Editor’s Note: Javad Heiran-Nia directs the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran and has written for Stimson on Iran’s foreign and domestic politics.
By Middle East Program Team
An analysis of Iran’s political landscape following the U.S. and Israeli war reveals a profound transformation, where the structure of power has been redefined in favor of a new generation of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders and security-intelligence figures.
In this new order, competition is largely confined to within the conservative camp, while reformist and moderate currents have been effectively eliminated from the power equation. Given the political disengagement of their traditional social base in a rapidly dwindling middle class, reformists have no foreseeable prospect for reintegration into the power structure.
The primary reasons for this exclusion include prior purges and the prioritization of regime survival over reform.
Although the IRGC evolved as a parallel institution alongside the regular military from the early days of the 1979 revolution, it entered the realm of economic activities during the 1989-1997 presidencies of Hashemi Rafsanjani, subsequently acquiring multi-dimensional power within Iran’s power structure.
The 2026 war dramatically intensified this trend, as power has become concentrated in the IRGC and its affiliated security networks to an unprecedented degree. Prominent figures — including Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and military commanders — all possess robust IRGC backgrounds. This structure leaves no room for civilian political figures with reformist leanings.
Prior to the war, widespread disqualifications had already severely weakened the reformist current. For instance, Hassan Rouhani, the former moderate president, was barred from candidacy in elections for the Assembly of Experts, the body that is charged with choosing and supervising the Supreme Leader. This process homogenized the political space and restricted competition to within the conservative camp.
In the post-war environment, the primary objective of the new leadership is the perpetuation of the system, and internal discourse is centered on mechanisms of power preservation rather than democratic reforms or political participation. In such an atmosphere, reformist perspectives are perceived as threats to stability and national unity.
The gradual exclusion of the reformist current from Iran’s power structure is the outcome of the interaction of three key factors: the unequal structure of power, conservative success in eliminating rivals, and the strategic and operational weaknesses of the reformists themselves.
Unequal Power Structure: Playing on a Predetermined Field
The most significant obstacle confronting reformists is the foundational structure of the Islamic Republic, which concentrates power in unelected institutions loyal to the Supreme Leader.
Following the 1979 Iranian revolution, revolutionary institutions such as the IRGC were initially dominated by a spectrum of factions, ranging from Islamic leftists to traditionalists. However, from the 1990s onward, these institutions gradually transformed into powerful instruments of the conservative current. A prime example is the shift within the IRGC from its initial left-leaning elements to conservative dominance.
According to Hossein Bashiriyeh, an Iranian political sociology theorist, the failure of the first provisional government of Prime Minister Mehdi Barzagan to eliminate independent power centers constituted a significant step in constraining the scope for competition and political participation. Subsequent reformist figures such as Presidents Mohammad Khatami and Rouhani have operated within the constraints of these limitations, with Khatami once likening his role to that of a logistics coordinator.
In this context, the decisive role of the Guardian Council in engineering the political power structure of the Islamic Republic must be underscored. Candidates for parliament and the presidency must be approved by the Council, which consists of clerics chosen by the Supreme Leader and by the head of the judiciary, who the Leader also appoints.
This mechanism serves as a powerful filter, depriving reformists of the possibility of serious competition. For example, Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of the founder of the Islamic Republic, as well as Rouhani, the former president, were both disqualified from candidacy for the Assembly of Experts.
The IRGC has also played a pivotal role in suppressing protests and eliminating political rivals, most recently after mass protests in January. Its animosity toward the reformist current is deeply rooted, and its commanders have openly threatened to counter any political opening if deemed necessary.
The conservative and hardline current has invoked concepts such as “state expediency” and “red lines”to restrict the sphere of political activity. This instrument enables them to alter the rules whenever reformists achieve a success, thereby nullifying that achievement.
Reformist Performance: Missed Opportunities and Passivity
Despite these structural obstacles, the reformist current’s exclusion can also be attributed to its own operational and strategic deficiencies, resulting in a growing distance from its social base, namely the middle class. After winning elections, reformists failed to establish effective grassroots organizations for the sustained pursuit of demands. This led to the erosion of their connection with society.
Reformists can be regarded as the heirs of the Islamic Left of the early revolution. Although their initial focus was justice-centered, subsequent social changes and a departure from the radical atmosphere of the early revolutionary period led reformists to prioritize freedom over social justice. This shift was observable in the presidential election of May 1997 when Khatami assumed office with reformist slogans emphasizing political development.
The Iranian people — particularly the younger generation and the middle class — still viewed the ballot box as a means to effect social, cultural, and political change. However, some votes for Khatami should also be seen as the public’s preference for replacing a “bad strategy” with a “less bad strategy.”
Khatami administration efforts to promote political development, including press freedom, the establishment of non-governmental organizations, and political party activity, encountered severe opposition and resistance from conservative currents. For example, the amendment of the press law in 2000 in favor of more freedom was vetoed by the conservative current and removed from the agenda of parliament. Gradually, the view took hold that reformism was not feasible within Iran’s political power structure.
Following the controversial 2009 elections and widespread protests by the middle class during the so-called Green Movement, the process of eliminating reformists by the conservative current intensified. The arrest of reformist leaders and the escalation of security pressure on this current were among these measures.
The eight years of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s administration, which led to both restrictions on political space and US-led economic sanctions, combined with a corrupt state structure to increase pressures on the populace. The middle class still sought a way out of this situation through the ballot box, choosing the “bad strategy” from among the “bad” and “worse” options. This led to the election in 2013 of Rouhani, a pragmatist, whose administration was viewed by reformists as a “surrogate womb” and a form of “quasi-reformism” that would allow them a minimal presence in the power structure.
Rouhani’s re-election in 2017 created expectations that he would take action on key political issues such as lifting the house arrest of Mir Hossein Mousavi, Zahra Rahnavard, and Mehdi Karroubi, leaders of the 2009 post-election protests, and other matters related to political development. This did not materialize.
External factors, such as Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal and the re-imposition of sanctions, further exacerbated the economic situation and hit the middle class particularly hard.
Since 2011, the middle class has shrunk by about 8 million, with the proportion of the middle class within Iran’s overall population dropping from approximately 65–70% at the start of the 2010s to 50% or lower now. During the 2012–2019 period, international sanctions eroded the size of this socioeconomic stratum by an average annual rate of 17%.
Subsequently, the middle class disengaged from the political system, increasingly boycotting elections. Even Khatami, in 2019 parliamentary elections, was unable to encourage this class to participate and stated that they no longer heeded his words and had moved beyond him.
Reformists have also failed to attract new generations. Even if a new civil current were to emerge as an alternative, it would not be the conventional reformist current, but rather a movement with a different understanding of politics.
The severe weakening of the middle class will likely lead to the further consolidation of conservative power in future elections. Where previously a form of quasi-democracy existed in Iran’s political power structure, what now prevails is a pseudo-democracy.
Reformist theoretician Saeed Hajjarian describes the current state of Iranian society as a kind of “suspension” in which one must wait and see what understanding is reached between domestic and external actors.
Intra-Conservative Competition: Pragmatists vs. Hardliners
Despite the marginalization of reformists, factionalism persists in Iran, this time as competition within the conservative camp between relative pragmatists and ultra hardliners.
The pragmatist or realist faction includes President Masoud Pezeshkian, Parliament speaker Qalibaf, and a number of senior IRGC commanders. They maintain that the regime’s survival depends on de-escalation and negotiation with the United States to alleviate economic pressures and end the naval blockade. This faction succeeded in persuading the new Supreme Leader to accept a ceasefire and direct negotiations with the United States.
In opposition, the hardline faction, embodied in the Paydari or Resistance Front, opposes any concession to the United States and views negotiations themselves as a sign of weakness and betrayal. This faction emerged in 2011 with the spiritual backing of the late Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, a cleric close to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
The group’s members, who held significant power during Ahmadinejad’s presidency, gradually distanced themselves from his administration, seeking to redefine their revolutionary identity. In practice, this created new frictions within the conservative camp.
The senior Ayatollah Khamenei, who was killed by the Israelis on the first day of the war, framed political disagreements as impediments to progress and positioned himself as the sole supra-factional authority and guarantor of the regime’s principles. Ironically, his removal has made it more difficult for the government to coalesce around a single strategy for war or for peace.
With the prospect that reformists will remain on the margins, Iran’s political future will be shaped by the competition within the conservative camp. A continuation of the war with the U.S. is likely to strengthen the hardliners, to the detriment of those who favor negotiations and economic development.
Header image: Funeral ceremony for Ayatollah Khamenei in Qom – Mehr News Agency
Middle East
Editor’s Note: Javad Heiran-Nia directs the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran and has written for Stimson on Iran’s foreign and domestic politics.
By Middle East Program Team
An analysis of Iran’s political landscape following the U.S. and Israeli war reveals a profound transformation, where the structure of power has been redefined in favor of a new generation of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders and security-intelligence figures.
In this new order, competition is largely confined to within the conservative camp, while reformist and moderate currents have been effectively eliminated from the power equation. Given the political disengagement of their traditional social base in a rapidly dwindling middle class, reformists have no foreseeable prospect for reintegration into the power structure.
The primary reasons for this exclusion include prior purges and the prioritization of regime survival over reform.
Although the IRGC evolved as a parallel institution alongside the regular military from the early days of the 1979 revolution, it entered the realm of economic activities during the 1989-1997 presidencies of Hashemi Rafsanjani, subsequently acquiring multi-dimensional power within Iran’s power structure.
The 2026 war dramatically intensified this trend, as power has become concentrated in the IRGC and its affiliated security networks to an unprecedented degree. Prominent figures — including Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and military commanders — all possess robust IRGC backgrounds. This structure leaves no room for civilian political figures with reformist leanings.
Prior to the war, widespread disqualifications had already severely weakened the reformist current. For instance, Hassan Rouhani, the former moderate president, was barred from candidacy in elections for the Assembly of Experts, the body that is charged with choosing and supervising the Supreme Leader. This process homogenized the political space and restricted competition to within the conservative camp.
In the post-war environment, the primary objective of the new leadership is the perpetuation of the system, and internal discourse is centered on mechanisms of power preservation rather than democratic reforms or political participation. In such an atmosphere, reformist perspectives are perceived as threats to stability and national unity.
The gradual exclusion of the reformist current from Iran’s power structure is the outcome of the interaction of three key factors: the unequal structure of power, conservative success in eliminating rivals, and the strategic and operational weaknesses of the reformists themselves.
Unequal Power Structure: Playing on a Predetermined Field
The most significant obstacle confronting reformists is the foundational structure of the Islamic Republic, which concentrates power in unelected institutions loyal to the Supreme Leader.
Following the 1979 Iranian revolution, revolutionary institutions such as the IRGC were initially dominated by a spectrum of factions, ranging from Islamic leftists to traditionalists. However, from the 1990s onward, these institutions gradually transformed into powerful instruments of the conservative current. A prime example is the shift within the IRGC from its initial left-leaning elements to conservative dominance.
According to Hossein Bashiriyeh, an Iranian political sociology theorist, the failure of the first provisional government of Prime Minister Mehdi Barzagan to eliminate independent power centers constituted a significant step in constraining the scope for competition and political participation. Subsequent reformist figures such as Presidents Mohammad Khatami and Rouhani have operated within the constraints of these limitations, with Khatami once likening his role to that of a logistics coordinator.
In this context, the decisive role of the Guardian Council in engineering the political power structure of the Islamic Republic must be underscored. Candidates for parliament and the presidency must be approved by the Council, which consists of clerics chosen by the Supreme Leader and by the head of the judiciary, who the Leader also appoints.
This mechanism serves as a powerful filter, depriving reformists of the possibility of serious competition. For example, Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of the founder of the Islamic Republic, as well as Rouhani, the former president, were both disqualified from candidacy for the Assembly of Experts.
The IRGC has also played a pivotal role in suppressing protests and eliminating political rivals, most recently after mass protests in January. Its animosity toward the reformist current is deeply rooted, and its commanders have openly threatened to counter any political opening if deemed necessary.
The conservative and hardline current has invoked concepts such as “state expediency” and “red lines”to restrict the sphere of political activity. This instrument enables them to alter the rules whenever reformists achieve a success, thereby nullifying that achievement.
Reformist Performance: Missed Opportunities and Passivity
Despite these structural obstacles, the reformist current’s exclusion can also be attributed to its own operational and strategic deficiencies, resulting in a growing distance from its social base, namely the middle class. After winning elections, reformists failed to establish effective grassroots organizations for the sustained pursuit of demands. This led to the erosion of their connection with society.
Reformists can be regarded as the heirs of the Islamic Left of the early revolution. Although their initial focus was justice-centered, subsequent social changes and a departure from the radical atmosphere of the early revolutionary period led reformists to prioritize freedom over social justice. This shift was observable in the presidential election of May 1997 when Khatami assumed office with reformist slogans emphasizing political development.
The Iranian people — particularly the younger generation and the middle class — still viewed the ballot box as a means to effect social, cultural, and political change. However, some votes for Khatami should also be seen as the public’s preference for replacing a “bad strategy” with a “less bad strategy.”
Khatami administration efforts to promote political development, including press freedom, the establishment of non-governmental organizations, and political party activity, encountered severe opposition and resistance from conservative currents. For example, the amendment of the press law in 2000 in favor of more freedom was vetoed by the conservative current and removed from the agenda of parliament. Gradually, the view took hold that reformism was not feasible within Iran’s political power structure.
Following the controversial 2009 elections and widespread protests by the middle class during the so-called Green Movement, the process of eliminating reformists by the conservative current intensified. The arrest of reformist leaders and the escalation of security pressure on this current were among these measures.
The eight years of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s administration, which led to both restrictions on political space and US-led economic sanctions, combined with a corrupt state structure to increase pressures on the populace. The middle class still sought a way out of this situation through the ballot box, choosing the “bad strategy” from among the “bad” and “worse” options. This led to the election in 2013 of Rouhani, a pragmatist, whose administration was viewed by reformists as a “surrogate womb” and a form of “quasi-reformism” that would allow them a minimal presence in the power structure.
Rouhani’s re-election in 2017 created expectations that he would take action on key political issues such as lifting the house arrest of Mir Hossein Mousavi, Zahra Rahnavard, and Mehdi Karroubi, leaders of the 2009 post-election protests, and other matters related to political development. This did not materialize.
External factors, such as Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal and the re-imposition of sanctions, further exacerbated the economic situation and hit the middle class particularly hard.
Since 2011, the middle class has shrunk by about 8 million, with the proportion of the middle class within Iran’s overall population dropping from approximately 65–70% at the start of the 2010s to 50% or lower now. During the 2012–2019 period, international sanctions eroded the size of this socioeconomic stratum by an average annual rate of 17%.
Subsequently, the middle class disengaged from the political system, increasingly boycotting elections. Even Khatami, in 2019 parliamentary elections, was unable to encourage this class to participate and stated that they no longer heeded his words and had moved beyond him.
Reformists have also failed to attract new generations. Even if a new civil current were to emerge as an alternative, it would not be the conventional reformist current, but rather a movement with a different understanding of politics.
The severe weakening of the middle class will likely lead to the further consolidation of conservative power in future elections. Where previously a form of quasi-democracy existed in Iran’s political power structure, what now prevails is a pseudo-democracy.
Reformist theoretician Saeed Hajjarian describes the current state of Iranian society as a kind of “suspension” in which one must wait and see what understanding is reached between domestic and external actors.
Intra-Conservative Competition: Pragmatists vs. Hardliners
Despite the marginalization of reformists, factionalism persists in Iran, this time as competition within the conservative camp between relative pragmatists and ultra hardliners.
The pragmatist or realist faction includes President Masoud Pezeshkian, Parliament speaker Qalibaf, and a number of senior IRGC commanders. They maintain that the regime’s survival depends on de-escalation and negotiation with the United States to alleviate economic pressures and end the naval blockade. This faction succeeded in persuading the new Supreme Leader to accept a ceasefire and direct negotiations with the United States.
In opposition, the hardline faction, embodied in the Paydari or Resistance Front, opposes any concession to the United States and views negotiations themselves as a sign of weakness and betrayal. This faction emerged in 2011 with the spiritual backing of the late Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, a cleric close to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
The group’s members, who held significant power during Ahmadinejad’s presidency, gradually distanced themselves from his administration, seeking to redefine their revolutionary identity. In practice, this created new frictions within the conservative camp.
The senior Ayatollah Khamenei, who was killed by the Israelis on the first day of the war, framed political disagreements as impediments to progress and positioned himself as the sole supra-factional authority and guarantor of the regime’s principles. Ironically, his removal has made it more difficult for the government to coalesce around a single strategy for war or for peace.
With the prospect that reformists will remain on the margins, Iran’s political future will be shaped by the competition within the conservative camp. A continuation of the war with the U.S. is likely to strengthen the hardliners, to the detriment of those who favor negotiations and economic development.
Header image: Funeral ceremony for Ayatollah Khamenei in Qom – Mehr News Agency
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