Editor’s Note: Since 2013, Stimson’s Japan Program has been collaborating with the Embassy of Japan in Washington, D.C. on a publication series Views from the Next Generation, a collection of essays by emerging Japanese policy experts on issues critical to the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance. With new leadership in both Washington and Tokyo, 2025 will be a pivotal year for the alliance as the two countries mark its 65th anniversary and the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II.
Between January and March 2024, Stimson recruited three next-generation experts to contribute commentaries on key issues for the alliance’s long-term health: the role of the U.S.-Japan alliance in a global context, U.S. congressional perspectives on Japan and the U.S.-Japan relations, and ongoing bilateral consultation on the command and control (C2) structure and coordination between U.S. forces and the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF).
By Yuki Tatsumi, Senior Fellow and Director, Japan Program
The Problem
The U.S.-Japan security alliance has long been a cornerstone of both nations’ foreign policies, serving as a key mechanism for ensuring regional stability. However, recent public opinion polls in both countries suggest a growing divergence in perceptions regarding the alliance’s role in the region.
A recent poll conducted by the Japanese Cabinet Office found that 95% of Japanese respondents believe that strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance is crucial for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. In contrast, a survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs revealed that 43% of Americans believe the United States should “stay out” of world affairs—one of the highest levels recorded in the past 30 years.
This perception gap between the two nations has widened over time. While Japanese public support for the alliance has remained consistently above 90% for over a decade, the percentage of Americans favoring global disengagement has surged from 29% in 2018 to 43% today. This inward-looking trend among Americans is increasingly reflected in government policy decisions. In his recent address to Congress, President Donald Trump devoted little time to foreign policy, with no mention of Asian diplomacy. Although he has repeatedly expressed his intent to confront China through tariffs, he has yet to provide a comprehensive strategy for addressing structural security concerns.
Meanwhile, there are signs of a shift in the U.S. Congress’s stance on China. In the past, China policy was one of the rare areas where there was bipartisan agreement, but differences of opinion have surfaced and are becoming more pronounced, particularly within the Republican Party, which currently controls both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Some argue that the U.S.-Japan alliance should be strengthened in order to deter China, while others are more pragmatic and skeptical of the United States’ current capabilities to deter China, arguing that the U.S. alliance in Europe should be reviewed or even cut and that vast resources should be concentrated in the Indo-Pacific region. The latter group aligns with broader arguments for limiting U.S. diplomatic involvement and “America First” rhetoric.
With U.S. policy toward China still lacking a clear direction, President Trump fueled further uncertainty to regional stability by signing an executive order to freeze all the U.S. foreign aid administered by U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as well as a full review of all foreign aid programs. On March 10, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced that 83% of the foreign aid programs have been terminated and that the remaining programs would be transferred under the State Department—thereby eliminating USAID—although this decision has been challenged by a U.S. District Court judge. This marks a significant reduction in U.S. global engagement. Japan is concerned that the reduction of American involvement in the region risks creating a vacuum, which China may quickly exploit to expand its strategic influence in the Indo-Pacific.
Essential Context
At a time when U.S. foreign policy seems more unpredictable than ever, congressional diplomacy has taken on a new level of importance in reassuring America’s allies, including Japan. Unlike the executive branch, where foreign policy can change drastically from one administration to the next, Congress offers a degree of stability. The senior members of the Congressional Foreign Policy Committees and Congressional Armed Services Committees often have over a decade of experience in shaping global policy, giving them the institutional knowledge to provide consistency in U.S. international engagement. By strengthening legislative relationships with key allies, Congress can act as a stabilizing force in uncertain times, ensuring that America’s commitments remain strong.
Fortunately, the U.S.-Japan legislative relationship has a strong foundation. Bilateral exchanges between Japanese and American lawmakers began in 1968 and have continued for over five decades, making these exchanges some of the longest-standing diplomatic engagements between the two countries. Aside from a brief pause during the COVID-19 pandemic, these exchanges have remained active, with more than 350 bipartisan delegations visiting Japan to date.
Key participants in this longstanding initiative include Senator Bill Hagerty (R-TN), former U.S. Ambassador to Japan during the first Trump administration; Senator Dan Sullivan (R-AK), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Readiness in the Armed Services Committee; Representative Diana DeGette (D-CO), a member of the Congressional Study Group on Japan (CSGJ); and Representative Ami Bera (D-CA), ranking member of the East Asia and Pacific Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Relations.
These visits are essential for advancing dialogue on issues such as security, supply chain stability, and intelligence-sharing, and serve to reinforce diplomatic continuity across changing administrations. By engaging with Japanese lawmakers and bureaucrats who directly navigate regional challenges, bipartisan congressional delegations gain valuable firsthand insights that help shape U.S. policymaking. The extended nature of these trips fosters closer engagement among lawmakers, strengthening bipartisan cooperation in ways that Washington’s political climate often does not allow.
The scope of cross-cultural interaction is expanding through exchange programs for members of Congress and congressional senior staff carried out by organizations such as the Association of Former Members of Congress (FMC), the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE), and the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation. In recent years, inter-parliamentary engagement has become increasingly active, extending beyond the Japan-U.S. relationship to include broader regional cooperation.
Congressional engagement is particularly well-positioned, for instance, to strengthen the crucial United States-Japan- South Korea trilateral summit, launched in 2023, especially as it faces uncertainty with the departure of all three participating state leaders. Bipartisan delegations of U.S. legislators to the region can help the trilateral dialogue continue. One of the flagship programs run by the Japan-United States Friendship Commission provides a prime example of effective legislative diplomacy. It brings legislators from Japan, the United States, and South Korea together twice a year, and serves as an important forum for trilateral dialogue. Increasing the number of such forums will help the United States strengthen its latticelike network of Indo-Pacific alliances, which is key to closing the soft power gap exacerbated by the closure of USAID.
There are many other recent examples of Congressional engagement in U.S.-led multilateral diplomacy. Last year, for example, a Congressional caucus on the Quad was established with bipartisan participation from both the Senate and House of Representatives. Additionally, the House of Representatives passed the Strengthening the Quad Act, a bill aimed at promoting greater human exchange among the Quad nations—the United States, India, Australia, and Japan—by facilitating congressional visits and discussions on critical issues such as economic cooperation and geopolitical risks. To ensure continuity in regional diplomacy, legislative engagement has become increasingly significant. Congressional backing for such mini-lateral frameworks reinforces the United States’ commitment to regional stability.
Challenges
The new U.S. administration is undertaking a fundamental reassessment of its international engagement. During a congressional hearing in January, Secretary of State Marco Rubio articulated this shift, reaffirming the administration’s commitment to an “America First” policy. “[U]ltimately, under President Trump, the top priority of the United States Department of State will be the United States,” he stated. “American taxpayer dollars should only be spent to advance U.S. interests, and every penny should be scrutinized to ensure its sincerity and effectiveness.”
This perspective signals a departure from the post-war consensus that alliances serve as strategic assets for the United States. Instead, there is an increasing perception that such partnerships place undue financial and security burdens on the United States—a viewpoint frequently expressed by President Trump.
Furthering this retrenchment, the State Department placed a temporary freeze on the funding for key international exchange programs, including the Fulbright Program, which was established by Senator James William Fulbright in 1946 to foster global academic collaboration and diplomacy. It has facilitated the academic exchange of 6,700 Japanese students to the United States, including four Nobel laureates and four former Japanese prime ministers. This decision directly affects over 12,500 American students, cutting off a historically valuable investment in national security, economic prosperity, and future U.S. leadership.
Congress holds immense power—the power of the purse, the power to conduct oversight, and the power to influence foreign policy. When used effectively, these tools ensure that U.S. commitments remain steady and strategic and allow Congress to check hasty executive actions.
But there is a challenge: Congress can only act when bipartisan consensus exists on key priorities, including the Indo-Pacific region. That consensus does not just appear; it must be cultivated. This is why Japan’s engagement with legislators from both parties is more important than ever. Strengthening ties with Congress is critical to ensuring that the United States and Japan have strategic alignment.
One effective strategy has been direct appeals from Japanese leadership. In 2015, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe addressed Congress, emphasizing the need to uphold a rules-based maritime order. In 2024, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida reaffirmed Japan’s commitment to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, pledging to share more of the regional security burden with the United States. the United States.
While these high-profile speeches are impactful, they must be complemented by sustained engagement to ensure a long-term impact. Existing exchange frameworks, such as those led by the FMC, JCIE, and the Mansfield Foundation, play a critical role in fostering dialogue. However, some congressional meetings and visits to Japan risk becoming one-off events that fail to translate into lasting engagement. Further strengthening and improvement is urgently needed.
Policy Recommendations
Institutionalizing U.S.-Japan Legislative Engagement for Policy Stability:
To reinforce long-term U.S.-Japan legislative cooperation, the U.S. Congress should leverage the legislative authority to institutionalize the existing exchange program, ensuring a structured, regular dialogue between lawmakers. By transitioning from informal, ad-hoc visits to a formalized system, this initiative will guarantee sustained engagement through political transitions and shifting administrations.
Creating a U.S.-Japan Congressional Working Group for Strategic Dialogue:
To further strengthen U.S.-Japan relations, a new U.S.-Japan Congressional Working Group should be established, building on the foundation of existing initiatives such as the Congressional Study Group on Japan. The CSGJ has successfully fostered bipartisan engagement among senior members from both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. This new working group would enhance collaboration by bringing together key members of foreign affairs and military committees from both countries. It would focus on strategic dialogue regarding regional security challenges, including a potential Taiwan contingency, the North Korean nuclear threat, and a unified policy approach toward China. This would ensure a common understanding of each side’s foreign policy direction.
Enhancing Bipartisan Cooperation and Foreign Policy Continuity:
Congress should leverage its budget authority to not only sustain but also expand bipartisan Congressional Delegations (CODELs) and Staff Delegations (STAFFDELs) in response to rising geopolitical challenges. Enhancing direct engagement between U.S. lawmakers and key allies such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia is key to filling the soft power vacuum created by the closure of the U.S. government’s foreign aid projects. Beyond diplomatic benefits, bipartisan delegations provide lawmakers with a shared understanding of regional security dynamics, fostering cross-party cooperation that is essential for overcoming political divisions.
