For many years, the relationship between the United States and the European Union has been a defining feature of global relations. Traditionally centered on trade in line with the EU’s earlier incarnations as a customs zone and free trade area, the relationship has blossomed in recent decades to encompass a wide range of international issues from migration to international finance to energy. More recently, with the advent of the war in Ukraine and the resulting security threat posed by Moscow, along with shifts in U.S. foreign policy, the EU has taken some significant steps to adopt a distinct military and defense identity. Careful to work in concert with NATO, the EU is seeking a complementary role, focusing on improved analysis, steps to counter hybrid probing, better civic preparedness, and strengthening Europe’s defense industrial base. This trend has injected a new element into the transatlantic relationship with significant ramifications for the U.S. role in European security and U.S. strategic interests, and it has also highlighted the importance of considering both U.S. and European foreign policy approaches toward other regions, notably Asia.
Is the EU a viable partner to the U.S. on the global stage, or has it been positioning itself, across both the Biden and Trump administrations, as a rival or at least an alternative for trade and new technologies? Can Europe really take on increased responsibility for its own security and act as a viable U.S. security partner, especially while it seeks to forge a more autonomous path at the same time? If Europe establishes a meaningful identity on security, what will that mean for the U.S. in the years ahead? How will the transatlantic relationship evolve? It appears that this shift is very much in line with current strategic thinking in Washington that the burden for Europe’s defense needs to shift decisively away from the U.S.; a greater prominence for the EU in this space is a logical result. It also, however, carries with it the seeds of new stresses and strains in the bond given some of the apparent contradictions and consequences that are likely to arise on both sides of the Atlantic. Within Europe, there are tensions barely beneath the surface over how quickly and to what extent the EU should be an integral actor in defense and hard security. For the U.S., the conventional push for greater European defense autonomy has not fully factored in its ramifications for U.S. strategic flexibility and extended capability, as well as standards centered around U.S. weapons. Considering some scenarios that could unfold in the next few years and their implications helps clarify the choices facing both Washington and Brussels.
The return of Donald Trump to the White House has led to a general U.S. disengagement from the multilateral system and a greater disregard for its accompanying national commitments. This approach correlates with a stated goal to focus on deals with other great powers, and what appears to be a general disinterest in, bordering on contempt for, the interests and aspirations of friends and allies. This will probably be reflected in the upcoming National Defense Strategy, which is likely to show Europe tumbling down the White House’s list of priority regions. More concretely, this has been manifested in the doubts Trump sowed during his first term on NATO’s Article V mutual defense guarantees, dramatic funding reductions to the UN system, and critical Trump comments about dealing with the EU. It has been compounded by the administration’s stated intention to shift resources and attention away from Europe toward Asia, tussles with the EU on tariffs and technology regulation, and a more transactional and commercial approach on a number of issues, notably on supporting the war effort in Ukraine.
For its part, the EU has adopted for the moment a response that blends silence, appeasement, and internal restructuring and reform. It has provisionally acceded to Trump’s approach toward trade, including the imposition of 15% tariffs on most exports to the U.S. to secure an agreement and provide some degree of business predictability. Brussels has also been careful not to react to extreme trade threats emanating from the White House and to accommodate, through minor course corrections, Washington’s pushback on EU regulation and policies on new technologies such as AI. Moreover, Brussels has sought to be visibly responsive to U.S. demands on sourcing more energy, mainly LNG, from the U.S. while struggling to meet Washington’s insistence to fully cut off imports of Russian oil.
On defense, Europe is seeking greater capabilities by stepping up spending and development of its defense industrial base while still conceding that an active U.S. role in European defense will remain vital for many years to come. Europe has also taken substantial steps to beef up its military and financial support to Ukraine and accepted U.S. proposals to buy U.S. armaments and ship them to Kyiv. The EU is also key to greater European borrowing to finance defense budgets through its rules on national budgets and could even move toward floating European-wide “defense” bonds. NATO, even if it takes on a more European flavor, will likely remain front and center for U.S. engagement in Europe, but the EU represents a separate and visible component for European-led arrangements that will answer Washington’s complaints and provide a way ahead for Europe’s own defense aspirations.
Have these developments on both sides of the Atlantic led to a new steady state in relations and division of responsibilities? Has Trump finished with his agenda to disengage from security commitments to Europe and achieved his end goals on trade? Are the realignments and abandonment of long-held European positions on trade relations, technology regulation, and security cooperation enduring, or are intra-EU discord and disagreements likely to break out? These are all important questions to keep in mind. China’s continuing rise, despite its current economic troubles, poses an existential business threat to both the EU and the U.S., with a mixture of confrontation and cooperation on the table. Doubtlessly, these pressures are putting a genuine strain on internal EU policymaking that is only partially offset by the existential stakes of the issues that the bloc confronts.
Critical Factors
Trying to map out what might come next involves looking at several critical factors. Contextual factors start with the EU’s economic vitality, which is essential to Europe’s own confidence and to underwrite any sustained increase in defense spending, especially in the face of an apparent loss of economic faith; the frothy U.S. stock market; and consolidating domination of next generation technologies, notably artificial intelligence. Another is the growing awareness and appreciation of the serious security threat Russia now presents to Europe — compounded of late by likely Russian gray zone probing in the Baltics, Denmark, and elsewhere. A third is the longer-term challenge or threat posed by China’s mercantilist approach to trade that runs the real risk of decimating whole industrial sectors in Europe. Fourth, the political winds in Europe are shifting to the right in reaction to faltering living standards and disillusionment with the establishment that is fueling a steady rise in extremist — particularly right-wing — political forces across the EU, threatening the very foundations of the pan-European project.
There are also several direct factors surrounding Europe’s ability to establish and build upon its own defense identity. One would be how it handles a loosening of NATO, with the prospect of reduced U.S. leadership. How, if at all, do the Europeans compensate through the EU and its nascent defense mandate and capabilities? And, finally, the ability of Europe’s own defense and tech sectors to create a resilient foundation for the continent’s defense will be critical.
Scenarios
There are three plausible scenarios for how the security dimension of the US–EU relationship could evolve into the 2030s. Each of them contains implications for how Europe will navigate these challenges and what options might exist for U.S. policymakers.
The first one is a general continuation of current trends. The U.S. continues to prioritize “America First” and confronting China in the Asia-Pacific, resulting in further disengagement from the specifics of European security and leading to more of an arm’s length transatlantic relationship that is mostly transactional. That NATO is hollowed out becomes mostly irrelevant. For the present, Europe quietly accedes to many of Washington’s demands and expectations, seeking to cling to the only partnership it knows and biding time to gain consensus on making more fundamental market reforms such as a unified capital market. Observing reduced U.S. interest in European security, Moscow steps up efforts to test Europe’s resolve. Outside of defense, transatlantic flash points continue to be trade, technology regulation and promotion, environmental standards, and political interference. Trade barriers remain, and the dollar sustains its global dominance. As a consequence of anemic economic performance, U.S. distancing, and Russia’s gray zone probing, political support for European far-right parties and movements continues to increase across Europe, leading to reduced confidence in the EU and an openness to relations with Russia. Europe and the U.S. grow further apart.
On defense issues, the EU continues to make incremental improvements in its defense capabilities and industrial policy yet falls short of a consolidated and coherent policy to stand up to Russia. Europe is likely to remain dependent on key but uncertain U.S. capabilities for the foreseeable future. Joint weapons procurement and production are hard to obtain and sustain. Competition among European weapons manufacturers sets national governments at odds with one another. The U.S. reaction ranges from continued mild support to indifference.
A second scenario envisions a near collapse of the EU as U.S. and Russian pressure on the bloc produce fissures among and within member states. Decision makers increasingly disregard rules privileging EU collective action and roll out individual policies and restrictive trade rules. EU efforts to shore up its domestic tech sector falter in the face of U.S. intransigence and relentless Chinese competition. Transatlantic trade relations are characterized by distrust and resentment on both sides. Economic growth is negligible, and populist discontent propels far-right parties into governments as their electoral fortunes improve.
Russia steps up its gray zone probing of European defense, emboldened by seeming U.S. indifference along with its decision to pull out most of its troops based in Europe. NATO’s collective security is seriously undermined, with its defining operational purpose in doubt and the absence of an accepted leader. European efforts, particularly through the EU, to fortify its own defense fizzle as infighting over resources and perceived vulnerabilities increases. European defense sector manufacturers secure a small home advantage as countries ramp up spending but fail to make inroads into bigger global markets, notably the U.S.
A final scenario sees Europe as actively charting a more independent approach toward the U.S., Russia, and China. Brussels leans into a more American-style transactional approach, reconciling to the new normal of tariffs but resists U.S. pressure to increase purchases of U.S. energy supplies and water down its approach to technology regulation. It leads efforts for European industry to diversify away from excessive supply-chain reliance on the U.S., and it charts its own course on global engagement, even to the point in some cases of competing with the U.S. The EU ramps up its fiscal capabilities, notably its ability to issue shared debt instruments. The European Council pushes back hard on Russian provocation, causing Moscow to pause its harassment and reconsider the threat it faces. Brussels confronts Chinese industrial competition in a forceful but blended manner that gives European industry greater domestic competitive advantage. European economic growth resumes, and the political appeal of the far-right peaks and starts to diminish.
Mostly through the EU, but with greater autonomy in NATO, European nations strike a more decisive stand on building an independent collective security identity and role. Europe builds on the fledgling Franco-UK nuclear cooperation and makes a more decisive break from expanded U.S. weapons purchases, even in spite of the loss of some capabilities. Key U.S. political and economic stakeholders pressure the U.S. administration to revise its hands-off approach and re-embrace a greater partnership. Europe, distrustful, hesitates. The transatlantic relationship is fraught and uncertain.
Where to Next?
The plausibility of each of these scenarios depends on a number of factors. Foremost will be Europe’s economic growth in the next few years. Anemic growth will lead to self-doubt and a lack of confidence in the future. This in turn could adversely affect the civic space in Europe, leading to increased polarization and reduced trust. Europe’s industrial competitiveness with China and U.S. frontier technology will matter. Political developments in the U.S. and the coherence and direction of Trump Administration policies will also exert an exogenous impact on how and in what direction this relationship heads. An emboldened Global South, with a bulging youth population, may also have a critical effect. Finally, of course, an unknowable Black Swan event such as a pandemic, serious economic crisis, or natural disaster could have an unexpected dramatic and unexpected effect.
The trajectory of Europe taking greater responsibility for its own defense will depend on all these factors as well as the inherent ability of its political leadership to overcome decades of reliance on the United States, which has bred some complacency and disassociation. It will also be influenced by and influence how Russia proceeds with provocative attitudes and actions that challenge or threaten European security. In turn, Washington will need to consider the implications for Europe — but also for U.S. foreign policy — of continuing to push Europe forward on its own defense, which is likely an overdue course correction but one not without implications for U.S. foreign policy options and leadership and the utility of the transatlantic relationship.
This is a medium-term set of scenarios, covering the rest of the decade and into the 2030s. Some will advocate that given this uncertainty, the best case for Europe is to wait out the Trump administration and then hope things will return to “normal.” However, the challenges Europe faces are more immediate and require a new direction. It is also unclear whether after four years of Trump there will be anything recognizable to return to. Eroded trust and new patterns of cooperation and global dialogue will likely result in a new paradigm that considering these possibilities will inform.
Other Stimson products on the transatlantic relationship:
What Kind of US Security Partner Will the EU Be?
By Andrew Hyde
Diplomacy & Dialogue
For many years, the relationship between the United States and the European Union has been a defining feature of global relations. Traditionally centered on trade in line with the EU’s earlier incarnations as a customs zone and free trade area, the relationship has blossomed in recent decades to encompass a wide range of international issues from migration to international finance to energy. More recently, with the advent of the war in Ukraine and the resulting security threat posed by Moscow, along with shifts in U.S. foreign policy, the EU has taken some significant steps to adopt a distinct military and defense identity. Careful to work in concert with NATO, the EU is seeking a complementary role, focusing on improved analysis, steps to counter hybrid probing, better civic preparedness, and strengthening Europe’s defense industrial base. This trend has injected a new element into the transatlantic relationship with significant ramifications for the U.S. role in European security and U.S. strategic interests, and it has also highlighted the importance of considering both U.S. and European foreign policy approaches toward other regions, notably Asia.
Is the EU a viable partner to the U.S. on the global stage, or has it been positioning itself, across both the Biden and Trump administrations, as a rival or at least an alternative for trade and new technologies? Can Europe really take on increased responsibility for its own security and act as a viable U.S. security partner, especially while it seeks to forge a more autonomous path at the same time? If Europe establishes a meaningful identity on security, what will that mean for the U.S. in the years ahead? How will the transatlantic relationship evolve? It appears that this shift is very much in line with current strategic thinking in Washington that the burden for Europe’s defense needs to shift decisively away from the U.S.; a greater prominence for the EU in this space is a logical result. It also, however, carries with it the seeds of new stresses and strains in the bond given some of the apparent contradictions and consequences that are likely to arise on both sides of the Atlantic. Within Europe, there are tensions barely beneath the surface over how quickly and to what extent the EU should be an integral actor in defense and hard security. For the U.S., the conventional push for greater European defense autonomy has not fully factored in its ramifications for U.S. strategic flexibility and extended capability, as well as standards centered around U.S. weapons. Considering some scenarios that could unfold in the next few years and their implications helps clarify the choices facing both Washington and Brussels.
The return of Donald Trump to the White House has led to a general U.S. disengagement from the multilateral system and a greater disregard for its accompanying national commitments. This approach correlates with a stated goal to focus on deals with other great powers, and what appears to be a general disinterest in, bordering on contempt for, the interests and aspirations of friends and allies. This will probably be reflected in the upcoming National Defense Strategy, which is likely to show Europe tumbling down the White House’s list of priority regions. More concretely, this has been manifested in the doubts Trump sowed during his first term on NATO’s Article V mutual defense guarantees, dramatic funding reductions to the UN system, and critical Trump comments about dealing with the EU. It has been compounded by the administration’s stated intention to shift resources and attention away from Europe toward Asia, tussles with the EU on tariffs and technology regulation, and a more transactional and commercial approach on a number of issues, notably on supporting the war effort in Ukraine.
For its part, the EU has adopted for the moment a response that blends silence, appeasement, and internal restructuring and reform. It has provisionally acceded to Trump’s approach toward trade, including the imposition of 15% tariffs on most exports to the U.S. to secure an agreement and provide some degree of business predictability. Brussels has also been careful not to react to extreme trade threats emanating from the White House and to accommodate, through minor course corrections, Washington’s pushback on EU regulation and policies on new technologies such as AI. Moreover, Brussels has sought to be visibly responsive to U.S. demands on sourcing more energy, mainly LNG, from the U.S. while struggling to meet Washington’s insistence to fully cut off imports of Russian oil.
On defense, Europe is seeking greater capabilities by stepping up spending and development of its defense industrial base while still conceding that an active U.S. role in European defense will remain vital for many years to come. Europe has also taken substantial steps to beef up its military and financial support to Ukraine and accepted U.S. proposals to buy U.S. armaments and ship them to Kyiv. The EU is also key to greater European borrowing to finance defense budgets through its rules on national budgets and could even move toward floating European-wide “defense” bonds. NATO, even if it takes on a more European flavor, will likely remain front and center for U.S. engagement in Europe, but the EU represents a separate and visible component for European-led arrangements that will answer Washington’s complaints and provide a way ahead for Europe’s own defense aspirations.
Have these developments on both sides of the Atlantic led to a new steady state in relations and division of responsibilities? Has Trump finished with his agenda to disengage from security commitments to Europe and achieved his end goals on trade? Are the realignments and abandonment of long-held European positions on trade relations, technology regulation, and security cooperation enduring, or are intra-EU discord and disagreements likely to break out? These are all important questions to keep in mind. China’s continuing rise, despite its current economic troubles, poses an existential business threat to both the EU and the U.S., with a mixture of confrontation and cooperation on the table. Doubtlessly, these pressures are putting a genuine strain on internal EU policymaking that is only partially offset by the existential stakes of the issues that the bloc confronts.
Critical Factors
Trying to map out what might come next involves looking at several critical factors. Contextual factors start with the EU’s economic vitality, which is essential to Europe’s own confidence and to underwrite any sustained increase in defense spending, especially in the face of an apparent loss of economic faith; the frothy U.S. stock market; and consolidating domination of next generation technologies, notably artificial intelligence. Another is the growing awareness and appreciation of the serious security threat Russia now presents to Europe — compounded of late by likely Russian gray zone probing in the Baltics, Denmark, and elsewhere. A third is the longer-term challenge or threat posed by China’s mercantilist approach to trade that runs the real risk of decimating whole industrial sectors in Europe. Fourth, the political winds in Europe are shifting to the right in reaction to faltering living standards and disillusionment with the establishment that is fueling a steady rise in extremist — particularly right-wing — political forces across the EU, threatening the very foundations of the pan-European project.
There are also several direct factors surrounding Europe’s ability to establish and build upon its own defense identity. One would be how it handles a loosening of NATO, with the prospect of reduced U.S. leadership. How, if at all, do the Europeans compensate through the EU and its nascent defense mandate and capabilities? And, finally, the ability of Europe’s own defense and tech sectors to create a resilient foundation for the continent’s defense will be critical.
Scenarios
There are three plausible scenarios for how the security dimension of the US–EU relationship could evolve into the 2030s. Each of them contains implications for how Europe will navigate these challenges and what options might exist for U.S. policymakers.
The first one is a general continuation of current trends. The U.S. continues to prioritize “America First” and confronting China in the Asia-Pacific, resulting in further disengagement from the specifics of European security and leading to more of an arm’s length transatlantic relationship that is mostly transactional. That NATO is hollowed out becomes mostly irrelevant. For the present, Europe quietly accedes to many of Washington’s demands and expectations, seeking to cling to the only partnership it knows and biding time to gain consensus on making more fundamental market reforms such as a unified capital market. Observing reduced U.S. interest in European security, Moscow steps up efforts to test Europe’s resolve. Outside of defense, transatlantic flash points continue to be trade, technology regulation and promotion, environmental standards, and political interference. Trade barriers remain, and the dollar sustains its global dominance. As a consequence of anemic economic performance, U.S. distancing, and Russia’s gray zone probing, political support for European far-right parties and movements continues to increase across Europe, leading to reduced confidence in the EU and an openness to relations with Russia. Europe and the U.S. grow further apart.
On defense issues, the EU continues to make incremental improvements in its defense capabilities and industrial policy yet falls short of a consolidated and coherent policy to stand up to Russia. Europe is likely to remain dependent on key but uncertain U.S. capabilities for the foreseeable future. Joint weapons procurement and production are hard to obtain and sustain. Competition among European weapons manufacturers sets national governments at odds with one another. The U.S. reaction ranges from continued mild support to indifference.
A second scenario envisions a near collapse of the EU as U.S. and Russian pressure on the bloc produce fissures among and within member states. Decision makers increasingly disregard rules privileging EU collective action and roll out individual policies and restrictive trade rules. EU efforts to shore up its domestic tech sector falter in the face of U.S. intransigence and relentless Chinese competition. Transatlantic trade relations are characterized by distrust and resentment on both sides. Economic growth is negligible, and populist discontent propels far-right parties into governments as their electoral fortunes improve.
Russia steps up its gray zone probing of European defense, emboldened by seeming U.S. indifference along with its decision to pull out most of its troops based in Europe. NATO’s collective security is seriously undermined, with its defining operational purpose in doubt and the absence of an accepted leader. European efforts, particularly through the EU, to fortify its own defense fizzle as infighting over resources and perceived vulnerabilities increases. European defense sector manufacturers secure a small home advantage as countries ramp up spending but fail to make inroads into bigger global markets, notably the U.S.
A final scenario sees Europe as actively charting a more independent approach toward the U.S., Russia, and China. Brussels leans into a more American-style transactional approach, reconciling to the new normal of tariffs but resists U.S. pressure to increase purchases of U.S. energy supplies and water down its approach to technology regulation. It leads efforts for European industry to diversify away from excessive supply-chain reliance on the U.S., and it charts its own course on global engagement, even to the point in some cases of competing with the U.S. The EU ramps up its fiscal capabilities, notably its ability to issue shared debt instruments. The European Council pushes back hard on Russian provocation, causing Moscow to pause its harassment and reconsider the threat it faces. Brussels confronts Chinese industrial competition in a forceful but blended manner that gives European industry greater domestic competitive advantage. European economic growth resumes, and the political appeal of the far-right peaks and starts to diminish.
Mostly through the EU, but with greater autonomy in NATO, European nations strike a more decisive stand on building an independent collective security identity and role. Europe builds on the fledgling Franco-UK nuclear cooperation and makes a more decisive break from expanded U.S. weapons purchases, even in spite of the loss of some capabilities. Key U.S. political and economic stakeholders pressure the U.S. administration to revise its hands-off approach and re-embrace a greater partnership. Europe, distrustful, hesitates. The transatlantic relationship is fraught and uncertain.
Where to Next?
The plausibility of each of these scenarios depends on a number of factors. Foremost will be Europe’s economic growth in the next few years. Anemic growth will lead to self-doubt and a lack of confidence in the future. This in turn could adversely affect the civic space in Europe, leading to increased polarization and reduced trust. Europe’s industrial competitiveness with China and U.S. frontier technology will matter. Political developments in the U.S. and the coherence and direction of Trump Administration policies will also exert an exogenous impact on how and in what direction this relationship heads. An emboldened Global South, with a bulging youth population, may also have a critical effect. Finally, of course, an unknowable Black Swan event such as a pandemic, serious economic crisis, or natural disaster could have an unexpected dramatic and unexpected effect.
The trajectory of Europe taking greater responsibility for its own defense will depend on all these factors as well as the inherent ability of its political leadership to overcome decades of reliance on the United States, which has bred some complacency and disassociation. It will also be influenced by and influence how Russia proceeds with provocative attitudes and actions that challenge or threaten European security. In turn, Washington will need to consider the implications for Europe — but also for U.S. foreign policy — of continuing to push Europe forward on its own defense, which is likely an overdue course correction but one not without implications for U.S. foreign policy options and leadership and the utility of the transatlantic relationship.
This is a medium-term set of scenarios, covering the rest of the decade and into the 2030s. Some will advocate that given this uncertainty, the best case for Europe is to wait out the Trump administration and then hope things will return to “normal.” However, the challenges Europe faces are more immediate and require a new direction. It is also unclear whether after four years of Trump there will be anything recognizable to return to. Eroded trust and new patterns of cooperation and global dialogue will likely result in a new paradigm that considering these possibilities will inform.
Other Stimson products on the transatlantic relationship:
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