirection of 90,000 former weapons scientists to peaceful work. The GP also helped end the production of plutonium for weapons purposes at power reactors in Russia and Kazakhstan, replace highly enriched uranium with low-enriched uranium in research reactors, and consolidate dangerous pathogens and nuclear materials at fewer, more secure sites.

By 2010, most of the projects in Russia were completed or winding down and, in accordance with the GP’s expanded geographic mandate adopted in 2008, GP members were shifting focus away from dismantling legacy arsenals to broader capacity building to prevent and reduce chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) security threats globally.  In 2011 the renewed Global Partnership agreed on four priorities: (1) nuclear security; (2) biological security; (3), scientist engagement; and (4) implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (a resolution obliging states to implement a range of domestic measures to prevent WMD proliferation, including by non-state actors). In March 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea, the G8 became the G7 when it suspended Russia from the exclusive club, and from the GP.

Twenty-Four Years of Tangible Threat Reduction

The GP’s second generation of threat reduction included strengthening nuclear and radiological security; improving chemical and biological safety and security; enhancing border security, export controls; supporting international treaty regimes and their institutions; and helping countries meet obligations such as UN Security Council Resolution 1540. In doing so, the GP built a global “web of prevention” linking governments with international organizations, technical institutions and civil society. A key — and continuing — focus of this work has also been sustained biothreat reduction work, particularly through the Signature Initiative to Mitigate Biological Threats in Africa (SIMBA). In partnership with African organizations including the Africa Centers for Disease Control, SIMBA supports sustainable capacity development in biosecurity, biosurveillance, and non-proliferation.

Throughout, the GP maintained its ability to respond to active crises. Its established relationships, expertise, and delivery mechanisms have enabled it to pivot when urgent threats emerge, including supporting the international effort to eliminate Syria’s declared chemical weapons program in 2013 — and again over the past year, with GP members supporting redeployment of inspectors from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to Syria where they are working closely with the transitional government in Damascus to uncover, verify, and destroy the former Assad regime’s remaining chemical weapons and facilities. The GP was also instrumental in providing support for eliminating dangerous chemical weapons materials in Libya in 2016 and has funneled CBRN security support to Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. GP members continue to contribute to the OPCW’s Trust Fund on Assistance and Protection of Ukraine and to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s continuous monitoring missions at Ukraine’s nuclear power plants after Russia’s seizure and occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, Europe’s largest. The ability to adapt, coordinate, and build on previous experiences has been central to the GP’s staying power.

The Threat Landscape is Changing Again

A quarter of a century after 9/11, the WMD threat landscape has changed again, now being shaped by rapid technological change. The diffusion of advanced technologies is creating new pathways through which WMD capabilities can be developed, acquired, or deployed. Artificial intelligence (AI), synthetic biology, quantum technologies, additive manufacturing, autonomous systems, and other emerging technologies can alter the accessibility, speed, scale, precision, and detectability of activities relevant to WMD.

In 2002, the question was how to prevent WMD materials and expertise from falling into the wrong hands. In 2026, the question is how to ensure that rapidly advancing technologies do not create new pathways to WMD proliferation and how to harness those same technologies to make threat reduction more resilient and effective.

While the GP’s continued focus on state-based WMD programs and the acquisition and use of WMD by non-state actors remains as relevant today as 25 years ago, the changed threat environment has prompted the adoption of an updated strategy to match the times.

During Canada’s G7 Presidency in 2025, GP members endorsed a new threat reduction strategy focused on WMD-Relevant Technologies (WMD-RT), to include AI, synthetic biology, quantum sensing, additive manufacturing, and uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS). A key feature of the strategy is its focus not just on the potential these technologies have to accelerate and exacerbate WMD threats, but also to offer new tools for prevention, detection, and response.

IMPACT WMD: Next Generation Threat Reduction

Following the adoption of the new strategy, the GP’s CBRN Working Group approved the establishment of the Innovation for Mitigating Proliferation and Countering Threats of WMD (IMPACT WMD) Initiative in November 2025. It is designed to serve as an agile, action-oriented mechanism to engage regularly, strategically, and programmatically with industry partners — through a Community of Action (CoA) — that share the GP’s threat reduction objectives to address the benefits and risks of WMD-RT.

Its three workstreams — shared principles and language, horizon scanning and scenario modelling, and technology sprints — are oriented toward identifying emerging risks and turning technological opportunities into practical threat-reduction capabilities.

While the G8 mobilized to address a dangerous legacy of the past at Kananaskis, with IMPACT WMD, the GP is building resilience and preparing for the technologies shaping threats today and in the future.

The Enduring Value of the Global Partnership

Operating for nearly a quarter century, the G7-led GP has become the world’s largest, and longest-standing, multilateral mechanism dedicated to WMD threat reduction. What began in the aftermath of 9/11 as a response to acute risks posed by non-state actors and the vast Soviet legacy of WMD materials, facilities, and expertise has evolved into a partnership of 31 members coordinating practical efforts to prevent, detect, and respond to CBRN security threats around the world. As a flexible framework through which multiple countries can pool resources, expertise, and political attention to further concrete threat-reduction projects, the GP has proven its value to the threat reduction enterprise. With IMPACT WMD, the GP is adapting again: from managing known WMD risks toward anticipating and shaping the emerging technological environment in which future WMD risks may arise.