Editor’s Note: Stimson’s Myanmar Project seeks a variety of analytical perspectives on issues relating to Myanmar’s civil war, domestic politics, foreign relations, and other topics. Wai Yan Phyo Naing, PhD, serves as a Consultant at the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation (CPR) and is a specialist researcher in Myanmar Studies. His expertise encompasses Myanmar’s relations with Russia, China, and Thailand, as well as the experiences of Myanmar migrants in Thailand.
By Pamela Kennedy, Deputy Director, East Asia Program
Just three weeks after attending China’s Victory Day ceremony, Myanmar’s acting president Min Aung Hlaing traveled to Russia on September 24 to attend the 2025 World Atomic Week Forum. This was his seventh visit to Russia since the 2021 coup and his second major diplomatic engagement in September 2025. While earlier trips produced few concrete results, they have consistently been used to signal the regime’s political direction and foreign alignment. The March visit to Belarus, for example, saw the announcement of the 2025 election date. The timing of this latest trip to Russia — three months before the polls — along with the discussions during the visit on nuclear, space, and port development cooperation all underscore that the current regime led by Min Aung Hlaing seeks to implement scientific modernization projects by collaborating with Russia primarily to bolster the regime’s international image and legitimacy and counteract international isolation and Chinese influence after the coup.
Min Aung Hlaing’s strategically timed visit to Russia and discussions on key projects serve as a demonstration to both domestic and international audiences of Myanmar’s commitment to its partnership with Russia. These actions, while grounded in substantive cooperation, primarily serve as a symbolic alignment and legitimization of the regime, signaling autonomy from other major powers, notably China, regardless of the tangible outcomes of these initiatives.
Strategic and Technical Cooperation
Nuclear cooperation was the central theme of the visit. Since the coup, Min Aung Hlaing has used engagement with Russia to project an image of scientific progress and modernization. In 2023, the State Administration Council (SAC) of Myanmar agreed with Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation (ROSATOM) to establish a “Nuclear Technology and Information Center” in Yangon. Despite repeated references to the plan, implementation has stalled due to the SAC’s unresolved payment and investment arrangements. The intended audiences include Myanmar’s domestic population, and the plan aims to reassure both elites and the public, as well as global actors, especially potential allies and investors. The nuclear cooperation plan’s stalling stems chiefly from the junta’s financial constraints, which are due to sanctions, investment uncertainty, and internal conflict, all of which undermine the regime’s capacity to enact high-profile projects and reveal the project’s emphasis on image-building to gain legitimacy rather than on making substantive technological progress.
The proposed project involves a 110MW small modular reactor (SMR) consisting of two 55MW units produced by ROSATOM. While the site has not been confirmed, observers widely believe it will be located in the Mandalay region, likely in Thabeikkyin or Meiktila. The inclusion of Mandalay’s chief minister in the delegation to the Atomic Forum reinforced this view. The potential reactor site in Mandalay embodies the intersection of geostrategy, security, and political considerations as Mandalay has pragmatic advantages such as central connectivity to Naypyidaw, resource availability, and enhanced facility security. The decision also reflects the regime’s efforts to distribute economic growth and more visibly reward political loyalty within the ruling military regime, rather than maximizing benefit to traditional urban centers like Yangon. Earlier speculation centered on the Bago region after its chief minister joined the March 2025 Moscow delegation that signed the initial SMR agreement, which became infamous as a target of scrutiny from local ethnic armed groups such as the Karen National Union (KNU).
Across Southeast Asia, SMRs are emerging as a low-carbon energy alternative. For the SAC, the project serves as both an energy initiative and a political signal of modernization. While the military regime expresses interest in renewable energy, such as solar panels, its primary focus has been on nuclear power since 2002, which is seen as a vehicle for both energy security and regional prestige. Nuclear projects, such as SMR initiatives, provide both the regime and Min Aung Hlaing himself with an opportunity to position junta-led Myanmar as a technologically advanced actor and enhance their own influence in the region. This strategic orientation suggests that nuclear energy offers greater political capital and status for the junta than renewables. Yet Myanmar’s weak technical capacity, crushing fiscal strain, and escalating conflict make implementation highly improbable. Myanmar’s SMR project faces severe obstacles due to ongoing domestic issues, i.e., armed conflicts, political instability, and disputes with local communities and EAOs, which expose the infrastructure to security threats and disrupt implementation. At the same time, local technical capacity remains inadequate and Russia’s involvement is still limited to supplying technology without significant investment or on-the-ground support, with limited local resources to fill in the gaps. As a result, despite the symbolic value of the Russian SMR project for the junta, the project’s successful execution remains highly unlikely.
Space Cooperation
Space cooperation also played a key role in Min Aung Hlaing’s discussions in Russia. Earlier this year, the military regime established a national space agency as part of its science and technology strategy. While this is not Myanmar’s first engagement with space-related efforts, it is the most prominently organized initiative under the military regime. Previously, Myanmar participated in regional space discussions and activities, primarily through ASEAN forums, showing interest in basic satellite communications such as leasing transponders for telecommunications and TV particularly during the NLD’s administration in collaboration with Japan. The creation of the national space agency by the SAC marks a significant advancement, signaling a shift of space assets from civilian uses to military purposes such as reconnaissance and secure data transmission, thereby directly enhancing the military’s capabilities. Therefore, most of the agency’s CEOs and vice-CEOs are drawn from Min Aung Hlaing’s inner military circle. Another close aide of Min Aung Hlaing who graduated from a Russian university became the acting director-general, reflecting Min Aung Hlaing’s tendency to use strategic sectors to consolidate control. This ensures that the strategic advantages and resources of the space program remain tightly under the control of the head of state, reducing the risk of dissent or independent centers of power.
In Moscow, Min Aung Hlaing discussed satellite development, remote sensing, and data-sharing with Russian officials. These talks followed earlier meetings with Chinese officials, including representatives from the Harbin Institute of Technology and Harbin Electric Corporation, which explored comparable forms of training and cooperation. Despite these announcements, “visits and discussions,” the military’s progress in the domain of space cooperation has been minimal. Financial constraints and technology transfer conditions remain key barriers. Still, the creation of the agency and engagement with both Russia and China highlight the regime’s attempt to present itself as technologically advanced and internationally relevant, additionally engaging multiple powers to avoid becoming overly dependent on one.
Strategic Port Development
The confirmation of Russian investment in the Dawei Deep Sea-port and special economic zone was the most concrete outcome of the visit. The project is located in the southern part of Myanmar and covers 196 square kilometers in the Andaman Sea. It lies significantly southeast of Kyaukphyu, another major deep-sea port in collaboration with China that is situated on the Bay of Bengal in Rakhine State in western Myanmar. While Kyaukphyu faces west towards India and the broader Indian Ocean, Dawei is positioned farther southeast, closer to the Thai border, providing access to the Andaman Sea and connections with mainland Southeast Asia.
However, while it has been long discussed but never formalized, Dawei is now described as Russia’s first potential port access point. This move aims to strengthen Russia’s position in regional trade and energy routes in Southeast Asia; Min Aung Hlaing and President Vladimir Putin emphasized the project’s strategic importance as a hub for trade, logistics, and energy cooperation.
Meanwhile, China has expressed interest in partnering with Thailand to restart the Kra Canal Project in southern Thailand, south of the Dawei project. As a result, Russian investment has not notably increased and has even paused after Russian officials reviewed the project’s economic aspects. This situation suggests that Russia may have to rethink or put its investments on hold due to China’s decision to launch a similar project in the region. Therefore, considering concurrent port projects by India, China, and Thailand in the wider region, it remains essential for the junta to include multilateral engagement and cooperation in its regional strategies.
Although still in its early planning stages, Dawei holds clear geopolitical significance. For Russia, it offers access to the Indian Ocean and a potential corridor to the Pacific. For Myanmar, it signifies symbolic recognition of its geo-strategic position in the region and may attract investment amid Western sanctions. Discussions in Moscow reportedly centered on construction and financing, with Russian state-linked firms expected to lead early development.
If realized, Dawei would entail a limited but symbolically meaningful expansion of Russia’s regional influence given its location, allowing Myanmar’s junta to balance strategic relations with Russia and China. By leveraging Moscow’s involvement, the junta aims to lessen dependence on Beijing while securing concessions from both major powers.
Paper Partnerships, Unlikely Reality
Since it seized power in 2021, Myanmar’s military regime has sought reduced interference, economic incentives, and security assurance from China, and diplomatic support, military equipment, and technology transfers from Russia. Due to its dependency on both Moscow and Beijing, Naypyidaw’s leverage is limited, allowing for only marginal gains rather than broad strategic autonomy. China’s economic strength ensures it can pressure Myanmar to safeguard its interests and projects, while Russia is driven largely by its goals for arms sales and regional influence, not by a desire to challenge China. In this case, strategically, the military regime may aim to diversify partnerships to maximize external support and buffer against Western sanctions while hedging its position between Russia and China.
Min Aung Hlaing’s trip to Moscow matters for two primary reasons. First, it is a crucial diplomatic maneuver demonstrating Min Aung Hlaing’s continued reliance on Russia to project an image of legitimacy and modernization ahead of the 2025 election. Second, it signals Moscow’s calculated willingness to retain a modest foothold in Myanmar despite its global isolation, providing both economic benefits and long-term geopolitical leverage, while also demonstrating that Russia can sustain external partnerships. Moscow’s willingness to invest, even in slow-moving areas, and its pursuit of diplomatic solidarity with Myanmar reflect its broader policy of balancing Western influence and reinforcing its image as a resilient, globally relevant actor despite its weak economy and few existing interests in Southeast Asia.
None of these strategic projects, however, can proceed without tacit Chinese approval. Beijing is the undisputed regional leader in SMR technology, leads regional satellite programs, and remains the principal investor in Myanmar’s infrastructure through projects such as Kyaukphyu. It is highly unlikely to support competing Russian ventures that would weaken its influence. However, China can maintain ultimate leverage if Myanmar-Russia engagement does not challenge Beijing’s core interests or regional leadership. The involvement of Moscow could even benefit China by preventing Myanmar’s total dependence and diffusing international attention.
Conclusion
As a result of these realities, Min Aung Hlaing’s outreach to Moscow seems more like a balancing act between China and Western sanctions than a genuine strategic shift, with the aim to utilize limited Russian cooperation for diplomatic and geopolitical gains ahead of the 2025 general elections while still adding some amount of strategic buffer against China. This highlights the importance of monitoring regional powers’ influence in Myanmar, recognizing that the junta’s balancing act aims to maximize external support while maintaining flexibility amid sanctions and internal instability.
The war in Ukraine constrains Russia’s resources, and Myanmar’s economy is too fragile to sustain major infrastructure projects. Despite the largely symbolic importance of Min Aung Hlaing’s Russia visit, the outcomes remain aspirational. Russia’s ongoing supply of weapons and drones is central to the junta’s battlefield viability and political survival, underpinning all other aspects of Naypyidaw-Moscow ties. This arms partnership is foundational, providing Moscow with leverage and strategic presence in Southeast Asia, while collaboration in prestigious sectors such as nuclear and space boosts the junta’s legitimacy and port cooperation may strengthen economic links over time. This partnership enables the military regime to sustain its fight against resistance forces and withstand international isolation in the near-term. Symbolic projects like nuclear cooperation and the Dawei deep-sea port are, therefore, layered atop this complex security relationship, signaling junta-led Myanmar’s modernization and strategic autonomy to other countries but also highlighting their reliance on continued Russian support and Chinese acquiescence.
Myanmar’s Russian outreach is primarily a survival strategy driven by insecurity, sanctions, and isolation, with defense ties enabling broader, more ambitious diplomatic and infrastructure initiatives. As the election approaches, the trip underscores both the regime’s search for legitimacy abroad and the limits of its foreign policy, which is ambitious in intent but weak in capacity. Therefore, external actors should focus on the implications of these symbolic alignments and their potential to shape Myanmar’s post-election foreign policy trajectory.
About the Author
Wai Yan Phyo Naing, PhD, serves as a Consultant at the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation (CPR) and is a specialist researcher in Myanmar Studies. His expertise encompasses Myanmar’s relations with Russia, China, and Thailand, as well as the experiences of Myanmar migrants in Thailand. With an academic background in History and International Relations, and extensive experience in policy analysis, he investigates strategic developments and cooperative frameworks relating to Myanmar and its role within the Asia-Pacific region. He holds a PhD in History and a Master’s degree in Socioeconomic and Political Development of Modern Asia from the National Research University—Higher School of Economics, Moscow.
Symbolic Alignment: Why the Myanmar Junta Is Expanding Its Engagement with Russia
By Wai Yan Phyo Naing
Southeast Asia
With nuclear, space, and port cooperation featuring in Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to Russia in September 2025, it could seem that Myanmar’s military regime is shifting toward a relationship with Russia that is of greater strategic significance. Yet substantial barriers remain for transforming these discussions into reality, making possible cooperation more symbolic in nature as the junta attempts to signal its international relevance and autonomy from great powers. China’s dominant position and leverage in the region further serve to complicate the possibility of a genuine strategic shift for the military regime.
Editor’s Note: Stimson’s Myanmar Project seeks a variety of analytical perspectives on issues relating to Myanmar’s civil war, domestic politics, foreign relations, and other topics. Wai Yan Phyo Naing, PhD, serves as a Consultant at the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation (CPR) and is a specialist researcher in Myanmar Studies. His expertise encompasses Myanmar’s relations with Russia, China, and Thailand, as well as the experiences of Myanmar migrants in Thailand.
By Pamela Kennedy, Deputy Director, East Asia Program
Just three weeks after attending China’s Victory Day ceremony, Myanmar’s acting president Min Aung Hlaing traveled to Russia on September 24 to attend the 2025 World Atomic Week Forum. This was his seventh visit to Russia since the 2021 coup and his second major diplomatic engagement in September 2025. While earlier trips produced few concrete results, they have consistently been used to signal the regime’s political direction and foreign alignment. The March visit to Belarus, for example, saw the announcement of the 2025 election date. The timing of this latest trip to Russia — three months before the polls — along with the discussions during the visit on nuclear, space, and port development cooperation all underscore that the current regime led by Min Aung Hlaing seeks to implement scientific modernization projects by collaborating with Russia primarily to bolster the regime’s international image and legitimacy and counteract international isolation and Chinese influence after the coup.
Min Aung Hlaing’s strategically timed visit to Russia and discussions on key projects serve as a demonstration to both domestic and international audiences of Myanmar’s commitment to its partnership with Russia. These actions, while grounded in substantive cooperation, primarily serve as a symbolic alignment and legitimization of the regime, signaling autonomy from other major powers, notably China, regardless of the tangible outcomes of these initiatives.
Strategic and Technical Cooperation
Nuclear cooperation was the central theme of the visit. Since the coup, Min Aung Hlaing has used engagement with Russia to project an image of scientific progress and modernization. In 2023, the State Administration Council (SAC) of Myanmar agreed with Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation (ROSATOM) to establish a “Nuclear Technology and Information Center” in Yangon. Despite repeated references to the plan, implementation has stalled due to the SAC’s unresolved payment and investment arrangements. The intended audiences include Myanmar’s domestic population, and the plan aims to reassure both elites and the public, as well as global actors, especially potential allies and investors. The nuclear cooperation plan’s stalling stems chiefly from the junta’s financial constraints, which are due to sanctions, investment uncertainty, and internal conflict, all of which undermine the regime’s capacity to enact high-profile projects and reveal the project’s emphasis on image-building to gain legitimacy rather than on making substantive technological progress.
The proposed project involves a 110MW small modular reactor (SMR) consisting of two 55MW units produced by ROSATOM. While the site has not been confirmed, observers widely believe it will be located in the Mandalay region, likely in Thabeikkyin or Meiktila. The inclusion of Mandalay’s chief minister in the delegation to the Atomic Forum reinforced this view. The potential reactor site in Mandalay embodies the intersection of geostrategy, security, and political considerations as Mandalay has pragmatic advantages such as central connectivity to Naypyidaw, resource availability, and enhanced facility security. The decision also reflects the regime’s efforts to distribute economic growth and more visibly reward political loyalty within the ruling military regime, rather than maximizing benefit to traditional urban centers like Yangon. Earlier speculation centered on the Bago region after its chief minister joined the March 2025 Moscow delegation that signed the initial SMR agreement, which became infamous as a target of scrutiny from local ethnic armed groups such as the Karen National Union (KNU).
Across Southeast Asia, SMRs are emerging as a low-carbon energy alternative. For the SAC, the project serves as both an energy initiative and a political signal of modernization. While the military regime expresses interest in renewable energy, such as solar panels, its primary focus has been on nuclear power since 2002, which is seen as a vehicle for both energy security and regional prestige. Nuclear projects, such as SMR initiatives, provide both the regime and Min Aung Hlaing himself with an opportunity to position junta-led Myanmar as a technologically advanced actor and enhance their own influence in the region. This strategic orientation suggests that nuclear energy offers greater political capital and status for the junta than renewables. Yet Myanmar’s weak technical capacity, crushing fiscal strain, and escalating conflict make implementation highly improbable. Myanmar’s SMR project faces severe obstacles due to ongoing domestic issues, i.e., armed conflicts, political instability, and disputes with local communities and EAOs, which expose the infrastructure to security threats and disrupt implementation. At the same time, local technical capacity remains inadequate and Russia’s involvement is still limited to supplying technology without significant investment or on-the-ground support, with limited local resources to fill in the gaps. As a result, despite the symbolic value of the Russian SMR project for the junta, the project’s successful execution remains highly unlikely.
Space Cooperation
Space cooperation also played a key role in Min Aung Hlaing’s discussions in Russia. Earlier this year, the military regime established a national space agency as part of its science and technology strategy. While this is not Myanmar’s first engagement with space-related efforts, it is the most prominently organized initiative under the military regime. Previously, Myanmar participated in regional space discussions and activities, primarily through ASEAN forums, showing interest in basic satellite communications such as leasing transponders for telecommunications and TV particularly during the NLD’s administration in collaboration with Japan. The creation of the national space agency by the SAC marks a significant advancement, signaling a shift of space assets from civilian uses to military purposes such as reconnaissance and secure data transmission, thereby directly enhancing the military’s capabilities. Therefore, most of the agency’s CEOs and vice-CEOs are drawn from Min Aung Hlaing’s inner military circle. Another close aide of Min Aung Hlaing who graduated from a Russian university became the acting director-general, reflecting Min Aung Hlaing’s tendency to use strategic sectors to consolidate control. This ensures that the strategic advantages and resources of the space program remain tightly under the control of the head of state, reducing the risk of dissent or independent centers of power.
In Moscow, Min Aung Hlaing discussed satellite development, remote sensing, and data-sharing with Russian officials. These talks followed earlier meetings with Chinese officials, including representatives from the Harbin Institute of Technology and Harbin Electric Corporation, which explored comparable forms of training and cooperation. Despite these announcements, “visits and discussions,” the military’s progress in the domain of space cooperation has been minimal. Financial constraints and technology transfer conditions remain key barriers. Still, the creation of the agency and engagement with both Russia and China highlight the regime’s attempt to present itself as technologically advanced and internationally relevant, additionally engaging multiple powers to avoid becoming overly dependent on one.
Strategic Port Development
The confirmation of Russian investment in the Dawei Deep Sea-port and special economic zone was the most concrete outcome of the visit. The project is located in the southern part of Myanmar and covers 196 square kilometers in the Andaman Sea. It lies significantly southeast of Kyaukphyu, another major deep-sea port in collaboration with China that is situated on the Bay of Bengal in Rakhine State in western Myanmar. While Kyaukphyu faces west towards India and the broader Indian Ocean, Dawei is positioned farther southeast, closer to the Thai border, providing access to the Andaman Sea and connections with mainland Southeast Asia.
However, while it has been long discussed but never formalized, Dawei is now described as Russia’s first potential port access point. This move aims to strengthen Russia’s position in regional trade and energy routes in Southeast Asia; Min Aung Hlaing and President Vladimir Putin emphasized the project’s strategic importance as a hub for trade, logistics, and energy cooperation.
Meanwhile, China has expressed interest in partnering with Thailand to restart the Kra Canal Project in southern Thailand, south of the Dawei project. As a result, Russian investment has not notably increased and has even paused after Russian officials reviewed the project’s economic aspects. This situation suggests that Russia may have to rethink or put its investments on hold due to China’s decision to launch a similar project in the region. Therefore, considering concurrent port projects by India, China, and Thailand in the wider region, it remains essential for the junta to include multilateral engagement and cooperation in its regional strategies.
Although still in its early planning stages, Dawei holds clear geopolitical significance. For Russia, it offers access to the Indian Ocean and a potential corridor to the Pacific. For Myanmar, it signifies symbolic recognition of its geo-strategic position in the region and may attract investment amid Western sanctions. Discussions in Moscow reportedly centered on construction and financing, with Russian state-linked firms expected to lead early development.
If realized, Dawei would entail a limited but symbolically meaningful expansion of Russia’s regional influence given its location, allowing Myanmar’s junta to balance strategic relations with Russia and China. By leveraging Moscow’s involvement, the junta aims to lessen dependence on Beijing while securing concessions from both major powers.
Paper Partnerships, Unlikely Reality
Since it seized power in 2021, Myanmar’s military regime has sought reduced interference, economic incentives, and security assurance from China, and diplomatic support, military equipment, and technology transfers from Russia. Due to its dependency on both Moscow and Beijing, Naypyidaw’s leverage is limited, allowing for only marginal gains rather than broad strategic autonomy. China’s economic strength ensures it can pressure Myanmar to safeguard its interests and projects, while Russia is driven largely by its goals for arms sales and regional influence, not by a desire to challenge China. In this case, strategically, the military regime may aim to diversify partnerships to maximize external support and buffer against Western sanctions while hedging its position between Russia and China.
Min Aung Hlaing’s trip to Moscow matters for two primary reasons. First, it is a crucial diplomatic maneuver demonstrating Min Aung Hlaing’s continued reliance on Russia to project an image of legitimacy and modernization ahead of the 2025 election. Second, it signals Moscow’s calculated willingness to retain a modest foothold in Myanmar despite its global isolation, providing both economic benefits and long-term geopolitical leverage, while also demonstrating that Russia can sustain external partnerships. Moscow’s willingness to invest, even in slow-moving areas, and its pursuit of diplomatic solidarity with Myanmar reflect its broader policy of balancing Western influence and reinforcing its image as a resilient, globally relevant actor despite its weak economy and few existing interests in Southeast Asia.
None of these strategic projects, however, can proceed without tacit Chinese approval. Beijing is the undisputed regional leader in SMR technology, leads regional satellite programs, and remains the principal investor in Myanmar’s infrastructure through projects such as Kyaukphyu. It is highly unlikely to support competing Russian ventures that would weaken its influence. However, China can maintain ultimate leverage if Myanmar-Russia engagement does not challenge Beijing’s core interests or regional leadership. The involvement of Moscow could even benefit China by preventing Myanmar’s total dependence and diffusing international attention.
Conclusion
As a result of these realities, Min Aung Hlaing’s outreach to Moscow seems more like a balancing act between China and Western sanctions than a genuine strategic shift, with the aim to utilize limited Russian cooperation for diplomatic and geopolitical gains ahead of the 2025 general elections while still adding some amount of strategic buffer against China. This highlights the importance of monitoring regional powers’ influence in Myanmar, recognizing that the junta’s balancing act aims to maximize external support while maintaining flexibility amid sanctions and internal instability.
The war in Ukraine constrains Russia’s resources, and Myanmar’s economy is too fragile to sustain major infrastructure projects. Despite the largely symbolic importance of Min Aung Hlaing’s Russia visit, the outcomes remain aspirational. Russia’s ongoing supply of weapons and drones is central to the junta’s battlefield viability and political survival, underpinning all other aspects of Naypyidaw-Moscow ties. This arms partnership is foundational, providing Moscow with leverage and strategic presence in Southeast Asia, while collaboration in prestigious sectors such as nuclear and space boosts the junta’s legitimacy and port cooperation may strengthen economic links over time. This partnership enables the military regime to sustain its fight against resistance forces and withstand international isolation in the near-term. Symbolic projects like nuclear cooperation and the Dawei deep-sea port are, therefore, layered atop this complex security relationship, signaling junta-led Myanmar’s modernization and strategic autonomy to other countries but also highlighting their reliance on continued Russian support and Chinese acquiescence.
Myanmar’s Russian outreach is primarily a survival strategy driven by insecurity, sanctions, and isolation, with defense ties enabling broader, more ambitious diplomatic and infrastructure initiatives. As the election approaches, the trip underscores both the regime’s search for legitimacy abroad and the limits of its foreign policy, which is ambitious in intent but weak in capacity. Therefore, external actors should focus on the implications of these symbolic alignments and their potential to shape Myanmar’s post-election foreign policy trajectory.
About the Author
Wai Yan Phyo Naing, PhD, serves as a Consultant at the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation (CPR) and is a specialist researcher in Myanmar Studies. His expertise encompasses Myanmar’s relations with Russia, China, and Thailand, as well as the experiences of Myanmar migrants in Thailand. With an academic background in History and International Relations, and extensive experience in policy analysis, he investigates strategic developments and cooperative frameworks relating to Myanmar and its role within the Asia-Pacific region. He holds a PhD in History and a Master’s degree in Socioeconomic and Political Development of Modern Asia from the National Research University—Higher School of Economics, Moscow.
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