More than 72 years passed between the creation of the U.S. Air Force and the creation of the U.S. Space Force. Now less than a decade after the creation of the latter, Washington is abuzz with serious discussions about spinning off yet another military branch — this time a U.S. Cyber Force. The debates about an independent air force went on for more than two decades, and people talked about the merits of a separate space force for nearly as long. Calls for a cyber force may not have gone on for quite so long, but neither are they entirely new, having mirrored somewhat the establishment and evolution of the U.S. Cyber Command in 2010, aspects of the 2020 Cyberspace Solarium Commission, and ongoing parallel debate over a space force. In 2025, however, the topic is back in a big way with the publication of a new report presenting a blueprint for how to implement a cyber force, and the establishment of a new Commission on Cyber Force Generation.
These developments are prompting curiosity and questions from many quarters. One big question is why now, and why is the prospect being treated as an inevitability rather than a potentiality? In his first term, President Trump elevated the status of USCYBERCOM, and in his second term, the general tenor around boosting U.S. cyber capabilities is more assertive than it was under President Biden. Proponents of a cyber force have stated it is possible that the White House may call for its creation imminently, although there is not much public evidence of this likelihood. What we do know is that the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) directed the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) to conduct an evaluation of “alternative organizational models for the cyber forces of the Armed Forces,” including the feasibility and advisability of creating a separate force in the Department of Defense for operations in the cyber domain. Beyond this, however, there are questions about why the establishment of the force is being taken as an inevitability.
A second question is what the force would do and how it would be resourced. As with any new defense policy decision, the potential benefits must be weighed against the very real resulting costs. One major problem with any new military branch is the inevitable silo effect created by a new bureaucracy. The Department of Defense is already plagued with excessive bureaucracy and all the attendant costs, red tape, and turf wars that result. The leaders of a new military service would work quickly to establish a unique institutional culture and identity. They would also likely prioritize their own institutional prerogatives, even though cyber operations are not an end unto themselves. Cyber operations only matter because they impact the rest of the military and national security more broadly.
This point can’t be made often enough, as the rationale for a new service devoted to cyber operations remains flimsy. Aviators in the years before 1947 at least had a theory that they could win wars independently of ground or naval operations if they could drop bombs on exactly the right targets. Even though World War II and every conflict that followed proved their theory invalid, enough people believed it to warrant the 1947 creation of the United States Air Force.
While no one is suggesting cyber operations can independently win wars, the role of cyber operations in conflict is growing, brought sharply into focus through the Russia-Ukraine war. Recent revelations about vulnerabilities in critical U.S. infrastructure and supply chains have contributed to a growing sense that the current system isn’t working, whether with respect to U.S. cyber defense and resilience, its information-sharing, or domestic coordination, and that sophisticated adversaries like China have the upper hand. Yet, these are not weaknesses that a military cyber force would necessarily address; they require coordination between state and federal governments and enhanced public-private cooperation.
This leads to a third question: How would the Cyber Force interact with other services and their existing cyber capabilities, including USCYBERCOM?
Current thinking on the Cyber Force makes a strong distinction between force generation and force employment, with an emphasis on gaps in the former. A recent report stressed that the current force generation model for cyberspace — recognized as a domain of warfare since 2004 — isn’t working. Currently, each of the services organizes, trains, and equips cyber forces and provides forces to the Cyber Mission Force, which is the so-called action arm of Cyber Command. But because none view cyberspace as its primary concern or responsibility, there are “extraordinary inconsistencies and shortfalls in proficiency and readiness and deep struggles to recruit and retain top cyber talent.”
If recruiting and training within the existing services are problems, there are ways to solve them that don’t involve creating a new service. Department of Defense officials can create a joint school with a common set of prerequisites and qualifications for prospective students. The U.S. military already has several joint training and education institutions. The Army’s Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma is a good example. Soldiers and Marines both attend the same school to learn the essentials of their occupation with occasional service-specific instruction. That model has worked for generations in several occupational specialties.
Time will tell — and presumably soon — if the current buzz transforms into concrete steps to establish a force or if it fizzles out again. If progress is made, then it will be critical to allow space to address some of the more fundamental questions raised here, and by others, about the real need for a new force versus finding other paths for cultivating expertise and improving U.S. cyber capabilities.
Three Questions We Should Ask About an Independent US Cyber Force
By Allison Pytlak • Dan Grazier
Emerging Technology
Recent efforts to progress thinking about how to operationalize a proposal to create an independent cyber force within the United States military are sparking a range of questions. These include questions about the necessity of such a force, what it would do, resourcing, and how it would interact with the cyber capabilities of other parts of the military. Proponents argue that amid a landscape of ever-increasing cyber threats from known U.S. adversaries, a focused force is necessary for the United States to keep up while others point to existing capabilities and structures as sufficient. Why now, and how, are among the questions examined in this commentary.
More than 72 years passed between the creation of the U.S. Air Force and the creation of the U.S. Space Force. Now less than a decade after the creation of the latter, Washington is abuzz with serious discussions about spinning off yet another military branch — this time a U.S. Cyber Force. The debates about an independent air force went on for more than two decades, and people talked about the merits of a separate space force for nearly as long. Calls for a cyber force may not have gone on for quite so long, but neither are they entirely new, having mirrored somewhat the establishment and evolution of the U.S. Cyber Command in 2010, aspects of the 2020 Cyberspace Solarium Commission, and ongoing parallel debate over a space force. In 2025, however, the topic is back in a big way with the publication of a new report presenting a blueprint for how to implement a cyber force, and the establishment of a new Commission on Cyber Force Generation.
These developments are prompting curiosity and questions from many quarters. One big question is why now, and why is the prospect being treated as an inevitability rather than a potentiality? In his first term, President Trump elevated the status of USCYBERCOM, and in his second term, the general tenor around boosting U.S. cyber capabilities is more assertive than it was under President Biden. Proponents of a cyber force have stated it is possible that the White House may call for its creation imminently, although there is not much public evidence of this likelihood. What we do know is that the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) directed the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) to conduct an evaluation of “alternative organizational models for the cyber forces of the Armed Forces,” including the feasibility and advisability of creating a separate force in the Department of Defense for operations in the cyber domain. Beyond this, however, there are questions about why the establishment of the force is being taken as an inevitability.
A second question is what the force would do and how it would be resourced. As with any new defense policy decision, the potential benefits must be weighed against the very real resulting costs. One major problem with any new military branch is the inevitable silo effect created by a new bureaucracy. The Department of Defense is already plagued with excessive bureaucracy and all the attendant costs, red tape, and turf wars that result. The leaders of a new military service would work quickly to establish a unique institutional culture and identity. They would also likely prioritize their own institutional prerogatives, even though cyber operations are not an end unto themselves. Cyber operations only matter because they impact the rest of the military and national security more broadly.
This point can’t be made often enough, as the rationale for a new service devoted to cyber operations remains flimsy. Aviators in the years before 1947 at least had a theory that they could win wars independently of ground or naval operations if they could drop bombs on exactly the right targets. Even though World War II and every conflict that followed proved their theory invalid, enough people believed it to warrant the 1947 creation of the United States Air Force.
While no one is suggesting cyber operations can independently win wars, the role of cyber operations in conflict is growing, brought sharply into focus through the Russia-Ukraine war. Recent revelations about vulnerabilities in critical U.S. infrastructure and supply chains have contributed to a growing sense that the current system isn’t working, whether with respect to U.S. cyber defense and resilience, its information-sharing, or domestic coordination, and that sophisticated adversaries like China have the upper hand. Yet, these are not weaknesses that a military cyber force would necessarily address; they require coordination between state and federal governments and enhanced public-private cooperation.
This leads to a third question: How would the Cyber Force interact with other services and their existing cyber capabilities, including USCYBERCOM?
Current thinking on the Cyber Force makes a strong distinction between force generation and force employment, with an emphasis on gaps in the former. A recent report stressed that the current force generation model for cyberspace — recognized as a domain of warfare since 2004 — isn’t working. Currently, each of the services organizes, trains, and equips cyber forces and provides forces to the Cyber Mission Force, which is the so-called action arm of Cyber Command. But because none view cyberspace as its primary concern or responsibility, there are “extraordinary inconsistencies and shortfalls in proficiency and readiness and deep struggles to recruit and retain top cyber talent.”
If recruiting and training within the existing services are problems, there are ways to solve them that don’t involve creating a new service. Department of Defense officials can create a joint school with a common set of prerequisites and qualifications for prospective students. The U.S. military already has several joint training and education institutions. The Army’s Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma is a good example. Soldiers and Marines both attend the same school to learn the essentials of their occupation with occasional service-specific instruction. That model has worked for generations in several occupational specialties.
Time will tell — and presumably soon — if the current buzz transforms into concrete steps to establish a force or if it fizzles out again. If progress is made, then it will be critical to allow space to address some of the more fundamental questions raised here, and by others, about the real need for a new force versus finding other paths for cultivating expertise and improving U.S. cyber capabilities.
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